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Summary 
The management literature has claimed that the complexity of business contexts has made 
firms confront hypercompetitive (D'Aveni, 1994) or high-velocity environments (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1997). Behind such claims lies a new interest in the dynamics of adaptation and in 
particular in a firm's flexibility as a way of adjusting under conditions of uncertainty (Volberda, 
1999). 
This study takes up the challenge of exploring the dynamics of organisational adaptation 
under the conditions of environmental volatility that characterised Argentina over the period 
1989-1999. The empirical focus of the thesis is the study of the determinants of organisational 
flexibility in four family-owned companies: two flexible and two less flexible from the edible oil 
industry (i. e., a deregulated industry) and pharmaceutical industry (i. e., an industry in the process 
of deregulation). 
By means of an innovative analysis (which includes longitudinal analysis, coding 
analysis, statistical analysis and the use of original display charts) we were able to show what 
determines whether an organisation is flexible. The findings of our case study were interrogated 
and interpreted by developing theoretical ideas from three areas of literature between which 
historically there has been no interface. These are the literatures on organisational flexibility, 
organisational innovativeness and institutional embeddedness. 
In our empirical results we identified five determinants of organisational flexibility as a 
set of organisational and managerial capabilities that enabled some firms to adapt quickly in a 
highly competitive environment (i. e., heterogeneity of the dominant coalition, centralisation and 
formalisation of decision-making, low macroculture embeddedness, environmental scanning, and 
a strong organisational identity). The study also sheds light on the process of transformation and 
adaptation of family firms - an area that has not yet been the subject of extensive empirical 
inquiry (Aronoff and Ward, 1997). 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
"In the old days in science, the universe wasfairly simple. Nearly every science museum 
has a huge, old model of the solar system in which all the movements of the planets are 
represented with clockwork gears. Then we realized that reality was much more complex. All 
motion was relative. Yhe universe is a system in dynamic motion andflux with all motion being 
determined by the forces of inertia, complex gravitational interactions of heavenly bodies and 
even unseen gaseous clouds, random collisions, millions of asteroids, and the overall movement 
ofgalaxies toward the outer boundaries ofthe universe. " (D'Aveni, 1994: xiii). 
D'Aveni (1994) goes on to draw an analogy between our increasing perception of the 
complexity of the universe and the complexity of the business world. Business has entered a new 
reality, one that is more complex and dynamic, in which timely adaptation is critical for a firm's 
survival. Since the 1990s the new business context has been characterised by macro- 
environmental changes, changes in the way firms are organised, and changes in management 
style. 
The macro-environmental changes affecting businesses have been shaped by an 
acceleration of change in the economic, social, technological and political worlds. March (1995) 
underlines four factors that have brought volatility and uncertainty into the environment in which 
firms operate. The factors are global linkages (i. e., the business networks that cause global 
interdependencies to multiply and national boundaries to fade), information technology (which 
affects the possibilities for coordinating and controlling organisations), knowledge-based 
competition (i. e., the use of knowledge as a primary source of competitive advantage), and 
political uncertainty (i. e., the loss of autonomy of the national state through a general loss of 
control over boundaries). 
All these factors have caused competition to intensify, product life cycles to shorten and 
technological innovation to increase. Hypercompetition, D'Aveni (1994) states, best describes 
the process by which the business environment accelerates. D'Aveni (1994) indicates that the 
choice is clear for managers: either to stand still and allow the constant change to wash over 
them, trying to resist the environmental changes, or to actively adapt to the environment and take 
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advantage of its opportunities. In a dynamic world, D'Aveni (1994: 356) points out, only 
dynamic firms and those that can adapt rapidly to bypercompetitive environments, will survive. 
Over the last decade, management literature has also heralded the importance of new 
forms of organising to confront uncertain and hypercompetitive environments. Theories 
regarding ideal types of organisation have proliferated in an attempt to find ways firms can adapt 
rapidly under high levels of competition. Goranson (1999: 65) suggests the concept of agile and 
virtual enterprise, understanding by virtual organisation "aggregations ofsmaller units that come 
together and act as though they were a larger, long-lived enterprise. " Such an organisation has 
the advantage of being highly responsive. 
Hedlund (1994) introduced the Morin in which different elements of an ideal 
organisation are highlighted, namely lateral rather than vertical communication, temporary 
constellations of people and units rather than permanent structures, and heterarchy instead of 
hierarchy, among others. Heldlund's N form is less futuristic but still more an ideal than a 
realisation. 
The latest empirical attempt to understand the ways firms organise themselves to adapt to 
competitive contexts comes from Pettigrew and Fenton (2000). Instead of focusing on ideal 
ways of organising, Pettigrew and Fenton (2000) have stressed how firms organise themselves 
and what the indicators of this are. The conclusion of their European survey is that the most 
adaptable and innovative firms have combined changes in structure (i. e., more decentralisation, 
delayering and project forms of organising), changes in processes (i. e., horizontal 
communication, investments in inforination technology and new human resource practices), and, 
changes in their boundaries (i. e., downscoping, outsourcing and more strategic alliances). 
Finally, the changing environment of the 1990s has also brought challenges in terms of 
the way firms are managed if they want to adapt successfully. These challenges have been 
signalled in management literature as a need for environmental sensing and sense-making 
(Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991), a managerial culture favouring change (Newman and Nollen, 
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1998), a broad knowledge base and variety of managerial expertise (Grant, 1996), and the 
development of high-order learning (Teece et al, 1997; Fiol and Lyles, 1985). 
Behind such claims of environmental, organisational and managerial changes lies a new 
interest in the dynamics of adaptation and in particular in a firm's flexibility as a way of 
adjusting under conditions of uncertainty (Volberda, 1999). Amongst those who champion the 
new dynamic view of the firm, there is a belief that managers are unable to influence their rapidly 
changing environment (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983). Hence, they urge the adoption of flexible 
structures and systems which react to change automatically. This is a highly deterministic view - 
the actions of the manager being limited merely to making adjustments to the structure and 
systems. Others (D'Aveni, 1994; Child, 1972 and 1997) suggest a more proactive role for the 
manager in which he/she does have the ability to influence the environment in which the firm 
operates. 
In spite of the recognition of the importance of a firm's adaptation and flexibility, much 
of writing on adaptation concentrates on short-term strategic and organisational adaptations 
(Lewin et al, 1999). Moreover, research into adaptation still involves using cross-sectional 
research designs combined with the static metaphors of contingency thinking to analyse the fit 
between firm and environment. The inadequacies of this tradition are now well recognised by an 
emergent approach in the field of adaptation that seeks more dynamic explanations of adaptation 
(Lewin and Volberda, 1999). This emergent approach has encouraged researchers to identify the 
best ways for fhms to adapt rapidly to ever changing realities (Volberda, 1999). Lewin et al 
(1999) applaud research which utilises historical and longitudinal data to reveal the chains of 
causality that help to make up a more dynamic theory of adaptation and discover the essence of 
the adaptation process. Our research into determinants of organisational flexibility comes at a 
time when a more dynamic approach to the study of organisational adaptation under conditions 
of environmental uncertainty is badly needed. 
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This study takes up the challenge of exploring the dynamics of organisational. adaptation 
under the conditions of environmental volatility that prevailed in Argentina over the period 1989- 
1999. In particular, we focus our attention on the determinants of organisational flexibility that 
made it possible for some firms to adapt rapidly in uncertain contexts. The empirical focus of the 
thesis is the study of the transformation process in four firms - two of which are considered 
flexible and two less flexible in two different industries: pharmaceuticals (an industry in the 
process of deregulation) and edible oils (a deregulated industry). Our analysis draws upon 
longitudinal data collected from the firms by means of interviews, archive material and statistical 
data. Using an innovative analysis, we combine coding analysis from interview transcripts, 
statistical analysis and the use of original display charts, to show the determinants of 
organisational flexibility as a set of organisational capabilities that enabled some firms to adapt 
rapidly in the changing and highly competitive business environment that prevailed in Argentina 
in the 1990s. 
Outline of this thesis 
Chapter 2 has a double focus. Firstly, we present views on a firm's adaptation. Secondly, 
we introduce views on inertia in organisations; as a force that prevents organisations from 
adapting. The approaches analysed are: contingency theory and strategic choice theory (to 
explain a firm's adaptation) and population ecology and elements of strategic management theory 
(to explain the causes of inertia in organisations). While these theories allow us to understand 
why and how firms adapt, they do not analyse what factors allow a firm to adapt quickly under 
conditions of environmental turmoil. We describe how three alternative literatures - flexibility 
(i. e., Volberda, 1999), innovation (Damanpour, 1991) and institutional embeddedness 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) - can be used to build a more precise approach towards 
adaptation under conditions of environmental turmoil. We then use the concept of organisational 
flexibility to refer to the organisational and managerial capabilities firms need to enable them to 
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adapt quickly following environmental shifts. This literature review also raised several issues 
about what determines whether an organisation is flexible, and from this exploration of the 
determinants of flexibility we state the three main questions of this study: 
- Do somefirms display moreflexibility than others in competitive circumstances? 
- ny are somefirms able to display moreflexibility? 
-And how they do it? 
Chapter 3 describes the methodology adopted for our empirical research. While our focus 
is the firm level of analysis, a dual phase research strategy was used: the sectoral level and firm 
level of analysis. At the sectoral level of analysis, we first of all needed to select which 
industries were going to be studied and then we needed to operationsalise which firms were 
flexible and less flexible in each industry. Regarding the first issue (i. e., the selection of the 
industries to be studied), two industries were selected, one which was in the process of 
deregulation (i. e., pharmaceuticals) and the other which was already deregulated (i. e., edible 
oils). It was believed that the regulation levels could shed light on the way firms adapted and 
their ability to be flexible (Volberda, 1999; Grabowsky et al, 1978). To identify the different 
levels of flexibility, a set of operational indicators of organisational flexibility were selected and 
applied. These were then customised for each industry. 
The case study approach used at the firm level of analysis allowed the firms' process of 
transformation to be investigated and the determinants of organisational flexibility to be 
identified. Four firms, two from each industry, were selected (i. e., Sidus and Andr6maco in the 
pharmaceutical industry, and AGD and Vicentin in the edible oil industry). The firms were polar 
types, one flexible and the other less flexible, and they were analysed over the period 1989-1999. 
This chapter also provides an account of the epistemological stance of the research. 
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In chapter 4 we begin our multilevel analysis by analysing the national business 
environment (NBE) in which firms were embedded over the period of analysis. 'Ibree main 
elements of the NBE were examined in order to understand how the NBE has affected the 
competitiveness of the industries and companies over time. The three elements considered in our 
analysis were: the role of the state, the financial institutions and the role of the national culture. 
Chapter 5 is an analysis of the macro and competitive environment faced by the 
pharmaceutical and edible oil industries in the 1980s and 1990s. We describe how this 
environment changed for both pharmaceuticals and edible oils from one characterised by low 
levels of competition to one characterised by hypercompetition (D'Aveni, 1994). 
The results of our comparative case study are described in chapters 6 to 10. Chapters 6 to 
9 outline the significant strategic and organisational transformation within the four case studies. 
Chapter 10 compares the four firms and describes the factors our analysis identified as 
determining organisational flexibility - namely the heterogeneity of the dominant coalition, the 
levels of centralisation and formalisation of the decision-making process, the low level of 
macroculture embeddedness, environmental scanning, and the strong organisational identity 
found in the flexible firins. Each determinant was operationalised and analysed according to a 
series of methods identified in the empirical literature relating to the different fields. 
In chapter II we conclude this thesis. Having summarised our findings we discuss the 
contributions made by this research to the study of organisational adaptation and in particular 
organisational flexibility. We also comment on the study's limitations and suggest areas for 
future research to address these limitations and to utilise further the methodology developed in 
this research. 
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Chapter 2: Adaptation, Innovation and the Flexible Organisation 
2.1 Introduction 
The business literature on organisational change is replete with prescriptions regarding 
the management and design organisations require to confront highly competitive and changeable 
environments. Such characteristics include decentralisation of decision-making, flatter 
structures, risk-taking attitudes, empowerment and innovations of different sorts (Miles and 
Snow, 1986; Ezzamel et al, 1994; Hedlund, 1994; Pettigrew and Fenton, 2000). 
In spite of all the business literature offering these signposts for flexibility, there is little 
theory on the determinants of organisational flexibility. However, it is necessary to develop such 
a theory in order to understand how organisations can adapt rapidly to the sudden environmental 
and market changes that occur in volatile contexts (D'Aveni, 1994). 
This chapter seeks to analyse the literature on determinants of organisational flexibility. 
The literature on determinants of organisational innovativeness and institutional embeddedness 
are also examined. "Me latter are highlighted because they relate to organisational flexibility and 
inform those organisational and contextual factors influencing flexibility. The chapter is 
therefore divided into six sections. After this brief introduction, the second section sets out to 
understand how and why firms adapt. In particular we are interested in the environmental 
pressures exerted on firms, and organisational and managerial processes influencing their 
adaptation. Inertial approaches are used as an explanation of those factors that may prevent 
organisations from adapting. 
In sections three to five we describe how three alternative literatures can be used to build 
a more precise understanding of how organisations adapt under conditions of environmental 
turmoil. This combined approach includes literature on the determinants of organisational 
flexibility, organisational innovativeness and institutional embeddedness. Sections three and four 
deal with both detenninants of organisational flexibility and determinants of organisational 
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innovativeness as related and sometimes overlapping concepts. The research on institutional 
embeddedness in section five sheds light on the strategic and organisational constraints 
environmental pressures impose and seeks to explain variation in how firms respond to a given 
set of institutional pressures. Section six states the patterns of adaptiveness from which the 
determinants of organisational flexibility are derived. Finally, in section seven we underline a set 
of researchable questions to guide the subsequent methodology and analysis. 
2.2 Adaptation and inertia in organisations 
Many writers have characterised today's business environment as "hypercompetifive" 
(D'Aveni, 1994, Volberda, 1996,1999), "high velocity" (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), or 
shaped by 'jolts" (Meyer et al, 1990). In emerging economies, such as the Argentinian one, 
these environmental features have been exacerbated by a sudden opening up of the markets to 
free competition. In these circumstances, rapid adaptive organisational processes are essential to 
a firm's survival and success (Volberda, 1999; D'Aveni, 1994). 
From a social science point of view, organisational adaptation is "the ability of an 
organisation to change itse1r, or the way in which it behaves, in order to survive in theface of 
external changes which were not predicted in any precise way when the organisation was 
designed "(Tomlinson, 1976: 533). Ibis definition confirms March's assertion that adaptation is 
essential to survival: those companies that do not adapt "seem destined to expire" (March, 1995). 
However, adaptation views of organisation development have been contested. In an 
attempt to distinguish between the different debates within organisational theories, Astley and 
Van de Ven (1983) argue that one of these debates is about the adaptation/selection dichotomy. 
Even though the adaptation approach is widely accepted in strategy and organisation theory 
(Lewin and Volberda, 1999), some theories emphasise the idea of selection, retention, or inertia 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977 and 1984; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
8 
Those favouring the inertia approach - such as the ecological perspective - stress 
environmental selection rather than "selection of the environment" (Child, 1997: 45). For them, 
organisations are swept along by environmental pressures. These approaches highlight tensions 
between the possibilities an organisation has for adaptation and change, preservation and inertia. 
So what makes it possible for organisations to adapt rapidly to environmental changes? 
How can organisations learn to adapt to volatile conditions? Concepts such as the flexible firm 
(Volberda, 1999), the innovative firm (Blau and McKinley, 1979; Drucker, 1999; Pettigrew and 
Fenton, 2000), the adaptive firm (Haeckel, 1999) or the agile firm (Goldman et aL, 1995) were 
coined as a way of explaining the organisational capabilities needed in organisations to allow 
them to adjust to the ever-changing environment. 
This study draws heavily on the concept of organisational flexibility for two reasons: 
firstly, because of its appropriateness to understanding unpredictable and uncertain contexts such 
as the Argentinian one (Volberda, 1999,1997; D'Aveni, 1994); secondly, the concept of 
organisational flexibility also sheds light on the enhanced capabilities organisations under 
environmental turmoil develop to enable them to adapt quickly and undertake great 
transformations (Volberda, 1999; Bahrami, 1992; Evans, 1991). 
So, why and how can organisations adapt? In particular, what are the contextual, 
managerial, and organisational challenges organisations have to meet so that they can adapt? 
What role do environmental forces play in a firm's adaptation? And does the organisation and its 
top management have an active or reactive role in the adaptation process? By asking two final 
questions we aim to understand those factors preventing firms from adapting: Why are 
organisations inert? And, do inertial forces stem from environmental forces or from within the 
organisation? In our analysis of the adaptation and inertia approaches, we focus on three main 
issues (Le, role of outer context, organisation and top management team) that will help us to 
determine why and how adaptation is possible and identify the forces that may prevent 
organisations from adapting. We leave aside one important question, however: what are the 
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capabilities needed by organisations to enable them to adapt? This question, however, will be 
addressed later in the analysis as we discuss the importance of a firm's flexibility in adapting in 
rapidly changing environments. 
We therefore use key organisational frameworks to understand the possibilities 
organisations have for adaptation and the inertial forces that might prevent them from doing so. 
Following traditional studies in the field of organisational adaptation and inertia (Lewin et al, 
1999; Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Lewin and Koza, 2001) we note four organisational 
perspectives in which the role of the context, organisation and management feature as key 
elements in understanding a firm's adaptation process. These perspectives are: contingency 
theory, strategic choice theory, population ecology theory and elements of strategic management 
theory. Work on organisational renewal and the neo-institutional theory, both of which are 
clearly relevant to this theme, were deliberately excluded at this stage. These streams of 
research, however, are picked up later in the thesis. In the following pages we briefly describe 
key organisational frameworks and the dominant themes of these frameworks as they relate to 
adaptation or inertia. 
Organisational adaptiveness 
How can firms adapt? And what is the role of organisational flexibility in a firm's 
adaptation? The answer is highly dependent on one's conceptions of the environment and 
perspective on the organisation-environment relationship. In this section, two theories dealing 
with the organisation-environment relation are considered: contingency theory and strategic 
choice theory. These theories may clarify the extent to which the environment affects the 
possibilities a firm has of adapting and being flexible. 
The old contingency approach was based on the assumption that organisations adjust 
their aims and shape in order to suit themselves to market and other environmental characteristics 
(Astley and Van de Ven, 1983; Singh et al, 1986). Bums and Stalker (1961: 21) pointed out that: 
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"Very often, the environment of the person or organisation is itself changing, so that even to 
maintain the same degree offitnessfor survival, people and institutions may have to change their 
ways. " The consequence of the contingency approach for a firin's adaptation is that the finn 
should achieve a fit with the changing and competitive enviromnent through "appropriate 
organisationalform " (Lewin and Volberda, 1999: 522). 
On the basis of their qualitative research, Bums and Stalker (1961) identified 
organisational forms which they characterised as mechanistic and organic. They postulated that 
the more variable and unpredictable the environment is, the more flexible the organisational 
structure and process must be to enable the firm to adapt rapidly. According to this perspective, 
organisational. flexibility is considered to be the reactive capacity of organisations to confront 
turbulent environments (Volberda, 1999). 
Bums and Stalker (1961) and Woodward (1965) also emphasise that an organisation's 
successful adaptation to the environment depends on the ability of top management to interpret 
the conditions facing the firni in an appropriate manner and to adopt relevant courses of action. 
The role of the top team then is to be reactive and their most important task is to be in tune with 
the environment (Singh et al, 1986). 
Contingency theory is useful in identifying the importance of environmental pressure in 
organisational life and in balancing out more subjective approaches towards organisational 
adaptation. In emerging markets in which environmental turmoil is frequent (Hoskisson et al, 
2000), it is essential to appreciate the role exerted by the environment in triggering internal 
changes. 
However, the most important shortcoming of contingency theory is that it fails to explain 
internal organisational factors that may influence adaptive processes (i. e., social and cultural 
aspects, and leadership factors among others) (Pettigrew et al, 1992). It also fails to understand 
the role of the management in organisations and their ability to influence decision making and 
exert strategic choice (Child, 1972). It was the combination of external and internal factors (i. e., 
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environmental pressures, organisation and top management team roles) that defined the 
determinants of organisational flexibility we introduce later in chapter 10. 
Some organisational scholars have become increasingly disenchanted with the 
mechanical and deterministic conception of the organisation-environment relationship as 
described by contingency theory. Its strong deterministic bias largely ignores the important 
variable of managerial choice. It was Child (1972) who most explicitly argued for a less rigid 
view of the interaction between organisations and their environment. He called for a more 
voluntaristic or "strategic choice" approach to organisation-environment relations. 
The strategic choice perspective suggests that proactive adaptability and loose coupling 
between organisations and environments allows structural variation and renders organisations 
less vulnerable to homogenising forces exerted by the environment. Child and several others 
(Khandwalla, 1977; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985) have argued that organisations are not always 
passive. recipients of environmental influence but also have the power to reshape the 
environment. Organisational flexibility is thus necessary to enable a firm to make rapid and 
viable choices (Child, 1997) and to enact environments (Weick, 1979). Organisational flexibility 
will not however, be a reactive capacity (as it is in contingency theory) but a proactive one 
(Volberda, 1999). 
The strategic choice approach then drew attention to the active role of those who have the 
power to make decisions. However, new approaches within the theory (Child, 1997; Hrebiniak 
and Joyce, 1985) argue that organisational adaptation is the result of the interdependence of and 
interaction between strategic choice and environment. Both agency and environment are 
necessary for a satisfactory explanation of organisational adaptation. 
The previous analysis of contingency and strategic choice perspectives on adaptation 
opens up a debate between what Astley and Van de Ven (1983) have called deterministic and 
voluntaristic orientation in the adaptation and change of organisations. In the deterministic 
orientation (represented in our analysis by contingency theory), change takes the form of 
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adaptation from the organisation to the environment. The role of the manager is reactive because 
the manager has to re-arrange the internal organisation to fit the environment. Conversely, the 
voluntaristic orientation for Astley and Van de Ven (1983) (in our analysis represented by the 
strategic choice approach) sees the environment as subject to influence by individuals. Managers 
have freedom to change contextual factors. Organisations are continually constructed, enacted 
and changed by organisational members. Accordingly, the manager can be said to have a 
proactive role in guiding the process of adaptation. 
In this research we view the adaptation process as a dynamic one in which, for any given 
organisation, elements or variables related to managerial choice and environmental influence 
coexist. Thus we avoid the deterministic and voluntaristic extremes provided by some 
organisational approaches (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985; Child, 1972 and 1997). Change, then, is 
the outcome of enviromnental context and managerial action (Pettigrew, 1985,1987). Here, we 
view organisational flexibility as the interplay between outer and inner organisational contexts, in 
which managerial and environmental factors are interrelated (Pettigrew, 1985,1990; Lewin et al, 
1999; Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Lewin and Koza, 2001). Such a view of organisational 
flexibility allows us to appreciate more holistically how organisations adapt quickly in conditions 
of envirom-nental turmoil (D'Aveni, 1994; Volberda, 1999). 
So far, we have been analysing how and why firms adapt. We have established the 
importance of the interrelation between environmental pressures and managerial choice, thereby 
avoiding extreme and incomplete explanations of adaptation. However, there are many factors 
that may restrict the ability organisations have to adapt to environmental changes and take 
advantages of opportunities the environment offers. But what are the factors that may hinder an 
organisation's ability to adapt? Do those factors stem mainly from the firm's outer context or can 
inertia be found in the inner context of the organisation? Organisational inertia is offered as an 
explanation as to how and why firms are prevented from adapting. 
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Organisational inertia 
Many authors have argued that organisations are fundamentally inert and therefore 
constrained in their ability to respond to environmental change (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 
Miller and Friesen, 1980). In other words, organisations may be limited in their ability to 
recognise and act upon opportunities despite the fact that those opportunities are present in their 
industry. 
Early organisational theory researchers recognised some of the negative consequences of 
bureaucracy (Blau, 1956; March and Simon, 1958). Stinchcombe (1965) suggested that firms 
tend to become institutionalised and that the basic structure of organisations remains relatively 
stable over time. More recently, organisation theorists have argued that major stimuli are 
required for organisations to undergo periods of revolution, and therefore organisations are, by 
nature, sluggish in their ability to respond to environmental change (Miller and Friesen, 1980). 
However, population ecology writers have taken a more extreme stance on the subject of 
organisational inertia. Organisational ecology has developed in response to the reactive 
adaptation bias generated by contingency theory. It considers the dynamic processes affecting 
the development of organisational populations over time and, in contrast to the prevailing 
adaptive perspective, focuses on selection as the main mechanism of adaptation and change. 
According to this perspective, adaptation and change is severely constrained and most 
organisations flounder helplessly in the grip of environmental forces (Carroll, 1988). 
Hannan and Freeman's (1984) seminal paper presents a model of structural inertia. They 
argue that inertial properties in organisations; are so strong that timely adaptation to 
environmental change is impossible. When levels of inertia are high, adaptive behaviour is more 
difficult and the environment selects out those organisations that do not fit (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984; Delacroix and Swarninathan, 1991). For the population ecology approach 
environmental selection replaces internal adaptation (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983). As the 
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environment is relentlessly efficient in weeding out any organisation that does not fit, the role of 
managers is therefore insignificant (Hannan and Freeman, 1977,1984). 
In population ecology theory, there is no place for flexibility; rather, population ecology 
emphasises the anti-flexibility of organisations and their slowness in responding to changing 
environmental opportunities and threats. In this view, organisations are rarely able to engage in 
transformations (Carroll, 1988; Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
Latterly some population ecology theorists, however, have admitted structural change of 
units. In his study of strategic business exit in Intel Corporation, Burgelman (1994) argued that it 
was not corporate strategy but the internal selection environment that caused a shift from 
memory chips to the more profitable microprocessor business. Burgelman found that the context 
set by top management had strong selective effects on the strategic actions of the firm. Similarly, 
Noda and Bower (1996) try to explain how selection processes operate within organisations. 
They reveal how the initial internal constraints in two different companies - BellSouth and US 
West - shaped the firms' very different strategies in cellular telephony over the period 1984- 
1990. 
While some researchers in the field of population ecology have thus admitted structural 
change, the general fatalistic tendency of population ecology exposes it to more fundamental 
criticism. Its underlying theories represent a view of individual-organisation interactions that are 
grounded in the assumption that the human role in organisations is essentially passive (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984). 
The early ecologist approach also failed to explain several relations and organisational 
aspects. This approach could not explain situations in which the environment had been altered 
(i. e., regulated environments like the pharmaceutical industry in this research). Moreover, while 
theories of structural inertia can explain variation in change across large populations of 
organisations, they provide less insight into variation in change within organisations. Their 
tendency to take inertial forces for granted has led population ecologists to overlook the process 
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by which individual firms adapt to environmental changes by renewing their organisations to 
confront different contextual realities in a competitive way. Nor could it explain how radical 
change and innovation can occur. The transformation stories of Sidus and AGD in chapters 7 
and 8 of this thesis are proof of the inability of population ecology theory to understand the way 
firms can undertake profound changes and avoid inertial forces stemming from the environment. 
While the population ecology perspective has emphasised the ruthless role of the 
environment as a key factor in understanding inertia in organisations, elements of the strategic 
management literature have placed considerable importance on internal sources of inertia. 
Miller and Chen (1994) point out that competitive inertia reflects the number of market 
changes a company makes to attract customers and overcome competitors' practices. Inertia 
would be high when, compared with competitors, firms make few changes in competitive 
practices. In their analysis of 32 US domestic airlines, Miller and Chen (1994) found the sources 
of competitive inertia in the managers' willingness to act. 
Like Miller and Chen (1994), Sull (1999 a, b) tries to determine what the internal sources 
of inertia in organisations are. Studying the process of adaptation in Firestone and Laura Ashley, 
Sull (1999 a, b) mentions four factors that may cause companies to fail to adapt appropriately in 
the event of environmental shifts: strategic frames; processes; relationships; and values. Each of 
these factors can restrict adaptation. Strategic frames or mental models can act as blinkers and 
make it difficult to assess competitors, customers and business strategies. Processes may become 
routines, thus impeding effective responses (i. e., as in the case of Firestone and radial 
technology). Relationships (i. e., with customers and suppliers) may fetter the company, thereby 
limiting flexibility. Finally, the company's set of beliefs may harden into dogma, thereby 
precluding other business possibilities. Elements of the strategic management literature thus 
widens our understanding of the problems the less flexible firms may have when they try to 
adapt. In chapter 10 we discuss the different managerial and organisational factors that may have 
caused the sluggish response of the less flexible firms in conditions of environmental pressure. 
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Concluding remarks 
The review of adaptation and inertial theories has stressed different challenges 
organisations have to meet to be able to adapt and those factors that may deter them from doing 
so. Some perspectives (population ecology, contingency theory) emphasise the constraining 
influence of contextual forces; others (strategic choice) recognise the opportunities for human 
agency. Each of these perspectives helps to understand a particular aspect of how organisations 
develop 'fitness' within a given context but they do not explain how organisations survive in 
endogenously dynamic environments and how they cope with unknown future states. In the 
perspectives analysed, nothing is said about what organisational capabilities are needed to adapt 
and avoid inertial traps. What are the enhanced capabilities organisations need to cope with 
higher levels of disorder? Is it possible for some organisations to learn to adapt to more volatile 
conditions? 
By organisational. capabilities we mean the "unique internal management processes and 
intangible resources, which are less visible and less easily copied [and which] have come to be 
seen as potential sustainable sources of advantage" (Galbraith, 1994: 2). Capabilities are 
developed by organisations as they grow in size and scope (Galbraith, 1994). 
Firms that are careful about the capabilities they develop relative to the environment in 
which they operate can transform and adapt quickly to very dynamic markets (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Raff, 2000; Helfat, 1997,2000; Huygens et al, 2001). However, under extreme 
competitive pressure, very persistent or long-standing core capabilities that do not incorporate 
new competences and skills may evolve into core rigidities (Rosenbloom, 2000; Leonard-Barton, 
1992), thereby impeding organisational adaptation. Organisational flexibility is the concept we 
use in this research to refer to those capabilities that allow organisations to adapt rapidly under 
conditions of environmental turmoil. 
But what determines whether an organisation is more or less flexible? In the following 
section we deal in particular with the determinants of organisational flexibility. Innovativeness is 
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not rejected. On the contrary, as Quinn (1985) and Volberda (1999) suggest, organisational 
flexibility is an inclusive concept that encompasses the idea of innovation. Tbus, organisational 
flexibility is a necessary condition for innovation. But what makes a firm more innovative or 
flexible? The lack of precision and bluffed boundaries between these two concepts warrants a 
discussion of the similarities and differences between organisational flexibility and organisational 
innovativeness. 
Institutional theory is introduced as a complementary theory because it emphasises the 
role of mimetic behaviour in explaining patterns of adaptation, innovation and change among 
firms in an industry (Dacin et al, 2002; Webb and Pettigrew, 1999; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) 
thus shedding light on both the capacity for action and inertial forces of companies in an industry 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Institutional theory also spells out the capabilities firms need in 
order to overcome isomorphic pressures arising from the environment (Greenwood et al, 2002). 
2.3 Research on determinants of organisational flexibility 
What is organisational flexibility? What does being a flexible firm imply? How do we 
know if we are in the presence of a flexible organisation? 
Bahrami (1992: 34) indicates that organisational flexibility varies according to the 
situational context. Bahrami (1992) attributes this variation to the polymorphous nature of the 
concept of flexibility. Tbus, the precise meaning of flexibility is dependent on the focus of the 
research. Thus, it is possible to talk about manufacturing flexibility (Adler, 1988; De Meyer et 
al, 1989; Gerwin, 1993; Upton, 1994; Heijltjes, 2000), numerical flexibility, functional flexibility 
(Atkinson and Meager, 1986), flexible information systems (Boynton and Victor, 1991; Golden 
and Powell, 2000), flexible automation (Adler, 1988) and a flexible workforce (Prowse, 1990; 
Dastmalchian, 2001). 
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The polymorphous nature of the concept of flexibility indicated by Bahrami (1992) led us 
to expect difficulties in finding an accurate definition. However, there have been some attempts 
to bring conceptual clarity into the field of organisational flexibility. 
The most relevant work on organisational flexibility has been done by Volberda 
(1999: 100). In his book he defines organisational flexibility as "the degree to which an 
organisation has a variety of managerial capabilities and the speed at which they can be 
activated, to increase the control capacity of management and improve the controllability of the 
organization. " Through this definition Volberda articulates one of his core arguments: the 
flexible organisation needs to balance the conflicting demands of stability (viz. control) and 
dynamism. While many organisational scholars present flexibility and stability as opposite ends 
of a continuum (Adler, 1988; Boynton and Victor, 1991), Volberda argues that flexibility and 
stability are two sides of the same coin, in that flexibility without stability results in 
organisational chaos. 
While Volberda's definition is revealing in terms of the role of management and the need 
for rapid reaction to achieve flexibility in organisations, he does not consider organisational 
capabilities that may boost or hamper the attainment of flexibility. For Volberda, organisational 
flexibility is comprised of two components: managerial task (i. e., "the creation orpromotion of 
capabilitiesfor situations that generate unexpected disturbance') and organisational design (i. e., 
structure of the organisation) (see Volberda, 1999: 100,101). However, Volberda's concept of 
flexibility does not identify other organisational factors that are not related to the design of the 
firm such as those we have considered in our research (i. e., organisational identity or the role of 
organisational embeddedness in the firms' institutional macroculture). 
A more comprehensive definition of organisational flexibility is given by Teece et al 
(1997). American literature has tended to use the concept of dynamic capabilities to refer to 
flexibility (Teece et al, 1997; Rosenbloom, 2000, Tushman and Smith, 2001). In their theoretical 
framework, which is based on dynamic capabilities as enablers of adaptation and change in a 
rapidly changing envirom-nent, Teece et al (1997: 516) define dynamic capabilities as "thefinn's 
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ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly 
changing environments. " More concretely, Teece et al (1997) indicate that dynamic capabilities 
should be able to enhance technological, organisational, and managerial processes inside the firm 
to enable it to organise more effectively. Teece et al (1997: 521) also state that firms that have 
honed and perfected these capabilities are referred to as "high-flex. " 
In this thesis we use the concept of organisational flexibility in a way similar to that 
proposed by Teece et al (1997), considering organisational flexibility as a repertoire of 
organisational and managerial capabilities that allow organisations to adapt quickly under 
conditions of environmental change. We must now consider the organisational and managerial 
capabilities mentioned in the literature that allow organisations to be flexible. 
Organisational flexibility as an organisational task 
For many authors, the ability of an organisation to achieve organisational flexibility 
depends on the design adequacy of organisational variables, such as technology, structure and 
culture (Zammuto and O'Connor, 1992; Volberda, 1999). Organisational structure, however, is 
the main focus of the organisational flexibility writers (Volberda, 1999). The design of the 
organisational structure encompasses not only the actual distribution of responsibilities in an 
organisation, but also the planning and control systems set up in the companies, the process of 
decision making and coordination (Zammuto and O'Connor, 1992; Volberda, 1999). 
The theoretical literature on organisational flexibility stresses the importance of 
multidimensional design (i. e., units that can be easily added and subtracted) (Ackoff, 1977), 
lateral organisation (i. e., in terms of coordination across functions and businesses) (Galbraith, 
1994), innovative structure (i. e., a structure that allows the rapid shift of product composition and 
decentralisation of decision making) (Krijen, 1979), and an organisational design aligned with 
market needs, the nature of competitors, and the industry (Overholt 1997). 
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From an empirical point of view, many other writers have suggested networking forms of 
organising (in Liebeskind et al's (1996) study of two biotechnology firms), flat structures (in 
Rosenbloom's (2000) analysis of the process of transformation in NCR), and collaboration 
partnerships (in Bahrami (1992) and Bahrami and Evans' (1995) study of organisational 
flexibility in the hi-tech sector in the Silicon Valley). These empirical studies provide evidence 
of how a flexible design allows companies to become front-line organisations that deal with 
problems rapidly by reducing the lag between strategy and operation. 
One of the problems associated with the foregoing research is that it does not examine 
how the suggested designs can be implemented in organisations. The authors do not attempt to 
clarify whether 'a flexible design' is suitable for every company or whether it should apply to 
those organisations competing in industries with fast product cycles (i. e., information 
technology). This thesis undertakes an examination of the changes in the organisational design 
of the firms under study from an empirical point of view, and thereby complements the existent 
theoretical studies. 
Besides organisational design, other organisational factors are also mentioned as 
influencing organisational flexibility. For example, Volberda (1999) considers that culture plays 
an important role in promoting flexibility. He distinguishes between conservative and innovative 
culture: an innovative culture (the culture required to encourage flexibility) will be 
heterogeneous, with a delegative leadership style and managers with an attitude that favours 
improvisation rather than routine. It will also tolerate ambiguity and autonomy. 
Delegation and autonomy are not new ideas in the literature however (Overholt, 1997; 
Krijnen, 1979). Overholt (1997) examines the organisational archetypes needed under conditions 
of environmental change and severe competition. He points out that flexibility may be achieved 
through highly autonomous and decentralised organisations. These firms are process-based with 
fewer layers and high levels of permeability of boundaries. 
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In his study of organisational flexibility in companies in the Silicon Valley, Bahrami 
(1992) provides evidence of how the most flexible firms accommodate opposing tendencies such 
as centralisation and decentralisation. The companies described as flexible by Bahrami are 
centralised in terms of their strategic direction with a lot of autonomy for managers to run the 
business. The case of a telecommunication corporation illustrates these ideas. The corporation 
has very small and decentralised units with a great deal of autonomy. However, centralisation of 
strategic decisions was a key element for coordination and cooperation between units. 
In flexible organisations not only are levels of centralisation of decision making low, but 
there is also a low number of formalisation processes (Volberda, 1996). Again Volberda (1996 
and 1999) indicates that organisations with the potential to be highly flexible have low levels of 
standardisation (i. e., specification of the contents and result of the work), and low levels of 
formalisation (i. e., job descriptions, work instructions and general rules). (See also Ng and 
Dastmalchian, 2001). 
Such flexible organisational factors - decentralisation and formalisation of decision 
making - will provide great leeway for managers to assume more responsibilities in the firms and 
to move quickly, thereby achieving fast responsive capacity. The managerial role in achieving 
organisational flexibility will be the subject of the analysis of the following section. 
Organisational flexibility as a managerial task 
In this section we concentrate on two main questions: what are the managerial features of 
flexible firms? And what kind of flexible capabilities are needed to respond and adapt to sudden 
environmental shifts? 
From a manufacturing perspective, Adler (1988) states that technological flexibility 
requires managerial flexibility. He highlights the new content of these managerial capabilities as 
attitudinal, that is taking responsibility for the whole process; cognitive, meaning the process of 
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identifying and solving problems; and, lastly, systemic interdependence, which is reflected in 
inter-functional cooperation and team-work. 
Volberda (1999) asserts the importance of a broad knowledge base and a variety of 
managerial expertise in devising appropriate responses. The heterogeneity of backgrounds and 
experiences needed in a flexible firm is related to the need to face competitive environments. 
Boynton and Victor (199 1) show how a company like Coming, which had managers with a broad 
knowledge base deriving from a variety of expertise, was able to develop capabilities in order to 
introduce new products and seize market opportunities. 
Diverse managerial expertise may encourage the organisation to recognise the need for 
change (Volberda, 1999; Rosenbloom, 2000). This was studied empirically by Calori et al 
(2000) while analysing the process of change in Novotel. Novotel increased its management 
team from eight to eighteen employees and in so doing broadened the kinds of experience in the 
management team. The new management team complemented each other in terms of different 
cognitive styles, thus bringing new strategic options, innovation and creativity to the company. 
Heterogeneity and broad managerial mindsets foster the ability to create and support 
ideas. Bahrami (1992) points out how the cosmopolitan mindset at Apple Computers has led to 
different cultural assumptions and premises being incorporated. Volberda (1999) indicates that 
management must have the ability to identify, experiment and explore new fields and ideas rather 
than exploiting existing routines. Experimentation, for Volberda, can be achieved by having 
heterogeneous managers with broad managerial mindsets. Volberda illustrates differences in 
heterogeneity and managerial mindsets in two electronic firms: Sharp and Texas Instruments 
(TI). While Sharp was able to develop dynamic capabilities in the electronic calculator industry, 
TI failed because its limited managerial mindsets caused it to focus exclusively on the 
semiconductor market. 
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The literature on organisational flexibility makes a number of predictions about the 
factors determining the flexibility of an organisation. Each company's flexibility will be 
determined by a variety of organisational and individual factors. At the organisational level, an 
adequate 'flexible" organisational design and low levels of centralisation and formalisation of 
decision making were mentioned. In addition, the literature has suggested that at the top 
management level, heterogeneity of the managerial team and a broad knowledge base are 
required to build a flexible organisation. 
The perspectives analysed so far have limitations. Most of the literature reviewed in this 
section is theoretical and little empirical research has been done in organisational settings. Take, 
for example, the most comprehensive research in the field by Volberda (1999). As Volberda 
(1999: 264) admits, his analysis of the flexible firm "is to some extent speculative, based on a 
limited number of observations. " There has been little empirical verification of the concepts 
Volberda presents. Our analysis of the determinants of organisational flexibility is thus an 
attempt to link both theory and practice in a field in which empirical analysis is scarce. 
Many questions regarding the content and process of being flexible remain unanswered. 
Volberda, for example, suggests that organisational flexibility is an emergent process triggered 
by highly competitive environments. As such, he focuses on describing the way firms react 
using some 'flexible capabilities' rather than trying to understand what causes them to be flexible 
and the way those determinants have been built up over time. Furthermore, can organisational 
flexibility be built as an intended process instead of just an emergent one? The intentionality of 
the process of being flexible opens up a series of questions that Volberda does not tackle directly: 
is the building of organisational flexibility a long-term process? What are its antecedents and 
origins? What antecedents are necessary or sufficient? We have filled this void in the literature 
by analysing the determinants of a firm's flexibility and have empirically demonstrated the 
importance of flexibility as an intended process in the firms. * 
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2.4 Research on determinants of organisational innovativeness 
"A variety of innovations are essential for our economic health. In the corporate 
environment that has been emerging since the 1960s, business must be innovative, learning to 
operate in an unfamiliar context and within new constraints stemmingfrom worldwide trends, 
changes in the labor force, the ups and downs of government regulations, and technological 
development" (Kanter, 1983: 22). 
Kanter's statement shows an awareness of the importance of the study of the determinants 
of innovativeness as another means of understanding how organisations adapt to their ever- 
changing context. 
However, before examining the determinants of a firm's innovativeness, it is important to 
achieve clarity regarding the conceptual basis of innovation. In the literature there are multiple 
definitions of the content and scope of innovation. Some writers focus on the element of product 
innovation, suggesting that innovative firms are those that bring new products onto the market 
(Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996; Whipp and Clark, 1986; Normann, 1971). Eisenhardt and 
Tabrizi (1995: 84) also emphasise the idea of product innovation as "the centralpath by which 
they [organisations] adapt and sometimes even transform themselves in changing environments. " 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1997), studying high-velocity industries, go further by saying that rapid 
and relentless change can occur through product innovation. 
The perception of newness, that is "any idea, practice, or material artifact perceived to 
be new by the relevant unit of adoption " (Zaltman et al, 1973) has also been considered a factor 
that characterises and represents innovation (Thompson, 1965; Knight, 1967; Damanpour and 
Evan, 1984; Van de Ven, 1986). 
Another school of writers prefers an even broader perspective when it comes to 
understanding innovation. In this approach, product, process and service are seen as elements 
involved in the process of innovation (Van de Ven, 1986; Kanter, 1983; Van de Ven and Poole, 
1995; Tidd et al, 1997; Pettigrew and Fenton, 2000). 
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This thesis adopts a broad approach to understanding innovation, considering product, 
processes and services among all the innovative activities companies can engage in (Van de Ven, 
1986; Walton 1987; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Pettigrew and Fenton, 2000). 
But what determines whether a firm is innovative? The determinants most frequently 
researched in the literature on organisational innovativeness can be divided into two different 
levels: the organisational level and the top management team level (Wolfe, 1994; Slappender, 
1996). 
The influence of the characteristics of the top management team 
Much of the literature on innovation stresses the impact of characteristics of the top 
management team on an organisation's innovativeness. This view of innovation assumes that 
certain individ4als have personal qualities that predispose them to innovative behaviour 
(Slappender, 1996). 
Hage and Dewar (1973) empirically compared the concept of elite values and structural 
factors in sixteen health and welfare organisations. They argued that the diversity of occupations 
in an organisation led to more ideas about what needed to be done in the organisation and also 
facilitated adoption of innovations. This variety also implied a variety of contacts outside the 
organisation in which the professionals were working. 
Robertson and Wind (1983) gathered together both the diversity of managerial experience 
and the contacts managers have with people outside the firm or industry under the name of 
"cosmopolitanism "I or the "cosmopolitan mindset". Their empirical analysis of more than a 
hundred hospitals reveal that innovativeness is higher in those hospitals in which professionals 
(i. e., the physicians) have a cosmopolitan orientation. Diversity among top managers may 
provide the external linkage needed to bring new ideas into the organisation. 
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Diversity in the top team can also bring administrative innovations into the organisation 
(pertaining to organisational structure, administrative processes, and human resources) rather 
than only technical innovations (referring to products, services and technology used in the 
company) (Evan and Black, 1967; Moch and Morse, 1977; Daft, 1978; Damanpour, 1996). 
Finally, some writers assert that the diversity of experience and mental models that will 
foster innovativeness in an organisation will be supported by the managers' tenure in the job or 
company and their educational background. In that respect, some have argued that new 
managers with different perspectives, new ideas and less commitment to the organisation are thus 
more receptive to innovation and change than those with longer tenure in the companies 
(Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981; Rogers, 1983; Damanpour, 1991; Pettigrew et al, 1992). 
Kimberly and Evanisko (1981), in their study of innovation in hospitals, show evidence of how 
the personal traits of managers (i. e., tenure, cosmopolitanism, educational level) are significant 
predictors of both technological and administrative innovation. 
The concepts of diversity of backgrounds and cosmopolitanism highlight the importance 
of the internal heterogeneity of the management team. This heterogeneity might boost the setting 
up of networks outside the organisation (Hage and Dewar, 1973; Robertson and Wind, 1983), the 
possibility of introducing new ideas into the organisation (Pettigrew, 1972), and the creation or 
diffusion of both technical and/or administrative innovations (Evan and Black, 1967; Daft, 1978). 
Criticism of the perspective focusing on the traits of the top team and their influence on a 
firm's innovativeness stems from the fact that it tends to focus its analysis on the innovative 
actions of the organisational participants, thus leaving aside important organisational and 
contextual characteristics (Slappender, 1996). In our research we need to look at the way these 
concepts are operationalised in family firms: do the firms analysed in this study have a degree of 
diversity that grants them internal heterogeneity? How did the family firms in our research 
balance out the need for diversity among the top team and the critical role played by family 
members in the direction of the companies? The literature has not yet addressed these questions. 
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The influence of organisational characteristics on innovativeness 
The most frequently investigated organisational detenninants of innovativeness include 
the degrees of centralisation and formalisation of the decision-making process. There is a 
general consensus among theorists in the field of organisational innovativeness that higher 
degrees of centralisation and formalisation influence innovation in a negative way because 
together they concentrate decision making, hindering the ability of members of the organisation 
to participate in and be committed to organisational aims (Normann, 1971; Kanter, 1983; 
Nicholson et al, 1990; Damanpour, 1991; Webb and Pettigrew, 1999; Chandler et al, 2000). 
Thompson (1965) tries to explain the rigidity of the centralised organisation by using the 
Weberian concept of the "bureaucratic" organisation. In this kind of organisation, each member 
receives orders from a superior. Internal distribution of power and status are relevant goals. The 
bureaucratic organisation is characterised by efficiency but low innovative capacity. 
Hage and Dewar (1973) and Hage (1999) justify the idea of the negative relation between 
innovation and centralisation by arguing that when power is concentrated in only a few people, 
there are fewer opportunities for creation and innovation since those who have power prefer to 
maintain the status quo. 
Bringing together earlier empirical work that takes an organisational level view, 
Damanpour (1991) indicates a negative relationship between innovativeness and the degrees of 
formalisation and centralisation. However, Damanpour also argues that the implementation stage 
of the innovation process requires a higher degree of formalisation and centralisation than the 
initiation phase. 
The process view of innovativeness (Van de Ven et al, 1999) stresses that at any time an 
organisation is likely to be in the process of adopting several innovations, each at a different 
stage of generation and implementation. The innovativeness of an organisation, therefore, will 
depend on its ability to address the different requirements of each phase of adoption 
simultaneously. Hence, while low levels of formalisation and centralisation of decision making 
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may increase innovativeness in the creation phase, there will be a point at which the relaxation of 
control will disrupt implementation (Zaltman et al, 1973; Zmud, 1982; Kanter, 1983; Nicholson 
et al, 1990; Damanpour, 1992). 
The literature on organisational innovativeness thus identifies a number of patterns of 
adaptiveness. Innovativeness in a firm will be determined by a variety of organisational and 
individual factors, which include the characteristics and diversity of the firm's top management 
team and the degree of centralisation and formalisation of decision making. 
Context is central to our understanding of organisational innovativeness (Van de Ven, 
1986). With the exception of some processual writers (Whipp and Clark, 1986; Clark, 1995; Van 
de Ven et al, 1999) the research examined so far tends to look into organisational and managerial 
features without taking into consideration the importance of a firm's embeddedness in the sector 
and national business environment. The sector, industry and national systems of innovation do, 
however, influence the process of innovation in an organisation (Walton, 1987; Tidd et al, 1997). 
Institutional influence comes into play when levels of uncertainty and unpredictability 
increase (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Webb and Pettigrew, 1999). In the face of uncertainty, 
mimetic behaviour and institutional embeddedness would protect companies from turmoil 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Abrahamson and Formbrun, 1994). Questions arise as to how 
companies in volatile contexts - as in the Argentinian case - can adapt rapidly without being 
caught by inertial forces. A consideration of the so-called neo-institutional theory and, in 
particular, the degree of embeddedness in the macroculture domain will lead to an appreciation 
of the influence of institutional pressures on the process of adaptation. 
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2.5 Institutional embeddedness 
In the literature on organisational innovativeness and flexibility, the debate concentrates 
on the ways organisations adapt and what determines organisational. adaptability (Volberda, 
1999; Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996). In institutional theory, however, the debate is split 
between those writers that stress the explanation of similarities (i. e., isomorphism and stability in 
a population of organisations), and those that consider the institutional approach as the basis for a 
theory of continuity and change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). In this section we shall 
concentrate on the latter. We also explore the mechanisms needed by companies to overcome 
environmental pressure and how this affects new business initiatives and strategic decisions taken 
by firms. 
Institutional theory explains adaptation as a homogenisation process by which firms 
within a sector will become increasingly alike overtime. The process of homogenisation in a 
sector is called isomorphism. by DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 149): "Isomorphism is a 
constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the 
same set ofenvironmental conditions. " 
One of the consequences of the process of homogenisation is that it tends to increase the 
organisation's levels of inertia and also increases the similarity of member organisations' 
strategic profiles (Abrahamson and Fonibrun, 1994; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Hence this 
line of institutional argument suggests that it is very difficult to find firms that are applying a 
different strategic pattern or doing things in a very different way from other businesses in the 
same sector. 
Abrahamson and Fornbrun (1994: 729) go further by stating that "insularity and 
sluggishness result because homogeneity of beliefs within an interorganizational macroculture 
encourages memberfirms' managers to interpret environment in similar ways, to identify similar 
issues as strategic, and so to adopt similar competitive positions. " 
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Therefore, in assessing the adaptation process of an organisation in an industry it is 
important to address the issue of what determines the threshold level at which institutional 
pressures are overcome and the company can adopt new initiatives or strategies that differ from 
the rest of the actors in the industry. The threshold level will be determined then by the degree of 
embeddedness in the dominant macroculture or institutional field (Webb and Pettigrew, 1999; 
Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1994). Institutional embeddedness (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; 
Greenwood et al, 2002) may encourage companies to copy other successful organisations within 
the same institutional settings (Haveman, 1993). The zones of manoeuvre available for firms are 
severely constrained by institutions (Scott, 1987). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Abrahamson and Fombrun (1994) suggest that 
embeddedness is detennined by a range of factors which include the degree of connectedness of 
an organisation to its institutional field (e. g. participating in trade or professional associations, 
facilitating and sharing infon-nation) and the perceived similarities to other members of the sector 
(e. g. similarity of education and career background of key decision makers). 
Cognitive mechanisms are also said to influence embeddedness. The concern in this 
literature is how frameworks of meaning affect individual and corporate actors as they interpret 
and make sense of their worlds (Dacin et al, 1999,2002; Zilber, 2002). Dutton and Dukerich's 
(1991) work on the Port Authority of New York sheds light on the embeddedness of that 
organisation in terms of cognitive mechanisms. They found that the attitudes and actions of both 
administrators and employees of the Authority were the outcome of moral and emotional 
concerns. The study represents an important contribution to our understanding of how normative 
and affective factors can shape organisational strategy. 
Thus far, our discussion has highlighted the importance of embeddedness and the inertial 
forces that embeddedness brings to the organisation. But firms may simply not conform to 
institutional pressures (Ang and Cummings, 1997; Westphal and Zajac, 2001). So, how can they 
avoid becoming deeply embedded in their industry macroculture? Do organisations exhibit 
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different processes of change in response to a pressing institutional context? What are the 
mechanisms of disembeddedness, or de-institutionalisation? More recent literature in this area 
has tried to answer these questions by taking a different approach towards embeddedness and the 
organisation's ability to overcome institutional pressures. Oliver (1991 and 1992) and 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) introduce a less deterministic perspective to the institutional 
literature by recognising the critical role of managerial action. 
Oliver (1991 and 1992) introduces the notion of dissipation and de-institutionalisation as 
a way of explaining the gradual deterioration in the acceptance and use of a particular 
institutionalised practice. For Oliver, characteristics of the institutional field interact with the 
internal features of an organisation. The outcome of this interaction is the possibility of breaking 
down institutionalised practices and replacing them with new ones. 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996), on the other hand, introduce a framework for 
understanding adaptation and change in which exogenous factors (such as market context and 
institutional context) are tied up with endogenous dynamics (e. g. interest values, power 
dependencies and capacity for action). If there are competing mindsets, or values and a 
fluctuating balance of power among the dominant coalition, the endogenous dynamics are 
enablers of change. Diversity among the top team - deriving from different professional 
experience and backgrounds, and even the appointment of a new CEO stimulates the flow of new 
ideas in the organisation. These mechanisms mean that an organisation is less tied down by 
prevailing archetypes (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988), less likely to accept environmental 
pressure and more likely to challenge the outer context (Westphal and Zajac, 2001). 
Analysing the change process at the institutional, organisational and strategic issue levels 
in two banks, Fox-Wolfgramm et al (1998) conclude that the 'ýprospector" bank (i. e., a dynamic 
and organic organisation) had a low level of embeddedness because of its "virtuous resistance" 
to institutional coercive and mimetic forces. This resistance helped the bank to achieve strategic 
reorientation. The "defender" bank (i. e., a less dynamic bank, focused on efficiency and 
32 
mechanic organisation), however, it was deeply rooted in the institutional context and this led the 
bank to an "aborted adaptation". Fox-Wolfgramm et al (1998) emphasise the mechanisms that 
prospector organisations need so as to avoid institutional pressures. Prospector organisations 
have low levels of formalisation and specialisation, with higher levels of decentralisation of 
decision making than their defender counterparts. 
Similarly, Zondra and Hinings (1998) develop a taxonomy of organisations in order to 
understand how they respond to violations of institutional norms. In that taxonomy, they argue 
that "renegade" organisations are those organisations operating outside institutional norms. 
Renegades have organisational diversity, are willing to take risks and respond to exogenous 
change with - if necessary - fundamental reorientations. Renegades avoid complying with 
institutional pressures. 
The neo-institutional perspective adopted by Oliver (1991 and 1992) and Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996) provides some insight into adaptation processes. This newer approach in 
institutional theory opens up the discussion of a firm's capacity for action, that is "the ability to 
manage the transition process from one template to another" (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 
1039). This capacity for action means that change, adaptation and innovative behaviour are 
possible, and avoids the rather deterministic perspective of earlier approaches in institutional 
theory in which organisations. were passive recipients of environmental pressure (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Thus, organisations can challenge the environment in which they are embedded 
by introducing new practices and strategies. 
2.6 Patterns of adaptiveness derived from the literature review 
Our review of the literatures on organisational flexibility, organisational innovativeness 
and institutional embeddedness offers insight into the determinants of organisational flexibility. 
This combined approach was needed to provide depth and scope in the study of adaptation under 
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conditions of environmental turmoil. Table 2.1 is a composite table that shows patterns of 
adaptiveness derived from the literature review. 
TABLE 2.1: PATTERNS OF ADAPTIVENESS IN THE LITERATURE REVIEW ON ORGANISATIONAL, FLEXIBILITY, 
INNOVATIVENESS AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Patterns of Adaptiveness Sources in the literature 
At the SectorlIndust? y Level Institutional Theory Literature: DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Oliver 1991 and 1992; Abrahamson and 
#Low level of embcddedness in the dominant Fornbrun, 1994; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Ang 
macroculture and Cummings, 1997; Fox-Wolfgramm et al, 1998; 
Zondra and Hinings, 1998; Webb and Pettigrew, 1999 
At the Organisational Level Literature on Organisational Flexibility: Krijnen, 
1979; Overholt, 1997; Bahrami, 1992; Galbraith, 
#Deccntralisation of decision making (through 1994; Bahrami and Evans, 1995; Volberda, 1996, 
autonomy of decision making and a flexible 1997 and1999 
organisational design) 
#Low level of formalisation of decision making Literature on Organisational Innovativeness: 
Normann, 197 1; Zaltman et al, 1973; Kanter, 1983; 
Nicholson et al, 1990; Damanpour 1991 and 1992 
At the Top Managerial Level ofthe Firm Literature on Organisational Flexibility: Adler, 1988; 
Bahrami, 1992; Volberda, 1996,1997 and 1999; 
#Heterogeneity of the dominant coalition (e. g. Heijltjes, 2000; Calori et al, 2000 
diversity of backgrounds and experience and 
cosmopolitan mindset) Literature on Organisational Innovativeness: Moch 
and Morse, 1977; Hage and Dewar, 1973; Daft, 1978; 
Kimberly and Evanisko, 198 1; Rogers, 1983; 
Damanpour, 1991 and 1996 
Institutional Theory Literature: Oliver, 1991 and 
1992; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Zondra and 
Hinings, 1998; Fox-Wolfgramm et al, 1998 
The common patterns identified in table 2.1 infonn the choice of determinants of 
organisational flexibility in this study. Our literature review and empirical evidence have 
identified five determinants of organisational flexibility. Three of them are drawn deductively 
from the literatures on organisational flexibility, innovativeness and institutional theory (see table 
2.1). These determinants are: low macroculture embeddedness; heterogeneity of the dominant 
coalition; and low degree of centralisation and formalisation of decision making. In addition, we 
are going to explore two further determinants that have emerged inductively from our empirical 
findings. These are environmental scanning and a strong organisational identity. 
The neo-institutional approach developed by Greenwood and Hinings (1996) and Oliver 
(1991 and 1992) allows us to see how low macroculture embeddedness is needed to avoid 
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mimetic and inertial forces exerted by the institutional domain. Organisations that are more 
peripheral and thus less embedded in an institutional context are less committed to prevailing 
practices and more ready to develop new ones (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). 
The literature on organisational flexibility and innovation, on the other hand, makes two 
predictions: firstly, that heterogeneity in the dominant coalition (e. g. through diverse 
backgrounds and experience) will enable different cognitive frameworks to emerge, helping 
companies navigate turbulent times and cope with change and uncertainty; and secondly, the low 
degree of centralisation and formalisation of decision making (e. g. through more autonomy and 
flat structures) are needed to adapt quickly to environmental changes (Hage and Dewar, 1973; 
Nicholson et al, 1990; Volberda, 1999). 
Finally, environmental scanning and a strong organisational identity emerged inductively 
and are elaborated in two different bodies of literature that will be analysed in chapter 10. It will 
be necessary to examine the empirical results of this research, however, in order to understand 
the extent to which the latter two determinants are significant in explaining organisational 
flexibility. 
2.7 Themes and questions for empirical research 
The competitive landscape faced by firms throughout the 1990s has become more 
uncertain (D'Aveni, 1994). In such a hyperturbulent or hypercompetitive environment 
traditional approaches to adaptation have failed because of their assumptions of stability (Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1997; Lewin et al, 1999). In our literature review we have seen how new 
concepts have emerged that reflect this highly dynamic situation (i. e., our combined approach to 
determinants of organisational flexibility, innovativeness and institutional embeddedness). 
As we have seen in this chapter, research on adaptation has been dichotomised by polar 
positions postulating either environmental determinism or managerial choice. Neither position is 
realistic and therefore cannot help to understand adaptation in a dynamic reality. We have, 
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therefore, stated how organisational flexibility is needed to adapt to rapidly changing 
environments. In particular, we have identified a possible set of determinants of organisational 
flexibility as the capabilities firms need to adapt under conditions of uncertainty. It is this theme 
that will form the basis of our empirical research. This leads to the first research question: 
-Do somefirms display moreflexibility than others in similar competitive circumstances? 
By asking this question we aim to understand the adaptive capability of organisations in a 
rapidly changing environment. Flexible fn-rns will be those that cope with acceleration of change 
in the business environment. Competitive changes force firms to move more quickly and boldly 
and to experiment with new strategies and new ways of organising. There is a sense in the 
management literature that these experiments characterise the rise of a flexible firm (Volberda, 
1999), which leads to our second and third questions: 
-"y are somefirms able to display moreflexibility? 
-And how they do it? 
If firms are consistently adapting to enviromnental pressures and leapfrogging industry 
boundaries, this would suggest that a set of determinants of organisational flexibility is 
influencing their behaviour. Throughout the literature review we have mentioned the importance 
of three elements as factors affecting how and why firms adapt. These elements are: the 
institutional pressures firms have to bear, and the managerial capabilities and organisational 
arrangements needed to confront quickly changing environments and achieve flexibility. These 
three elements trigger a set of sub-questions relating the how and why firms display flexibility, 
hence: 
How do firms cope with institutional pressure? The way institutional pressure is handled 
by firms may provide insight into why some firms comply with environmental forces while 
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others prefer to reject those forces. Particular questions concerning the link between the firms 
and their environment are: how were flexible firms able to anticipate changes in their 
environments? And did firms' macroculture embeddedness affect their response capacity, and if 
so, why? 
What are the new managerial capabilities needed in order to adapt in conditions of 
environmental turmoil? We have already mentioned the challenges companies face under these 
circumstances. In such an environment of uncertainty, if firms do not incorporate new 
managerial capabilities, it will be difficult for them to respond quickly to market changes. 
Moreover, their capacity for action will be reduced. Understanding which are the intangible 
resources (capabilities) that allow firms to cope with environmental turmoil and how these new 
capabilities influence the sensemaking of organisational issues is one of the aims of this research. 
More specific questions concerning the managerial capabilities of the companies in this research 
are: what are the demographic characteristics of the managerial team in flexible and less flexible 
companies? To what extent does the diversity of mental models enhance flexibility and why? 
What organisational arrangements enabled fast adaptive response behaviour by firms? 
Adapting the organisation to compete in hypercompetitive environments may imply that 
companies have developed new structures and organisational arrangements to bring about the 
flexibility needed to move fast. Here we are interested in analysing what the new organisational 
arrangements were and how the new arrangements have positively or negatively influenced the 
decision-making process. In particular we want to know how flexible and less flexible firms 
balanced autonomy, control and delegation. What were the main obstacles in the way of 
achieving higher degrees of decentralisation without risking loss of organisational control? 
As we have seen, there are still significant failings in the way organisational flexibility is 
investigated and operationalised. The focus of research on organisational flexibility has been 
theoretical rather than empirical. We have previously stressed the lack of empirical verification 
of the theoretical concepts presented in the literature. These shortcomings must be addressed in 
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order to pursue our research questions. These issues will be taken up in the next chapter where 
we discuss the methodology used for this research. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Three philosophical and methodological issues are central to any research study -why to 
research? what to research? and how to research? (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The first two of 
these questions were addressed in chapter 2, which culminated in the statement of our research 
questions. A further issue is analysed in this chapter: how should the research be carried out? 
The questions that we raised at the end of chapter 2 aim to guide and support the empirical 
analysis of determinants of organisational flexibility. In stating the questions we also underline 
the research strategy and design adopted in this research. We conducted the study in two main 
stages. The first one was the sectoral level of analysis and the second one - the focus of our 
analysis - the firm level. 
The first research question - do some firms display more flexibility than others in 
competitive circumstances? - involved both selecting the most appropriate industries to be 
analysed and discovering the most suitable firms for the analysis. Regarding the selection of the 
industries, a common denominator throughout the 1990s was the competitive pressure that 
affected different industries across different sectors after the opening up of the economy to 
foreign competition. The general level of foreign direct investment was therefore the main factor 
in the selection of the industries in this study. However, different industries may differ in terms 
of their degree of regulation which may considerably moderate competitive pressure in a sector 
(Smith et al, 1991). Exploring the differences between firms in extreme sectoral situations (i. e., 
regulated sectors and sectors in transition to deregulation) can shed light on different ways of 
handling institutional pressure. We therefore selected the pharmaceutical industry (i. e., in 
process of deregulation) and the edible oil industry (i. e., a deregulated industry). 
Moreover, a series of indicators was created to rank the different companies in the two 
industries according to their organisational flexibility. The indicators highlighted a group of 
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flexible and less flexible companies ftom which the firms studied in this research were chosen: 
two flexible and two less flexible firms ftorn both industries. 
The second stage of our research - the firm level of analysis - aimed to answer the other 
two broad research questions we have: why are some firms able to display more flexibility? And 
how they do it? This stage implied a deeper level of analysis using comparative case studies to 
explore the content, context and process of transformational change in the firms identified at the 
first stage (Pettigrew, 1990; Eisenhardt 1989a; Pettigrew el al, 1992). In so doing, we started to 
give shape and scope to the determinants of organisational flexibility. 
The depth of the analysis needed to understand the different determinants of 
organisational flexibility, on the other hand, also necessitated a different approach in which 
multiple methods - both qualitative and quantitative - were applied. These methods were backed 
up by the specific literatures supporting each determinant. These methods are indicated later in 
this chapter and their operationalisation explained in chapter 10. 
After this introduction, in section two the epistemological underpinning of the research is 
explained. The sections which follow focus more concretely on the research strategy and design. 
In section three the sectoral level of analysis is elaborated. Here we discuss how the industries in 
this research - pharmaceuticals and edible oils - were selected. In section three we also give 
details of the indicators used to identify firms according to their organisational flexibility in the 
industries under analysis. These indicators highlighted firms that were consistently flexible and 
less flexible over the period analysed (1989-1999). 
Section four provides an account of the firm level of analysis. We discuss the use of 
comparative case studies to understand the process of transformation of the firms. We also 
explain the process of data collection and data analysis. We briefly describe the methods used to 
analyse the determinants of organisational flexibility. Finally, section five and six state the 
limitations of the research and the conclusions respectively. 
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3.2 Epistemological underpinnings 
Traditional approaches to theory building in organisational study have tended to produce 
valuable, but nonetheless incomplete, views of organisational knowledge, mainly because they 
have been predicated predominantly on the tenents of one major paradigm (Kuhn, 1970). While 
many scholars have argued that there are all sorts of difficulties with paradigm aggrandisement 
(see Burrell and Morgan, 1979, Gioia and Pitre, 1990) by now the field recognises that the use of 
any single research paradigm produces too narrow a view to reflect the multifaceted nature of 
organisational reality. 
In this research a multiparadigm. perspective is adopted as multiparadignis allow a more 
comprehensive consideration of organisational phenomena and generate more complete 
knowledge (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Gioia and Pitre, 1990). 
The epistemological assumptions of this research seek to straddle both functionalist and 
interpretive paradigms. If one concedes that the boundaries between paradigms are blurred then 
their conception as transition zones to be bridged is facilitated by the use of second-order 
concepts (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The most useful bridge between the interpretive and 
positivist paradigms falls under the rubric of structurationism (Gioia and Pitre, 1990; Giddens, 
1979,1984). 
Giddens's structuration theory reconciles human action (in the form of structuring 
activities) and established organisational. structures, suggesting that agents pursue their own ends, 
even though their activities or inactivities might be influenced by structural precondition. 
Proponents of this theory do not treat structuring as separate from structure: they consider social 
construction together with the objective characteristics of the social world. While an account of 
the agent's activities can be built up from an interpretive analysis of the actions, such an account 
would be inadequate unless it included the factors guiding these actions and their results. 
Structuring and structure are placed on an equal footing by showing how social structures emerge 
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from structuring activities and become external and influencial on subsequent structuring 
processes. Structure is both the medium and the outcome of the interaction (Giddens, 1979). 
Giddens (1979) also argues for 'knowledgeability' of actors and for their postulated 
capacities to interpret and undertake actions. However, the possibility of accessing knowledge is 
restricted by the flaws of the same human intellectual mechanism and the intricate nature of 
phenomena (Guba and Lincoln, 1994) 
As such, the structuration theory serves as a means of bridging the gap between 
subjectivist and objectivist views by proposing a revision of the dichotomous relationship 
between the two analytic units favoured by positivist approaches: the voluntarism of individuals 
(agency) and determinism (constraining structures and systems) (Clark, 2000; Fenton, 1996). 
The net effect of this view is that structuring and structure are not seen as exclusive concepts 
simply because they reside in a different paradigm. As Gioia and Pitre (1990) phrased it, 
structuration resolves an apparent paradox between action and structure. However, critical 
assessment of the theory reveals that structuration theory seems preoccupied with social 
interaction emphasising "temporal conflation " (Clark, 2000: 69). Giddens own recommendations 
were few, beyond an artificial separation of analysis of strategic action from the analysis of social 
structure (Clark, 2000; Archer, 1988). 
Whether social reality is a steady state or rather a process of becoming (Sztompka, 1993) 
is not clarified by the structuration theory. Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that organisational 
theories have largely adopted views of reality based on assumptions of order and equilibrium 
rather than change. As we showed in Chapter 2, this is very much the case in the literature on 
inertia. However, some adaptation theories, such as the contingency theory, impose order and 
stability (Hannan, 1998; Carroll and Hannan, 2000). In this research we follow Sztompka's 
(1993) dynamic concept of the social reality. 
Sztompka (1993) develops a dynamic view of reality he calls 'social becoming'. At the 
core of the concept of social becoming lies the idea that reality is not in a steady state but in the 
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process of becoming. The notion of determinism is rejected in favour of the notion that an 
individual can initate changes in the environment - however, the environment in turn influences 
or constrains these actions (Sztompka, 1993). 
Aligning with a mixed epistemological stance (i. e., structurationism) raises important 
issues regarding suitable methodology and consequently research design choice. In this thesis, 
we give greater prominence to the strengths of the data-collection and data-analysis techniques 
with which quantitative and qualitative research are each associated and see this as capable of 
being fused. We recognise that quantitative and qualitative research may often be connected 
with distinctive epistemological and ontological assumptions but these connections are not 
viewed as fixed and ineluctable. The experience of this thesis made us view research methods as 
somewhat autonomous. 
The approach of this research means that elements of positivism and interpretivism can be 
used together. Examples of this combined approach in our research can be found in the way we 
analyse the determinants of organisational flexibility. The case of the heterogeneity of the 
dominant coalition is revealing in that it illustrates how we applied elements of the positivist and 
interpretivist approach. To understand the heterogeneity of the dominant coalition we used 
objective data sterning from our demographic analysis. However, we enhanced our demographic 
analysis with interpretive data from the interviews. In so doing, we were able to combine the 
static picture given by the quantitative data with the more processual data provided by qualitative 
data. 
The need for a multi-method research technique makes us reject epistemological 
polarities (i. e., functionalist and interpretive). The combination of qualitative and quantitative 
research also helped us to understand macro and micro levels of the phenomena. Quantitative 
analysis was more suitable for the investigation of macro phenomena in our research (i. e., such as 
the use of indicators at the sectoral level of analysis to discover flexible firms) as well as micro 
level ones (such as the analysis of some of the determinants of organisational flexibility). 
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Qualitative analysis was better suited to penetrating the meaning of micro phenomena (such as 
the stories presented in our case studies that illustrate the meaning actors attribute to the 
structural environment). 
Given the broad questions with which we started, it would have been unrealistic to expect 
one method to satisfy all the requirements. Not only was the explanation of the firm level 
features that cause the phenomena deemed important in the research, but so was the identification 
of the phenomena at the sectoral level. We have therefore tried to find flexible and less flexible 
firms. Moreover, we have also tried to reveal what determines whether a firm is flexible. 
Our epistemological stance implies a method of inquiry that is concerned with action and 
movement in the analysis of the firm (i. e., through Sztompka's, "social becoming", 1993). A 
holistic approach is also necessary to show the interaction of social actors in their context as 
another element derived from our epistemological stance (i. e., through Giddens's structuration 
theory, 1979 and 1984). The method of inquiry implied by our epistemological assumptions is 
that of contextualism derived philosophically from Pepper (1942) and theoretically and 
empirically from Pettigrew (1985,1987,1990; and 2001). 
Contextualism 
Pepper (1942) describes four "world hypotheses" or approaches to obtaining formal 
knowledge - formism., mechanism, contextualism and organicism. Central to these hypotheses is 
the notion that knowledge is acquired through the constant refinement of common sense and 
claims by criticism and improvement (Tsoukas, 1994). Pepper describes contextualism as a 
theory that is synthetic and dispersive. The theory is synthetic in that it takes as its object of 
study patterns of historical events rather than discrete facts. It is also dispersive in that it 
considers the historical events as loosely structured rather than connected by 'lawful 
relationships' (Tsoukas, 1994). 
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The strength of contextualism is that the focus on the historical event can help the 
researcher to understand the regularities and deep structures in the events analysed. This theory 
of method conceives of the understanding of phenomena as holistic in nature. Contextualism not 
only attempts to identify the influence of the environment but also tries to understand the intra- 
organisational features. By realising the complexity of reality, it gives a role to both points of 
view. Organisations are embedded in an environment that conditions their actions and 
performance but, at the same time, gives managers the possibility of acting and reacting under 
environmental pressure. In other words, there is room for managerial or strategic choice (Child, 
1972), for action and context (Pettigrew et al, 2001). Contextualism is a bridge between those 
theories emphasising environmental determinism and managerial choice. 
One of the first and most thoughtful attempts to understand organisational change 
according to the contextualist framework was the work done by Pettigrew (1985) in ICI. 
Pettigrew proposes a holistic and contextualist analysis of organisational phenomena. This 
implied two different analyses: a vertical (or multilevel) analysis and a horizontal (or 
longitudinal) analysis. The multilevel perspective tries to grasp the intertwined existence of 
different levels of analysis: the impact of the economy, the sectoral perspective, and features of 
individual finns. Longitudinal analysis, on the other hand, aims to analyse the past, present and 
future of the phenomena. It is concerned with both the content and action. Holism is achieved 
by overlaying horizontal and vertical levels of analysis, the two being interconnected through 
time. 
A multiple level of analysis is required to show how firms shape their organisational 
flexibility. Understanding the transformation of the firms from a multilevel perspective sheds 
light on the historical, organisational and economic roots from which it emerged (Pettigrew and 
Whipp, 1991). Pettigrew (1985), however, points out that because phenomena are studied in the 
context of interconnected levels of analysis, the researcher must clearly delineate these levels. 
These levels of analysis are explained below. 
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In order to be aware of the business system in which finns run their business it is 
important to recognise those factors (i. e., institutional or cultural) that either restrict or support 
businesses in a particular country. In his examination of organisations from both a postmodern 
and new organisational economics position, Clark (2000) states the importance of the study of 
national factors. Institutionalist (Whitley, 2000) and culturalist approaches (Hofstede, 1991) 
also stress the importance of studying national contexts because nations shape organisational 
action. In the particular case of Argentina, the process of the opening up of the economy to 
foreign competition, the privatisation programme and political reform were fundamental factors 
that disrupted the national business environment during the 1990s (see chapter 4). 
The sectoral level, on the other hand, has an immediate impact on the organisational life 
and performance of the companies (Pettigrew, 1990; McGahan and Porter, 1997). In the case of 
the industries analysed in this research, edible oils and pharmaceuticals were affected by a 
process of deregulation that either impinged on the companies directly (such as the 
pharmaceutical industry) or indirectly (in the case of the edible oil industry) (see chapter 5). 
Finally, the firm level of analysis - the main unit of analysis in this research - allowed us 
to further our understanding of organisational flexibility by looking at the transformation 
companies underwent (see chapter 6 ato 9). 
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FIGURE 3.1: MULTIPLE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS IN THIS RESEARCH' 
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Different levels of analysis also make it possible to answer different questions and reveal 
different causal factors. Examination of the outer context (i. e., the national, sector and industry 
levels of analysis) raises questions about how high levels of competitiveness may affect the 
capacity of firms to adapt, transform and achieve flexibility. Similarly, levels of regulation may 
explain whether organisational. flexibility is influenced by intermediary agents. The inner 
context, on the other hand, will reveal the process of transformation within the firm. The 
analysis of different internal processes such as managerial, structural and cultural transformations 
may shed light on the determinants of organisational flexibility (Volberda, 1996,1999; Djelic 
and Ainamo, 1999). 
Temporal interconnectedness becomes a critical part of the analysis in that it helps to 
explain how the national business environment the industry and the inner context of the firm 
interact and interrelate. Pettigrew et al (2001: 699) indicates that one major question for the 
researcher is "how to incorporate time, history, process, and action in the study oforganizational 
change ". 
I Source: Pettigrew, 1990; Pettigrew, 1992a 
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Pettigrew et al (2001) also highlight the importance of history in understanding the 
process of transformation of firms and therefore avoid ahistorical, acontextual and aprocessual 
approaches characteristic of cross sectional methods that collect and analyse data from a single 
point of view and time (Pettigrew, 1985; Huber and Van de Ven, 1995; Garvin, 1998). But 
history should not be understood as a mere chronology or just the telling of a story. History 
should reveal deeper organisational pathways. Retrospective and real time analyses are 
necessary to capture time (Pettigrew, 1990; Clark, 2000). 
We need to analyse how issues and factors unfold and interact over time to be able to 
understand the development of the determinants of a firm's flexibility. The examination of the 
past may reveal the critical role the founder's set of beliefs plays in the future success of the 
firms. Initial strategic and organisational choices may reveal how and why firms adapted in the 
way they did. The different strategic initiatives undertaken over time may indicate the firrns' 
possibilities for growth. 
In the following sections (3.3 and 3.4) we discuss in detail the sectoral and firm level of 
analysis. We examine the way industries and firms of this analysis were chosen and the 
comparative case study undertaken to understand the process of transformation of the firms. This 
is important because the process of transformation provides insight into the determinants of a 
firm's flexibility. 
3.3 Sectoral level of analysis 
Sector sample selection 
The pharmaceutical and edible oil industries were both chosen as sites of this research 
primarily as a result of the strong competitive pressures to which these industries were subject 
during the 1990s. The level of competition they faced during this period is indicated by the 
general level of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the degree of regulation (CEP, 1998). 
48 
The impact of FDI on the host economy was widely analysed in the literature on 
multinationals (hereafter MNQ (Hood and Young, 1979; Helleiner, 1990; Porter, 1990; Jenkins, 
1991; Dunning, 1993 and 1997; Jones, 1996 among others). Dunning (1993) points out that FDI 
can contribute as a creator and organiser of technological capacity, as an upgrader of human 
resources and the general welfare state. Competition might rise if FDI goes to a sector with the 
aim of enhancing it with innovative activities and capabilities. 
However, FDI can also harm indigenous businesses. Porter (1990) demonstrates how 
foreign companies have driven out local car manufacturers in the British car industry. Sectoral 
concentration might be another outcome of FDI flowing into a sector (Evans, 1976 a&b; 
Blomstrom, 1986, Cho, 1989; Aswicahyono et al, 1995). 
The Argentinian economy received substantial levels of foreign investment which 
changed the internal dynamic of both the pharmaceutical and edible oil industries in terms of the 
new companies entering the industry and the levels of competition and efficiency (Helleiner, 
1990; Dunning, 1993). In the 1990s, Argentina became the destination for the second largest 
amount of FDI in Latin America after Mexico (Touldn and Guill6n, 1997). The food and 
pharmaceutical sectors are among those that received most FDI in the country (see table 3.1). 
Other sectors which received a high level of FDI - such as communication (whose inward 
investments were more than a quarter of total FDI in the period 1990-1998), banking and TV - 
were rejected because survival rates of indigenous businesses were too low, thus making 
comparison very difficult if not impossible (see table 3.1). 
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TAMP I I- lý-AVVIVrrIT7Y%TWART)TNTVPITMFNITPFR VPrTC)R 1()()0-19()92 
Industry Percentage Inward Investmene 
Communication* 25.62% 
Banking and Financial Services" 16.60% 
Food and Beverages 12.03% 
TV* 11.58% 




Cellulose and Paper 3.70% 
F-Aut-omotive 3.50% 
* No Indigenous businesses among the 20 largest companies in terms of turnover 
**Only one indigenous bank among the 20 largest companies in terms of turnover 
***This does not include the acquisition in 2000 by Repsol of YPF (the Argentinian Petrol Company). 
The level of regulation of the industries, on the other hand, illustrates how regulatory 
agencies act to mediate competitive pressures, thereby protecting the firms from competition and 
market forces. As the environment in which companies operate becomes more deregulated, it 
provides them with greater freedom to transform their organisation by adapting to environmental 
changes. Thus, the level of regulation in an industry can shape the demands for organisational 
flexibility in a firm (Grabowsky et aL, 1978; Mahon and Murray, 1981; Smith and Grimm, 
1987). With this in mind, two industries, one regulated but in transition towards deregulation 
(pharmaceuticals) and one deregulated (edible oils-within the food sector) were selected. 
Indicators to identify flexible and less flexible firms 
Having decided on the most suitable industries for the analysis, it was also necessary to 
build a set of indicators to identify the companies in the different industries according to their 
level of organisational flexibility. We focused our analysis on indigenous family-owned 
businesses following two criteria: firstly we wanted to analyse firms in which the process of 
transformation was clearly observable, as in the case of family-owned firms in the 1990s; and 
secondly, we also wanted to control some of the possible sources of variation in our analysis by 
having a homogeneous sample of firms such as family-owned firms. 
2 Source of information: CEP, 1998 
3 The percentage takes into account the process of merger undertaken by MNC companies. However, the inflow of 
foreign investment coming from the privatisation process was not taken into consideration because it was mainly 
directed towards state owned businesses. 
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Regarding the first criteria, Pettigrew (1990: 275) advises that "if the phenomena to be 
observed have to be contained within a single or relatively small number of cases then choose 
cases where the progress is transparently observable". The competitive pressures in Argentina 
throughout the 1990s affected mainly family-owned businesses. Family-owned firms used to be 
the main organisational form operating in the country (Kosacoff, 2000; CEP, 1998)4. The 
companies had to transform their core activities to be able to compete efficiently with MNC 
companies in a market that suddenly opened up (CEP, 1998 and 1999; Gonzdlez Garcia et al, 
1999). 
Concerning the second criteria, we selected a homogenous sample of firms (i. e., 
indigenous family-owned businesses) as a way of controlling sources of variance stemming from 
the nature of the firms' ownership and mission (Ward, 1987). Neubauer and Lank (1998) 
indicate that the type of ownership and management differentiate family firms from other firms, 
therefore making family firms distinguishable from other organisations yet comparable with 
them. Thus, selecting a homogeneous sample (i. e., indigenous family-owned firms) makes it 
possible to understand and compare the process of transformation of the companies and 
consequently the determinants of organisational flexibility. 
Relying on a single indicator to select the companies for a comparative study can be 
problematic. Problems arise because of the different nature of the industries in which companies 
operate, making it difficult to generalise the use of an indicator for different industries. In the 
light of this argument, this thesis adopted a combined approach in which a set of indicators 
deriving from the literature on organisational innovativeness and flexibility were chosen. The 
indicators selected were: product innovation; collaboration and partnerships; and 
internationalisation and diversification (see table 3.2). 
4 Poza (1995) states that at the beginning of the 1990s, more than 80% of the firms in Argentina were family-owned. 
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TABLE 3.2: INDICATORS OF ORGANISATIONAL FLEXIBILITY IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL AND EDIBLE OIL INDUSTRIES 
General Indicator Customised indicators Custornised indicators Sources 
used in the used in the edible oil 
Pharmaceutical industry 
industry 
Product Innovation -Product innovation in -Product innovation Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 
(innovation traditional (branding) 1995 
capacity) pharmaceutical products Brown and Eisenhardt, 
-Product innovation in 1997 
non-traditional Jonsson, 2000 
pharmaceutical products 
Collaboration and -Collaboration and -Collaboration and Bahrami, 1992 
Partnerships partnerships with local partnerships with local Liebeskind et al, 1996 
competitors of foreign competitors of foreign Regner, 2000; 
players. players. Birkinshaw, 2000 
Pettigrew and Fenton, 
2000 
Intemationalisation -Intemationalisation -Intcmationalisation Aaker and Mascarenhas, 
1984 
Diversification -Diversification -Diversification Ansoff, 1988 
Webb and Pettigrew, 
1999 
In the pharmaceutical industry, the importance of product innovation is self-evident. All 
the patent law battles in emerging economies aim to protect inventions (Watal and Mathai, 1995). 
The pharmaceutical industry, as the report of the Boston Consultancy Group (BCG, 1999) points 
out, has historically based its competitive advantage on discovering blockbuster drugs and 
innovating and developing new products. This assertion makes it important to clarify that, except 
for few countries in the world, the vast majority of countries do not have companies that can 
afford to invest in the research and development (R&D) necessary to discover blockbuster drugs. 
In 1994, taking into consideration the first ten companies in the industry worldwide in terms of 
turnover, the average R&D investment was 15.72% of the turnover, representing nearly US$ 1 
billion. In Argentina over a similar period of time, the percentage invested in R&D was 2% and 
a leading company was investing approximately US$ 4 million yearly (BCG, 1999; Gonzilez 
Garcia et al, 1999). 
Product innovation is therefore understood as the ability to develop and release products 
onto the market. We did not look to companies that create blockbuster drugs. The BCG (1999) 
report also suggests that the challenge for companies in the future is not only to invest in 
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traditional pharmaceuticals, but also in other areas. Accordingly, we also sought companies that 
were increasingly investing outside traditional pharmaceutical products and towards, for 
example, genomic medicine and biotechnology. 'Ihe BCG reports that genomic medicine and 
biotechnology are the future drivers of the pharmaceutical industry. 
Partnerships and collaborations are also mentioned by the BCG report (1999) as an 
important aspect of the pharmaceutical industry, as a way pharmaceutical industries have of 
improving their ability to manage activities externally. The report, nevertheless, stresses the 
importance of partnerships for research, while in emerging economies in which research is not 
the most important activity of pharmaceutical companies, partnerships and collaboration should 
be defined as commercialisation (Gonzilez Garcia et al, 1999). Therefore, we sought to find 
companies that collaborated with local and/or foreign counterparts in strategic alliances, licensing 
or other types of venture. 
Internationalisation and diversification were common strategies used in the industry and 
helped to explain early adoption of strategies (Gonzdlez Garcia et al, 1999; Verriengo, 1992). 
These two strategies were the most regularly cited by the Corporate Research Foundation (1999) 
as relevant types in the 1990s. While internationalisation means "to increase the geographic 
scope of the firm's activities outside its home nation " (Webb, 1999: 72) (i. e., in the 
pharmaceutical industry through opening up companies or commercialising a product abroad), 
diversification "involves actions that increased or decreased the product/market scope of the 
firm's activities within its home nation" (Webb, 1999: 72) (i. e., in the pharmaceutical industry 
through mergers, acquisitions and investing in businesses along the value chain - such as retail, 
and biotechnology projects, among others). 
In the case of the edible oil industry, product development (branding) is mentioned as an 
important indicator of innovative ability of firms in the food sector and edible oil industry. 
Product development in these industries helps companies to achieve more market share and 
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consumer loyalty. We therefore sought to find companies that had introduced new products onto 
the market (Heijbroek et al, 1995). 
Collaboration and partnerships in the edible oil industry should take into consideration the 
peculiarities of the industry. In the edible oil industry, collaboration between companies is rare. 
Therefore, we sought to investigate the ties the companies in this industry had at the different 
stages of the chain of value (i. e., with farmers - such as long term contracts, financing or 
supplying raw materials; with suppliers - transport, port agreements; and with customers 
(Kethelhohn et al, 1998)). 
Diversification and intemationalisation also emerged as two strong indicators of 
organisational flexibility. Regarding the diversification activities of edible companies, vertical 
integration was the most relevant during the 1990s (Herranz, 1999). The internationalisation 
character of a food company, on the other hand, is a major feature of the industry, with foreign 
markets largely responsible for a substantial part of the turnover (Ketelhohn et al, 1998). The 
companies in the edible oil industry were essentially export-oriented. We examined the 
companies' international strategies through the setting up of new facilities or commercial offices 
abroad. 
A list of the indigenous family-owned companies among the first twenty firms in the 
pharmaceutical and edible oil industries was compiled and ranked so as to reflect their 
organisational flexibility according to the indicators shown in table 3.2. Eight companies were 
indigenous family-owned businesses in the pharmaceutical industry whereas, three companies 
were family businesses and nationally owned in the edible oil industry (see table 3.3 and 3.4). 
The indicators revealing organisational flexibility - product innovation, collaboration and 
partnerships, and internationalisation and diversification - were measured as high, medium and 
low, and the companies were ranked accordingly. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the criteria used to 
allocate the measures of high, medium and low to the different indicators in the different firms. 
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TABLE 3.3: A CLASSIFICATION OF INDIGENOUS FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESSES ACCORDING TO THEIR ORGANISATIONAL 
FLEXIBILITY: THE CASE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
General 
Indicators 





















Sidus High (3) High (3) High (3) High (3) High (3) 15 
Bago High (3) Low (1) High (3) High (3) High (3) 13 
Roemmers Medium (2) Low (1) High (3) High (3) High (3) 12 
Temis Lostalo Medium (2) Low (1) High (3) Medium (2) Low (1) 9 
Phoenix Medium (2) 1 Low (1) High (3) Medium (2) Low (1) 9 
Casasco Medium (2) Low (1) Medium (2) Medium (2) Low (1) 8 
Beta High (3) Low (1) Medium (2) Low (1) Low (1) 8 
Andr6maco Low (1) Low (1) Medium (2) Low (1) Medium (2) 7 
TABLE 3.4: A CLASSIFICATION OF INDIGENOUS FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESSES ACCORDING TO THEIR ORGANISATIONAL 
FLEXIBILITY: THE CASE OF THE EDIBLE OIL INDUSTRY 
General Product Collaborations Diversification Internationalisation Total 
Indicator Innovation and 
Partnership 
Indicatorsfor edible Branding Collaborations Diversification Internationalisation Out of 12 possible 
oil industry and points 
partnerships Company 
AGD High (3) High (3) High (3) High (3) 12 
Vicentin Low (1) Medium (2) Medium (2) Medium (2) 8 




TABLE 3.5: OPERATIONALISATION OF THE INDICATORS USED TO DISCOVER FLEXIBLE FIRMS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 
Indicator High Medium Low Source 
Measure 
Product innovation Release of at least Release one Release one IMS, 1999 
in traditional one product per product in more product in 50% 
pharmaceutical therapeutic class than 50% of the or less of the 
industry per year therapeutic classes therapeutic 
per year classes per year 
Product innovation Research and Research and Do not do Gonzilez: Garcia 
in non-traditional development of development of research or et al, 1999 
pharmaceutical biotechnological biotechnological develop Claves, 1999 
industry products products in biotechnological 
preliminary phase products 
Collaborations and -Strategic alliances -Co-Marketing -No BCG, 1999 
Partnerships or agreements or collaborations or Gonzilez Garcia 
-Licensing -Licensing partnerships et al, 1999 
agreements and agreements Manzone, 2000 
-Commercial 
agreements in the 
distribution 
channel 
Diversification Companies Companies Companies IMS, 1999 
participating in the participating in focus on one Gonzilez Garcia 
whole chain of part of the value activity et al, 1999 




Internationalisation -Branches in most -Branches or -Lack of foreign Claves, 1999 important regional investments in investments or; Gonzilez: Garcia 
markets (i. e., medium or small -Less than 10% et al, 1999 
Brazil, Mexico) or regional markets of turnover in BCG, 1999 
-Licensing (i. e., Chile, foreign sales 
agreements to sell Uruguay) or; 
own products or; -Between 10 and 
-30% or more of 30% of turnover 
the firm's turnover stemming from 
coming from foreign sales 
foreign sales f 
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TABLE 3.6: OPERATIONALISATION OF THE INDICATORS TO DISCOVER FLEXIBLE FIRMS IN THE EDIBLE OIL INDUSTRY 
Indicator High Medium Low Sources 
Measure 
Branding -Release of brands -Release of brands -Not 
of edible oils or of edible oils or participating in Heijbroek et al, 
derived products derived products the branding 1995 
(i. e., mayonnaise, (i. e., mayonnaise, market or Gutman and 
soyajuices) and soya juices) and -Release of Feldman, 1990 
-Obtaining a -Obtaining a brands of edible CEP, 1999 
market share of market share oils or derived 
15% or more between 10% and products (i. e., 
15% mayonnaise, 
soya juices) and 
-Obtaining a 
market share of 
less than 10% 
Collaboration and -Agreements -Agreements -No agreements Hcijbrock et al, 
Partnerships between the between the to collaborate 1995 
company and company and CEP, 1999 
fan-ners (i. e., farmers or 





suppliers (i. e., 
transport and 
distribution) 
Diversification -Company -Company -Company Rabobank, 1997 
participating in all participating in focusing on one and 1998 
the stages of the some of the stages stage of the CEP, 1999 
chain of value (i. e., of the value chain value chain 




Internationalisation -Company that is -Company that -Companies that Vcrheijen and 
opening up either opened up did not have Jimmink, 1995 
branches or branches or branches or Rabobank, 1997 
facilities in foreign facilities abroad facilities abroad CEP, 1999 
countries and or that managed and that 
-Companies that their own trading outsourccd their 
managed their own trading 
trading I I II 
In tables 3.5 and 3.6 we show how the measures of high, medium and low were allocated 
to the indicators in the different companies. In most of the indicators, industry studies showed 
how these measures should be allocated. However, industry or sectoral reports left some gaps 
the researcher had to fill using different criteria. 
In the pharmaceutical industry, studies are clear about how innovative (high, medium or 
low) a company should be considered to be in terms of traditional and non-traditional 
pharmaceutical products, or which company should be considered as highly diversified or not 
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(IMS, 1999; Gonzilez Garcia et al, 1999; BCG, 1999). However, we had to fill some gaps in the 
way we allocated the different measures in two of the indicators: collaborations and partnerships, 
and internationalisation. 
Industry reports in the pharmaceutical industry (i. e., BCG, 1999) state that strategic and 
network alliances are the deepest and most sophisticated type of collaboration in pharmaceutical 
firms (BCG, 1999: 15,26). Gonzilez Garcia et al, (1999) underline that, in the case of the 
pharmaceutical industry in Argentina, strategic alliances are rare and licence agreements or co- 
marketing agreements are to be found. Gonzilez Garcia et al (1999) also point out that 
commercial partnerships are important in Argentina at the level of the distribution channel. If a 
company had a strategic alliance or licence agreements and also a commercial agreement in the 
distribution chain we classified the indicator as high. When a firm had co-marketing agreements 
(because a co-marketing agreement implies a lower level of commitment than a licence 
agreement) or if the finn had licence agreements we considered that indicator as medium. When 
we could not find any type of collaboration or partnership we classified the indicator in that 
company as low. 
The case of how to measure the internationalisation of the firms proved to be difficult to 
solve because there are different ways of doing this. However, the different approaches are not 
opposed but complement each other. Some studies, for example, suggest that companies with 
licence agreements to sell their own products can be considered to have a highly international 
presence (BCG, 1999). Others considered that for Argentinian firins to be considered 
international, they should have a substantial presence in the most important markets (i. e., Brazil 
and Mexico) (GonzAlez Garcia et al, 1999). Finally, an industry report (Claves; 1999) suggests 
that Argentinian pharmaceutical firms can be labelled international if 30% or more than their 
income stems from foreign sales while firms with less than 10% of their turnover stemming from 
international sales may be considered local firms with a low level of international exposure. We 
have taken the different recommendations of the industry reports into consideration when 
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choosing which firms may be deemed as having high, medium or low levels of 
internationalisation, as shown in table 3.5. 
In the case of the edible oil industry, the only indicator that had to be developed for the 
researcher was collaboration and partnerships. Ketelhohn et al's (1998) study of the industry in 
the Mercosur area highlighted a tendency for firms to collaborate all along the value chain, with 
farmers at the beginning of the chain and suppliers at the other end. Some industry reports 
underline that the most common way of collaborating in the industry is mainly with farmers to 
avoid problems with the stocks of seeds to process (Ketelhohn et al, 1998; Heijbroek et al, 1995; 
CEP, 1999). Finns with collaboration and partnerships with both farmers and suppliers were 
classified as high; firms with either collaboration (i. e., either farmers or suppliers) were classified 
as medium. Finally, when we could not find any type of collaboration or partnership we 
classified the indicator in that company as low. 
3.4 Firm level of analysis 
Comparative and longitudinal case studies: Polar types 
The next stage of our research strategy required an investigation into what has caused the 
firms to develop a set of flexible capabilities to adapt fast when environmental change occurs. 
The case study method was selected as the most appropriate approach for exploring the 
processual and contextual factors that have influenced a firm's organisational flexibility. 
Moreover, our case studies are accounts of the transformation process of the companies because 
this process sheds light on the determinants of organisational flexibility (Volberda, 1999). 
A case study, as Eisenhardt (1989a: 534) states, is "a research strategy which focuses on 
understanding the dynamics present within single settings. " Berg (1979) explains the advantage 
of using case studies to grasp the complexity of change processes. Since the focus of our case 
studies is the account of the transformation process of the companies, this is relevant. Berg 
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(1979) points out that case studies permit a large number of variables to be studied and this is 
important for understanding the complexity of change and transformation. Secondly, he 
indicates that because of the political and emotional charge of the process of change and in order 
to comprehend the full meaning of change within an organisation, case studies allow the 
researcher to go inside the organisational dynamics and to uncover some of these dynamics. 
Yin (1994) suggests that when one is trying to answer 'how' and 'why' questions, the 
case study method is the most suitable. When 'how' and 'why' questions are being asked, it is 
because the researcher knows little about the process (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Langley, 1999) or when 
there is little control over the process (Yin, 1994). 
As Eisenhardt argues (1989a), the use of case studies can also help build theory. She 
points out that the strengths of building theory from case studies are its originality, the testability 
and empirical validity. Hence, the case study method seems to be the most appropriate to apply 
to this research due to the fact that so few studies seek to understand the determinants - of 
organisational flexibility. 
In line with Pettigrew's (1990) and Eisenhardt's (19 89a) advice, in this study we chose to 
conduct longitudinal and comparative case studies of polar types. Due to the limited number of 
cases - four in total - it makes sense to choose polar types as case studies as they reflect opposite 
extremes of the phenomena to be studied (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Pettigrew, 1990). Furthermore, 
given the time constraints, it would not be feasible to carry out more than four case studies in 
enough detail for a doctoral thesis. 
In the ranking shown in tables 3.3 and 3.4, Sidus (pharmaceuticals) and AGD (edible oils) 
emerged as the most flexible companies. Andr6maco (pharmaceuticals) and Buyatti (edible oils) 
on the other hand turned out to be the least flexible firms. Buyatti, however, was replaced by 
Vicentin because in November 2000 Buyatti went bankrupe, therefore making it difficult to gain 
access to both information and key informants for interviews. Figure 3.2 shows the flexible and 
5 In La Naci6n Newspaper. 10/11/2000. Section: Economy-Companies 
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less flexible firms in both the pharmaceutical and edible oil industries. Table 3.7 shows the 
companies' profile. 





Pharmaceutical Industry Edible Oil Industry 
Highly Flexible Companicý 
I 
Degree of Flexibility 
I 
Less Flexible Companies 
SIDUS GD 
Aceitera Gf eral Deheza 
ANDR6MACO VICENTIN 
(Opi ces Buyatti) 
TABLE 3.7: COMPANIES' PROFILE7 
Company Industry Related Businesses Employees Turnover 
(1999) (1999) in US$ 
millions 














Andr6maco Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceutical products 342 48.2 
(mainly dermatological 
products) 
6 The arrows indicates the comparisons undertaken in this research 7 Companies' data 
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Data Collection 
Timeframe ofthe study 
When did the process of transformation begin in the firms under study? What time frame 
is the most appropriate to understand the way flexible capabilities developed? Given that there is 
not an absolute answer, the researcher must be guided by pragmatic considerations in order to 
clarify the beginning and the end of the analysis. Our time frame focused on major social 
breakpoints (Pettigrew, 1990; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). As the national business 
environment and industry analyses show (Chapter 4 and 5 respectively), 1991 was a period of 
major social and economic transformation. 
Longitudinal data about the transformation process in the four companies was collected 
covering the firms' activities over the period 1989-1999. While 1991 represents the opening up 
of the Argentinian economy and the starting point of market liberalisation in Argentina, 1989 is a 
critical year for the whole economy - the peak of the 1980s economic crisis. 
Pettigrew (1990: 271) shows the importance of clarifying the beginning and end of the 
process that will be analysed: "there is a crucial issue of the time and perspective. Time sets a 
frame of reference for what changes are seen and how those changes are explained". A 
retrospective analysis of the firms was also carried out so the research could grasp the succession 
of events that triggered the radical changes in the firms over the 1990s and the factors that made 
firms adapt to the sudden environmental shifts in the 1990s. 
Access 
Gaining access turned out to be a challenging experience. The main problem we 
encountered was the lack of experience companies in Argentina had of cooperating with business 
researchers. The second problem stemmed from the character of the firms analysed. As Litz 
(1997) states, one of the problems associated with studying family companies is information 
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disclosure. Looking at the development of family businesses can be seen by family members as 
spying on family affairs. This is why much care was taken with the negotiation of access to the 
companies. The fact that the researcher is working in a leading business school in Latin America 
facilitated access. That fact reassured the companies of the academic purpose of the study. 
In AGD the initial contact was made with one of the Directors that the researcher 
previously knew. An internal contact was provided to arrange the interviews with the managers. 
In Sidus the initial contact was a family member who held an important managerial position. 
The interviewees were arranged by the initial contact. 
In Andr6maco, the first contact was the CEO and the one that helped in arranging the 
interviews. In Vicentin the Finance Manager was the initial contact. This contact was provided 
by AGD. 
Between the two flexible companies, Sidus proved to be more difficult in terms of getting 
access. The fact that Sidus was competing in an industry that was going through a process of 
deregulation made the company more suspicious about the aims of the research. A two page 
statement was sent in July 2000 to the Board of Directors, specifying the objectives of the 
research and the data needed (see annex 1). Before its approval was received a telephone 
conference about the proposal was held between the researcher and two members of the Board of 
Directors. Two days later, an e-mail was received saying that the proposal for the research in 
Sidus was approved. 
Of the less flexible companies, it was most difficult to gain access to Vicentin. Only after 
AGD provided the researcher with an internal contact was it possible to start the dialogue with 
Vicentin. Previous attempts to establish contact were ignored or rejected. 
An important issue in negotiating access with the firms was what the researcher said 
about the aims of the project. It would have been impossible for us to disclose the overriding 
intention of the research project, i. e. analysing the determinants of organisational flexibility in 
flexible and less flexible firms. The less flexible firms of this study would have surely refused to 
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participate in the study. Therefore, the researcher conveyed the same message to all four 
companies, i. e. that the study would focus on the transformation process of the firms over the 
1990s. By saying this, it made it possible for Andr6maco and Vicentin (the less flexible firms) to 
agree to participate in the study. 
As Pettigrew (1997) argues, ethics are crucial in all research. We were aware of the 
importance of disclosing the real aim of the research to the less flexible firms in order to avoid 
breaching the moral basis of this research. However, it took us time to unveil our real objective 
and this was done once we were sure that our link with the host case study organisation was 
strong enough to avoid discouraging the firms from continuing with the research. 
On a practical level, access to individuals for the four case studies was negotiated by 
exploiting networks as fully as possible. While in AGD and Sidus the process was fairly smooth 
once access to the company had been granted, in the case of Vicentin and Andromaco it proved 
more difficult. Secretaries turned out to be extremely useful gatekeepers. The good relationship 
established by the researcher with the Board's assistants and secretaries in Vicentin and 
Andr6maco was crucial when it came to arranging the interviews. In most cases, the secretaries 
arranged appointments without previous contact by the researcher with the interviewee. 
While carrying out the interviews the researcher also had the opportunity to participate in 
managerial meetings (Sidus and AGD), lunch with managers (in all four companies), spend 
weekends with the family (Sidus), and attend the companies' annual meetings (Sidus and 
Andr6maco). This type of access was helpful due to the fact that in a relaxed setting, people 
seemed more predisposed to speak freely. 
Data types 
The case study phase involved three main sources of data collected from the companies: 
in-depth interviews; documentary and archival material; and quantitative and statistical material. 
This triangulated methodology is useful as Pettigrew (1990: 277) indicates: "To draw on the 
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particular and different strengths of various data collection methods. " Different types of data 
can be used as cross checks. The collection of data was an iterative process, with two or more 
types of data being collected more or less at the same time. 
Interviews and Interviewees 
One of the most common methods used in fieldwork to further the understanding of a 
situation is interviewing (Fontana and Frey, 1994). There are various ways of conducting 
interviews. We decided to use in-depth semi-structured interviews, distinguishing this type of 
interviews from the structured and unstructured (Berg, 1979; Fontana and Frey, 1994). The 
table below compares the main differences between the three of them. The description of the 
semi-structured interviews shown in the table is an indication of the form a semi-structured 
interview took in this research. 
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TABLE 3.8: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURED. SEMI-STRUCTURED AND UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEWS. 
Structured Semi-Structured Unstructured 
Aim to be Explain a situation with Grasp and explain complex Understand behaviour or 
achieved objectivity. Minimise behaviour or situations. situations without imposing 
mistakes. categorisations. The aim is to 
be completely open to what 
I the data had to say. 
Questions Pre-establishcd. All Open-ended. Set of questions Open-ended. Basic and 
respondents receive same that will guide the interview. general questions. Let the 
set of questions. Interview pro-forma. interviewee talk. No pre- 
established techniques. 
Answer Limited set of categories Open answers. The No rules. The respondent 
(i. e.; strongly agree, agree, researcher can intervene to guides the conversation. 
disagree). focus the answer. 
Tape Yes/No Yes Yes/No 
Recording 
Role of -Controlling the pace of the -Sornewhat directive and -Non-directive and non- 
Interviewer interview. controlling. controlling. 
-Do not get involved, -Interviewer has to be flexible -Immersing and interacting in 
neutrality and facelessness. and at the same time the field. Involvement. 
-Follow sequence objective. Also a good 
-No particular features listener. 
required in the interviewer. 
Examples Interview generally related Contextualist empirical Ethnographic interview and 
to surveys. Research on research on organisational participant observation. 
adaptation and change change (Pettigrew, 1985; Research on cultural change 
coming from evolutionary Pettigrew and Whipp, 199 1; followed the ethnographic 
and/or population ecologist Newman and Nollen, 1998). interview tradition (Gregory, 
(Miller and Friesen, 1980; Also Gersick, 1994; Berg, 1983, Pettigrew, 1979. See 
Carroll and Hannan, 2000). 1979). also Van Maanen, 1988). 
Limitations Interviewee behaviour, The questions might not fit or Influence of the interviewer 
omission of information cannot be answered with the may bring bias by 
(because of the limited depth the research needs in exaggerated involvement. 
categories to answer); order to undertake an 
features of the analysis. 
questionnaire that can omit 
important aspects of the 
field under study. 
Interviews in thefieldwork 
A total of fifty-nine interviews were held in the companies. Pluralism in the selection of 
the interviewees was considered important because people from different levels of the 
organisation's hierarchy can offer accounts of the transformation in their companies from 
different perspectives (Pettigrew, 1990). Accordingly, people affected by the transformation 
process -managers and employees, family and non-family members - and those initiators of 
strategic initiatives that entailed a shift in the core activities of the companies were interviewed 
(see table 3.9). 
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Although pluralistic, we are aware of some limitations of the sample. The limitations 
arose from the fact that in some firms the number of family members in the interview process 
was greater than in others, so the data obtained may be biased by family opinions and 
perceptions. The size of the sample is also another potential limitation. 
Regarding the first limitation, there are important differences between Vicentin, for 
example, in which we interviewed seven family members, and Andr6maco, in which we 
interviewed only three family members. However, these differences were difficult to avoid when 
some of the companies - such as Vicentin - have a high proportion of family members in the 
operation. The size of the sample (fifteen interviews in each companies, except for Vicentin in 
which we undertook fourteen) might also be criticised for being too small to deduce significant 
conclusions regarding the process of transformation and the determinants of organisational 
flexibility. However we believe that with those interviews that we did, we reached theoretical 
saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) because we were able to obtain data about the 
transformation of the firms from different points of views and levels of the organisation. More 
interviews would not have enhanced our data or changed it. 
TABLE 3.9: INTERVIEWS IN THE DIFFERENT COMPANIES ANALYSED 















AGD 4 6 4 1 15 5 10 




61 61 0 1 15 1 31 12 
Vicentin 6 13 8 0 14 7 7 
*These are also part of the Board of Directors 
Before starting the interview the nature of the research project and the purpose of the 
interview were explained. In presenting the research aims we guaranteed the academic purpose 
of the interviews and the confidentiality of the information to be recorded. It was also a 
deliberate attempt to start to break the ice before the interview started. As Fontana and Frey 
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(1994) point out, the initial introduction leaves a profound impression on the interviewee and can 
determine the successful outcome of the interview. 
The first part of the interview was also deliberately organised so as to gain the 
interviewee's trust. Trust was considered essential to the success of the interview. We bore this 
in mind throughout the whole interview. Asking general questions about the background of the 
interviewee, his/her career and position in the company, and even past experience was helpful as 
a warm-up. 
Subsequently, questions were asked relating to the importance of the challenges faced by 
the industry (i. e., pharmaceuticals and edible oils) after the economic changes that took place in 
the early 1990s. Questions about the antecedents and history of the company and the strategy 
and changes that the company underwent before and after the 1990s followed. Ibereafter, more 
specific questions concerning the organisational structure, the strategic initiatives created by the 
firm and the culture and values of the company were asked. 
In the final stages of the interview, the interviewee was asked to mention those aspects 
that the company still needed to improve or those tasks still underway. Raising this question 
proved interesting because it showed different levels of perception of the challenges the company 
had to face in the future. 
While we had pre-established questions, these were used as a guide to different topics the 
researcher wanted to explore. Many questions were open-ended with the deliberate idea of 
linking those answers to other related topics. Open-ended questions also allowed new topics to 
emerge, thus oiling the deductive-inductive process of analysis that would enrich the case study. 
The interview pro-forma used in this study is located in annex 2. 
Interviews were scheduled as follows: firstly, interviews with key informants and 
especially those with precise knowledge of the history of the company; secondly, interviews with 
those involved in strategic initiatives that entailed a transformation of the core businesses of the 
firms; and finally, the Directors of the companies were interviewed to round off the process. 
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The decision to space out the interviews in the way explained above was taken so as to 
avoid asking the directors more mundane background questions about the company. The 
sequence chosen was important because we firstly learrit about the history of the company, then 
about the process of transformation and finally we went to the Directors to get their perception of 
critical organisational issues. 
FIGURE 3.3: INTERVIEWING PROCESS 
First Interview: 
Our initial contact in the 
company. 
This first interview: 
-Triggered new topics 
-Clarified and defined the suitable 
people to be interviewed 
Understanding the companies' histor 
-Interviews with managers (family and 
non-family members) with a historical 
knowledge and background of the 
Understanding the transformational 
process of the firm I 
-Interviews with key people either famil 
members or not in different areas of the 
organization. 
-Interviews with key people running 
strategic areas ofthe company. 
Understanding the transformation 
process of the firm 11 
-Interviews with the Board of Directi 
-Emerging new topics 
-Cross checking information 
between managers and the Board 
-New categories of analysis. 
Tape recording, transcription and translation 
Fifty-one out of fifty nine interviews were tape-recorded. Tape recording allowed the 
researcher to fix his attention on the interviewee's comments rather than taking notes. 
Nevertheless, tape recording the interviews proved, in some cases, to impose some restrictions on 
the extent to which interviews were prepared to speak frankly. The youngest managers 
interviewed were more wary in their answers and comments. Two cases illustrate this problem. 
One interviewee in AGD and another in Sidus were very cautious in their answers and suspicious 
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of the researcher's questions. They appeared stressed and looked at the tape recorder machine all 
the time. In these cases more information was obtained off the record than in the formal tape- 
recorded interview. 
However, I experienced most problems in Vicentin whose managers were reluctant to be 
recorded. Six interviews in that company were not tape-recorded. As many managers and 
employees interviewed pointed out, the company had a strict policy of not disclosing information 
to anyone except with permission from the Board, so although the Board agreed with the 
interview process, managers preferred not to have the interviews recorded. The researcher took 
notes instead of recording the interviews. Not having the pressure of knowing that all they said 
was going to be recorded, the interviews spoke freely about different issues. 
The interviews were transcribed and translated into English. For the transcription a 
professional service was hired and closely supervised by the researcher. The researcher himself, 
nevertheless, did the translation. This guaranteed the correctness of the translation. In so doing 
we avoided possible linguistic biases and retained the real meaning and spirit of the interview. 
Interview pro-forma 
, An interview pro-forma was developed following the analysis carried out in the literature 
review. A set of triggering questions were grouped by themes and used as a guide in the 
interview process (see annex 2). 
The questions were grouped according to nine topics that sought to unravel issues about 
the historical background of the companies and industries (i. e., the importance of the industry 
and economy, and the antecedents and history of the firms) and issues related to the 
transformation of the companies from a holistic point of view (i. e., by means of an understanding 
of the strategy of the companies before the transformation process; changes throughout the 
1990s; structure of the organisation; market and products; management; governance; and, finally, 
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values and culture). All the questions sought to understand the context, content and process of 
transformation of the firms (Pettigrew, 1985 and 1997 and Pettigrew et al, 1989). 
The pro-forma was also useffil in that it provided a consistent format for the interviews, 
thus conferring a certain coherence on the different interviews. The pro-forma, nevertheless, was 
used as a guide, not as a strict pattern to follow. The questions were used or rejected by the 
researcher according to the interviewee's responses. The pro-forma also proved its effectiveness 
in realigning the interview when the focus of the interview was lost and when there were breaks 
in the discussion. The pro-forma not only helped the researcher to add or reject questions, but 
also enabled him to explore new issues and themes that emerged from the interviews. 
Documentary data 
In order to enhance, triangulate (Stake, 1994), and validate (Yin, 1994) the information 
from the interviews, documentary and archival material were needed. The archive data ranged 
from histories of the companies, internal documents, institutional information and external 
reports. 
The validity and reliability of documentary data is the subject of considerable debate 
(Hodder, 1994). Pettigrew (1990: 277) underlines the importance of documentary and archive 
material in longitudinal research, but also warns about its weaknesses. He says that while 
documents can provide facts, they are also "subject to dangers ofselective deposit and survivaL " 
However, if treated with appropriate caution, documentary data can complement the information 
obtained from interviews and provide insight into the context in which decisions were taken. In 
this research we used four types of documents: internal documents; company histories; industry 
reports; and, in some cases, consultant reports. 
In the Argentinian context, the fact that these companies are privately owned meant that 
they had no need to produce public information such as annual reports. Hence, the process of 
collecting information involved a great deal of background work such as seeking out information 
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in the companies' headquarters and in the companies' archives in different locations throughout 
the country. 
In AGD the documents provided by external consultants were helpful in that they detailed 
the changes in the structure and the aims behind those changes. Data provided by industry 
reports, such as the one on the pharmaceutical industry, made it possible to compare the 
historical evolution of both Sidus and Andr6maco. Andr6maco's CEO's passion for his family 
history, on the other hand, allowed us to gather a lot of documents from the founders' period 
such as the personal diary of Rafil Roviralta and a chronology of family events. Documents 
setting out the strategic aims of the companies short and long term were also useful in that they 
showed the companies' long-term visions and the means they used to achieve them. 
To obtain access to the different archives, the researcher firstly asked each interviewee 
whether they had any document or knew of any document in which some of the processes they 
were describing were explained. Archive material was also obtained by asking the Board of 
Directors of the four companies for permission to have a copy of some documents. Ibis was the 
case with speeches given by founders and current Directors, and strategic plans and some reports 
given to the Board by business units, among others. 
Statistical data 
Finally, statistical and quantitative data provided the necessary background information 
about the evolution of the company. The following table shows the most relevant quantitative 
data collected and the aims achieved with that information. 
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TABLE 3.10: EXAMPLE OF STATISTICAIJOUANTITATivE DATA REOUIRED FROM THE COMPANIES 
Statistical/Quantitative Data Required In order to understand... 
Market Share Evolution Products/Evolution of the company and 
its participation in the market 
Sales, Volume Growth over time 
Sales per product/area or division Diversification process 
Average Price Competitiveness 
Liabilities How the companies funded their growth 
Average ages, tenure and experience of top 
management team 
Evolution of companies' demographic features 
The statistical and quantitative data collected supported the investigation of different 
aspects of the transformation of the companies, such as the firms' strategic shifts (through data 
related to the diversification process, evolution of products and average price), and managerial 
changes (through data on demographic features). 
Data Analysis 
So far, the research design and data collection have been explained. But what are the 
most appropriate methods of analysing the determinants of organisational flexibility? The 
purpose of this section is to clarify how the data were analysed so as to reveal the detenninants of 
organisational flexibility. 
Hubennan and Miles (1994) indicate that analysing data is an interactive operation that 
starts from the moment of data collection and includes also data reduction, data display, and 
drawing and verifying conclusions. The following table shows our framework for analysing the 
data. 
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TAnT PIII- T)ATA ANAT VqT. -Z- AN IWFRArTPvT- mor)F. T. 
Main aspects Main activities Operationalisation of the Alms 
activity through... 
Data reduction -Coding and storage of -Storage of data in broad -Try to avoid "death 
data. categories of analysis. through data asphyxiation 
-Data storage on own (Pettigrew, 1990: 281). 
database. 
Data display -Writing up analytical -Analytical chronologies -Understand the backdrop 
chronologies. using suitable categories for and key transformational 
the different companies changes in the 
(Pettigrew, 1990). These organisations' development 
chronologies bear the seeds of -Shaping the determinants 
the analysis. of organisational flexibility. 
Cross case -Comparison between -Comparative analysis -Un erstan ing ow 
analysis the four companies between flexible and less companies built 
using the five firms and also highlighting organisational flexibility. 
determinants of the differences between Jo find common patterns 
organisational highly flexible firms, and between flexible and non- 
flexibility found. between less flexible firms. flexible firms. 
-A series of methods pinned 
down in different literatures 
supporting the determinants 
used. 
Data Reduction 
A process of reducing and storage of information helped to avoid what Pettigrew 
(1990: 281) called "death through data asphyxiation" or what Morse (1994: 229) called 
"drowning in data ". This is the case when data accrues without a proper method of reducing it, 
overwhelming the most skilful researcher. 
We coded the data under broad categories - the same categories used in our interview 
pro-forma (i. e., importance of the sector and the economy; antecedents and history of the 
company; strategy of the companies before 1990; changes throughout the 1990s; changes in the 
structure of the organisation; strategic initiatives; culture, values and family- See annex 2). The 
data was stored using a database designed specifically for the task, therefore rejecting existing 
software packages such as NUD*IST. Although helpful, software such as NUD*IST proved to 
be time consuming and not as malleable as our own database. 
74 
Data Display 
Writing down descriptive, wide-ranging and issue-organised chronologies was the 
method used to display the data and to start shaping possible determinants of organisational 
flexibility. 
To write the case studies, Pettigrew's suggestion of the case as analytical chronology was 
used (Pettigrew, 1990). Writing chronological, extensive, descriptive and issue-organised case 
studies of each firm, as Eisenhardt (1989a) and Huberman and Miles (1994) propose, was a very 
helpful tool for the generation of insights. In the analytical chronologies, both the story and the 
story across levels of analysis were told. The analytical chronologies contained the seeds of the 
analysis itself (Pettigrew, 1990; Naumes and Naumes, 1999). 
The case studies in this research, as Langley (1999: 697) stresses, have embedded 'ýplots " 
and "themes " through the selection of issues to be analysed. Five issues or "themes " were 
considered in relation to the case studies in this research as a way of approaching the 
transformation process of the four companies in this study: strategic initiatives (for the most 
flexible firms) or markets and products (for the less flexible firms); changes in the structure of 
the companies; changes in management; changes in governance; and unresolved issues. 
In moving from description to explanation, the sequence became a vital aspect of the 
narrative (Pentland, 1999; Langley, 1999). The narrative of events and its sequence provided 
valuable data relating to patterns of events, roles, social networks, relationships, power, cultural 
values and other contextual aspects. Examples of these in this study are changes in the status of 
members of the firms after major strategic shifts or restructuring, the roles and place of both 
family and non-family managers over time, and main culture changes affecting organisational 
life. 
Following Huberman and Miles' ideas (1994), one can argue that there is an iterative 
relationship between induction (data-driven) and deduction (theory-driven) forms of analysis. In 
the course of this research we shifted between induction and deduction as a way of testing and 
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verifying the information gathered. Figure 3.4 shows how the analysis is a process that combines 
the literature review and refinements in the analytical framework and fieldwork. 
FIGURE 3.4: DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE ANALYSIS IN THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
Literature Literature review 
review First analytical -Innovation Second Modif ication of the 
-Innovation framework -Flexibility analytical analytical 
-Organisational -Institutionalism framework framework 
change Hypercompetition 
Analysis of determinant 
of flexibility 
Starting the Analysing and writin 7` Q6 w u Operational ising r 10 til fieldwork. Collecting data up the case studies. . Emerging concepts 
As Figure 3.4 indicates, the analytical process of this research was a constant forward and 
backward relationship between the case data and the literature to ensure an appropriate analytical 
framework and the validation of findings. This process corresponds to what Eisenhardt (1989a) 
calls "enfolding literature", that is to say the comparison of emergent concepts with those 
already existing in the literature. 
Cross-case analysis 
After the single case analysis, I move on to the cross-case analysis. The purpose of the 
cross case analysis was to explain the different determinants of organisational flexibility in the 
more and less flexible firms (see chapter 10). In so doing, it was possible to compare patterns of 
behaviour between a highly flexible and a less flexible firm, between two highly flexible firms, 
and between two less flexible firms. This phase was triggered by writing a conference paper 
based on empirical data obtained from the two flexible companies (Hatum and Pettigrew, 2001). 
Writing the paper proved beneficial in clarifying both methods and categories of analysis used in 
the research. Subsequent reviewer feedback has also been useful. 
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Different methods were selected to analyse the determinants of organisational flexibility. 
Each method was drawn from the empirical literature on each determinant. For example, 
demographic analysis was used to analyse the heterogeneity of the dominant coalition; coding 
analysis for centralisation and formalisation. of decision making, low macroculture embeddedness 
and environmental scanning. Significance tests were used for heterogeneity of the dominant 
coalition and centralisation and formalisation of decision making. Finally, discourse analysis 
was used to understand the identity of the organisation. 
The following table briefly shows the different methods used in analysing the 
determinants of flexibility and their sources. The operationalisation of the different methods is 
explained in detail in chapter 10 where the different determinants of organisational flexibility are 
also analysed. 
TABLE 3.12: DETERMINANTS AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS USED 
Determinant Data Sources and Method/s Sources 
Heterogeneity of the -Demographic analysis Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
dominant coalition (quantitative variables and Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; 
qualitative indicators) Bantel and Jackson, 1989; 
-Significance test Murray, 1989; Webb, 1999; 
-Use of qualitative data obtained Hambrick, 1989 
from the fieldwork 
Low Centralisation and -Coding analysis Webb and Pettigrew (1999) 
Formalisation of decision -Significance test Webb, 1999 
making -Use of qualitative data obtained 
from the fieldwork 
Low macroculture -Coding analysis Webb and Pettigrew, 1999; 
embeddedness -Tracking strategic initiatives Damanpour, 1991 
-Use of qualitative data obtained 
from the fieldwork 
Environmental Scanning -Coding analysis Daft et al., 1988; Beal 2000; 
-Use of qualitative data obtained Choo 1999; Pettigrew and 
from the fieldwork Whipp, 1991 
A strong organisational -Analysis of speeches, discourses Collins and Porras, 2000; Webb 
identity and letters. et al., 1966; Lee, 2000; Hardy, 
1 1 2001 
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3.5 Limitations of the research 
While the positivist view is that social reality can be observed and recorded by the 
observer, the interpretivists have come to recognise that the researcher interacts with reality and 
thus may introduce values and preferences (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). 
The researcher thus needed to take steps to minimise any biases that might have 
inadvertently crept into the social interaction process of collecting case study material or 
conducting semi-structured interviews. It is important for the researcher not to introduce his own 
opinions yet remain receptive to the views of the informant (Eisenhardt, 1989a). To ward off this 
problem, data triangulation was used to validate and give credibility to the findings at the 
different levels of the research process (i. e., research design, data collection and data analysis), 
thus lessening the limitations and problems presented by this research. 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) and Bryman (2001) suggest three alternative criteria for 
evaluating the trustworthiness in research. They suggest that trustworthiness is made up of 
credibility, transferability and dependability. Credibility or feasibility of the researcher's 
accounts can be obtained by submitting research findings to the companies in which the original 
research was undertaken to achieve respondent validation. Transferability of findings to other 
contexts (what is also called generalisability) can be obtained by thick descriptions to 'ýprovide 
others with what they refer to as a database for making judgements about the possible 
transferability offindings to other milieux" (Bryman, 2001: 272). Finally, dependability entails 
the reliability of the process and can be achieved by adopting an audit approach, ensuring that 
complete records are kept at all stages of the research process. The following table shows the 
steps undertaken for ensuring trustworthiness of this research. 
78 
TART. ip. 1-11- F. I-FMFNT. gTO FNSURF TRUSTWORTHINESS INTHIS STUDY 
Stage of the Elements to ensure credibility (C), transferability (T) and dependability (D) 
Research 
Research Design Purposeful selection of the industries and cases (C) 
Use of multiple case studies (C) 
Use of research protocol (C, D) 
Data Collection Use of multiple sources of evidence (C, D) 
Pluralism of informants (C) 
Tape recording and transcription (D) 
Have key informants to review the draft case report (Respondent 
validation) (C) 
Data Analysis Deductive and Inductive process between theory and practice (T) 
Presentations, papers and conference papers (C, T) 
Report and discussion with companies of analytical outcomes of the 
research (C) 
However important the steps undertaken to avoid biases and improve the accuracy of the 
results, this research was still subject to limitations. At the research design level we have used a 
particular set of indicators to select flexible firms. Further research needs to show whether a 
selection of other indicators would produce similar results regarding the sample of companies to 
be analysed. 
Questions also arise as to what would have happened in a very stable context (i. e., high 
levels of regulation). Would the firms participating in a very stable context develop flexible 
capabilities? What type of organisational capabilities would be deemed important in such a 
context? Our study relies on an industry in the process of deregulation (i. e., phannaceutical) and 
a deregulated industry (i. e., edible oils). However, the results of our research say little about a 
highly regulated industry. The social reality may vary significantly across other firms and 
industries, thus more case studies and analysis in other industries are needed. 
The selection of the determinants of organisational flexibility as categories of analysis 
may also have limited the findings of this research. In choosing the five determinants we may 
have ruled out other possible determinants of organisational flexibility, thus restricting the 
outcomes of the analysis. We may have foreclosed the possibility of understanding other ways 
flexibility can be achieved in an organisation. 
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It is also difficult to apply our findings more generally to companies other than 
indigenous family firms in emerging markets. While the sample of family firms gave the 
research control over some of the variation in its findings, it has also constrained the possibility 
of generalising the findings of the research beyond family firms because of the particular nature 
of such firms, as explained in section four in this chapter and introduction of chapter 10. More 
research is needed in which a different sample of companies are analysed (such as MNCs, or 
indigenous businesses in emerging and developed countries) so as to bring into the analysis other 
possible determinants of organisational flexibility stemming from different environmental 
realities. Different methods of analysis would also add value to an area that is characterised by a 
dearth of empirical studies. 
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has considered the methodology adopted for answering the questions stated 
in Chapter 2. We portrayed our epistemological assumptions as informed by Giddens' (1979, 
1984) structuration theory and Sztompka's (1993) 'social becoming'. We also tried to wed our 
epistemological assumptions to the contextualist theory of methods. These underpinnings 
influenced the selection of our research methods: we needed to collect qualitative and 
quantitative data from different levels of analysis, and we also needed to collect longitudinal data 
about the process of transformation of the companies as this process sheds light on the 
determinants of organisational flexibility (Volberda, 1999). 
In the light of what has been said, we adopted a two-phase approach. In the first phase, 
we needed to discover the most suitable industries for the study and rank the companies 
according to a series of indicators of organisational flexibility. The second phase necessitated the 
use of comparative case studies to explore the internal process of transformation of the firms and 
to start to highlight the determinants of organisational flexibility. 
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However, following our contextualist method of inquiry, we need to start our exploration 
with three different levels of analysis. Accordingly, chapter 4 is an analysis of the Argentinian 
business environment over the period 1989-1999. What were the main socio-economic and 
cultural processes affecting indigenous firms in Argentina? What were the challenges the 
national context posed the firms in the 1990s? These questions are answered in chapter 4. In 
chapter 5, we go on to deal with the industry level of analysis. We describe and analyse the main 
challenges the pharmaceutical and edible oil industries faced over the period 1989-1999. What 
were the consequences of the economic opening up in the 1990s for the industries analysed? 
How did the economic changes affect the competitiveness of the indigenous firms in the 
industries under study? These questions are addressed in chapter 5. In Chapters 6 to 9 we 
explore the organisational inner context of the four firms in this study. What were the main 
transformations undertaken by the firms to adapt to the sudden changes of the environment? 
What strategic initiatives were favoured by the firms under conditions of environmental change? 
And what organisational and managerial capabilities were considered critical in such 
circumstances? These questions are tackled in chapters 6 to 9. 
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Chapter 4: Argentinian Business Environment 
4.1 Introduction 
Studies of organisation have often omitted the importance of national differences as 
shapers of the organisational action of firms (Clark, 2000; Whittington and Mayer, 2000; 
Pettigrew et al, 2001). Clark (2000: 8) argues that this may have happened due to the fact that 
many organisational theorists are located in the USA and therefore tend to consider the context of 
their findings (i. e. the American context) as "an undiscussed background" and consequently 
universalise them. National and regional specificities are, however, becoming increasingly 
acknowledged as factors affecting the ways in which firms in emerging economies respond to 
competitive pressures (Pettigrew et al, 2001; Hoskisson et al, 2000). As this study demonstrates, 
particular features of the Argentinian business environment had a deep impact on the character 
and transformation of indigenous firms over time. 
Argentina, the country on which this analysis focuses, has been considered a newly 
industrialised country (Helleiner, 1990), a developing country (Lal, 1975), an emergent country 
(Contractor, 1998) or a less developed country (Kirkpatrick, 1987; Buckley and Casson, 1985). 
We consider Argentina to'be an emergent country or as having an economy different from that of 
developed countries. 
Hoskisson et al (2000) indicate that an emerging market economy can be defined as one 
that satisfies two main criteria: a rapid pace of economic development and government policies 
favouring economic liberalisation. The term "emerging country", for Zahra et al (2000) and 
Ramamurti (2000), also presupposes economic, social, institutional and political instability 
compared to economically developed countries. 
But what are the particular national features that distinguish the Argentinian national 
context from others? To what extent have the unique characteristics of the national context 
shaped indigenous businesses? (Porter, 1990; Clark and Muller, 1996; Clark, 2000). And how 
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have the national business characteristics impacted on the way indigenous businesses organise 
themselves, transform and respond under competitive pressures? (Hoskisson et al, 2000). 
Aiming to understand these questions, this chapter is set up as follows: after this brief 
introduction, section two sets out to understand the different theoretical strands in discussing the 
importance of the country level of analysis. Two main perspectives are briefly presented and 
examined: the institutionalist approach and the culturalist approach. Section three introduces the 
framework we use to understand the National Business Environment (NBE), and section four 
develops the analysis of the Argentinian business environment. Finally, in section five, we 
present some concluding remarks. 
4.2 Country level of analysis 
The structure and operation of firms and markets differ from country to country. These 
differences stem from variations in dominant social institutions such as the state and the financial 
systems (Whitley, 1992a). As Whitley (1992a) points outý a country level analysis has to be 
carried out in order to deal with relations between the national, institutional and firm levels of 
analysis. Similarly, Sorge (1991) considers that the national level of analysis is important in 
clarifying the "affinity" between the national pattern of organising and the sectors and firms that 
succeed in the economy. 
National factors play an important role in explaining differences in business 
organisations. The logic behind stressing the national level analysis, as Clark and Muller (1996) 
state, is that nationally dominant socio-economic configurations, which include attitudes and 
behaviours, will persist over long periods. The institutional and cultural constraints under which 
the organisation operates are explained by looking at national features. 
Porter (1990) stresses the role of the nation by saying that national attributes and 
competitive advantage affect the performance of companies in a particular country. The home 
base is where "strategy is set, core product and process development takes place, and the 
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essential and proprietary skills reside" (Porter, 1990: 69). The national context is the source of 
the main technologies and skills that underpin competitive advantage. Industries will succeed in 
those nations in which four determinants of national advantage are more present. The four 
determinants are: the firm's strategy, structure and rivalry; the factor conditions (i. e., the nation's 
position in factors of production such as skilled labour and infrastructure); the demand 
conditions; and, finally, the related and supporting industries. 
The literature has developed different frameworks to explain and analyse how 
institutions, historical evolution, and the culture of different nations can influence a firm's 
behaviour. The debate regarding the level of national influence at the firm level is an old one and 
is evident in both sociological and organisation theories (Clark and Muller, 1996). The debate in 
the literature can be divided into two main strands: the "institutionalist " and the "culturalist ". 
As Lane (1989) explains, the "culturalist" approach provides an explanation of national 
diversity that is vital to understanding a particular business organisation. It has concentrated its 
attention on the practices and values shared by a national community. By contrast, the 
"institutionalist" approach has stressed the social and institutional determinants of business 
organisation in order to explain business organisation in a specific national context. 'Me 
institutionalist approach to understanding the interaction between firms and markets, on the one 
hand, and other social-economic institutions, on the other, has been conceptualised in terms of 
national business systems (Whitley, 1992a; Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998; Ferner et al, 2001), 
industrial orders (Lane, 1989), or national institutions (Whittington and Mayer, 2000). 
In the next section we address the debate between institutionalist and culturalist 
approaches. The objective is to show how elements of national business systems can influence 
the life of different organisations and in particular the indigenous businesses of a country. 
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The institutional and cultural approach 
The institutional approach is based on the premise that action, in this case business 
organisation action, is largely shaped by institutions. Writers who explicitly or implicitly adopt 
this approach have explored institutions such as the state, the financial institutions, the labour 
system, the system of general education, vocational education and training, industrial relations, 
the employment system, and the system of social stratification (Ferner et al, 2001; Whitley, 1996 
and 2000; Lane, 1989 and 1992; Zysman, 1983). An important group of researchers has 
examined how long-lasting national patterns were generated by crucial episodes in historical 
development, including the process of industrialisation (Sylla and Toniolo, 1991). 
As Whitley (1992b) states, the dominant institutions of a country and the institutional 
context in that country influence the business environment by conditioning firms' activities. As 
examples of these ideas, Whitley's (2000) study of divergent capitalism in East Asia and Eastern 
Europe shows that in contexts in which the state or other 'systems of collective organization' do 
not help the market to reduce uncertainty in the long-term, innovation strategies are difficult to 
develop and sustain (i. e., Eastern European countries in Whitley's analysis). 
The point about systems is their cohesion. In this kind of social system, firms, the state, 
culture and education systems interlock creating distinctive business systems. Whitley (1994) 
makes predictions about the pattern of business organisation in Europe. He distinguishes types 
of business systems, ascribing France to the category of 'state co-ordinated', Germany the 
'collaborative' and the United Kingdom the 'partitioned'. Whitley (1994) suggests that these 
business organisation peculiarities lead to particular business strategies and structures in the 
different countries. In Germany, he expects decentralisation of economic power and owners' 
involvement in management. In France, Whitley expects centralisation and the owners to be 
fairly involved. The British partitioned system, on the other band, is quite distinct: business 
systems are characterised by being highly decentralised and the owners are detached from the 
management of firms. 
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The institutionalist approach has, however, been criticised by the lack of understanding of 
factors other than institutions. Sorge's (1991) study of systems of organising in Germany and 
France demonstrates that besides institutions studied by national institutionalists, there are other 
socio-economic features that help to understand the way countries organise. Among such 
systems are the systems of recruitment, training and career mobility. 
One of the most critical assessments of national institutionalism comes from Whittington 
and Mayer (2000). On the basis of their study of the evolution of the strategy and structure of 
corporations in France, Germany and the UK over forty years, Whittington and Mayer (2000) 
could not match the experience of the corporations analysed with the specific predictions of 
Whitley's (1994) business systems. They found that businesses in all three countries diversified 
their strategy and decentralised their structure regardless of the different institutional 
arrangements: "The engineering-oriented and bank-connected Germans arejust as diversified as 
thefinancially driven British. 7he statist, hierarchical French are even more divisionalized than 
the federal Germans " (Whittington and Mayer, 2000: 219). Whittington and Mayer (2000) 
challenged the distinctive business systems institutionalists proposed and put forward a different 
idea - i. e. convergence based on efficiency. 
The influence of cultural attitudes and behaviour on business and management styles 
complements the approach introduced by national institutionalism. The concept of cultural effect 
takes account of the fact that societies vary in the arrangement of how their institutions and 
organisations are composed, and these variations reflect their distinctive traditions, values, 
attitudes and historical experience. Grasping the local culture can offer indigenous businesses a 
competitive advantage when competing with foreign newcomers (Sorge, 199 1; Hofstede, 199 1). 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989: 42) point out that a nation's history, infrastructure and culture 
influence the country's life "including the norms, values, and behaviors of managers in its 
national companies. " The national culture impregnates the way things are done in local firms. 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) also show how the pioneering spirit and egalitarian values of 
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American society were less tolerant of the elitism and paternalism found in family-dominated 
companies in Britain until World War IL These cultural values swayed the managerial culture of 
the USA by underlining the importance of a corporate meritocracy that fostered a new class of 
professional managers, to whom owners in turn delegated authority for the running the business. 
An important strand of the cultural perspective is based on Hofstede's (1980,1991) four 
dimensions of the consequences of culture. The four dimensions he postulates in his examination 
of dominant value patterns in different countries are: power distance; uncertainty avoidance; 
individualism/collectivism; and masculinity/femininity. Hofstede suggests that cultural patterns 
are rooted in the value systems of substantial groupings of the population and that they are also 
stabilised over long periods in history. These notions can be useful in analysing and 
understanding managerial behaviour and reactions. This means that managers have cultural 
differences engraved in their minds, and these in turn reinforce particular values and guide 
managerial action and choices. 
Trompenaars (1992: 6) defines culture as "the way in which people solve problems. " The 
impact of this way of solving problems will be seen at three levels: the national, the corporate 
and professional culture. Trompenaars (1992) considers the cultural differences of one hundred 
countries and how those differences affect the organisational life of companies in those countries. 
For example, he indicates the differences between individualistic and communitarian cultures. 
At the firm level of analysis, this difference impacts on the way people view organisations. 
Thus, individualistic cultures (e. g., American or British) essentially view organisations as 
instruments. In such a culture, the ties generated by a firm's structure are abstract, legal ones, 
regulated by contract. Conversely, in communitarian cultures (e. g., Argentina or Brazil in 
Trompennars' typology) organisations are viewed as being part of a social context all members 
share. Organisations are likened to a large family community that may live longer than its 
members. 
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Trompenaars (1992) also differentiates between 'specific culture attribute' (when we 
engage with others in specific areas of life) or 'diffuse culture' (when we engage in multiple 
areas of our lives). Therefore, specific cultures such as the American and Northern European 
ones would prefer systems such as management by objectives and performance-related pay to 
motivate employees. However, more diffuse societies such as those in Latin America would 
reject these mechanisms. Performance-related pay is viewed as affecting personal relationships 
and increasing competition between people with whom you might share not only work but also 
personal feelings and affection. 
An important risk of culturalist approaches is the tendency to over-simplify national 
cultures and construct cross-culture comparative analyses on the basis of exaggerated cultural 
stereotypes. Child and Kiesser (1979: 269) have indicated that a methodological problem of 
cultural variables is that these have not been incorporated into "a model which systematically 
links together the analytical levels of context, structure, role and behaviour. " Cultural variables 
are treated in an ahistorical and static fashion as immanent properties of nations, rather than 
emergent features of it (Ferner and Quintanilla 1998). 
Characterising the national business environment (henceforth, NBE) entails theorising 
from a multidimensional viewpoint. In so doing we are avoiding the inherent determinism of the 
institutional approach (Whittington and Mayer, 2000) and the over-simplification of the cultural 
approach that relies exaggeratedly on cultural stereotypes (Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998). 
While institutional arrangements usually shed light on key phases and formative events in 
the evolution of the nation state, such as the industrialisation process, cultural elements can bring 
into the discussion and facilitate the understanding of the implications of culture in managerial 
practices and business organisational behaviour over time (Hofstede, 1991). Our analysis of the 
NBE therefore examines both institutional and cultural elements to understand the context in 
which firms have to operate. 
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But, what are the institutions that can help us to understand the evolution of indigenous 
finns? How have these institutions shaped the development of national enterprise? And what 
national cultural elements influence the managerial behaviour of indigenous firms? The next 
section aims to answer these questions. 
4.3 National Business Environment (NBE) 
Drawing on the findings that emerge from the foregoing analysis of the literature, our 
intention now is to develop a framework called 'national business environment' to provide an 
understanding of the extent to which the national business features of Argentina have influenced 
both the development and structure of indigenous businesses in the country. 
Our framework of analysis needs to shed light on the process of industrialisation in the 
country so as to spell out the competitive pressures indigenous businesses faced over time and 
the radical changes Argentina underwent in the 1990s when its business organisations were 
transformed. It is by understanding the process of industrialisation of a country that one becomes 
aware of the evolution of indigenous businesses (Kosacoff, 2000). Sylla and Toniolo (1991) 
emphasise that it is important to take into consideration the role of the state and the financial 
institutions. We will also consider the national culture as it can complement and enhance our 
analysis of the evolution and organisation of indigenous firms. It is not possible to understand 
organisational and managerial arrangements in isolation from the culture that influences them 
(Hofstede, 1991). 
The following figure displays the framework used in this research to understand the 
Argentinian business environment. Thereafter, the main aspects of the framework are explained. 
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FIGURE 4.1: NBE AND THE STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS FIRMS 
Elements of the National 
Business Environment 
NBE 
-The role of the state 
-Tlie financial system Influences Business organisation and 
-Ibe national culture and 
structure of indigenous firm 
values 
The NBE: The nation state is considered to be the central factor in the analysis. The 
nation state demarcates the boundaries for the study of the specific processes of industrialisation, 
economy, politics and social conventions. 
The NBE consists of the social, CUltUTal, economic, political and legal framework in 
which business activities take place. Understanding the main features of the NBE sheds light on 
the structure and development of firms in that particular context (Whitley, 2000). 
The role of the state: The role of the state is seen to be particularly influential in shaping business 
systems as well as exerting a direct and an indirect influence on other institutions (Lane, 1992). 
The state, as the last resort for the legal framework, has a direct influence on the organisation of 
many of the crucial institutions which shape economic activities, education, the financial system, 
IR systems, as well as itself constituting one of the major influences on the structure and 
behaviour of firms (Whitley, 1992 a, b). 
The state, as a key potential agent of industrialisation and development, can influence the 
economy of a nation in a variety of ways. On a broader level, the state can promote, or not, 
political and social stability that may contribute to economic development by stabilising 
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expectations and reducing the risk of private economic decision making (Sylla and Toniolo, 
1991). 
Whitley (2000) gives examples of how the role of the state varies in different countries 
and affects the structuring of business systems. He contrasts the case of Anglo-Saxon countries 
in which the state prepares the ground for the private sector to invest (i. e., through legal and 
institutional arrangements) but prefers to avoid the risk of sharing such an investment, and South 
Korea in which the state commits significant resources to sharing private-sector investment risks. 
Through regulation of the market boundaries (i. e., tariff and subsidies) in some countries 
(Whitley's refers here to Taiwan and Korea) the state remains a dominant collective agent of 
decision-making compared to less regulated American or European economies. These examples 
allow Whitley to state that the level of state integration and autonomy influences businesses' 
dependence on the state and the need for firms to co-ordinate their strategies with state policies 
(Whitley, 2000). 
The role of financial systems: Sylla and Toniolo (1991) argue that the role of financial 
institutions is critically important as an agent of industrialisation. They exemplify this with 
reference to how German banks helped to boost industry, while in Britain the accumulation and 
the profits of pioneer industrialists were enough to meet the long-term financial needs of modem 
industry, and the bank played a less prominent role in financing industrial growth (See also 
Whittington and Mayer, 2000; Lewin et al, 1999). 
A broader interpretation of the importance of the financial system is offered by Zysman 
(1983) who distinguishes between three types of financial systems, each of them affecting the 
relationship between banks, industries and firms, and each with different political implications. 
The three financial systems are: firstly, a financial system based on capital markets where the 
resources are allocated in competitive markets based on prices; secondly, a credit-based financial 
system that encourages state intervention; and, finally, a credit-based system that is dominated by 
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financial institutions. In financial systems based on capital markets, such as in Britain and the 
USA, the access to capital is dependent upon cost and terms imposed by financial institutions. 
Stock markets are highly developed. The role of the state is predominantly regulatory. Financial 
institutions do not usually influence firms internally and the relationship between banks and 
firms is described as short-term oriented. 
In Zysman's classification of financial systems, there are two credit-based systems 
according to the role that the state assumes. In some cases, the state becomes a player with 
different degrees of intervention, as in the cases of the French and Japanese. In other systems, as 
in the case of Germany, a limited number of financial institutions dominate the market 
independently from government intervention.. In both cases capital markets are weaker. In the 
latter case, most investment credit is provided by banks, which in some cases also own 
significant amounts of shares in their clients' firms. 
The national culture and values: Hofstede (1985 and 1991) argues that organisations have their 
own culture and prevalent value system, both of which are influenced by the national culture. 
National values and culture are reflected in organisational life even if the organisation spreads to 
international markets. He suggests four dimensions in his examination of dominant culture 
patterns across countries. These are: power distance; uncertainty avoidance; 
individualism/collectivism; and masculinity/femininity. 8 The combination of the first two leads 
people to view an organisation as hierarchical, pyramidal and bureaucratic (i. e., France and other 
Latin countries) or as an impersonal bureaucracy (such as the Germanic vision of organisations). 
The outcome of the combination of the other two can give rise to organisations in which people 
prefer to collaborate with others (i. e., Swedish car factories) or organisations in which people 
reject this idea and want to work on their own and set their own goals (i. e., American car 
8 These are the original terms used by Hofstede in his analysis. The researcher acknowledges that they may be 
unpalatable for the modem reader. Nevertheless, Hoftede's work has proved useful in conceptualising the 
differences between national cultures and has been influential in the field of cultural studies. 
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factories). Hofstede concludes that the differences of models in people's minds will not only 
condition the way they work but also the basic organisational features. Particular cultural 
differences, which reinforce specific values, guide managerial actions and choice. 
One of the main criticisms of Hofstede's approach is related to the creation of abstract 
dimensions to understand national culture. Alvesson (2000) points out that the rich interpretive 
capacities of culture can only be utilised if a study takes into account social practices and 
meanings in the organisation. Abstract cultural explanations or patterns, such as those suggested 
by Hoftede, fail to capture the complexity that culture entails. Alvesson (2000), however, 
considers that a specific dimension is appropriate if it is not uncoupled from observable social 
practice. 
Business organisation and development of indigenous firms: The objective here is to analyse the 
interaction between previous socio-institutional complexes and the nature and structure of firms. 
These socio-economic institutions allow a closer understanding of the complexities of change 
and choice faced by indigenous firms and managers operating in the country. Thus, the role of 
the state in the economy tells us about the market organisation (i. e., if the state regulates the 
economy, state-owned businesses may dominate the market); the financial system discloses 
aspects of the predominant ownership in the NBE studied (e. g., whether there is a direct control 
of owners or whether market-type control dominates); and cultural arrangements reveal aspects 
of trust and authority relations in an organisation (i. e., trust in formal institutions, social and 
moral distance between leaders and led, type of authority and corporate governance among 
others) (Whittington and Mayer, 2000; Whitley, 2000 and 1996; Kristensen, 1996). 
So far, the analysis of the literature has revealed different perspectives on the analysis of 
business systems. Institutionalists have argued in favour of the analysis of what they considered 
critical specific national factors in explaining differences in business organisation: the 
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institutions. Culturalists, on the other hand, have stressed differences in national culture as the 
main element in understanding how firms organise and how managers react. 
National particularities are, without doubt, a critical element in shaping the competitive 
advantage of firms and industries. These peculiarities may have led some companies to adapt 
and transform their organisations and strategy to achieve organisational flexibility (Lewin et al, 
1999). 
We suggest that without using a pluralistic framework, within which elements from both 
the institutional and culturalist approaches are taken into account, it is not possible to examine 
countries and understand the dynamics of their national business system. In the particular case of 
the framework introduced above, we aim to state both the socio-institutional arrangements of the 
NBE (through the role of the state, financial institutions and national cultural values) and to 
understand the link between these arrangements and the development and structure of indigenous 
businesses in the country. The following section explores and develops elements of our 
framework of analysis in the case of Argentina. 
4.4 The Argentinian Business Environment 
The role of the state 
There are different theories about the stages of development of Argentinian industry 
(Kosacoff, 2000; Gerchunoff and Llach, 1998; Llach, 1997; Di Tella and Zimelmann, 1977; 
Ferrer, 1971). In broad terms, however, three major periods can be identified in Argentina's 
industrialisation process. In each period, the role of the state was a key factor in boosting that 
process. 
The first period was from around 1880 till the crisis of 1930 when the country became 
integrated with the rest of the world as an agro-export economy. The second period extended 
from 1930 to 1989, the chief feature of which was the application of so-called import substituting 
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industrialisation (henceforth ISI) within a semi-closed economic framework. Finally, a new era 
for the industrialisation process of the country started in 1989 with a stabilisation plan and the 
structural reforms of the Convertibility Plan. 9 
First period: the agro-export model (1880-1930): Once its institutional structure was settled, 
Argentina won a place in the international economy as a dynamic exporter of primary goods and 
importer of capital and manufacturer goods (Kosacoff, 2000). From 1880 to 1914, the economy 
was open to foreign investments. The economy was based on the agricultural production of the 
Pampas. A few major products were developed for export (meat, leather, seeds and wool). 
There was national and foreign investment in railways, roads, harbours and everything related to 
the infrastructure. Kosacoff (2000) indicates that during this period, economic fluctuations were 
linked with both the weather conditions (since the main exports were agricultural products) and 
the British business cycle (since Britain was the main international trading partner). 
During this period the growth of the economy was based on the production of raw 
materials and the sale of these products to the external market. Exports and imports represented 
50% of the GDP (fifty years later this figure had fallen to 20%) (Fodor and O'Connell, 1972; 
Gerchunoff and Llach, 1998). In 1913 Argentina ranked I Ith in the world in terms of GDP per 
capita (Llach, 1997). 
The First World War forced the country to develop some industries in an attempt to 
replace the imports that were no longer arriving from Europe. Textile, shoe and furniture 
industries appeared at that time. ýIbe peak of the industrial activity was reached between 1914 
and 1929, during which period industrial production grew 127%. Between 1926 and 1929 steel 
production rose by 48%. Nevertheless industrial growth was in traditional agro-industries and 
light industries following the pre-war trend. Productivity gains in agriculture played a major role 
9 The economic crisis in Argentina that began towards the end of 2001 may imply the beginning of a new economic 
era in the country. These are, however, early days to make predictions about the economic future of the country. 
Economic and social stability is needed to understand the far-reaching consequences of the recent crisis. 
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in inducing industrial growth as well as in increasing per capita incomes (Gerchunoff and Llach, 
1998). 
The state intervened little in the economy and preferred to follow a liberal Policy, leaving 
economic decisions to market forces. However, successive governments during this first stage 
tried to encourage the export of agricultural products and the special trade relationship with 
Britain (Floria and Garcia Belsunce, 1992). 
The end of the expansion of the agricultural frontier, together with the 1930 international 
crisis, caused the demise of the agro-export model. 
Second period: Import Substituting Industrialisation (ISI) and a semi-closed economy (1930- 
1989): After the crisis of 1929, the government imposed an exchange control in 1931 and import 
permits in 1933. As a consequence import tariffs rose. These measures are illustrative of the 
new way in which the economy operated. The process of substitution of imports was helped by 
the incipient industrialisation already achieved during the first phase. Furthermore, World War H 
made it more difficult for imports to reach the country. This was another incentive for the 
governments of the 1940s to encourage industrialisation in the country. 
Industrialisation proceeded rapidly under the auspices of the Peronist regime (1946- 
1955). Per6n saw in industry the potential for high employment and consumption. Three 
mechanisms were used by the government: restriction of imports; a credit policy for new 
industries through the Banco de Cr6dito Industrial; and the promotion of specific industrial 
sectors through the IAPI (Argentine Institute for Industrial Promotion). Nationalisation of 
private companies such as the British railways, telecommunications and electricity, among 
others, marked this stage. 
One problem associated with this attempt at industrialisation, which had long-term 
consequences for Argentinian industry as a whole, was the lack of focus and diversification of 
industries that developed. The government did not seek advantages in the different sectors. A lot 
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of the industries that developed were not large enough to benefit from economies of scale. The 
result was a manufacturing industry with high costs, high salaries and few possibilities of 
exporting (Garcia Vazquez, 1995). 
In 1958, the last ISI sub-period began. The most prominent of all the plans during this 
sub-period was the one launched by President Frondizi (1958-1961). Heavy industry - such as 
petrol, gas, paper, chemicals, plastics, metals, machines and cars - was stimulated. Restrictions 
on imports were very severe. Subsidiaries of MNCs started to participate extensively to fill the 
gap left by national industries. All this process took place within the framework of a highly 
protected economy and was a response to the explicit policy goal of raising the level of national 
economic self-sufficiency (Gerchunoff and Llach, 1998; Garcia Vizquez, 1995). 
The 1980s would be critical for Argentinian industry. The ISI stage ended in the late 
seventies. From 1976 onwards industry passed through a phase of sharp decline. From 1976 to 
1982 employment in industry dropped by 37%. 
The economic crisis peaked in 1982 but the Military Junta found a way of diverting 
attention away from the internal problems: it launched the invasion of the Falkland Islands (taken 
over by Britain in 1833). 10 After a short conflict, the British ousted Argentinian forces. Public 
outrage alerted the military to the fact that its rule was coming to an end, and signalled the start 
of a new democratic era in the country (Hinkelman, 1998). 
After the re-establishment of democratic government in 1983, led by President Alfonsin 
(the Military Juntas were in power from 1976 to 1983), the economy began to suffer severe 
problems. The interest on foreign debt represented 9.4% of GDP (compared to only 2.2% in 
1980) which, combined with increasing inflation, fiscal problems and the stagnation of the 
economy, meant that the new and inexperienced democratic government got off to a difficult 
start. Although the government implemented some measures (the so-called "Plan Austral"), 
inflation rose dramatically in 1989. In that year, Argentina experienced a record level of 5,000% 
10 The Falkland Islands are called Islas Malvinas by Spanish speaker 
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hyperinflation. In the period 1980-1989, the country suffered an economic contraction close to 
14.3% (Gerchunoff and Llach, 1998). 
Yhird period., Economic openness, structural reforms and the role offoreign direct investments 
(FDI): In 1989, the new government led by President Menem embarked on a process of far- 
reaching changes in the economy. In the course of five years (1989-1994), the country went 
from being a tightly regulated and protected economy to an open one, where free competition 
was allowed. The economic plan, which affected virtually every aspect of the economy, was 
based on three pillars of reform: monetary; fiscal; and trade and regulatory reforins. 
Monetary reform - from which the convertibility of the currency was developed"- and 
fiscal reforms were necessary to tackle an old Argentinian problem: inflation. Inflation was 
slashed from its peak of 5,000% in 1989 to 0.7% in 1997. Privatising the state-owned companies 
and bringing down subsidies helped to reduce government expenditure (Toulin and Guill6n, 
1997; INDEC, 1998). 
While the monetary and fiscal reforms were important for the stability of the country, it 
was regulatory reform and the opening up of the economy to foreign trade and investment that 
impacted on the level of competitiveness of the indigenous companies. In one year (1990-1991), 
the import tariff was reduced from 18.4% to 11.6%. Additionally, deregulation in different 
sectors of the economy caused the price of services to plummet (Llach, 1997). 
As a result of the privatisation process and the opening up of the economy, the 
participation of the state diminished throughout the whole economy. Until 1989 the state was the 
sole supplier of the basic services: gas, oil, telecommunications and electricity were state-owned 
enterprises. In 1988, the state controlled seven of the first fifteen enterprises (ranked according 
to turnover). By 1997, the presence of the state in that ranking was reduced to thirteenth position 
1 The convertibility plan created a currency board that pegged the Argentinian peso with the US dollar in a one to 
one parity. 
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(The National Lottery). In 1992, the state accounted for 17% of companies among the top 100 
companies (ranked according to turnover). In 1996 this figure was further reduced to 2%. 
(Revista Mercado, 1992 and 1997) (see figUre 4.2). 














The role qfstate in the structure and development (? I'Arýgentinianfirlns 
The participation of the state in the industrialisation process of Argentina had a great 
impact on the genesis of indigenous firms, their growth and decline in the national market. The 
following table shows the links between the role of the state in tile economy and the type of 
organisations that were emerging at the different stages of the industrial isation process. 
12 Source: Revista Mercado (November 1999). This ranking takes into account the first hundred companies in the 
country in terms of turnover. The ranking shows the variations among these companies in terms of ownership 
struCtUre. 
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TABLE 4.1: STAGES OF ARGENTINIAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE EVOLUTION OF BUSINESS 
ORGANISATIONS13 
Type of context Agro-export model ISI and closed economy model 1930-1989 Economic openness 
and firm 1880-1930 1930-1976 1976-1989 14 1989 onwards 
General Industrial Protected market. Protected market Stabilisation- 
framework consolidation. British Industrial self- privatisation-openness 
hegemony sufficiency and deregulation. 
Higher competitive 
pressures 
FDI Mainly directed to Directed to production for the protected Directed to 
infrastructure market privatisations, merger 
and acquisitions of 
indigenous businesses 
Role ofthe State Supporting the agro- "Development and plan rational. " (Whitley, Diminished. Focus on 
export model. 1991). Protection, promotion and subsidies deepening structural 
reforms. 
Leading Export-oriented local State-owned National holding Subsidiaries of MNCs 
companies business groups. enterprises companies 
Semi-artisanal small Subsidiaries of Some SMEs 
and medium size MN`Cs. 
companies (SMEs) SMEs 
Type of Family businesses State-owned Holding companies Incipient development 
organisation enterprises Family Businesses of partnerships and 
Family businesses collaboration between 
Subsidiaries of indigenous groups and 
MNCs MNCs. 
At the start of the industrial process, when the state supported the agro-export model, 
indigenous family firms emerged as the most important presence in the economy. The export of 
agriculture and meat products was managed by family run farms (estancias) (Kosacoff, 2000). 
After the 1930s, state intervention in the economy in the form of the nationalisation of private 
companies caused a new type of organisation to emerge: the state-owned company. The 
protectionism that prevailed at that moment caused small and medium size companies (hereafter, 
SMEs) to consolidate. In fact, SMEs acquired their main operating features during the period of 
ISI (Yoguel, 2000). In the 1980s, indigenous holding companies emerged to fill gaps in activities 
in which the state did not participate (such as the food sector, among others (Bisang, 2000)). 
The deep structural changes that took place during the 1990s, however, merit a longer 
explanation to account for the decline of indigenous family-owned businesses in the country and 
the role of the state in that process. Three main processes over the decade analysed shed light on 
13 Different sources: Llach, 1997; Fracchia'and Spinetto, 1998; Gerchunoff and Llach, 1998. 
14 Except by the period 1979-1981 in which external openness was attempted (LIach, 1997). 
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the influence state decisions had on the fate of indigenous businesses: firstly, it is important to 
mention the impact of structural reforms on strategic thinking and planning; secondly, the sudden 
withdrawal of the state as one of the most important agents in the economy; and finally, the 
importance MNC companies acquired over time through the process of privatisation and the 
merger and acquisition (henceforth, M&A) of indigenous firms. 
The structural reforms in Argentina during the 1990s brought economic stability but at 
the same time competitive pressures and uncertainty for indigenous businesses. The days when 
nominal macroeconomic indicators were volatile were over. Indigenous businesses were now 
able to operate in a more stable macro-economic environment. However, indigenous firms had 
to confront high levels of uncertainty because of the competitive pressures introduced by foreign 
firms following the opening up of the economy. As a result of this, indigenous firms had to take 
strategic decisions of a different nature than they had hitherto been used to. These decisions 
were based on longer planning horizons -a new concept for indigenous companies used to a 
small and protected market with low levels of competition (Dal Bo and Kosafoff, 2000; Touldn 
and Guill6n, 1997). 
The withdrawal of the state from the economy also had a great impact on indigenous 
firms. However, the strengthening of indigenous businesses did not naturally follow the 
withdrawal of the state after the process of privatisation (1991-1994). The state did not favour 
indigenous businesses in the privatisation process. Foreign firms with the managerial capacity to 
run the critical state-owned companies were given preference in that process. The state was 
therefore replaced by foreign firms instead of indigenous firrns. 
After the withdrawal of the state from the economy, once the privatisation process ended, 
a process of M&As began in which foreign companies acquired a large number of family 
businesses. This process changed the map of local competition. The arrival of new participants 
brought pressure to bear on local firms ruled by a less efficient dynamic. The implementation of 
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new business strategies and productive techniques by MNCs implied a breakthrough for tile local 
firms which were by no means as efficient as their foreign counterparts (CEP, 1999). 
Foreign companies were responsible for initiating 66% of the M&As over the period 
1990-1998. With the privatisation process, MNCs occupied the role of the state, and by buying 
indigenous businesses they consolidated their influence in the national economy. Many 
traditional family businesses decided to sell their companies to a MNC, while others started to 
play on a different ground. The survivors were companies that could adapt their firm to the new 
market requirements. This process of selling off national companies (see figure 4.3) influenced 
the market structure, changing the balance between national and foreign companies within the 
different sectors (CEP, 1998). 









The financial system 
[3 Turnover of 
foreign firms (as 
% of total) 
Turnover of 
National firms. 
(as % total) 
According to Zysman's (1983) classification, the Argentinian financial system is closer to 
the credit-based model rather than the market-based type. Underdevelopment of capital markets 
and a limited number of financial institutions traditionally dominated the system. The dominant 
IIIStItLItIOIIS in Argentina were banks of different sorts (mainly commercial and stated-owned 
15 Source: CEP ( 1998) and Revista Mercado (1990), over a sample of the First 160 companies in tcn-ns of tumover 
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banks). This was complemented by strong state intervention that generated a closed financial 
system for many decades and only began to change after 1990. Throughout the second period of 
industrialisation (1930-1989), the financial system was used by the state as an instrument of 
development. During that period, the Central Bank was a regulator of the government's industrial 
policy (CEP, 199 8). 
In periods of inflation or hyperinflation, commercial credit was not affordable. The lack 
of loans during inflationary phases necessitated a different business logic. In periods of 
hyperinflation little working capital was needed (or affordable): buyers had to pay in advance, 
production was carried out with this money, and the difference due to indexation was collected 
once the merchandise was delivered (CEP, 1998). 
The advent of stability has put a totally different financial system in place. Monetary 
reform was the most important aspect of transformation of the Argentinian financial systems. 
The convertibility plan required the Central Bank to fully back the monetary base in the form of 
foreign assets. The Central Bank was independent of the executive branch, making it 
accountable only to Congress. This fact reduced the government's ability to use the Central 
Bank as a last-resort lender. The changes in the monetary system increased the amount of money 
in the financial system, so commercial credit became available again (CEP, 1998; Kosacoff, 
2000). 
The opening up of the capital markets was accompanied by a shift in their composition. 
Government banks began to play a smaller role, having been replaced by private lenders, both 
domestic and foreigner (see table 4.2). 
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16 
Group of 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
entities 
Total number 206 205 158 147 138 
in the system 
National 6 3 3 3 3 
banks 
Provincial and 28 29 27 17 17 
municipal 
Private banks 63 67 57 64 50 
Foreign banks 31 31 30 28 37 
Cooperative 39 38 10 8 6 
banks 
Non-banking 39 37 31 27 25 
entities I I 
The role ofthefinancial system in the development and structure ofindigenousfirms 
The credit policy of the state (through its various mechanisms such as the creation of the 
Banco de Cr6dito Industrial in the 1950s, IAPI, and the Development Bank, among others) plus 
the underdevelopment of the capital markets have strongly influenced the type of ownership of 
firrns in Argentina over time. It is no coincidence that the family structure of the firms in the 
country lasted so long. Given that it was impossible to rely on commercial credit from the local 
banks (due to high interest rates or the lack of policy to support certain activities) Argentinian 
entrepreneurs preferred to draw on family savings to fund their enterprises (CEP, 1998). 
Over time, Argentinian companies suffered from capital shortages during periods of high 
growth and/or the state control of interest rates to support economic development. As a result, 
banks (private or state funded) allocated money to particular sectors and activities such as export 
industries (during the Per6n Presidency) or the heavy manufacturing sector (throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s). Consequently, indigenous firms found it was more reliable to depend on family 
funding than to trust in the financial system. Whitley (2000) indicates that direct ownership - as 
was the case in Argentina - is a direct consequence of low levels of trust in the formal 
institutions. 
16 Source: INDEC, 1998 
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The deregulation and liberalisation. that has occurred since 1990 has produced a radical 
transformation and modernisation of the Argentinian banking system. However, as the CEP 
(1998) reports, access to commercial credit has varied according to the financial capacity of the 
firms. While SMEs tend to depend to a large extent on national banks, large indigenous 
businesses tend to be customers of private and international banks. However, the main source of 
funding for investments is still family savings and net worth (CEP, 199 8). 
The national culture and values 
To undertake the analysis of national culture and values in Argentina, we used Hofstede's 
(1980,1985 and 1991) analysis, which proposed four national culture dimensions: power 
distance; uncertainty avoidance; individualism and collectivism; and masculinity-femininity. 
This is the only study in which Argentinian culture, among others, is analysed on a quantitative 
basis. 17 Moreover, the study provides a framework for understanding how Argentinian culture 
has changed over time. 
TABLE 4.3: THE ARGENTINIAN NATIONAL CULTURE COMPARED WITii LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND AMERICA'S 
Country Power Distance* Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Individualism* Masculinity 
Mexico 81/70 82 30/33 69 
Venezuela 81/66 76 12/28 73 
Brazil 6qn2 76 38/37 49 
Colombia 67/75 80 13/18 64 
Peru 64/69 87 16/22 42 
Chile 63/56 86 23/38 28 
United States 40 46 91 62 
Argentina 49/56 86 46/47 56 
*The second value in the table corresponds to predictions of the evolution of the value over time (Hofstede, 199 1) 
17 Other existent quantitative research in which Argentina was analysed is mainly based on Hofstede model of 
analysis (see Trompenaars, 1992). 
" The scores presented in this table corresponds to the findings of Hofstede's work (1980,1991) 
Power distance score: the higher the score the higher the power distance. Scores above 44 are considered to be an 
indication of a high level of power distance. 
Uncertainty avoidance: the higher the score the higher the uncertainty avoidance. Scores above 56 are an indication 
of a high level of uncertainty avoidance. 
Individualism: the higher the score, the higher the individualism. Scores above 50 are considered an indication of a 
high level of individualism 
Masculinity: the higher the score, the higher the masculinity. Scores above 50 are considered to be an indication of a 
high level of masculinity 
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Power distance is the extent to which people believe that power and status are distributed 
unequally and indicates their readiness to accept an unequal distribution of power as the proper 
way for social systems to be organised (Hofstede, 1991). Power distance in Argentina is 
increasing over time (Hofstede, 1991). This increase in the power distance score may be 
explained by Argentinians' attitude towards authority. They do not like authority and do not trust 
figures of authority. Authority deriving from the state is therefore looked upon with suspicion 
and state actions are seen as corrupt (The Economist, June 30th 2001). 
A recent study carried out by Gallup (see Escribano, 2001) confirms that Argentinians 
have little faith in their institutions. Only 38% of the people interviewed said they trust 
institutions in general. The Church and educational institutions were considered the most 
trustworthy institutions (with 60% and 74% respectively). Political institutions such as 
Parliament and political parties are not trusted by Argentinians (only 11% and 10% of 
interviewees respectively considered those institutions to be trustworthy). Another study by 
Paladino and Willi (2000) considered the particular case of Argentinian managers and concluded 
that Argentinian managers do not rely on political and legal institutions. 19 
Collectivism versus individualism is the extent to which individual identity derives from 
the collectivity as opposed to the self. Individual cultures are loosely coupled. Individuals are 
expected to look out for themselves and their immediate families. Status derives from individual 
accomplishment. Collective cultures rely on membership in groups - social classes, companies, 
communities, or extended families - for identity and status. People are protected by the group, 
depend on the group, and are expected to act in the group's best interests (Hofstede, 1980 and 
1985). 
Argentina is more collective than individualistic, owing, in part, to the high number of 
immigrants of Spanish and Italian extraction. Hofstede (199 1), however, indicates that there is a 
slight tendency towards more individualism among future generations. The collectivist culture 
19 In the World Economic Forum Report of Competitiveness, Argentina is ranked 51" out of 59 countries in tenns of 
corruption. The average ranking for Latin America was 46.3 (in Paladino and Willi, 2000). 
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prevalent in Argentina is perceived to derive from a sense of duty and obligation to the family. 
This is understandable in a society that rejects the state as a reliable authority and falls back on 
the family or other social institutions (such as the Catholic Church) as trustworthy (Floria and 
Garcia Belsunce, 1992; Escribano, 200 1). 
Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which people are threatened by uncertain, 
unknown, or unstructured situations (Hosftede, 1980). Uncertainty avoidance is high among 
Argentinians who are tired of economic and political turmoil. Argentinians always search for the 
right way to make transitions as quickly as possible. The lack of clear-cut answers and the 
number of years required for complete transitions encouraged people to retreat into old habits 
such as avoiding initiative and innovation. These attitudes have been clearly reflected throughout 
Argentinian history when strong opposition from society has flared up after long periods of 
economic turmoil (Gerchunoff and Llach, 1998; Muchnik, 1998; Garcia Vdzquez, 1995). 
Finally, Argentinians have a tendency towards masculinity in Hofstede's (1991) 
dimension masculinity-femininity dimension. Masculine Cultures are characterised by doing and 
acquiring, rather than thinking and observing. They value affiliation and view failure as much 
less important. Hofstede (1991) illustrates the masculine character of a society in terms of the 
way countries resolve international conflicts. He states that feminine countries compromise and 
negotiate. However, masculine countries fight. As an example of this, Hofstede (1991: 100) cites 
the way the Falkland crisis was handled. The Argentinian military government occupied the 
islands in April 1982 as a result of which British sent an expeditionary force to rebuff the 
occupiers. Argentina and the UK are both masculine countries in Hofstede's dimensions, and 
fighting and acquiring was the way both countries preferred to handle the conflict. 
The role ofnational culture and values in the structure and development ofArgentinianfinns 
How can the features of Argentinian culture and values affect the business organisation? 
The national culture and values mainly affect the governance structure of the firms, the ways in 
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which people deal with each other and other organisations, and the patterns of work organisation 
and control (Whitley, 2000). 
In organisations, power distance, as shown by Argentina, increases the extent of formal 
hierarchy and the degree of centralisation. On the other hand, it decreases the level of 
participation in decision-making (Hofstede, 1980; Trompenaars, 1992). Trust and authority 
relations are also affected. Argentinian managers' unwillingness to delegate authority and 
employees' unwillingness to take the initiative are emblematic of a higher power distance. In 
Argentina, the organisation is seen as "a pyramid ofpeople" (Hofstede, 1991: 141). 
Indigenous businesses in societies with high power distance are characterised by a 
paternalistic culture. However, due to the increasing power distance in Argentinian society, 
paternalism is remote rather than reciprocal (Whitley, 2000). Remote paternalism implies a high 
degree of social and moral distance between leaders and led. This paternalistic culture influences 
the corporate governance structure of indigenous firms. These structures are characterised by a 
low level of managerial participation and the lack of clear boundaries between the role of 
ownership and management (Whitley, 2000; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002). 
Argentinian employees' reluctance to take individual responsibility is partly a reflection 
of their collectivism. The clarity of rules, procedures, job security and systems organisations that 
companies try to build up, on the other hand, is a clear sign of uncertainty avoidance. Reliance 
on clear procedures, well understood rules, and detailed job descriptions helps employees reduce 
uncertainty and cope with their discomfort with unknown situations. Finally, the masculinity and 
collectivity of Argentinian society will attach importance to group rewards and group 
empowerment rather than individual performance rewards (Hofstede, 1991) (see table 4.4 for 
more details). 
Hosftede's categories of analysis are taken up by Hamed and Miconnet (1999) in their 
study of the diffusion of process management practices in the Swedish company Ericsson in three 
different countries: Sweden, New Zealand and Argentina. Regarding the case of Argentina and 
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its uncertainty avoidance, Hamed and Miconnet (1999) provide evidence of how employees in 
Ericsson Argentina are more likely to accept clearly defined reporting systems and 
responsibilities than their counterparts in New Zealand and Sweden. In addition, reward systems 
associated with the idea of taking risk, for instance performance-related pay systems, are rejected 
by Argentinian employees who are sensitive to uncertainty. They also suggest that Argentinian 
employees are less individualistic than their counterparts in New Zealand and Sweden, making it 
easier to foster teamwork, as the research fieldwork in Ericsson Argentina showed. 
TABLE 4.4: IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL CULTURE FOR ARGENTINIAN 13USINESSES20 
National High Power Distance High Collectivism Masculinity 
culture factors Uncertainty 
affecting firms Avoidance 
(Whitley, 2000) 
Governance -Top-down leadership -Important to -Tendency 
-Patemalist-rcmote know who has the towards multiple 
governance authority over reporting 
who, and who to 
obey 
Relations -Hierarchy is -Well defined -Hierarchy -Group 
(within the important hierarchy reflects personal empowerment 
organisations) -Distant relation -Consensus status rather than 
between top important achievement 
management and -Avoid conflict -Emphasis on 
employees -Rules and relationships 
-Favours; upward procedures rather than tasks 
delegation needed to be clear -Appeal to 
-Employees with low collective identity 
level of participation 
of decision-making. 
Work -High levels of -Formalisation of -Requires more -Rewards for 
organisation and centralisation of decision-making control and status difference 
control decision making -Tight control, dedication to not for 
- People do not feel based on well- norms of performance 
responsible for results established rules behaviour difference 
-Risk-taking at the top and standards -Responsibility 
-Change is a top-down -Emphasis on tends to become 
process precision and diluted within the 
-High resistance to routines group 
change -Innovation -Change is seen as 
avoidance a challenge to the 
-Change group 
perceived as a -Change is slow 
threat. High and shared 
resistance I II 
20 Sources: Hofstede (1980,1985 and 1991); Laurent (1986); Trompenaars (1992); Granell et al, 1997 
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The power distance and uncertainty avoidance dimensions emerge as important ones in 
understanding how organisations undertake processes of change (Granell et al, 1997). According 
to Hofstede (1991), faced with a situation or decision, an organisation has to ask itself two 
questions: who are the people with the power to decide? And what are the rules or procedures to 
be followed in order to achieve the desired objectives? The answer to the first question is closely 
linked to the way power is distributed in the organisation. In the case of high power distance, 
there are few people in the organisation who can start the process of change. Where there is low 
power distance, the process of change is much more of a joint effort. The answer to the second 
question is linked to uncertainty avoidance: when uncertainty avoidance is high, people look for 
clearly defined and standardised procedures, whilst when uncertainty avoidance is low, things 
tend to be simpler and more inforinal. The change process, however, is bound to be easier when 
uncertainty avoidance is low. Figure 4.4 shows the models of organisation proposed by Hofstede 
(1991) as a result of combining the two dimensions previously analysed (power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance). 
Regarding the organisation as a pyramid of people (as in the case of Argentina, see figure 
4.4) makes change a difficult process. Employees may therefore perceive change as threat. In 
such an organisation, resistance to change is bound to happen (Granell et al, 1997). Granell et 
al's (1997) study in Venezuela (which, in terms of Hofstede's uncertainty and power distance 
dimensions, has similar characteristics to Argentina) suggests that in countries with similar 
characteristics to Venezuela, the process of change will be successful when employees know the 
changes planned in advance. To be successful, Granell et al (1997) suggest, change processes 
require time and patience. Change must be slow and gradual. In such a culture, Granell et al 
(1997: 15 1) continue, "anticipating change is better than having to react to it. " 
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4.5 Conclusions 
The structure and development of indigenous firms are to a large extent tile reflection of 
the institutions, values and assumptions of different societies. The analysis of the Argentinian 
business environment in terms of the role of the state and financial institutions in the 
industrialisation process and national culture and values reinforces the fact that specific national 
factors play an important role in explaining differences in business organisations. 
The Argentinian case is a good example of a country and a business system that, despite 
undergoing a radical transformation and modernisation in a very short period, is significantly 
21 SOUrce: Hofstede (1991 ) 
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imprinted by its past institutional legacy. Indigenous firms were also shaped by the changes in 
the national business environment. Their rise, growth and decline can be explained as a product 
of the business environment in which they are embedded. 
The previous analysis also reflects how certain nationally dominant socio-economic 
configurations persist over long periods and influence firms' behaviour. Moreover, national 
peculiarities are a critical element shaping the competitive advantage of both companies and 
industries. Indeed, the origin of any successful industry is specific to national attributes and not 
firm factors (Porter, 1990). So questions arise concerning the main features of the 
pharmaceutical and edible oil industries in this study. What are the key industry phases? How 
did the industries cope with chauges in the national context in the 1990s? What new practices 
were instigated by macro-economic changes? And how did these changes affect the firms within 
the different industries? In the next chapter, we explain the evolution and transformation of the 
pharmaceutical and edible oil industries. 
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Chapter 5: The pharmaceutical and edible oil industries 
5.1 Introduction 
This study draws a clear distinction between the terms 'sector' and 'industry'. Analysing 
the innovation process at the car manufacturer Rover, Whipp and Clark (1986: 26) define 'sector' 
as a notion that "applies to collections of enterprises which provide similar goods and services, 
possibly in competition with each other, though the degree of competition may well be regulated 
in practice. " In his model for assessing competition within an industry, Bain (1968) 
distinguishes sector from industry. He points out that we are dealing with a sector when different 
firms engage in a productive activity that has some common functions. At the same time these 
firms also have differences, and the differences frequently stem from firms that "in the same 
sector may produce quite different goods or services, fuYi'lling different needs of buyers and 
perhaps catering to entirely different groups of buyers" (Bain, 1968: 6). In this case, following 
Bain's definition, we are in the presence of an industry. Thus, we can talk about the food sector 
but we may also distinguish between the different industries within this sector such as diary 
products, edible oils, and food processing, among others. 
Another possible definition is one that sees the industry as related to the concept of 
market. The market exists when "there is an exchange ofgoods or services between sellers and 
buyers, shaped by the forces of supply and demand and co-ordinated by the price mechanism" 
(Gospel, 1992: 2). Based on Gospel, it is possible to say that an industry is a group of many 
actors, who interact with the same kind of product or services according to a distinctive logic of 
action and interest. Every industry is unique, with its own nature and dynamics and also its own 
evolutionary path. 
In their theoretical work on strategic groups, McGee and Howard (1986) also take the 
market into account in order to define industrial boundaries. Furthermore, they include another 
criterion -that is, technology - that stresses the similarities in the processes the industry uses. 
113 
The academic literature has analysed the influence of industries on firm's behaviour from 
different angles. In some fields, such as Industrial Organisation (10), a whole body of research is 
devoted to the factors determining performance in an industry, and to explaining why, in some 
industries, companies obtain consistently higher returns on investments than in other industries. 
The basic idea postulated by this approach is that the structural characteristics of industries 
influence the conduct of organisations and, in turn, this behaviour affects performance (Bain, 
1968). More recently, McGahan and Porter (1997) argued that industry effects are more 
persistent over time than other kinds of effects such as business or the corporate-parent effect. 
They found no support for the idea that a rapid change in the economy diminishes the importance 
of industry effects. 
The notion of fit between environment (in a broad sense), industry requirements, a firm's 
strategy, and its structure has played a key role in developing the strategic management literature. 
The fit between industry features and the firm's strategy has also been used extensively to 
explain why some firms do better than others (Chandler, 1962). Another stream of the 10 
approach argues that the firm's strategy has a feedback effect on the market structure. Porter 
(1981 and 1985) points out that the industry is not a cage in which the firm is held prisoner. 
Through their strategies, firms can influence the forces that determine industry profitability. 
Firms can shape an industry's structure, changing its attractiveness for better or worse. 
Moreover, a firm's innovation can increase or reduce entry barriers. 
From the institutional perspective, isomorphism as an effect is stressed. Having ties with 
the institutional environment can help companies to be less vulnerable (Baum and Oliver, 1991). 
Industry experience benefits the organisation because the industry reflects "the 
interdependencies between competitors " (Ingram and Baum, 1997: 97) 
The contextualist approach has also taken into account the importance of the sectoral 
level of analysis. Pettigrew (1990) states the importance of multiple levels of analysis when 
studying processes of change. The firm, sector and national economy are the three levels of 
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analysis that need to be taken into account because the context in which firms are embedded 
consists of an intertwined set of relationships and links between the firms, sectors and the 
national economy. 
Different studies have been carried out from this perspective. Pettigrew and Whipp 
(1991), for example, analysed the competitive and strategic behaviour of eight firms in four 
different industries. For them, a firm's strategy, competition and strategic change are related to 
the sectoral and national environment in which it is immersed. A similar analysis can be found in 
Berg (1979), who studied the process of change in a glass manufacturing company, in Whipp and 
Clark (1986), who studied the process of innovation in the automotive industry in Britain (Rover 
in particular), and in Child and Smith (1987), who examined the transformation process at 
Cadbury. 
The above review shows that the sectoral or industry level of analysis is a crucial element 
in the understanding of a firm's behaviour. Companies do not operate in a vacuum, but always 
conduct their business in a particular configuration of an industry within a nation state. 
Furthermore, sectors and industries are the main element within which the country features are 
operationalised. The industry level of analysis is seen as a crucial mediator, a meso-level, which 
allows us to link the micro-level of the individual firm with the macro-level of the nation state. 
The key questions that emerge from the previous review are: what were the main 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical and edible oil industries over time? What were the main 
changes during the 1990s? Why have these industries changed radically over the period 1989- 
1999? And finally, what were the main competitive pressures for indigenous businesses 
stemming from the industries' transformation? 
After this introduction, sections two and three aim to answer the above question in 
relation to both the pharmaceutical and edible oil industries. To facilitate the analysis of the 
industries we have followed the following sequence: firstly, the market structures are examined. 
Secondly, the historical development of each industry is explained. Thirdly, the changes in the 
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industries throughout the 1990s are highlighted. Finally, the competitive pressures for 
indigenous firms stemming from changes in the industries are also underlined. In section four, 
we explain the main characteristics of both the pharmaceutical and edible oil industries as 
hypercompetitive environments. 
5.2 The pharmaceutical industry 
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most dynamic industries in Argentina, 
representing 1.1% of the GDP and sales of US$ 3,557 million with an average annual growth of 
6% (INDEC, 1998 and Financial Times, March 4h 1999). Total spending on health care in 
Argentina represents 7.21% of GDP, while in Latin America this figure is 5.7% on average 
(Claves, 1999). Argentina, one of the few countries with phamlaceutical innovative capabilities 
(Katz, 1992; Ballance et al, 1992) is the I Oth largest market in the world and represents 1.5% of 
world sales (see table 5.1). 'Ibis fact makes the market very competitive with nearly all renowned 
MNCs having a presence in the Argentinian market. 
TABLE 5.1: WORLD RETAIL PHARMACY PURCHASES (US$ MILLION)22 
Countries Total sales World ranking % change 1998-1999 
USA 74,095 1 11 
Japan 38,764 2 -1 
Germany 15,470 3 6 
France 14,165 4 4 
Italy 9,123 5 8 
UK 8,385 6 8 
Brazil 6,536 7 -5 
Spain 5,284 8 11 
Canada 4,276 9 11 
Argentina 3,557 10 6 
Mexico 3,263 11 11 
AustralialNew Zealand 2,464 12 8 
This chapter sets out to describe the structure and development of the industry over the 
period 1989-1999 in which the pharmaceutical industry shifted dramatically. The particularities 
22 Source: Financial Times, March 4h, 1999. The information provided is for sales of prescription drugs. It excludes 
the OTC (over-the-counter) market sales. 
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of the industry, the regulations in force, and changes in the national economy played a critical 
role in the changes the industry underwent. These aspects are considered in the analysis. 
The phan-naceutical market structure 
Describing the structure of the market can be a complex process due to the different 
actors and regulations in force in the market. Figure 5.1 is an attempt to simplify the structure of 
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Agents and Roles 
'fhe pharmaceutical market in Argentina involves a set of production, distribution, 
financing, consumption and regulation functions. There is a group of players or agents that 
assume different roles in these functions. 
The agents that act in production are fundamentally medicine laboratories and, on a 
smaller scale, drug manufacturers and pharmacies. There are also some provincial public 
laboratories in charge of producing medicines to be supplied to the public health system 
(Gonzdlez Garcia et al, 1999; IMS, 1999). 
Although there are 220 active companies, the largest laboratories are responsible for most 
sales. In the prescription drug market, the ten largest companies account for 40% of sales, and 
the forty largest companies are responsible for more than 80% of the sales (IMS, 1999 and 
Claves, 1999). The market concentration is increasing for the prescription drug market, which 
represents more than 90% of sales. Indigenous businesses represent 51% of the total sales in the 
sector (IMS, 1999). 
The industry's main professional bodies are CAEME and CILFA. The former, defending 
intellectual property and the patent system, gathers together MNC companies; the latter, 
defending the national industry, unites indigenous businesses. COOPERALA brings together 
indigenous medium and small size companies (Claves, 1999). 
The commercialisation agents are distributors, drug manufacturers and pharmacies. 
Among distributors there are four large companies with domestic capital and a few small regional 
distributors. Drug manufacturers, on the other hand, number more than one hundred. Finally, 
there are almost 12,000 pharmacies in Argentina that are responsible for retailing. Furthermore, 
kiosks and supermarkets are becoming increasingly important in the sale of over-the-counter 
(henceforth, OTC) medicines (Manzone, 2000). 
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With regard to demand, there are different financing agents. On the one hand, there are 
the institutional agents: social institutions, 23 prepaid plans, and the central administration. On the 
other hand, there are private citizens who buy medicines financing the purchase in total or in part 
by means of a direct payment. 
There are two kinds of consumers of medicines. The instrumental one - the physician - 
who decides when and which medicines must be used, and the consumer, who actually consumes 
the product. Unlike most product markets, the demand for drugs does not depend exclusively on 
consumer tastes. In many instances, pharmaceuticals are chosen by doctors or pharmacists and 
are paid for subsequent to their purchase by health insurance schemes other than final consumers. 
In the best case, the final consumer can choose where to buy the medicines, request substitutes 
and even decide to suspend the medication. On the other hand, physicians (instrumental 
consumers) often prescribe the brand directly, limiting the possibility the end consumer might 
have to request a substitute product (Manzone, 2000; Claves, 1999). 
The regulation and supervision of the industry is a responsibility shared by the Central 
Government and the Provinces. The industry as a whole has been subject to government 
regulations. Within the inter-jurisdictional division of the work, Provinces have maintained 
supervision functions while the Central Government, through the National Administration of 
Medicines, Foods and Health Technology (ANMAT) has retained the quality control and 
registration of products (Katz, 1997). 
The historical development of the pharmaceutical industry in Argentina 
The Argentinian pharmaceutical industry was and still is characterised. by a strong 
national identity. A number of factors can help to explain the relative success of domestic 
enterprise, including the reduced rate of innovation in the 1960s and 1970s in the drug industry 
worldwide and the fact that most of foreign firms showed a lack of interest in the Argentinian 
23 Called 'obras sociales' in Argentina. 
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market (UNCTC, 1984). However, the success of Argentina's drug firms cannot be attributed to 
these factors alone. The success of domestic pharmaceutical companies in Argentina, as 
Chudnovsky (1979) points out, was also due to their distinctive strategy, which was made up of 
the following elements: a) emphasis on marketing skills and product differentiation activities; b) 
the use of licenses to gain access to difficult sub-markets; c) opposition to a strong patent system 
in order to obtain active ingredients from non-patented sources; and d) a certain degree of local 
technology. 
During the phase in which this industry was set up, it adopted an industrial organisational 
model that benefited indigenous firms through a relatively favourable institutional and regulatory 
framework that granted them a rapid expansion vis-ii-vis the subsidiaries of MNC companies. 
Katz and Burachik (1992) state that throughout the 1960s and 1980s three types of 
companies were found in the Argentinian market: firstly, indigenous firms vertically integrated 
towards local production of pharmaceutical raw material; secondly, it was also possible to find 
indigenous firms that imported all active principles they used in the local manufacture of 
medicines. And finally, there were subsidiaries of MNC companies that bought the raw material 
necessary for production from their own headquarters. 
The companies that operated with imported pharmaceutical raw materials were supplied 
by non-patentist countries such as Italy, Spain or Hungary, and therefore paid prime prices 
significantly lower than those charged by mutinational firms' headquarters. Another group of 
companies decided to integrate their local operation vertically by manufacturing active principles 
or raw materials. With that purpose, they had set up small multipurpose chemical plants in which 
they manufactured reduced quantities of the chemical product required. Unlike national 
companies, the subsidiaries paid a transfer price which was significantly higher than those in the 
non-patentist world, thereby reducing the possibility of competing by lower price (Chudnovsky, 
1979; Katz, 1992; Bogo, 1994). 
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It is important to understand that the coexistence of these three different production 
organisations was only possible in a particular institutional and regulatory framework that was 
characterised by three main aspects: 
I-The government gave priority to indigenous firms in the registration of new pharmaceutical 
products (Vemengo, 1992); 
2-National legislation did not recognise product patents in the field of pharmaceuticals 
(Chudnovsky, 1979); 
3-The maintenance of a high level of tariff-protection for domestic production of pharmaceutical 
raw materials (Chudnovsky, 1979; Bogo, 1994). 
The institutional framework described above fostered the expansion of indigenous 
business throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. 
Changes in the pharmaceutical industry in the 1990s 
In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s the pharmaceutical industry was protected and stable, and 
based on an institutional framework that allowed that. The 1990s, when the regulatory 
framework on which the industry relied was lifted, represented a major shift. 
The structure and regulatory framework of the pharmaceutical industry changed 
dramatically during the 1990s. The external openness of the economy, the deregulation of 
economic activity and revitalised competition became the basic philosophical pillars on which 
the new pattern for the industry was established (see figure 5.2). 
At least three major elements of the new regulatory scenario affected the pharmaceutical 
industry, representing, as Katz (1992) points out, a shift away from the former system that had 
prevailed in the industry over almost three decades. The three issues were: 
a) The elimination of price control over medicines; 
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b) The simplification of the access mechanism for the registration of new products; 
c) The modification of patent law. 
FIGURE 5.2: CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN ARGENTINA 1989-1999 
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Elimination ofprice control in medicines 
At the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, the policies of deregulation of the 
economy resulted in the elimination of the regime of price control in the industry and its 
subsequent liberalisation, breaking the tradition of more than a decade of prices controlled in 
various ways (maximum, regulated or agreed prices) (Katz and Burachik, 1992). 
Another measure for decreasing the price of the medicine was the elimination of barriers 
to the importation of medicines and active principles coming from countries with similar or 
greater quality controls than domestic ones (Decree 908/91). 
New patent law 24425 dw replaced November 2000. End or the period or 
die law III from 1864. Regulated by nwitions. Fullappitcanonofthc patent 
Decree 621/95. Patents can be obtamed for law. National companies startins to pay 
products and processes. Argentina decided royalties. 
a5 yew period oftransitm 10 
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However, the mechanism implemented failed completely to achieve the objectives 
sought, and in 1991 Decree N* 2284/91 was sanctioned. This decree opened a new phase in the 
deregulation programme, and came to play a leading role within short-and long-term public 
policies. This Decree -insofar as it related specifically to the pharmaceutical market - authorised 
the sale of OTC specialties in shops other than pharmacies and also made it possible to set up 
new pharmacies (Decree 2284,199 1). 
The tariff structure was also modified, eliminating tariff protection for most products, that 
is, raw materials or end products. Only a reduced group of products have remained subject to a 
tariff of I I% (GonzAlez Garcia et al, 1999). 
Simplification ofthe mechanismfor the registration ofnewproducts 
One of the most important innovations introduced by Decree 150/92 consisted of granting 
automatic entry in the Registry of the Ministry of Health to all those medicines authorised in the 
following countries: countries of the European Union, Canada, United States, Japan, and Israel. 
The implicit objectives of such a policy were: firstly, to speed up authorisation to commercialise 
medicines of domestic or foreign origin thus taking advantage of the assessment and control 
capability of the health authorities of leading countries; and, secondly, to favour the 
competitiveness and transparency of a market that continued to resist attempts to establish 
stability (Katz, 1997). 
The Decree also introduced modifications in the commercialisation of generics. The 
modification of the regulatory framework pretended to fulfil a double purpose: first, to promote 
the use of generic over branded products and to keep costs down within the health sector; second, 
to provide more information to physicians, pharmacists and the consumer-patient. 
125 
Modification of thepatent law 
This is probably one of the most controversial changes made and one that bad 
consequences in the long term for the industry as a whole. The changes in the legislation 
regarding patents, nonetheless, must be analysed within the context of what happened in the 
international arena, and specifically with reference to the debates held during the Uruguay Round 
of the GATT, TRIPs (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) and, TRIMS (Trade 
Related Investment Measures). The final object of this body of institutions and rules was to 
strengthen the protection of property rights over technological knowledge by extending that 
protection to fields that have traditionally been very weakly covered, like that of pharmaceutical 
products and genetic innovations (Katz and Burachik, 1992). 
This process ended with the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property) - 
GATT Treaty on April 1994, called the Marrakech Multilateral Agreement. It was ratified by 
Argentina through Law 24425 in December 1994 and regulated by Decree 621/95. The treaty 
consisted, among others, of the following aspects: 
a) Patents can be obtained for all inventions of products or procedures in every technological 
field as long as they are new, entail an inventive activity and have an industrial application; 
b) Written data or other compilations of material that, due to reasons of selection and layout of 
their contents, constitute creations of intellectual nature, will be protected as such; 
c) The protection conferred by a patent will not expire before a twenty-year period has elapsed, 
calculated from the date on which the application was presented (Law 24425,1994; Decree 621, 
1995). 
For indigenous companies, the patent law represented a breakthrough regarding the 
running of their businesses. Before the patent law, indigenous firms copied products that were 
originally developed by MNCs and commercialised them without paying any royalty to the 
owners of the formulae. The patent law meant that the payment of royalties was compulsory and 
that before launching any new product, indigenous firms would have to deal with the owner of 
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the patent. This also implied that the market position of foreign firms (which developed drug 
patents) was strengthened compared to indigenous firms (which produced or commercialised 
products) (Katz, 1997; Gonzilez Garcia et al, 1999; Claves, 1999). 
Competitive pressures in the pharmaceutical industry 1989-1999 
The changes the industry went through during the 1990s in terms of its regulatory 
framework prepared the ground for more competition. The deregulation process made it possible 
for foreign companies to compete in a market attractive for its size and potential development. 
For indigenous firms, the changes in the regulatory norms gave rise to levels of competition to 
which they were not accustomed. The period 1994-1997 saw the biggest investment ever in the 
industry with approximately US$ 1,200 million of foreign and national investments (Claves, 
1999; Manzone, 2000). 
But, what factors besides the changes in regulations brought about an increase in the 
competitive pressures in the industry? Firstly, the average prices of medicines - after the 
deregulation process began - were the highest in the region. That meant that Argentina was 
considered a high consumption group (Claves, 1999). Secondly, a process of M&As began in the 
industry, replicating a similar process in the international market. Both processes, as the 
subsequent analysis shows, brought into the industry new international companies and thereby 
increased competition. 
Volume ofsales and averageprice oftnedicines in the Argentinian market 
Argentina is the country with the highest average prices in Latin America. In the decade 
since 1990, when the process of liberalisation and deregulation began in the phannaceutical 
market, the average price of medicines rose by 105%. At the same time the volume of products 
sold in the market diminished (see figure 5.3 for evolution of average price and volume). All this 
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made Argentina a high consumption group. The average yearly consumption per capita in 1999 
was US$ 165 - the highest in Latin America (Gonzdlez Garcia et al, 1999; Manzone, 2000). 
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The sustained growth of prices was closely linked to the competitive strategy of the 
companies. It consisted of the permanent introduction of new products that were generally sold 
at higher prices than those under commercialisation. An example of this is what happened in 
1995 when the average price of new products in Argentina was US$ 14.76, which represented all 
increase of 69YO over the average price in the market at that moment (Claves, 1999). 
Taking into account the foregoing explanation and the huge difference between Argentina 
and the other Latin American countries in terms of market size and average price it is easy to see 
why foreign companies became interested in the market (see table 5.2). 
-- I MIS Health, various issues 1991-1999ý Claves, 1999 
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TABLE 5.2: AVERAGE PRICES IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES IN 1995 (IN USSý5 
Latin America Average 
price 
Other countries Average 
price 
Argentina 8.63 United States 13.51 
Uruguay 5.27 Germany 11.74 
Dominican Rep. 5.14 Canada 10.98 
Peru 4.38 United Kingdom 8.27 
Brazil 4.23 Australia 6.55 
CentralAmerica 4.19 Italy 6.12 
Colombia 3.27 France 6.11 
Chile 3.11 Spain 4.95 
Ecuador 3.07 South Korea 3.00 
Mexico 2.74 
Venezuela 2.24 
Changes in the configuration of the market 
Changes in the world pharmaceutical market and in the Argentinian economic context 
had an impact on the internal configuration of the pharmaceutical industry in the country. 
At the international level, the 1990s were characterised by a trend towards mergers, take- 
overs and strategic agreements. The strategic aim was to win scale and improve production, boost 
commercialisation and marketing strategies and, to a lesser extent, to enhance research and 
development (Mirasol, 2000). The following table shows the most significant M&As over time 
in the world pharmaceutical market. 
25 Sources: Gonzilez Garcia et al, 1999; Claves, 1999; La Naci6n Newspaper, various issues 
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TABLE 5.3: MERGERS AND ACOUISrrioNs IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET THROUGHOUT THE 1980s AND 1990S26 
Year Merger and Acquisition 
1985 Rorer and US/Armour 
Monsanto and Searle 
1986 Schering Plough and Key 
1988 Kodak and Sterling 
1989 Dow and Mrion 
Bristol-Myers and Squibb 
American Home and A. H. Robins 
1990 Boots and Flint 
Pharmacia and Kabi 
Rhone-Poulenc and Rorer 
1991 Smith Kline and Beecham 
1994 Smith Kline and Beecham and Sterling (over-the-counter pharmaceutical unit) 
Sanofi and Sterling (prescription drug operation) 
Pharmacia and Erbamont 
Hoffinan-La Roche and Syntex 
American Home and American Cynamid 
1995 Schwarz Pharma and Reed 7 Carnrick 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer and Fisons 
Pharmacia and Upjohn 
Hoech-Roussel and Marion Merrel Dow 
Gynopharma and Ortho-McNeil 
Glaxo and Burrough Wellcome 
Knoll and Boots 
1996 Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz (created Novartis) 
Elan and Athena Neurosciences 
1997 Roche-Boheringer Manheirn 
1998 Astra, and Zeneca (created AstraZcneca PLC) 
Hoechst AG and Rhone Poulenc S. A (created Aventis) 
Sanofi and Synthelabo 
1999 Abbot and Alza corp 
Roche and Genentech 
Warner Lambert and Agouron Pharmaceuticals 
Phan-nacia & Upjohn and Unimed Pharmaceuticals 
How did the international upsurge of M&As affect the pharmaceutical industry in Argentina? 
The international wave of mergers and acquisitions had an important influence on the re- 
positioning of MNCs in the pharmaceutical market in Argentina, as can be seen in table 5.4. 
Over the period 1994-1999 the market saw a noticeable trend in the acquisition of indigenous 
companies by MNC firms. Furthermore, the regulatory changes in the industry in Argentina and 
the economic openness made MNCs reconsider their strategy in the country. Some foreign 
companies that left the market in the 1980s entered again, re-buying the licence given to 
26 Various sources: The Economist, Jan 22d, 2000; Goetzl, 2000; Rogers, 2000 (a b); Barret et al, 1999; Nasri, 
1999; Torres, 1999. 
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indigenous companies (such as Rhone Poulenc to Elvetium or ICN-Syncro to Roemmers). Other 
MNCs bought indigenous businesses. The following table shows the most relevant acquisitions 
and the entry of foreign firms into the pharmaceutical market. 
TABLE 5.4: CHANGES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET IN ARGENTINA: RELEVANT ACQUISITIONS OR GREENFIELD 27 
Company that enters the 




Origin of capital 
Bristol Myers Squibb Argentia USA 
Roche Boheringer Manheinn Switzerland 
Allergan Loa Bonru Perel USA 
Alcon Plos USA 
Merk Volpino Germany 
R. P. Scherer Diversification USA 
Procter and Gamble Diversification USA 
Laboratorios Chile Armstrong Chile 
lvax Corp Elvetium and Alct USA 
Columbia Diprovcnt Mexico 
Laboratorios Chile Syncro Chile 
I. C. N Enters UK 
Grifols Enters Spain 
T. R_13 Enters Switzerland 
Teva Tutcur Enters France 
Ferring Enters Sweden 
Otsuka Pharmaceutical Enters Japan 
UCB Pharma Enters Belgium 
Baxternmuno Enters USA 
Knoll Enters Germany 
Novo Nordisk Enters Denmark 
Mallinckrodt Enters USA 
Eli Lilly e- n rs USA 
one enc Re-Enters France 
Monsanto Re-Enters buying Syntial USA 
Smithkline Beechman Re-Enters UK 
The entrance of new companies into the market through greenfield or acquisitions had 
two main consequences for the local industry and indigenous businesses. It firstly increased the 
market share for foreign companies. Secondly, it also boosted market concentration in the 
industry. Figure 5.4 and table 5.5 show both the market distribution and concentration levels in 
the industry respectively over the period 1989-1999. 
27 Various sources: Newspapers: La Naci6n and Clarin (various issues); Magazine: Revista Mercado (various 
issues). 
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Figure 5.4 shows how the participation of NINCs in the market has increased from 40.8 to 
48.6% over the ten years analysed. This can be explained by reference to the entrance of 
companies in the market and acquisitions made over that period. In 1989, the pharmaceutical 
industry accounted for twelve family-owned businesses among the first twenty. By 1999 only 
seven indigenous family-owned firms remained among the first twenty (IMS, 1989-1999). 
The second consequence of the process of M&A experienced in the pharmaceutical 
industry in Argentina is reflected in the levels of concentration in the industry. Concentration 
levels rose throughout the 1990s. The following table shows the tendency towards concentration 
in the phannaceutical industry in Argentina. 
-- I his figure was prepared with data supplied by I MS reports 1988-1999 
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TAM-iý 5.5: CON('[-N, rRA'FION LINELS IN'rIlE N IARMA('I-('I-[('Al, INDUSTRY OVER] HE PERIOD 1989- 199929 
Companies 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1999/1989 
First 5 24.68 23.17 22.14 21.88 23.64 22.70 23.17 24.19 24.10 24.77 24.64 -1.62'Yo 
companies 
First 10 36.38 34.95 33.80 33.47 35.35 34.07 35.33 37.29 38.20 38.48 38.08 4.67% 
Companies 
First 20 55.29 54.90 5361 52.80 54.87 53.25 55.37 57.63 58.69 60.14 59.80 8.16'Yo 
companies 
First 30 70.31 70.63 68.95 67.94 69.38 68.69 69.90 72.12 73.19 73.96 73.55 4.60% 
companies 
First 40 79.69 80.58 79.19 78.11 78.82 79.25 79.65 81.89 83.40 83.49 82.53 3.56'Yo 
companies 
First 50 85.69 86.75 85.47 84.56 84.90 85.96 86.07 87.67 86.72 89.10 88.57 3.36'Yo 
companies 
Summary 
The foregoing analysis has described and explained the most important t, actors 
contributing to the competitive pressures in the pharmaceutical market in Argentina. Two factors 
were identified as influencing the increasing competitive pressures over time: firstly, during the 
1990s the average price of products in the industry becarne the highest in the region, making 
Argentina a high consumption market. The second factor is linked with an international trend of' 
M&As that also took place in the phannaceutical market in Argentina. 
The consequence of the processes described above is that over the period 1989-1999 
competitive pressures increased. Foreign companies achieved more market share and market 
concentration rose. 
5.3 The Edible Oil Industry 
Agro-industries were one of the earliest industrial sectors to develop in Argentina. The 
agrifood sector has historically played a core role in the development of the country. Gutman 
(1993) points out that this sector had a triple function for the industrialisation process in the 
country. Firstly it was a producer of food for the internal market; secondly, it was a major 
29 Sources: I MS (various issues)-Ba II ance et al ( 1992) Revista Mercado (various issues). 
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exporter; and finally, it was one of the main sources of' tax resources for the state, and thereby 
provided the necessary currency to carry Out the industrialisation process. 
The agrifood sector as a whole has gone through various changes in the last two decades. 
These changes were mainly in the areas of production and technology, and in the 
internationalisation process that nowadays characterises the sector. The whole sector received 
32'YO of foreign direct investment in the country over the period 1990-1999, becoming the largest 
beneficiary of foreign investment (CEP, 1999). 
The edible oil industry is one of the most dynainic industries within the sector. This has 
experienced the highest rate of growth aniong agribusinesses over the last decade. It has been 
largely based on strong export perforniance. During this period it has become an export leader, 
earning US$ 5.2 billion in annual foreign sales (Ilerrantz, 1999), becoming tile largest exporting 
inclustry in 1984 and holding that position c%-cn since (Gutman and Feldman, 1990; INDEC, 
1998). 
Argentina is the main exporter of soybean and sunflower oil - two of the three most 
widely traded oils worldwide (see figure 5.5 and 5.6). Argentina is also the fifth largest producer 
of oilseeds and the sixth cnisher (i. e., it processes the oilseeds into edible oil) (Rabobank, 1998). 












FIGURE 5.6: MAJOR EXPORTERS OF SUNFLOWER OIL IN 1998'1 
The complex of edible oils: The main aspects of the industryand its structure 
Agents and roles 
Some edible oils are vegetable in origin while others are derived From aminal sources. 
Vegetable oils and fats are the most significant among the commerciallsed edible oils, accounting 
for 80% of oil consumption. For the purpose of this study and due to its importance in the 
Argentinian market, soy, sunflower, peanut, cotton and flax grains will make up the vegetable oil 
subsystem (Gutman and Feldman, 1990). 
Oilseed is grown by small scale, private enterprises among which family businesses are 
most important. Most crops involved are annuals. The large number of oilseed producers makes 
the market very competitive, with no single producer being able to exert significant Influence on 
price (Rabobank, 1998). Farmers have the technical support of Instituto Nacional de Tecilologia 
Agropecuaria (INTA) - the national agency for agnculture and technology. Their research into 
seed quality has boosted productivity. INTA works closely with MNC companies, which are the 
main producers of seeds (see figure 5.7). 
Once the crop has been harvested, it may be sold to a trader or to a collector. 'Me latter 
collect the oilseeds, store thern if necessary, and sell them on to the crushing or processing 
3' SOUrce: Rabobank, 1998 
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companies. 32 In some instances the crushers buy directly from the producer -a phenomenon that 
is increasing as both indigenous and foreign crushers attempt to secure supplies. In order to 
establish closer ties, some crushers are setting up contract farming. 33 
Crushing yields two products, oil and meal. The latter is rich in protein and is 
consequently an attractive ingredient for the animal feed industry (Verheinjen and Jimmink, 
1995). 
Crushing differs from country to country. In Argentina the crushing business is 
dominated by only a few companies. These are often owned by MNCs. Margins are low and 
market entry is difficult because the initial investment required is high. Quitting the industry can 
also be difficult because of the difficulty of selling the assets (Ketelhohn et al, 1998). The 
crushers are the most important part of the edible oil industry because they represent 
approximately 50% of the value added of oilseed products (Ketelhohn et al, 1998; Verbeinjen 
and Jimmink, 1995). 
Crushers joined forces and created CIARA, the professional association that represents 
both national and MNC companies. CIARA has an active role, both internally and externally. 
Internally, it lobbies for the industry (in matters such as taxation, and export reimbursements 
among others); externally, it participates in negotiations with Mercosur and the World Trade 
Organisation. The government seeks advice from CIARA for technical matters in the industry. 
CIARA's role is therefore more that of a board of advisors and lobbyist for the whole industry 
(Ketelhohn et at, 1998). 
Once crushing has taken place, the value chain splits into two. 71be crude oil produced by 
the crushers can be either exported in bulk or refined and in some cases hardened (hydrogenated) 
for the baking and frying industry. Refining is also characterised by economies of scale. In 
many cases both crushing and refining are integrated. Although crushing and refining 
32 For the purpose of this study we use both crushing or processing interchangeably 33 Information provided by crushing companies in Argentina, 1999 (Interviews in AGD, Viccntin) and CIARA, the 
professional association of the industry. 
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traditionally took place in different locations, there is now a trend to bring them closer together 
(Verheinjen and jimmink, 1995) (see figure 5.7). 
The last part of the value chain is the distribution and consumption of branded products. 
A wide range of products can be obtained from oils and fats (edible oils, mayonnaise, and soya 
juices, among others). 
The following figure is an attempt to show the different features of the value chain for 





It is the processing of oilseeds (crushing-refining), as can be seen in the figure 
above, that occupies a key position in the oilseed complex, providing the interface between 
the producer of seeds and the consumers of oils and meals. It Is on this part of the chain of 
value that this research concentrates its analysis since the processing activity has been the 
most dynamic over time and has also received most of the foreign investments in the edible 
oil industry (CEP, 1999). 
Processing companies also fulfilled the role of the state in financing different parts 
of the edible oil chain. There is a strong relation between the producer and the crushers. 
Me producers rely on the crushers not only for selling their products, but also for 
financing. 
Fi(A Riý 5.8: PRODUCERS AND CRUSHERS: A LONG-LASTING CONNENIEN'l RITA I IONS11111 
-Promise to sell the crop 
-Seeds ot'good quality 
-Better prices 
The historical development of the edible oil industry in Argentina 
The industry has historically been of permanent interest for politicians and 
businessmen alike due to its strategic role in economic growth and its capacity to increase 
foreign income through exports. The technological change in the industry in the 1970s, the 
strong international competition in the markets for these goods, and the protectionist 
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measures established by European countries altered the comparative advantage Argentina 
had enjoyed for a long time (Gatto and Gutman, 1993). 
The Argentine oil inchistry arose in the mid-nineteenth century and enjoyed periods 
of intense development during the 1930s and the 1960s. By the middle of the 1970s, the oil 
industry had become the most dynamic one in the country. Nowadays, Argentina is the 
primary world exporter of oil and is ranked second in pellet exports (CEP, 1999). 
Oil production multiplied sixfold during the period 1970-1997. Ovcr the period 
1972-1979, the indUstry exported oil worth on average US$ 216 million annually. In 1997 
the exports amounted to US$ 4.029 billion and in 1999 US$ 5.2 billion. This rise can also 
be seen in production, which rose from morc than 2 billion tonnes in 1989, to near 4.6 
billion tonnes in 1998, that is a 94% rise (CEP, 1999; flerranz, 1999). 
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The dynamism of the 1970s and 1980s encouraged the companies to increase their 
production capacity to meet export demands. This is one of the most important factors that 
detennined the rise in the level of concentration of the companies over these two decades. 
From 57 companics operating in the sector in the 1970s, there were only 40 in 1994 (CEP, 
SOUrce: ISI Emerging COUntries, 1999 
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1999). That was the resulf of a complex process that combined the opening of new 
companies and plants, the scaling up of existing ones and the shutting down of other firms 
and some acquisitions by new or existing companies of the industry. 
Changes in the edible oil Industry in the 1990s 
Being an industry that was always exposed to global competition made indigenous 
crushers particularly susceptible to changes in the international market as well as changes 
they had to confront in the intemal market. 
The 1990s implied new challenges flor the industry stemming from changes in the 
national economy and international markets. These can be summarised as deriving from 
four drivers of change: more demanding consumers; increasing competition-, greater 
availability of raw materials-, and changing trade I'lows. 
FmuRE5.10: DRIVERS OF UI IANGF IN 1-1 IF FDIBLFOIL INM JSTRY(URUSI I ING) 
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More demanding consumers 
During the 1990s, not only did the global edible oil industry face a greater number 
of consumers who were creating a greater demand, but some of this demand became more 
sophisticated, with consumers - in the developed world particularly - exercising their 
power with respect to the quality and the safety of the food they consumed. This was an 
opportunity and a challenge for indigenous crushers. Crushers in particular faced the 
challenge of producing more oil, as well as improving the consistency, quality and 
traceability of the products (Ketelhohn et al, 1998). 
More availability ofraw materials 
Worldwide the supply of raw materials has been growing on average by 3% yearly 
since 1990. New-comers such as China and India are taking on an increasingly significant 
role in the supply of raw material (Rabobank, 1998). 
Within the main raw materials (i. e., soya and sunflower oilseeds), an increasing 
number of sub-segments can be distinguished, based on biotechnological. development in 
seeds. There are now, for example, high oleic soybeans and sunflower seeds on the market 
(Oil World, 1999). As a result, the raw materials market is becoming de-commoditised in 
order to satisfy more specialist consumer demand. 
In the face of this, the challenge for the indigenous crushers was both to process 
higher volumes and to handle speciality products. This also required investment in 
additional capacity, infrastructure and logistics (Rabobank, 1997). 
Increasing competition 
The worldwide market liberalisation that characterised the 1990s has stimulated 
globalisation in the industry. As markets started to opened up, crushers in different 
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countries faced direct competition with cacti other. As a result, crushing margins fell, and 
this led in turn to cost-driven scaling-up of crushing facilities. Concentration was one Of 
the consequences because only a few players could achieve the necessary scale. Only a 
few companies worldwide dominated the industry and they expanded to less mature 
markets such as the Argentinian one and building up quick market shares, often through the 
acquisition of local companies. 
Concentration was usually high in this industry because profit margins were low, 
which made crushers very dependent on econornies of scales. With 57 companies in the 
1970s, the industry had only 37 by 1998 (see figure 5.11). Tile ten largest firms accounted 
for 85Y,, of the production (CEII, 1999; Rabobank, 1997). The consequences for 
indigenous businesses were clear: in 1989 the industry was made up for six fanilly-owned 
businesses among the twenty largest companies by turnover. By 1999 that figure had fallen 
by half. 
FIGUM. 5.11: l, FVFI, 01: CON(TN FRA I ]ON IN I IIF INDUSTRy35 
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Changing tradeflows 
The high degree of protectionism and subsidies used by developed countries during 
the 1990s hit Argentina and other oil-producing countries hard. The EU, with its protected 
agriculture, was one of the main obstacles for the industry. While in Argentina and Brazil 
the trade of seeds was free and the crushers only received incentives to export, the EU had 
the higher level of protection in the world at that moment (Rabobank, 1997). 
TARLF. 5.6- ARGFNTINA ANT) THR ME Lizvmlr, OF PRoTFc-rioN IN T14F EDIRLE OIL INDUSTRY36 
Argentina EU 
Grains -No subsidies at all. Oilseeds are -Acreage payments for oilseeds (subsidies 
subject to an export tariff. It is a for cultivated area) 
way to discourage exports of grains. -Import tax for all oilseeds 
-No import tariff for seeds imported 
I for crushing 
Oils Export restitution to encourage -Tariff imports (varies from 6 to 14%) II 1 
exports in oils. 
The table illustrates the difficulties the Argentinian edible oil industry faced when 
competing against high levels of protectionism in the EU. The EU, however, was due to 
decrease the level of protectionism under the World Trade Organisation agreement 
(Verheijen and Jimmink, 1995). This situation would have meant a breakthrough in the 
worldwide market in terms of more freedom and the possibility of entering one of the most 
important markets more easily. 
Competing pressures in the edible oil industry 1989-1999 
The changes in the Argentinian economy opened up an extraordinary opportunity 
for MNC companies to set up their operational facilities in one of the most important 
countries for edible oil production and exports. Between 1990 and 1998, the industry has 
received approximately US$ I billion of foreign and national investment (Herranz, 1999; 
36 Source: Rabobank, 1997 
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Interview with Alberto Rodriguez, CIARA 37) . 
Different factors influenced the increasing 
competitive pressures within the industry in the 1990s: economic stability; crushing costs; 
export capacity; and, proximity and quality of raw materials. 
FIGURF. 5.12: COMPFFIFIVE PUSSURFS IN 11IFFIABLE OIL INDUSTRY 1989-1999 
Economic stability 
Different aspects attracted foreign investors to the industry and gave rise to even 
more competition. Being one of the top six crushers in the world (Rabobank, 1998) 
Argentina was a place in which the companies needed to set up operational facilities. 
While the 1980s were dominated by internal turmoil, the econornic stability achieved in the 
1990s drew the attention of MNCs and encouraged them to invest in the industry. 
Although most of' the important companies already had a base in the country, new ones 
appeared as a result Of file stability of rnacro-economic indicators. New investments to 
improve efficiency were another outcome of the stability in the 1990s. Acquisitions by 
foreign companies were also important, such as the case of Guipeba by the Brazilian C'eval, 
37 Alberto RodrigLICZ is the President of CIARA, the most important professional association of the edible oil 
industry 
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and Oleaginosas Moreno and Oeste by Glencore (from the Swiss Group Andre) (CEP, 
1999; Oil World, 1999). 
Export capacity 
The industry is strongly oriented towards exportation. Almost the entire national 
crop of soybean and sunflower is crushed domestically. Given that domestic demand for 
oils and meals is a relatively small proportion of the total production, the country is a major 
net exporter for both products. 
By 1999, the Argentinian internal market had reached maturity (500,000 tonslyear) 
and it was therefore difficult to foresee an increase in consumption (CIARA, 1999; 
Interview with Alberto Rodriguez, CIARA). Thereafter, any investment made in the 
industry was destined for exports. The availability of oil for export made the country an 
appealing place for MNCs that were seeking excess capacity to satisfy net importer 
countries. 
Crushing costs 
Crushing costs are primarily determined by the structure of the industry in a specific 
country, since this determines the size and the technological sophistication of the crushing 
facilities. We explained above the importance of keeping costs down in an industry in 
which margins are low and dependent on the efficiency of crushing and procurement costs. 
Argentina has some of the lowest crushing costs worldwide, illustrating the efficiency that 
the industry has reached technologically and in terms of scale and transportation facilities 
(Herrantz, 1999) (see table 5.7). 
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TABLE 5.7.. COST STRUCTURE IN THE CRUSHING INDUSTRY IN 1998 (AS A PERCENTAGE OF WORLD AVERAGE)38 
Country Soybeans % of world average Softseeds % of world average 
Argentina 89% 84% 
Brazil 116% n/a 
China 119% 105% 
EU 93% 92% 
India 188% 105% 
Japan 124% 130% 
USA 87% 89% 
n/am--Not Available 
Crushing costs were an increasingly important factor in determining where the raw 
material would be crushed most efficiently. This is one of the reasons why Argentina 
attracted both foreign and national investors (Hinrichsen, 1999). 
Proximity and quality of raw materials 
The fact that Argentina was self-sufficient in oilseeds, oils and meals and that 
soybeans from the Mercosur 39 region were considered to be of a higher average quality 
than those produced elsewhere, was another reason why foreign direct investment began to 
flow into the industry (CEP, 1999). Furthermore, the disappearance of intra-Mercosur 
trade barriers allowed crushers in the Southern Cone region to source their raw material in 
any member country. As Argentina increased its crushing capacity throughout the 1990s, it 
was very convenient for companies which settled in the country to acquire, in case of 
shortage, oilseeds from other countries in the trade agreement such as Paraguay. Secondly, 
the economic growth of the region increased trade in oils and meals (mostly in Brazil) 
(Verheijen and Jimmink, 1995). 
38 Source: Rabobank, 1998 
39 Mercosur is a trade agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
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Summary and concluding remarks 
The foregoing analysis discussed the main factors that increased competitive 
pressures in the edible oil industry in the 1990s. Four factors were emphasised: economic 
stability; export capacity; crushing costs; and proximity and quality of raw materials. 
The 1990s therefore had a two-fold impact on indigenous firms: firstly, during this 
period indigenous businesses became more efficient. Efficiency was achieved through 
acquiring state of the art technology (to improve quality of products for more demanding 
international customers), and through reducing costs of production (to enable more 
competitiveness). Secondly, while these results were achieved by some of the companies, a 
lot of the indigenous businesses left the market due to the impossibility of investing in 
scaling up their plants and performing more efficiently (Hinrichsen, 1999; Oil World, 1999; 
Ketelhohn et al, 1998). 
The most obvious outcome of this process was a higher degree of concentration in 
the industry. Most of the companies that led the industry in the 1980s are today either 
small crushers or have been bought by foreign companies (Ketelhohn et at, 1998). 
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5.4 Is hypercompetition a feature of the pharmaceutical and edible oil 
industries? 
Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) point out that the characteristics of a particular 
environment influence the adaptive responses of the firms. Firms respond differently 
depending on whether they are in a stable or turbulent contexts (Volbcrda, 1999). But what 
attributes of an environment are likely to make it more turbulent than most other 
environments? 
Several researchers have stated the differences between stable and turbulent 
environments. Emery and Trist (1965) highlight these differences by saying that, compared 
to stable environments, turbulent ones have an increasing rate of change, complexity is 
higher, as is the level of connectedness between the firm and the environment. 
Khandwalla (1977) states that a turbulent environment is dynamic, unpredictable, 
expanding and fluctuating. It is an environment marked by changes, compared to stable 
environments in which little change occurs. Miles et al (2000) suggest that unpredictability 
and dynamism characterise a turbulent environment. Unpredictability is understood as 
changeability and instability, while dynamism is defitned by the rapidity of change. 
D'Aveni (1994) has coined the word "hypercompetition7' to refer to highly turbulent 
enviromments. Hypercompetitive environments are different from stable ones for D'Aveni 
in that the former escalate towards higher levels of uncertainty, dynamism, heterogeneity of 
the players, and hostility. 
Endorsing the different ideas explained above, Volberda (1996 and 1999) proposed 
three dimensions for analysing environmental turbulence: dynamism, complexity and 
unpredictability. Dynamism is defined in terms of frequency and intensity of change. 
Complexity is defined as the number of factors considered to be drivers of change and their 
interconnectedncss. Finally, unpredictability will depend on the information available to 
enable managers to predict future developments. The application of Volbcrda's (1999) 
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approach to analysing the environment faced by the pharmaceutical and edible oil 
industries in the 1990s produces interesting results. 
In terms of dynamism, both industries went through a relatively stable period of 
three decades (from the 1960s to the 1980s). The industries were used to long product life, 
similar competitors and well-established regulation. In the 1990s, the pace of change 
increased. It saw the opening up of the economy and the lifting of regulations in the 
economy that affected the pharmaceutical industry directly (i. e., through deregulation 
measures and a new legal framework) and the edible oil industry indirectly (i. e., through 
deregulation in transport). Regulations that had previously fended off competition were 
lifted, making way for new competitors and new products to enter the market, and 
consequently increasing the level of complexity of the industry (see table 5.8). 
Unpredictability is the outcome of a far-reaching process of transformation both at 
the national and industry level. Before the 1990s it was easier for the different companies 
in the edible oil and pharmaceutical industries to predict each other's movements. Changes 
in the economy and the entrance of new players with different technology and business 
strategies, however, brought unpredictability into the industries during the 1990s. 
The competitive environment for both edible oil and pharmaceutical industries 
changed from a stable context over thirty years (1960s to 1980s) to a turbulent environment 
in the 1990s, with each of the factors mentioned by Volberda reaching particulary high 
levels (see also tables 5.9 and 5.10). In such a situation, Volberda (1999) suggests that we 
are in presence of a hypercompetitive environment (Volberda, 1999; D'Aveni, 1994). 
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TARI F 5-R- llYPFRMmpETmoN IN THE EDIBLE OIL AND PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET OVER THE 1990S 
Features or turbulent or Changes throughout the 1990s 
hypercompetitive environments 
Dynamism Pace of change grew. This was a shift from previous industry 
stability. In a short time period, the structure of the industries 
changed to adapt to new environmental requirements. 
Complexity -New products (both industries). 
-New competitors via acquisition of companies or via grccnficld 
(both industries). 
-Lifting of regulations affecting pharmaceutical industry. 
I -Deregulation affecting both industries. 
Unpredictability -New regulations (i. e., patent law) and new actors (i. e., MNCs) 
made it difficult to forecast what would happen in the industries and 
it was even difficult to predict the companies' strategic moves. 
TABLE 5.9: CHANGES IN THE INSTITUTIONAL/COMPETmoN SETTINGS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
Aspects Before 1990s During 1990s 
Registration of Medicines Priority to domestic capital Simplification for foreign firms 
firms. to register products. 
Tariff and Price Control -High level of tariff protection Elimination of price control and 
or prohibition to import certain tariff systems. 
products. 
-Price control over products 
(maximum, regulated or agreed 
I prices). 
Patent Law No patent protection given t Patent for products and 
pharmaceutical products but for processes. 
processes. 
TABLE 5.10: CHANGES LN THE INSTITUTIONAUCOMPETITION SETTINGS IN THE EDIBLE OIL INDUSTRY 
Aspects Before 1990s During 1990s 
Deregidation The activity was not directly Lifting of regulations on 
regulated but the regulations over transportation. 
transportation affected the costs 
of the activity. 
Competition Freedom to set up plants. The Increasing competition 
only barriers were the natural worldwide. The result is that 
ones for this business: need for crushing margins have fallen and 
strong investments and assets to the need to scale up crushing 
start the activity. facilities has arisen. The outcome 
is concentration in the local 
market and indigenous businesses 
being driven out of it. 
Raw materials This aspect has a twofold Today's supply has widened by 
importance: firstly, before 1990s incorporating new players as 
few countries supplied raw world suppliers. On the other 
materials; and secondly, most of hand, sub-products appear as a 
them were commercialised in way of decommoditising the bulk 
1 bulk. I exports. 
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Summary 
In this section we raised the issue of environmental turbulence to understand 
whether the industries under analysis were stable or turbulent. It was argued that this 
distinction is important for understanding the adaptive responses of the firms examined in 
this study. 11ree dimensions were analysed in order to shed light on the features of the 
industries: dynamism, complexity and unpredictability. During the 1990s the intensity of 
competition in both the edible oil and pharmaceutical industries increased greatly. Such 
intense turbulence was described as hypercompetition. 
In a hypercompetitive context, questions arise regarding the adaptive responses of 
indigenous firms in such an environment. How did the firms in this study react in a highly 
changeable environment? Were the firms able to adapt and change quickly or were they 
laggards within their industries? If so, why? What strategies did the firms implement to 
enable them to face the environmental changes? And what organisational and managerial 
changes did they try? And finally, what made the companies under study decide in favour 
of either strategy and organisational change? Ile following chapters aim to understand 
those adaptive responses by highlighting the differences in the way flexible and less 
flexible firms confronted the high levels of competition present in their industries. 
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Chapter 6: Adaptive responses under competitive pressures 
Chapter 5 underlined the competitive pressures the pharmaceutical and edible oil 
industries underwent during the 1990s. We described these industries as hypercompetitive 
or highly turbulent (D'Aveni, 1994; Volberda, 1999). Craig (1996) and Volberda (1999) 
point out that hypercompaitive environments have precipitated far-reaching changes in 
firms' competitive position and have forced them to transform in order to compete 
effectively. The adaptive responses of firms under hypercompetiton would therefore vary 
according to the extent to which the transformation process was undertaken (Volberda, 
1997). The adaptive responses of the companies under analysis are, therefore, the main 
concern of chapters 7 and 8. 
In his seminal work, DAveni (1994) points out that in hypercompetitive 
environments, competitive advantages are quickly eroded. Companies therefore have to be 
more concerned about creating new competitive advantages than sustaining old ones. 
D'Aveni (1994) suggests that companies have to disrupt their own advantages and the 
advantages of competitors. These strategies need speed and surprise to enable companies 
to seize opportunities first. Questions arise as to what strategies are needed in such highly 
competitive environments? And what organisational and managerial challenges are 
required to allow a company to face hypercompetitive environments? 
At the strategic level, the literature has emphasised the importance of product 
innovation, process and knowledge as competitive and disruptive advantages. In 
presenting a model for understanding firms' competitive advantages, Nault and 
Vandenbosch (1996: 342) assert that in hypercompetitive markets companies should 
cannibalise their own advantages. For them it is better to "eat your own lunch before 
someone else does. " Such a strategy requires companies to invest and launch the next 
generation of advantages (i. e., product, process or knowledge) while current advantages are 
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still profitable. This pre-emptive strategy implicitly considers the importance of first 
mover or early adopter strategies. 
Being a first mover is widely accepted in the literature on hypercompetition as a 
protective and anticipatory strategy. Craig (1996) shows the importance of the first mover 
advantage in the Japanese beer industry and how competitors in that industry were 
surprised by a competitor's introduction of a new product. As Craig (1996) indicates, the 
first mover advantage can change the rules of competition in an industry. Eisenhardt and 
Tabrizi (1995) and Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) also point out the importance of the first 
mover advantage in product innovation in a high velocity environment. 
The need for competitive rather than sustainable advantages means organisations 
have to engage more in the exploration of new strategies rather than incremental 
exploitation of existing ones (Ilinitch et al, 1996). March (1995) indicates that 
environmental volatility and uncertainty requires change and flexibility if a company wants 
to explore new horizons. If the environmental context changes rapidly and organisations 
do not maintain a steady stream of exploration efforts, they may fail to adapt (March, 1995; 
Lewin et al, 1999). 
Pettigrew and Fenton's (2000) comprehensive study of new forms of organising in 
Europe sheds light on both strategic and organisational decisions faced by firms in rapidly 
changing organisational contexts. The analysis includes economies of scale, concentration 
on core activities rather than diversification, focus on competencies, and outsourcing and 
downsizing rather than vertical integration. 
In the course of this analysis, Pettigrew and Fenton (2000: 39) found that 
outsourcing and alliance activities increased by 65% over the period 1992-1996. However, 
only 11% reduced diversification. The de-diversification process was small and 
diversification among related business high. 
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Pettigrew and Fenton (2000) also underline the importance of new managerial 
processes in allowing companies to cope better with the complexities of a rapidly changing 
environment. These processes include, among others: diversity among the top team; 
empowerment; employee participation in decision-making; knowledge creation and 
knowledge transfer; collaboration and communication. 
It is important to highlight that the conclusions of Pettigrew and Fenton's research 
refer to studies carried out in companies in developed countries. Khanna and Palepu 
(1997) suggest that while western economies stress the importance of core competencies 
and focus, emerging markets emphasise the critical role of diversification. Khanna and 
Palepu (1997,2000) indicate that these differences in organising between more advanced 
western economies and emerging economies stem from their different institutional settings 
(see also Chapter 4 in this thesis). The unpredictability of government actions and the lack 
of access to the advanced technology, capital markets, cheap financing and technical 
knowledge available in western economies forces companies in emerging markets to rely 
on diversification as an organisational form to fill the institutional voids existing in their 
countries (see also Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998). 
Broadening the scale and scope of the business was also considered important by 
those who carried out empirical research in Argentina. Carrera et al (2000), in a study of 
the strategic responses of Argentinian companies throughout the 1990s, show that 
indigenous businesses strengthened both diversification of related activities and vertical 
integration. Thus, widening the scope of the business rather than concentration on core 
competencies was the strategy followed by indigenous businesses. Carrera et al (2000) 
explain that the institutional context in Argentina features a lack of highly developed 
intermediaries in the market, so the increase in scope was necessary to overcome that 
shortage (e. g. the impossibility of outsourcing some activities due to the lack of a reliable 
supplier). 
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While Pettigrew and Fenton (2000) emphasised the importance of alliancing, 
Yoguel and Milanesi (2001) - in a survey carried out in Argentinian firms - found that only 
25% of the companies signed cooperation agreements during the 1990s. The vast majority 
relied on informal connections rather than formal cooperation. 
Intemationalisation of indigenous firms' activities was also considered important in 
companies facing severe competition in the internal market in the 1990s. Guill6n and 
Toulin (1997) show how the intense pressures brought into the Argentinian market by 
foreign investment made indigenous firms start to intemationalise their activities as a way 
of balancing out the loss in the internal market (see also Toulin and Guill6n, 1997; Guill6n, 
2000). 
Changes at the organisational and managerial level were also indicated by Toulin 
(1997) and Yoguel and Milanesi (2001). These writers depict the challenges faced by 
companies in different sectors in Argentina during the 1990s and how most adaptable firms 
changed their organisational design from a functional hierarchical structure to one based on 
business units (ToulAn, 1997) or cells and teams (Yoguel and Milanesi, 200 1). 
New managerial capabilities also needed to be developed. Batley (2000) analysed 
the water industry in Argentina and highlighted the importance of operational autonomy as 
a way of confronting the speed of environmental changes. In practice, this operational 
decentralisation meant improving efficiency and effectiveness mainly by freeing managers 
from bureaucratic rules and controls. Yoguel and Milesi (2001) and Toulin (1997), on the 
other hand, stress the importance of having managers with broad state-of-the-art techniques 
and skills. This was a crucial factor for firms that attempted to transform and adapt their 
businesses during the period of structural adjustment in Argentina in the 1990s. 
In the light of the foregoing analysis, questions arise regarding the adaptation 
responses of the flexible and less flexible companies in this study. We have already shown 
the differences and similarities in studies that consider the adaptation process of firms 
operating under high levels of competition in developed countries and in Argentina. So, 
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did the companies in this study focus on core competences or diversify their activities? Did 
the firms dismantle the value chain or strengthen it? What were the most important 
strategies followed by the companies? What organisational and managerial aspects were 
the focus of their transformation process? And, finally, what were the differences between 
the adaptation behaviour of flexible and less flexible firms? 
Chapters 7 and 8 are transformational accounts that shed light on the adaptive 
responses of the flexible and less flexible firms selected for the analysis. In chapter 7A 
and B the transformation of Sidus and Andr6maco in the pharmaceutical industry is 
explained, while in chapter 8A and B the transformation of AGD and Vicentin in the 
edible oil industry is examined. 
To facilitate comparison between the companies analysed in this study, the 
structures of the chapters are similar. In each, we briefly analyse the history of the firm 
from its foundation to 1999. However, the cases centre on tracing key issues 
chronologically over the period 1989-1999, viz: strategic initiatives (in the case of flexible 
firms) or market and products (in the case of less flexible firms); changes in the structure of 
the company; changes in the management; changes in the governance; and finally, 
unresolved issues and challenges for the future. 
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Chapter 7A: Case study: Sidus Group 
40 
7.1 Overview of the history of Sidus 1938-1999 
Founded in 1938 by Miguel and Antonio Argiielles, today Sidus is a diversified 
group that participates in the pharmaceutical industry at various points in the chain of 
value. By 1999 Instituto Sidus, the mother company, was the 4h largest laboratory in the 
ranking of pharmaceutical companies in Argentina (IMS, 1999). Another company in the 
Group, BioSidus, was considered the most important biotechnological company in Latin 
America (Gonzilez Garcia et al, 1999). BioSidus was also considered one of the few 
companies that successfully weathered the economic recession that affected the country 
over the period 1998-2001 (Ramos, 200 1). 
Miguel and Antonio married and had children. Miguel had three children: Estela, 
Irma and Fernando. Sadly, Fernando died at the age of eighteen. Antonio, on the other 
hand, had two children - Marcelo and Silvia. None of the female children entered the 
business and the only male heir was Marcelo, who started to work in Sidus in 1963. By 
1984 the company was in effect run by Marcelo Argiielles, although the founders were still 
alive. 41 Antonio finally died in 1985 and Miguel in 1987. 
From the very beginning, the founders emphasised the importance of product 
innovation as a key factor for success. Product innovation promoted the growth of the 
company throughout the 1960s and 1980s (see figure 7.1 for the evolution of Sidus over 
time). 
The 1980s saw significant changes in the company. In 1980, Instituto Sidus set up 
a small biotechnological department. This investment would become the star project of the 
company a decade later: BioSidus. "In those days we could see that there were two clear 
alternatives: one was the phanno-chemical projects that were popular at the time in Italy 
40 In 1989 Instituto Sidus became a Group of companies, so, we will use the words Sidus, the Group or Sidus 
Group to differentiate them from Instituto Sidus the mother company. 
41 Interview with Santiago Garcia Bclmonte and informal talks with Luis Garcia Belmonte and Estcla 
ArgUelles 
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and Europe, on the basis that Italy was the supplier [of raw material] for the countries 
without patents; and the other was integration from the biological point of view. We took 
the risk ofheading towards biological integration. , 42 
MGuRE7.1: EvoLuTioN OF SIDUS 1938-1987 
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It was during the tenure of Marcelo ArgUelles that the company took off rapidly. In 
1988 the opportunity arose with the first and only strategic alliance in the industry at that 
time. 43 A deal with Merck, the world's largest medicinal laboratory in 1988, made it 
possible for Instituto Sidus to jump from 22 nd position in the ranking of pharmaceutical 
companies to 3 rd position in Argentina. The twelve-year agreement (until the year 2000) 
with Merck can be considered the most important milestone in the growth of the company 
during the 1980s (see stages of the firm in figure 7.2) 
42 Interview with Marcelo Argijelles, CEO 
4' To date there has not been another strategic alliance in the pharmaceutical industry in Argentina 
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"The agreement with Merck was a milestone in the company's history and marked 
a break with the usual paradigms because within the industry the deal was considered 
crazy, but the President of the companyforesaw the legal change which would take place 
in thefuture in our sector with the patent law, and when the patent law was passed he had 
already made a strategic alliance with a top level company, building a strength which no 
other Argentinian company has today. , 44 
After the Merck deal, however, the differences between Sidus and the rest of the 
companies in the industry widened. In 1989 Sidus pulled out of CILFA, the professional 
association that Sidus' founders helped to set up. 
Although the agreement boosted Instituto Sidus' position in the pharmaceutical 
industry, it was clear that once the deal was over, Instituto Sidus was in a potentially very 
fragile position. A strategy of diversification and spreading the activities of the company 
throughout the value chain began immediately after the deal with Merck. Figure 7.3 shows 
both the evolution of the Group after the deal with Merck and the main macro- 
environmental changes affecting the industry. 
Sidus embarked on various projects over the period 1989-1999. In 1989 the 
company set up what would become the first biotechnological company in Argentina and 
Latin America (Katz, 1992). The former biological department at Instituto Sidus emerged 
as the driving force of the group some years later. 
In 1990 Sidus also set up a distribution company. This step was necessary to enable 
them to commercialise all their own products and the products that Merck was pouring into 
the company. In 1992, Tecnoplant, a division of BioSidus, was established. It was a step 
towards developing markets for new bio-products of plant origin, as well as the production 
and multiplication of transgenic plants, among others. 45 
44 Interview with Marcelo Burstein-HR Manager. 
45 Interview with Marcelo Criscuolo-Executive Manager of BioSidus-Company's brochure. 
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1995 saw the company moving forward in the chain of value with its attempt to set 
up a company called Lasifarma, established to commercialise OTC (over-the-counter) 
products. However, the project failed and by 1999 Lasifarma was a small and shrinking 
46 company. 
The end of the decade would show Sidus returning to the mass consumption market 
but in a different way: investing in retail through buying a chain of pharmacies and 
intermediary companies. In 1998 then, Sidus, in a move unlike other companies in the 
industry, bought a franchise of Vantage pharmacies, set up its own outlets and also bought 
stakes in another chain. The move prompted Sidus to participate in intermediary 
companies that operated between the pharmacies and the unions and the social security 
system. This strategic move positioned the Group all along the value chain, from 
production, research and development to commercialisation, distribution and retailing (see 
structure of the group in figure 7.4). 
46 Interview with Jorge Cotonel-ex Marketing Manager, current head of New Businesses Unit. 
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FiGuRE 7.2: STAGES IN SIDUS' HISTORY 
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4' This figure was prepared using different sources of information: company's archive material; interview 
with Jorge Quintana and interview with Alejandro Garcia Belmonte. 
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FIGURE 7.4: SrRj'CTURF OF TIIFSIDUS OROLTYEAR 199948 
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7.2 Chronological and analytical tracing of key issues 
The strategic initiatives: Biotechnology 
In 1980, Marcelo ArgCielles, the sori of the then CEO of histituto Sidus, decided to 
embark on a risky but, as it proved, successful project: the setting up of a biolechnological 
department within Instituto Sidus. Both t1ounders, Antonio and Miguel, backed Marcelo in 
this venture: " When You sphi things out, voit realise that there was something tit the back of 
Marcelo's mind. - biotechnoloKv is the developnient qf products under their own brand 
iiaines. Having a licence ineans that You have a certain length of titne to cominercialise 





your products. When the time is up, they go, you have lost them. Today, we are using 
biotechnology to replace what we are going to lose once the Merck contract is over. 'A9 
Marcelo Argilelles' vision is also related to the situation of both the pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology industries in Argentina in the 1980s: while Argentina was thirty years 
behind countries such as the UK or the USA in terms of pharmaceutical research and 
development the biological area was still an unexplored field worldwide. Furthermore, 
Argentina had produced three Nobel prizes in the field of biology: Hussay, Leloir and 
Milstein. 50 The country had the human resources necessary to undertake such a project 
(Bercovich and Katz, 1990; Diaz, 1993). 
Thus, in 1980, Instituto Sidus hired three biochemists to set up its new biological 
department. The basic plan was that, by means of scientific investigation, Instituto Sidus 
would work with interferon to combat viral infections. In 1982, the number of scientists 
rose to 20. Between the period 1982-1984, Instituto Sidus financed periods of study leave 
for its group of scientists and researchers. The team was trained in three disciplines: 
genetic engineering, cell cultivation and protein purification. In 1986, Instituto Sidus 
bought laboratory facilities in the city of Buenos Aires. Cultural differences between the 
scientists and Instituto Sidus personnel speeded up the decision to move to a different 
51 location. 
1989-1999: The investment bearsfruit 
It was not until 1989, however, that BioSidus was established as an independent 
company and part of the Sidus group: "Imagine that year, 1989, everybody in the industry 
thought we were mad. 7hat year inflation rose steeply and we had a company that still did 
49 Interview with Santiago Garcia Belmonte- family member and Executive Director of Retail Businesses 50 Milstein studied in Argentina but won the Nobel Prize at Cambridge University. 51 Interview with Marcelo Criscuolo- Executive Director of BioSidus. 
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not have a product. We were in the last stages of our clinical trials. The situation in which 
the country was submerged made usfearfor theproject's survival. , 52 
In 1990, BioSidus was in the final stages of releasing its first product, the 
Recombinant Human Eythropoietin, which is used to combat anaernia. Although the plan 
had been to release the Interferon first, the company shifted strategy due to changes in the 
market. There were two main considerations that caused them to change strategy: firstly, 
the Erythropoietin was much more profitable than Interferon; secondly, and as an 
additional advantage to producing Erythropoietin, Interferon already existed in the country 
but not Erythropoietin. Hence, in 1987, the company halted the Interferon project and 
brought out the Erythropoietin. 53 
The product was launched in the United States in 1989, and in Argentina in August 
1990. The strategic move to release the Erythropoietin was rewarded by the market. The 
product has held 70% of the market share in Argentina while four products are competing 
for the market. 54 Moreover, BioSidus is considered one of the three largest producers of 
Erythropoietin worldwide along with Amgen and Genetech of the United States (Diaz, 
1993). 
In 1991, the Interferon was launched. The release of the product, however, 
encountered opposition from two different fronts: firstly, the foreign companies that 
already commercialised the product in the country (i. e., Roche, Schering Plough); and 
secondly, from the indigenous oncologists that were suspicious of using a national product. 
One of the problems the company had to face was when Roche - the Swiss 
laboratory - accused Sidus of selling a bogus product: "Marcelo held meetings with the 
52 Interview with Juan Carlos Bidegaray, Busivess Development Manager of BioSidus. 53 Interview with Juan Carlos Bidcgaray and Marcelo Criscuolo. '4 1f we consider that BioSidus provides the raw material for one of the competing products, the market share 
increases to 85% 
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President of Roche to avoid this kind ofsmear campaign. When we proved that Roche had 
accused usfalsely, simply because we were the competition, our sales rose significantly. "55 
BioSidus released two more products. In 1995, it launched the G-CSF, a product 
for patients who have undergone bone marrow transplants and for those undergoing 
chemotherapy. In 1997, the last product was launched, which was the growth hormone to 
treat growth problems in children (figure 7.5 shows the evolution of products released and 
turnover obtained in the period 1989-1999). 
FIGURE 7.5: EVOLUTION OF BioSiDus OVER THE PERIOD 1989-1999M 
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Years 
Internationalising the group through BioSidus 
The investments the group made in the first two products meant that the company 
could not afford to write off the debts incurred by the investments without looking beyond 
55 Interview with Marcelo Criscuolo-Executive Director of BioSidus 
'6 This figure was created using data from the interviews at Sidus and BioSidus and from the information 
provided by the Foreign Commerce Sales Department of BioSidus. 
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the Argentinian market. Thus, BioSidus created the foreign sales department. 57 The first 
target was Brazil. In 1993 BioSidus was in a position to register their products in the 
biggest market in the region. The company sold both products in Brazil (Erythropoietin 
and Interferon), attaining 70% of the Brazilian market. 58 This was when BioSidus leapt 
ahead. In 1993 the company had achieved economic independence from Sidus. 59 
While the company entered the Brazilian market with a partner, Biosint6tica, it 
granted licenses to MNC pharmaceutical companies to commercialise its products in the 
next stages of the internationalisation process in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean (see table 7.1). This new stage of internationalisation began in 1995. While 
Biosidus had an important worldwide presence, there were certain markets - for example, 
the European, American and Japanese markets - which, due to tight regulatory policies, 
were difficult to access. 
BioSidus had created the 'tit for tat' phenomenon. For example, Schwartz, a 
German company, had granted Instituto Sidus the licence to produce a series of products 
and BioSidus had granted them some other licences. This would allow BioSidus to enter 
the Chinese market within a few years by forming an alliance with Schwartz which already 
had a company in China. 60 
57 Informal talk with Juan Pablo Barta- Foreign Commerce Sales Department of BioSidus. 58 Data obtained from the Foreign Commerce Sales Department of BioSidus. 59 Interview with Marcelo Criscuolo-Executive Director of BioSidus. 60 Interview with Marcelo Criscuolo-Executive Director of BioSidus. 
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The investment in biotechnology was also helping the Group to keep the average price 
of its products above the average price of the industry as a whole, as figure 7.6 illustrates. 
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62 Source of information: Reports of I MS 1989-1999. 
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Challengesfor thefuture 
BioSidus faces three main challenges in the future. The first one is to release a 
broader range of products. The second and third challenges are related to building plants in 
Brazil and Canada. 
There are some lines of products that the company wants to bring out in the next 
few years. The new products, however, are products for a niche market such as those 
related to Alzheimer's disease, bone marrow transplant, thrombosis, osteoporosis and a 
regulator of intestinal flora, as well as those products considered appropriate for illnesses 
more prevalent in developing countries such as chagas and cholera. 63 
A second challenge would be to build a plant in Brazil. The group signed a joint 
venture with a Brazilian partner and founded a company called Biolatina: "At the moment 
this project is well under way, but it is hard to set up a bi-national company with Brazil, it 
is dijfIcult to getfinance whichfits the economic climate of both countries. , 64 
The final challenge for BioSidus would be to install a plant in Canada. The 
Canadian context supported this idea. Canada had its first patent law in 1989. It was a 
very moderate one which was modified in 1992: "The fact that some products are non- 
patentable in Canada gives us a great historical opportunity. The most interesting thing is 
that we can develop technology here, manufacture in Canada and obtain a certificate 
which says made in Canada, which is an easy way ofgetting into the States and Europe. , 65 
The strategic initiatives: Retail market 
From the laboratory to thepharmacy 
The most recent move Sidus made in the market was in 1998, when it decided to 
jump from one point in the chain to another, from production and research and 
63 Interview with Juan Carlos Bidegaray, Business Development Manager of BioSidus. 
64 Interview with Marcelo Criscuolo-Executive Director of BioSidus. 
65 Interview with Marcelo Argijelles-CEO. 
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development straight to the retail market, by setting up a chain of pharmacies. The original 
project was to invest US$ 15 million and establish 50 outlets. However, the plan was 
modified when Sidus realised that two foreign companies wanted to set up a franchise of 
pharmacies in the country. The Group thereafter bought only 7 pharmacies and a franchise 
Vantage - the first and only franchise in Argentina up to 1999.66 
Having a franchise allowed the Group to increase swiftly its level of participation in 
the retail market. With the franchises (200 pharmacies) and its own pharmacies, the Group 
sought to find mutually beneficial arrangements. In 1998, Sidus also bought 30% of the 
shares of P+P -a very important chain of pharmacies owned by the Pardo brothers. The 
last acquisition was explained as an attempt "to learn the businessfrom the most important 
company in the sector and to achieve synergies with our own pharmacies. Thirty percent 
ofthe shares was enough to accomplish this. , 67 
In one year then, Sidus shocked the pharmaceutical industry by entering a field that 
had not been explored by other pharmaceutical companies, buying the first and only 
franchise in the country, acquiring 7 pharmacies and buying a share in another chain 
(Manzone, 2000). "Our entrance into the market was a shockfor the rest of the industry. 
They did not expect us to make this move. Again we were in theforefront, thefirst to move 
ahead, destroying the competitors and setting ourselves apartfrom them. , 68 
In 1999, Sidus also decided to get involved in another activity which complemented 
its investments in the retail market. In 1999, it bought 60% of AIM and Compaflia de 
Servicios Farmac6uticos. The companies ranked first and second respectively in their 
specialities. AIM and Compania were mandatory or intermediary companies. They traded 
between the pharmacy and the social security system, agreeing contracts and discounts. In 
1999, Sidus also bought 30% of a company called PBM. PBM was a technology company 
that provided services to the mandatory companies. PBM had no competition because it 
66 Interview with Santiago Garcia Belmonte- family member and Executive Director of Retail Businesses. 67 Interview with Santiago Garcia BcImontc- family member and Executive Director of Retail Businesses. 68 Interview with Santiago Garcia Bclmontc- family member and Executive Director of Retail Businesses 
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was the only company providing this type of service: "By buying these companies what 
Sidus did was it distanced the companyfrom the rest of the industry. 1,69 
The incomplete tasks 
From the moment the pharmacies were opened, the volume of products sold by 
Sidus increased. 70 The new businesses, however, were still far from being profitable. 
Sidus' own pharmacies had a monthly turnover of US$ I million and the 30 % participation 
in P+P amounted to US$ 1.5 million monthly. Neither Sidus' own companies nor P+P 
reached the break-even point. Furthermore, the Vantage franchise was also seeing losses. 
"Our main aim in 2000 and 2001 is to break even in the three projects. All three of 
them are strategically important but we are not earning money with them; on the contrary, 
we are losing money. We need to own at least 20 pharmacies to gain scale. 7his, with a 
good management ofthe outlets, will give us profits. We need to have a level ofturnover of 
6 million a month to be able to absorb the costs ofsuch a structure. , 71 
To be able to do this, Sidus is thinking of either taking over four or five of P+P's 
fourteen pharmacies or buying 51% of P+P shares. By doing this, the group of phannacies 
plus the franchise will be able to achieve profits. 72 
On the other hand, companies such as PBM, AIM and Compaffia are also running at 
a loss: "The whole idea is great. It is an important stepforward to be thefirst to get a grip 
on this part of the industry. The companies, nevertheless, are operating below the 
breakeven point. Ken we bought them they were losing money. As you can see, money 
was not the main reasonfor buying them. But now, we have to sort things out and start to 
in a ke p roft ts. " 73 
69 Interview with Santiago Garcia Belmonte- family member and Executive Director of Retail Businesses. 70 Data obtained from company's sources (Marketing department). 71 Interview with Ricardo Pedreira-Manager Vantage franchise and own pharmacies. 72 In the year 2002 Sidus bought 51% of the P+P company. 73 Interview with Santiago Garcia Belmonte- family member and Executive Director of Retail Businesses. 
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Sidus took steps towards achieving this goal and these included making some 
changes: PBM and AIM have a new General Manager. Changes in Compaftia are 
forthcoming. 74 
Changes in the structure 
The effects of Sidus' decision to diversify are clearly reflected in the structure of the 
company. While in 1989 the structure of the company was a functional one (see figure 
7.7), in 1999 the group split up into 5 companies that are divisions of Sidus Group (see 
figure 7.8). 
The changes in the structure were decided in 1989 once BioSidus was established as 
a separate company. The Board believed that BioSidus had a different nature and this was 
demonstrated by the cultural clashes the group of scientists experienced while sharing the 
same space with Instituto Sidus' personnel. The Board therefore decided that BioSidus 
should have its own space "to express and develop itsetr "75 
With the other emerging areas such as the distribution company (SD), the OTC 
company (Lasifan-na) and the retail businesses, the company used a similar strategy. The 
aim, as the CEO stated, was "To avoid bureaucracy in decision-making. Having different 
companies with thefreedom to make decisions and a structure focused on theirparticular 
businesses helped us to befast andfirst. , 76 
After the creation of the second company -SD - in 1990, the Group started to 
reorganise the areas within Instituto Sidus (the mother company) to gain, as some managers 
stated, "economies of scale" and "efficiency". 77 The different support areas that 
previously gave their services to the main company were transformed into support areas for 
the whole Group. In so doing, the company avoided overlapping functions and activities. 
74 In the year 2000, PBM and Vantage achieved break-even point. In the year 2002 Sidus bought 100% of 
PBM and was negotiating with other companies to go into partnership with Sidus in AIM and Compaflia. 
75 Interview with Marcelo Argijelles-CEO. 
76 Interview with Marcelo Argijelles-CEO. 
77 Interview with Marcelo Burstein, Santiago Garcia Belmonte and Jorge Quintana. 
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The Group's support areas can be seen in figure 7.8 (within the structure of Instituto Sidus 
in the unshaded boxes). 
New support units emerged in this process, such as the Human Resource 
department in 1994, which replaced the old Personnel Department, and the area of 
Communication and Image to unify the corporate message of the whole group. Finally, the 
Logistics department was set up to achieve economies of scale throughout the companies of 
the group as shown in figure 7.8. 
Not only were new areas created but a new concept also emerged as central to 
running the businesses at Instituto Sidus: the business units. The reorganisation sought to 
give more power to the people in charge of the business units: "By doing this we wanted to 
infuse the areas with more dynamism, and we thought that theform of business units suited 
our objectives. "" 
While the different companies of the group benefited from the support of some 
units at the headquarters, the Board also decided they needed to update the units that 
depended directly on the Board. This is how three new areas emerged: Regulation and 
Legal Analysis in 1990; Sectoral Analysis in 1990; and finally, Macroeconomic Analysis in 
1997. In all three cases, these were areas that aimed to look into different aspects of the 
context surrounding and affecting the company. 
Changes to the structure were effected smoothly and without resistance. The fact 
that the company was expanding did not alter its normal development. As some managers 
stated: "The changes in the structure passed without notice. The company was expanding 
its activities, and thefact that it was decided that each new venture would become a new 
company meant that we did not notice the impact of the change. YMS was probably the 
success of the structural change. , 79 "We have not noticed any structural changes over the 
last ten years. However, ifyou compared the structure now and ten years ago, there have 
78 Interview with Marcelo Argilelles-CEO. 
79 Interview with Alejandro Garcia Belmonte-Controller. 
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been huge changes. I think this is solnelhing the Board was working on hard to trv to avoid 
the normal problems these changes itsmillY bring about. ' IVO 
NitlRv 7.7: SIDUS' STRUCTURE IN 1989"' 
Board of 
Di 
BioSidus Marketing Manufacture Manufacture F nance 
Pilar Bernal 
It Purchaising Administration] Regulations] Personnel 
Interview ývith Jorge Coronel-cx Marketing Manager, current licad of New Businesses Unit 
Figures 77 and 7.8 were created A-ith archive matcrial from the Human Resource department. 
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Changes in the managem2nt of the company 
wave of new professionals 
From 1980 when the company first started to diversify its activities, its management 
began to shift and become more professionalised. It was BioSidus that marked the 
difference between the old-style management and the new. Furthermore, BioSidus brought 
young professionals with a different profile into the organisation: "BioSidus was a rare 
experienceforus. Yhe new professionals, scientists and technicians differed greatly from 
the rest of the employees in the company. They were better prepared and could take 
decisions on their own. They were very efficient and had tools that we did not have. A2 
The rest of the company's ventures began to add more variety to the already 
established management in the company. Splitting the Group into a series of companies 
helped Sidus to start to professionalise the different businesses from scratch: "One of the 
advantages that wefound in exchanging thefunctional structurefor a structure dominated 
by the different businesses is that professionalising was not painful at all. Iwouldnothave 
liked to imagine the situation if all these new ventures had not been independent 
companies. We would never have achieved thee Icienc and level ofprofessionalisation y 
these companies have today. , 83 
While the new companies benefited from professionalisation from the moment they 
were set up, Instituto Sidus went through a different process: "Changes at the managerial 
level were needed at Sidus. We were laggards within the Group and the rest of the 
companies in the Group saw us as the steam train. Changes here had a different pace. 
There were areas that were keener on professionalising and other areas that still needed 
more work. j, 84 
The new and more sophisticated product lines Instituto Sidus incorporated over the 
1990s (i. e., odontology, biotechnology and ophthalmology among others) helped the firm 
82 Interview with Marcelo ArgGelles-CE0. 
Interview with Marcelo ArgUelles-CEO. 
Interview with Marcelo Burstein-HR Manager. 
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to renew the largest section of its work force: the sales team. 85 As table 7.2 shows, entry 
requirements for those seeking employment with Sidus were tougher, thus boosting the 
level of professionals incorporated in the finn over the 1990s. By 1999 the sales force of 
Sidus had increased in number from 20 in 1989 to 200 in 1999, reducing the average age 
from 49 years to 39. Similarly, the average amount of working experience was reduced 
from 15 years to 5 years. 86 Table 7.3 illustrates the changes in average age in different 
areas of the company. 
TABLE 7.2: DEGREES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTERING SIDUS OVER THE PERIOD 1989-1999 (SELECTED 
AREAs)87 
Areas 1989 1999 
Marketing -Experienced medical visitor -University degree 
-At least 10 years work -Age between 25-30 
experience in the industry. -3 years average experience (not 
exclusively in pharmaccuticals) 
Finance -University degree in -University degree-preferably 
accounting or economics accounting, economics and 
-Several years of experience in business administration 
banking or pharmaceutical -Experience in different 
industry industries is welcomed 
Human Resources (Personnel in -Not specified. The personnel -University degree 
1989) area focused on administrative -Having done training or 
matters therefore, no specific internship in a company before 
requirements for entering the -Experience outside the sector 
area. welcomed. 
TABLE 7.3: AVERAGE AGE OF PERSONNEL IN SELECTED AREAS OF SIDUS GROUP88 
Area/Company 1989-Average age 1999-Average Age 
Marketing 49 39 
Production 54 42 
Administration 48 37 
BioSidus 33 32 
Vantage Pharmacies Did not exist 30 
Although Sidus considered it advantageous to shift towards a more professionalised. 
company, they were also aware of the disadvantages of this move: "Previously, executives 
85 The sales force of Instituto Sidus accounted for 44% of the total work force of the company. 
86 Interview with Jorge Coronel-cx Marketing Manager, current head of New Businesses Unit. " This table was created with data provided by the different areas under analysis (Marketing, Finance and 
HR). 
88 This table was created using archive material provided by the HR department of Sidus. 
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were very intuitive, they based their relationship with the company exclusively on trust, 
within surroundings which needed very little control. They had a nosefor the market, very 
few managerial skills, but put in lots of effort. The new professional is someone with many 
skills, who is well trained, and who has less intuition but more intention. , 89 
At Sidus they asserted the importance of old and new managers as having a 
complementary role in the running of the company: "Yhe Board is convinced that old 
managers can help to preserve old values that are ourfoundation, and new managers 
would bring those values and tools that the company needs. I would not say that the 
coexistence is easy, but it works and we learnfrom each other. "90 
Control andplanning process 
In 1988 Instituto Sidus hired a consultant from Arthur Andersen to become its 
Administration Manager. Marcelo Bursteirt9l was given an important task by the Board: to 
set up the control systems of which the company had very few. 
Burstein spent his tenure setting up the whole area of administration, including the 
clarification of costs, preparation of budgets and the area of taxation. The emphasis in 
Burstein's work was on information systems and control processes: "The philosophy I 
encouraged, in agreement with the General Director, was to prioritise the sharing of 
information, the sharing of transactions, for which we installed a single database for the 
whole of the company. We created the control boards that allowed managers from 
different levels and the Directors to have access to different indicators of the company and 
itsperformance. Besides that we improved horizontal communication "92 (see table 7.4). 
It was not an easy task to convince the Board of the benefits of having more control: 
"We were afraid of control mechanisms. I was against them. We did not want to lose one 
89 Interview with Marcelo Burstein-HR Manager. 
90 Interview with Marcelo Burstein-HR Manager. 
91 Marcelo Burstein was firstly appointed as Administrative Manager and, subsequently, in 1995, as HR 
Manager. 
92 Interview with Marcelo Burstcin-HR Manager (ex-Administration Manager). 
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of our virtues which was being able to make decisions quickly. In other words, we wanted 
to avoid becoming a bureaucratic company. , 93 Burstein pointed out the difficulty of 
formalisation in a company that was not used to controls and processes: "It took me years 
to convince them to introduce technology, to introduce a budget. It seems incredible to me, 
today, to hear the CEO asking the managers tojustify how they have spent their budgets, 
when a few years ago he would say to me that if we set budgets the company would turn 
into a public and bureaucratic company. , 94 
TABLE 7.4: INDICATORS USED BY SELECTED AREAS OVER THE PERIOD 1989-199995 
Area Indicators in 1989 Indicators in 1999 
Marketing* -Sales budget -Sales budget 
-Spending budget 
*in 1999 the indicators correspond to -Investment budget 
the different business units of product 
lines. 
Production* -Estimates of cost per unit -%Productivity 
released. -Quality of products released 
*Carresponds to the Manufacture areas -Cost efficiency (cost over total in 1989 and the Technical Operation in units) 1999. 
Human Resources* -%Absenteeism -%Absenteeism 
-Specific indicators for training, 
*Personnel department in 1989 welfare policies and working 
conditions 
-Selection and perfonnance 
Board of Directors: Govemance, strategy and family 
Governance andfamily alignment 
When the founders were still alive, Antonio was the President of the company and 
Miguel its Vice-President. In 1985 Antonio died and Miguel took over the post of 
President, though only for a short period of time before his death in 1987. As mentioned 
before, Marcelo Arguelles, Antonio's son, was in effect running the company from 1984. 
Marcelo was the natural candidate when Miguel Argilelles died. 
93 Interview with Marcelo ArgrjellesýCEO. 
94 Interview with Marcelo Burstein-HR Manager. 
95 This table was created using data provided by the following areas at Sidus company: Human Resources, 
Marketing General Products and Technical Operations. 
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The Board that was created after the lounders' death to represciit the whole Camily, 
however, changed over time. To be able to understand the changes, it is important to 
understand the family tree. The figure shows the founders and their children. The 
founders' children married and their spouses are shown in the third row. 
FIGURE 7.9: FAMILY I RIT AND GOVERNANUF AF SIDI IS96 
When Marcelo Argiielles took over the presidency of the company, Femando 
Boscolo and Patr-icio Baya were already working in the firm and became Directors 
representing their wives on the Board. Luls Garcia Belmonte -- Estela ArgUelles' husband 
- was the last to join the company and this happened when Miguel Argiielles passed away. 
When In-na Argfielles and Patricio Baya divorced in 1994, Patricio bowed out and 
the Board was restructured. Marcelo Arg6clles (CEO and Director), Luis Garcia Belmonte 
and Fernando Boscolo were the only three Directors of the company. 97 IAlis Garcia 
Belmonte would represent Irma Argoelles' stake in the company. 
96 This figUre was created using data 1rom the following interviews: Santiago Garcia Bclmontcý Jorge 
Quintana and Marcelo ArgUelles. The f signal indicates that this person is dead. 
97 By 1999, Marcelo ArgUellcs was 54 years old, Patricio Baya NN as 58 years old and Luis Garcia Belmonte 
was 64 years old. 
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Over the years the Board settled down and the Directors started to work together: 
"We can say that it was not a promising startfor this Board. We did not get on very well. 
But you know, this is a family company, and we retain manyJamily values in terms of the 
way that none ofthe things we have lived through has weakened our relationship andfor us 
this is incalculably important. I have to say that I neverfound any obstacles to anything, I 
alwaysfound collaboration, willingness, help and support bothfor the things which turned 
out well and those which turned out badly. , 98 
While Fernando Boscolo was responsible for finance and SD, Luis Garcia Belmonte 
was responsible for Production and Lasifanna: "He (Marcelo Argdelles) is great at 
strategising. So we let him go ahead. Fernando and I, We are more the administrative 
type. We put order in Marcelo's turmoil. This is the best, and only way we found of 
working together, complementing each other. "99 
, 
In 1990, the Directors agreed to sign a family protocol, thus avoiding any rows 
between the third generation of family members. Some of them were already working in 
the company in 1990. The protocol made the entry conditions for family members tougher. 
The following table shows the main features of the protocol. 
9' Interview with Marcelo Argrielles-CEO. 
99 Informal talk with Luis Garcia Belmonte-Dircctor. 
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TAru F 7; - PRF-rnNMITIONI, FOR FAMTT-VMFMRFRI; WlqT4TNr, TO jnN smus N THE FUTURE 
100 
Aspects Requisites 
General conditions for a family -The family member will enter in the lowest position in the area he 
member tojoin the company or she will work. The aim of this policy is for the family member 
to learn all the work from the bottom of the hierarchy to be able to 
understand the nature of the job. This experience will also give 
him/ber the knowledge he or she will need as a future leader. 
-The salary will be appropriate to the position he or she holds. 
-Over the first year the newcomer will not receive a salary. The 
aim of this policy is to represent the time the newcomer would 
employ had not his/her parents helped him/hcr find a job. 
-Extra working hours will not be paid. 
Career Plan -Promotions in the hierarchy will depend exclusively on 
dedication, effort and professionalism. The most able and efficient 
professionals must hold the top management positions in the 
company. The fact that it is a family business is another matter. 
Attitude -The family member has a double condition as a family member 
and employee, thus he/she has more duties than the normal 
employee and must set an example for others. 
-The family member has to respect and follow all the norms 
concerning absenteeism. 
Strategy, delegation and control 
It was the Board's idea to reorganise the company in the early 1990s and create a 
group of companies. This decision had a specific aim concerning the strategic decision- 
making of the company: "I am overwhelmed by the bureaucracy a large organisation 
generates. In this aspect, our relationship with Merck had too much of an effect on our 
structure. I did not want this company to become a leviathan. I wanted to keep the speed 
in our decision-makingprocess. I think that this was our principal advantage. "' 01 
The reorganisation of the company in the early 1990s was helpful in tackling the 
task of avoiding bureaucracy in decision-making and allowing the Board - and its President 
- to focus on strategy. "In this business, as in others I imagine, you have to have timefor 
thinking about strategy, to have a vision. The vision of the business is something instinctive 
and natural, and there is not much difference between the 1980s and the 1990s. Yhe main 
difference between the 1980s and the 1990s is the time you spent grounding and developing 
the strategy. The 1990s were different, you had to be careful, so you needed more timefor 
working on strategic issues. "at we [the Board] wanted to achieve with the changes in 
'0 "Incorporation of family members in Sidus Group" Document provided by the Board of Directors. 
0' Interview with Marcelo ArgUelles-CE0. 
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the company, was to have more timefor thinking strategically and being open to changes in 
the context. , 102 
A process of delegation started once the second company of the group was created 
(i. e., BioSidus). It was a necessary and natural process that otherwise "would have trapped 
us in a terrible deadlock , 103 
Strategic decision-making, however, was centralised in the Board. Mr. Argilelles 
made it clear that there are some decisions that are not being delegated because "they 
represent critical aspects of the company's life andfuture. , 104 The following table shows 
those decisions considered to be strategic and that only the CEO and Board would take. 
TABLE 7.6: STRATEGIC DECISIONS NEEDING THE CEO'S INTERVENTION105 
Areas/Companies Strategic decisions 
In all the companies -Strategic alliances 
-Associations or joint ventures 
-Investments 
-Launching a bid to buy a company 
BioSidus -Development of new products 
-Licences to be given 
Marketing business units -Licences to be taken 
The most important way the Board of Directors exercises control is through these 
strategic decisions: "This is how the Board has a grip on the different businesses. 7bere 
are meetings in which the different critical areas analyse the different businesses. The 
Board is more interested in the strategic part of the presentation. They assume that you 
should be responsible for the operation. Another outcome of the Board's change of 
attitude toward the businesses is that it has forced managers to provide the Board with 
more accurate indicators and information, something that was impossible a decade 
102 Interview with Marcelo Argijcllcs-CEO. 
103 Interview with Marcelo ArgOelles-CE0. 
104 Interview with Marcelo Argaelles-CEO. 
'05 This table was prepared using information provided by the interviews with Marcelo ArgOelles, Marcelo 
Criscuolo and Jorge Coronel. 
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ago. A06 The following table shows the way two selected areas of the firm were controlled 
by the Board of Sidus. 
TA13LE 7.7: FOLLOW UP ON MEETINGS/REPORTS BETWEEN THE BOARD AND THE BUSINESS UNITS 107 
Business Units/Support area Frequency of meeting/report Indicators/aspects required by 
the board 
Finance Annually (Report) -Gross margin 
Monthly (Meeting) -Gross operating margin 




Retail Businesses Annually (Report) -Same information as finance 
Monthly (Meeting) but for the business unit. 
-Additional needs for funds 
-Investments 
-Business strategy: aims, 
actions, and projections. 
The incomplete tasky 
Many tasks have yet to be fully accomplished. However, two issues have 
preoccupied, and sometimes vexed, the managers. 
The first issue relates to the communication of strategy. For some managers, there 
is a lack of communication of strategic issues that sometimes undermines the feeling of 
belonging to the company and distorts the alignment of operational issues to strategic 
issues. 108 As the HR Manager stated: "I think that Marcelo (Argiielles) should try to 
explain better, to the managers, the whys and wherefores of the strategy he is working on. 
[I Sometimes this lack of communication causes misunderstandings, lack of motivation 
and duplication. Improving strategic communication is a challengefor the Board and its 
President. "109 
Another issue that has worried some managers is the delegation of some aspects of 
decision-making. While the delegation process worked in the different companies that are 
106 Interview with Santiago Garcia Belmonte-family member and Executive Director of Retail Businesses. 
107 This table was created using the reports sent to the Board by the Finance area and Retail Businesses unit 
(Reports analysed in Finance: 1994-1999; reports analysed in Retail Businesses: 1998-1999). 
log Interviews with Marcelo Criscuolo and Marcelo Burstein. 
109 Interview with Marcelo Burstein-HR Manager. 
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part of the Group, the situation at Instituto Sidus is different: "In the different companies of 
the group the wheels of the delegation process were well oiled. With Instituto Sidus it is 
different: the President is sometimes caught up in the day-to-day running of the company. 
He loves marketing and so he is always involved with that. "' 10 
The unresolved issues 
Two issues regarding the future of the company concern the Board and managers. 
The first issue is related to the participation of the third generation of family members in 
the Board and the second is related to the opening up of the company to the public. 
The problem of succession and family participation in the Board is one issue that 
could potentially harm the governance of the firm. Marcelo Argfielles' children are very 
young compared to the others in the third generation, thus making it difficult to decide who 
will be Argiielles' successor. In spite of this, Argdelles has been delaying the issue to give 
his own children the chance to decide whether or not they want to participate in the running 
of the company. 111 
"With regard to the family, I see a conflict on the horizon because in the next 
generation there are lots of children. I can see a clear conflict and huge differences 
arising between Santiago [Garcia Belmonte] and the rest of his generation. Ifyou were to 
ask me who I see as taking the leadership role in the family in a few years time, I would 
suggest that it would have to be Santiago. , 112 
"In my opinion the Board should be more participative and some of us [the third 
generation] should start to participate in it, then we could share the power that is today 
concentrated in Marcelo's hands. AD 
"0 Interview with Marcelo Burstein-HR Manager. 
111 Interviews with Jorge Quintana, Marcelo ArgOelles and Alejandro G. Belmonte. 112 Interview with Marcelo Burstein. 
113 Interview with Santiago Garcia Belmonte-family member and Executive Director of Retail Businesses 
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An idea shared by the human resource Manager (hereafter, HR Manager) and 
Santiago Garcia Belmonte was the creation of an executive committee between the Board 
and the managers: "This would be a way of starting to participate in the decisions, a 
committee in which top managersfrom the different companies of the Group - bothfamily 
and non-family members -participated. PPI14 "I am trying to sell this idea to the Board. It 
is the best way of avoiding tension between generations offamily members and a way of 
having a participative organisation. "' 15 
A second issue, which is equally important but not so pressing, was the possibility 
of floating BioSidus on the stock market. The company had a concrete plan which was to 
open BioSidus up to the public. The idea was to sell between 15 and 20% of the shares. 
This was planned for the year 2001: "It will change a lot of thingsfor us. We are working 
with people from Citibank The plan is to consolidate the company first and this 
undoubtedly will take us a couple ofyears. A16 
The Group has already received some offers to buy shares or to buy the whole of 
BioSidus or the whole Group. However, the Board was reluctant to sell: "Firstly we would 
not sell the company to any of ourfellow companies, although some of them have made a 
proposal. It is a matter ofpride. Selling to a multinational? Well, in this case we would be 
selling the whole Group not part of it. It is very difficult to share this company with 
companies the size ofScheringfor example. We would like to find a medium size partner, 
then we would be able to talk one to one. It would be a more equal relationship. A17 
114 Interview with Santiago Garcia Belmonte-family member and Executive Director of Retail Businesses. 11 5 Interview with Marcelo Burstein-HR Manager. 
116 Interview with Marcelo ArgUelles-CEO. 
117 Interview with Marcelo Argilelles-CEO. 
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Chapter 7B: Case Study: Laboratorio Andromaco 
7.3 Overview of the history of Andr6maco 1924-1999 
Founded in 1924 by the Spaniards Ra6l Roviralta and Fernando Rulet, Andr6maco 
was in 1999 a leading company in the dermatological sub-market of the industry (IMS, 
1999). Andr6maco also ranked 20 th in terms of turnover among pharmaceutical companies 
in Argentina (IMS, 1999). 
Roviralta and Rulet met in 1924 and it was Rulet who suggested setting up a 
laboratory for clinical analyses. Roviralta, however, said "no, instead we are going to set 
up a pharmaceutical laboratory. , 118 And so Andr6maco was bom. 
The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) brought about a split between the business 
partners because they had conflicting political beliefs. Until the definitive split between 
them that occurred in 1939, the company had commercial or industrial outlets in 19 
countries. 119 When the partners split, they shared the brands and branches out between 
them. They also granted each other the right to found businesses in countries where 
Andr6maco had not already established itself. 
Ra6l Roviralta carried on with the internationalisation process in different countries 
such as Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Colombia and Mexico. The 
headquarters of the new Andr6maco was in Argentina. 
In 1979, RaAl Roviralta died, leaving eight children. That year, the family situation 
took its toll on the organisation because the shares were held by so many private 
individuals that there was no impetus to continue as a group. 
A gradual exit from the world of business, the loss of group identity and family 
continuity in the Southern Cone area were the three phenomena which marked 1979. The 
only part of the family which persevered with the business was the family that remained in 
1 'a Personal travel diary Ra6l Roviralta, 24/05/1934. 
119 Argentina was the first branch set up outside Spain. 
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Argentina and took over operations in Uruguay and Paraguay under the son of Railil 
Roviralta, Alejandro. 'Me remaining companies of the group were sold off . 
120 As can be 
seen in figures 7.10 and 7.11, the Argentinian market is the most important for Andr6maco 
both in terms of volume and value of products sold in US$. 
While Rafil Roviralta was still alive and running the Group, Alejandro Roviralta 
was not involved in the business because his father did not want his children to get caught 
up in the company. Thus, when Raidl Roviralta passed away and Alejandro Roviralta 
inherited the Argentinian branch (Paraguay and Uruguay were included here), he decided 
to retain Carlos Salvo as CEO - formerly the CEO of the Andr6maco's Group. 
In 1983 Carlos Salvo died and Julio Tuchi took his place. Alejandro Roviralta 
stayed on the sidelines. Over 50 years old and with little experience as an executive, he 
preferred to employ an experienced manager to run the company. Julio Tuchi ran the 
company until 1997. 
"My father had no alternative. Tuchi's period represented a solution for my 
father. He could not manage the company so he had to rely on somebody else. Tuchi 
seemed to be the right person at the time. The problem is that he [Tuchi] lastedfor a long 
time and the market changed a lot but the company did not. , 121 
In 1988, Pablo Roviralta (the son of Alejandro Roviralta) entered the company 
when he was co-opted to the Board. However, it was not until 1993 that Pablo Roviralta 
started to have an important role in the company. That year, he set up the OTC (over-the- 
counter) department, and in August 1996 he became the Commercial Manager, a role 
which involved the management of 'ethical' products, promotion, and sales and marketing 
of OTC products. In 1997 he became the CEO of the company, replacing Tuchi. 
120 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (first and second interview, 1999 and 2000) and informal 
talks with Alejandro Roviralta and Alejandro Roviralta Jr. 
121 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (second interview, 2000). 
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On 25 th August 1997, the day Pablo Roviralta took over responsibility for the 
company, twenty-two managers were dismissed, the first step in a "shock strategry " 12' , as 
the company likes to define it. 
The new CEO undertook several changes to bring the company out of the 
stagnation of the previous two decades. Strategic focus on den-natology products, financial 
order and organisational restructuring were critical issues for the new management. 
However, by 1999 many difficulties were still jeopardising the company's growth. The 
changes in strategies, although clarifying the long-term objectives of' the company, put tile 
firrn in a inche of the market that limited its possibilities for growth (see Andr6maco's 
evolution 1989-1999 in figure 7.12 and also figure 7.13). 







122 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (second interview, 2000) 
12; Source ofinformation: Company's marketing department 
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FRA U 7.12: ANDROMACO'S FVOLU'rION 1989-199912' 
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124 SOUrce of infonnation: Company's marketing department. 
'25 This figure Aa,, constructcd using archival material in the company (SLIch as "Strategic Plan 1997-1998") 
and intervicv, -, .ý ith different managers. 
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7.4 Chronological and analytical tracing of key elements over the period 
1989-1999 
Market and Products: Finding out the strategic focus of the company 
From 1978 to 1997, the company followed a siniplc strategy: investing in those 
niches that were fast-growing and which could offer the company opportunities, no matter 
what the niche was. 
Andr6maco participated in all the therapeutic niches in the phannaceutical niarket. 
The fact that they had been an international cornpaný made them belleve that they could 
profit from the diftcrent products they already had and add new products to the already 
existing ones: "AfanY products it-ere latinched in the (1ý11ýrent therapeutic niches in the 
conviction that anYthini; would add value and evert-thing would have the powntialfin- 
commercialisation. A. fier a while these prothicts were witht/rawn because the return on the 
investniclif was mWative. -126 
llm%ever. the regulation of the market and the tight price control in the 1980s 
InterN ic%% ý% ith Pedro CarN allo- Fcchnical Director Andromaco 
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allowed the company to keep this policy of trying a new product in the market without 
taking heed of the long-tem-i consequcnces. 
This strategy, which many managers in the company called "(IýIfiisetl", or 
"blurred ", or characterised as having a "lack of vision ", "no vision " or "luck of strategic 
orientation " 127 , was Supported by a system of promoting the products to the distribution 
chain instead of via the normal channel of promotion (i. e., the doctors). The APMs 
(promotional and sales team) offered huge discounts to the wholesaler so they could reach 
the estimated sales levels: "Ahnost a whole Inonths worth ol'sales laid dorinant in the 
wholesuler warehouses because oj' this policy, which is obvions because when the 
wholesaler gets a discount he buYs more. " 128 
The 1990s, however, proved the inconsistencies of this strategy: "lij 1990 ive. fiwed 
the impossibilitY qflaunching new pi-o(hicts. We were losing mai-A-ef share. We thought 
about selling abrowl, but the export strategy alsofifilcd. "129 Figure 7.14 demonstrates that 
the firm's strategy was not rewarded by ail increase in market share. On the contrary, 
Andr6maco was losing ground in the pharmaceutical market for most ofthe decade. 














Market share (US 
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127 Interview NNith diverse managers in Andr6maco 12 8 Interview with Javier RUIZ-Managcr of Promotion and Sales 
12') Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (second interview, 2000) 
Sources of infonnation: For the period 1986-1988, company's archival material. For the period 1989- 
1999,1 MS Rcports. 
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While the market conditions allowed the company to increase its turnover until 
1994, after this date sales stagnated and started to decrease, and financial indicators began 
to give the owners cause for concern. In 1995, Pablo Roviralta and a group of managers 
studied the performance of all the products released by the competitors and Andr6maco 
over the period January 1990 to December 1995. A successful performance was defined as 
a product with a turnover of one million US dollars per year two years after being 
launched, or a product that could have cornered 10% of the market share in its niche with a 
turnover of at least US$ 250,000 also two years after the launch of the product. 131 The 
results were disappointing for the company. 
"The proportion of successful launches in the industry was around about 30%. 
Andr6maco had a proportion of 22 percent. We were more effective in the skincare 
product market where theproportion was 60%. But we kept on trying new niches in which 
we were not effective. Injact, the moneyfed into the other niches camefrom our cash-cow 
products, the dermatological ones. , 132 
The analysis carried out by the company in 1995 underlined the ineffectiveness of 
the product launches in the different niches. Of fourteen products launched over a period 
of five years, only three were considered effective releases with good performance. These 
three products were dermatological products (see figure 7.15). 
13 1 Archival material (document "Policy of launching products in Andr6maco", 1996) Interview with Pablo 
Roviralta and Javier Ruiz. 
132 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (first interview, 1999). 
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Fi(juRE7.15: NUMBER OF PRODLfCTS1, ALIN('IIFI)OVFRSt! ('CESSFt; I, I'ROI)Ll('TS 1990-1995"' 
5 
4 
Number of 3 
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launched 2 13 
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The study in itself did not change the strategy of the company, but it made it clear 
that Andr6maco had a definite propensity for working in the skin-care sub-market: "Ihe 
most important outcome qfthis stu(ýV was to make mY. fiither realise that we were on the 
wrong track. However, Tuchi was against this idea offbcus and nothing hal)penc(L Never 
mind, I said to in. vse? f this is thefirst step towards a big change in the companY. This 
change took two long andpah? ffil. vears to happen. " 134 
The critical Years: 1995-1996-1997 
The Mexican crisis in 1995 hit the whole industry hard. Until 1994 deregulation 
benefited all the companies in the industry. Turnover increased due to an increase in prices 
rather than units sold. 
However, after 1995, sales stagnated and Andr6maco's debt grew. The company 
found it difficult to recover from that situation: "The company was in a critical situation. 
In spite of'important decisions taken (is part of our 
business plan, like the increase in the 
"' This figure was constructed using archival material provided by promotion and sales department and the 
document "Policy of launching products in Andr6maco, 1996". 
In the figure the therapeutic classes are shown by different letters: A=Mctabolismý D=Dcrmatologyý 
G-Gcnito-Urinary; M- Muscular Systcmý N=Central Nervous System; P- Parasitologyý RýRcspiratory 
Systerm S=Locornotivc System. 
134 Interview Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6rnaco (second intcrvicw, 2000) 
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DG N1 N r, k, S 
Therapeutic Class 
price of Hipoglos and Dermaglos 135 , the financial problem could not 
be solved. , 136 "The 
company was rather slow to react to the threats itfaced. It did not update its products nor 
did it launch any successful products - the worst possible situationfor the company. , 
137 
A general audit of the company was carried out, showing a certain number of 
aspects that were out of date, a lack of order and - most strikingly - rampant corruption. 
Tuchi's power was hit very hard when it was proved that he was aware of and benefiting 
from corrupt practices. 
Besides all these problems, the Mexican laboratory Columbia (previously 
Andr6maco) bought the national laboratory Disprovent. Their plans were to launch 
dermatological products similar to those marketed by Andr6maco. 138 Thus the star 
products Andr6maco had were now in danger. 
By the end of the year, Tuchi's power was in tatters and the Board of Directors had 
been restructured. Pablo Roviralta and Alejandro Roviralta Jr. were now Directors. The 
Board asked Pablo to prepare a plan to get the company out of the crisis. Along with Javier 
Ruiz, who joined the company in January 1997, they prepared a new strategic formulation 
for the company. That plan was approved in April 1997. 
The shock strategy: 1997 
"I presented the plan to my father in April 199 7 and he backed it. Itwasdecided 
that Julio Tuchi would step down and I would take over his job on the 25th August 
1997. , 139 
On that day, the new CEO dismissed 22 managers. Ue new strategic plan was 
135 Dermaglos and Hipoglos arc the most important brands of the company. Both of them are dermatological 
products. 
136 Interview with Jorge Idiart-Manager of Zone 1, Capital-Andr6maco. 137 Interview with Pedro Carvallo- Technical Director Andr6maco. 
138 It is important to remember that when the group split up in 1979, the companies were left with similar 
products in the different countries. Thus the formulae of the new product Columbia laboratory tried to 
produce in Argentina were similar to those Andr6maco was already producing. 139 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (second interview, 2000). 
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communicated and the main aspects of the strategy were highlighted: 140 (Details of the way 
the strategy was operationalised can be found in table 7.8 and 7.9). 
-The company would focus on dermatological products. A strategy of niche products 
replaced the more generalist view of the former administration; 
-Reduction of the company's debt (i. e., US$ 5.3 million, which represented one and a half 
month's sales); 
-Investments in infrastructure to update the old facilities; 
-Decision to suspend the launch of any new product for two years; 
-To achieve 25% of market share ofthe dermatological niche by 2003. 
TABLE 7.8: STRATEGIC CHANGE: DIFFERENCE IN STRATEGY BEFORE AND AFTER 1997 141 
Aspect Until 1997 After 1997 "shock strategy" 
Strategicfocus Diversification in different sub- 
market niches 
Specialisation in dermatological 
sub-market 
Commercialfocus New Products Existent products 
Product launch In attractive and growing niches In dermatology 
Financingproduct releases Through transferring resources 
from mature brands (disinvest in 
mature brands) 
Re-invest in mature brands and 
re-position them in the market 
II 
140 Presentation to the management of the company of the new strategic plan 1997-1998. 
14' Data obtained from archival material in Andr6maco, interviews and report "Looking for a new breakeven 
poinf', 1996. 
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Improve gross operating margin -Not releasing new products for two years 
-Investing same amount of money as established by budget 
in 1996 
-Promoting brands taking into account profitability as 
key criteria 
Selection ofproducts topromote -Products with an important level of turnover in US dollars and units 
-Leading brands and well known in the market 
-Priority to own brands 
-Products produced nationally 
Reduce commercial costs stage I -Close delegations in the interior of the country 
-Discontinuity of Marketing Service Area 
-Reduce Administration of sales force area 
Reduce commercial costs stage H -Reorganise Special Promotion department 
-Reduce Special Products department 
-Outsource distribution 
143 
Reduce commercial costs stage III -Redesign administrative and commercial processes 
-Monthly budget control 
-Reduction of stocks 
-Better logistic coordination 
-Reduce budget for "creative production" 
-Sell brands without Promotional investment 
1 -Renegotiate contract with LeoPharma (licensing agreement) 
"We worked hard on the idea of differentiation. We asked ourselves what made us 
stand outfrom our competitors - did we do anything better than them? Should we highlight 
that aspect? Andr6maco, runs 1.1% of the total market. But in the dermatology sector it 
has 17 percent, followed by Plough with 5.8%. At Andr6maco this unusual asymmetry 
made us think. P, 
144 
"Having strategic focus has huge advantages which consist of ensuring the 
organisation has a meaning, direction and a logical raison d', 6tre when it comes to running 
things. It makes decision-making easier. , 145 
Once the strategic focus was defined, once it was decided that the company was 
going to commercialise skin care products, the remainder of the company's products were 
considered 'ýperipheraL P, 146 Thus, some peripheral products were used to acquire new 
brands in dermatology. 
142 Archival material in Andr6maco (document Strategic Plan 1997-1998). 
143 In 1980 Andr6maco set up its own distribution company Distran. This company was dissolved after the 
strategic changes that took place in the company in 1997. Distribution was outsourced through an existent 
company in the industry called Disprofarma. 
144 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (first interview, 1999). 
145 Interview with Pablo Roviralta, CEO Andr6maco- (second interview, 2000). 
146 Interview with Pablo Roviralta, CEO Andr6maco (second interview, 2000). 
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Supporting the strategy 
The new strategy was launched in an environment which showed little promise. In 
April 1997 the strategy was approved, and in August the new CEO took over and started to 
work on communicating the strategy and trying to bring some order into the company. 
In August 1998, Pablo Roviralta started to implement changes in the area of 
Promotion and Sales. It was necessary to build up a support system to boost the strategy 
Pablo Roviralta wanted to achieve. Javier Ruiz was the new head of the Department. The 
old policy of focusing on the wholesaler was changed by stressing the importance of the 
demand (the doctor). 
"We changed the paradigm for the way we commercialised products in the firm. 
We did not expect the wholesaler to sell one unit more ofmyproduct, because it is not up to 
them to generate the perception of a brand. We needed to generate this perception in the 
person who makes thepurchasing decision, which is the doctor. , 147 
At the end of August 1998, the company ran for almost 45 working days with short 
term liabilities and they had no way of paying wages. The situation worsened because the 
dismissal of 22 managers meant that a great deal of money was paid out in redundancy 
payments throughout 1997. By December 1998 the crisis was much more pronounced 
because of the lack of raw materials needed for use on the production line for the suntan 
lotion campaign. These crises made the company consider even more far-reaching changes 
in the logistics department. By 1999, none of the suppliers that used to provide raw 
material to the company were still working with Andr6maco. 148 
"I took over the company when it was nearly collapsing. These crises were 
inevitable. What happened with these crises throughout 1998 was that we reached rock 
bottom. However, we did not change our path, we stuckfirmly to our vision. Those crises, 
however painful, were helpful because they introduced more changes that would otherwise 
147 Interview with Javier Ruiz-Promotion and Sale Manager-Andr6maco. 
148 Interview with Hugo Garcia-Logistic Manager Andr6maco. 
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have been dijficult. P, 149 
By March 1999, the company had paid off its debt and started to generate its own 
resources. By May 1999, the company launched one product (after two years without 
releases) and bought up four new brands. 
Changes in the structure of the company 
From 1989 to 1996, the structure remained largely unchanged. The main change 
was in 1993 when Pablo Roviralta created the OTC department and later in 1996 when he 
became the new Commercial Director of the company. Creating the OTC department in 
1993 allowed the company to be more dynamic in the commercialisation of the OTC 
products that were one of its strengths. 
The main changes Andr6maco experienced related mainly to the merging of areas 
to create a structure more suitable for the new competitive arena. However, Andromaco 
was still structured in a functional way in 1999 (see figure 7.16). 
As one manager explained: "I remember that the structure of the company was like 
an octopus. The CEO made all the decisions and the head of each department was taking 
all of the decisions related to his section. Today, although there is a lot ofwork to be done, 
the company has decompressed the situation a lot by creating different areas within the 
different departments. "' 50 
"I do not think you will have many problems analysing the structure in 1989. It 
was a very easy structure: eve; ything was centralised in the General ManagerTuchi. "151 
From nine departments in 1989, the company downsized the structure to six 
departments in 1999. New areas were created within the different departments as shown in 
149 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (second interview, 2000). 
1-50 Interview with Pedro Carvallo-Technical Director in Andr6maco. 
151 Interview with Hector Alquati-OTC Marketing Manager in Andr6maco. 
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figure 7.16.152 
"The old structure had two main problems. Firstly, hierarchy was more important 
than anything else, so decisions were delayedfor ages. But secondly and probably most 
importantly, the old structure lasted a longtime, until I took over thepost of CEO. P, 153 
Since 1999 Andr6maco has had a structure in which positions have been 
consolidated and the structure in itself has evened out. But there are still some unresolved 
issues to be considered: firstly, there are still many layers in the different structures of the 
departments. This fact made decision-making more difficult and bureaucratic processes 
became very complicated: "We still have on average six layers. 7hat is a lot. There is not 
a great difference in the number of layers now and in 1989. This is one of the most 
important aspects we have to tackle. We have started to work on that issue though but it is 
not easy. , 154 
152 The first column shows the old departments and the way they merged to give rise to the new structure. 
The second column represents the new Departments and the third column is the opening up of the structure in 
1999. 
153 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (second interview, 2000). 
154 Interview with Juan Pablo Rizzo, HR Manager Andr6maco. 
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FIGIRE 7.16: EVOI. UI-ION OF II IF COMPANY'SS-IRUCIURE, 1989-1999155 
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Changes in the Management of tile comp ny 
Between 1989 and 1996, the managerial structure of the company remained largely 
unchanged. The style of the CFO marked the period: "Tuchi was i-athei- authoritarian. 
This did not allow him to surround himse1j'with the right people to make the changes the 
" 156 companY neet e(. 
The main critcria for hiring managers were, as some managers stated, age and 
experience in the indUstry: "Age was vet-y important. Previousýv, [in the 1980s] thetv were 
155 This figure was created using archive material from the Human Resource department and data provided by 
the Board of Directors. 
156 Interview with Juan Pablo Rizzo, FIR Manager Andr6maco. 
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a lot of old people in the company who relied on their years of experience in the 
industry. Y, 157 (see also table 7.10). 
The relationship between the managerial team and the CEO was not always 
amicable: "Tuchi inspired terror and I do not remember meetings in which the whole 
managerial team was behind him. He made all the decisions and the managers 
implemented them. Communication was really bad "Tuchi's management was 
characterised by a lack of any kind of communication between the different levels of the 
company, accompanied by the strict control of operations. Decisions were never 
discussed. -158 
In 1993, when Pablo Roviralta set up the OTC department, changes in the 
managerial team started to take shape:. "Setting up the OTC, area was a big challenge for 
the company, not only because of the commercial implications but in terms of the 
managerial team. I hired new people, professionals, different from the old professionals 
that were in Andr6maco at that time. The differences between the people working in OTC 
and the rest of the company were so huge that there was a lot o tension in the )f 
organisation. "159 
After the crisis the company went through during the period 1995-1997, Pablo 
Roviralta took over as the new CEO of the company and started to change things. 
Roviralta's first decision was to reshuffle the management team by dismissing twenty-two 
managers: "In 1996 we were working on the new strategic plan and, while doing so, I was 
assessing the different managers of the company. I started to see behaviour that was less 
than loyal to the company -people with very dffcult personalities. To avoid any type of 
resistance I got rid ofthose who I saw as an obstacle to change. " 160 
However, the managerial team was not ready in 1999: "1 think by the end of the 
157 Interview with Hugo Garcia-Logistic Manager in Andr6maco. 
158 Interview with Jorge Idiart-Manager of Zone I in Andr6maco. 
'59 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (first interview, 1999). 
'60 Interview with Pablo Rovralta-CEO Andr6maco (first interview, 1999). 
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year 2000 we are going to have our structure settled with all the boxes of the structure 
filled. I take special care when selecting those who are going to be part of the managerial 
team. , 161 
With the new managerial team, vertical and horizontal communication has 
improved: "Communication is clear now, in contrast to the closed system operated by the 
previous CEO. Before 1997 there was no communication between managers and 
employees. The workerfound his way by drawing his own conclusions. , 162 
Supporting the managerial change process: The HR area 
Until 1997 there was no HR Department in Andr6maco but a Personnel Department 
dealing with administrative matters. In July 1999 the first HR manager started work in the 
company. "When I started work there was no HR policy within the company. Therewasa 
lack of HR policy, widespread demotivation and a lack of integration in the organisation. 
Furthermore they did not consider HR to be a strategic resource for the company. , 163 
However, the new CEO wanted a change: he wanted Andr6maco to become a company 
that focused on people rather than on the hierarchy. 
The HR area was set up to support the new changes in the company. Pablo 
Roviralta and the new HR Manager established the objectives of the area in the medium 
term: firstly, to avoid the bureaucracy that had been a problem in the company; secondly, to 
bring people closer to the Board; and, finally, to improve the selection process and create a 
training programme for young professionals (table 7.10 shows the evolution of the entry 
requirements for selected areas in Andr6maco). 
"One of the problems I encountered was a terrible bureaucratisation in the 
company. The information it produced was not trustworthy, it was erratic and there were 
161 Interview with Pablo Rovralta-CEO Andr6maco (first interview, 1999) 
162 Interview with Walter Monzon-Finance Manager in Andr6maco 
161 Interview with Juan Pablo Rizzo-HR Manager in Andr6maco 
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no statistics. We are now working with the areas in creating trustworthy indicators. , 164 
"Another aspect we are working on is encouraging contact between the Board and 
the different levels of employees. Employees did not know the Board, they did not know 
what they were like. Using the tactic of holding conversation sessions with 20 people each 
time, Pablo Roviralta was able to comment on the company's strategy and let them know 
what changes the company was going through. , 165 
The last aspect human resources was working on in 1999 was the selection process 
in the company. One of the most ambitious projects in the area today is what they call the 
"Andr6maco seedbed. 2166 The company's aim is that by February 2001 there will be a 
group of ten trainees who can either replace or join the current managerial team in the 
medium term. 167 
For the CEO, selection has another important effect: "Selection is very important. 
Through selection I am trying to get all the heads of departments to share similar values. 
On the other hand we would like young people without experience to join the company. 
Why? Because the company would be their school and we will shape them with our 
mould. A68 
164 Interview with Juan Pablo Rizzo-HR Manager in Andr6maco 
165 Interview with Juan Pablo Rizzo-HR Manager in Andr6maco 
166 Archival material of the company provided by Pablo Roviralta '67 By May 2002 the company had not set up the group of ten trainees. 168 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco 
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TABLE 7.10: F-NTRY REOUIREMENTS FOR THE DIFFERENT AREAS IN ANDR6MACO. SELECTED AREAS 169 
Areas 1989 1996 1999 
Logistics (we take the -Age ("the older the -Idem 1989. -Young professionals 
case of Production and better'). (engineers). 
Technical Department in -Experience in logistics -Experience in other 
1989). in other pharmaceutical industries. 
company. 
Administration and -Accountant and tax -Accountancy -Accountancy 
Finance (we take the case specialist -Business -Business 
of Accounting and also Administration Administration 
Finance in 1989). 
Marketing OTC and -Promotional and sales -APM: Idern 1989 -Big changes in these 
Marketing Ethical team (APM): very Mktg: New OTC area areas. Reshuffle of - 
Products experienced in the introduced new and APMs: younger, with 
(Commercialisation in industry. younger professionals university degree or 
1989). -Mktg: Experience in with experience technical degree. 
the industry. different from the Experience in the 
pharmaceutical industry was not a 
industry. requirement. 
The rest of the -Other professionals: 
commercial area had Younger with university 
similar features to those degrees were 
in 1989. welcomed. 
-Experience in the 
industry was preferable. 
Board of Directors: Govemance, strategy and family 
Corporate governance in Andr6maco, 
While the founder, MR Roviralta, was still alive, the whole group of companies 
followed the orders of his right hand man, the Argentinian Carlos Salvo. There was neither 
a Board of Directors nor a committee that tried to establish general strategies for the group. 
Both RaAl Roviralta and Salvo took decisions. 170 
When RaAl Roviralta. died in 1979, and the group split up into different companies, 
the responsibility for the Argentinian branch (including Paraguay and Uruguay) fell to 
Alejandro Roviralta - the son of Ra6l Roviralta. His inexperience in the business and his 
shy personality 171 made him back out and delegate the management of the company first to 
Carlos Salvo and then to Julio Tuchi until the third generation took over the administration 
169 This table was created using data provided by the different areas under analysis (Marketing OTC, 
Marketing Ethical Products, Logistics and Administration and Finance). 
"0 Interviews with Pablo Roviralta (two interviews in 1999 and 2000); and informal talk with Mr. Alejandro 
Roviralta Jr. 
171 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (first interview, 1999). 
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of the company. 
In 1986, when Alejandro Roviralta Jr. joined the company they decided to set up a 
Board of Directors as a way of improving the communication of strategies to the future 
heirs. The Board was formed by Alejandro Roviralta (father and President), Alejandro 
Roviralta Jr. (eldest son and Vice-President) and Julio Tuchi (CEO). In 1988, Pablo 
Roviralta was co-opted to the Board. 
However, the Board of Directors was not meeting its objectives: "It did not make 
any difference when my brother and Ijoined the Board. We were inexperienced, and my 
father relied on Tuchi. So, we went there to listen to what Tuchi had already decided. , 172 
There was a transitional stage in the Board's life between 1993 and 1996 when the 
brothers started to have more power. Alejandro Roviralta Jr. assumed responsibility for 
institutional communication and Pablo Roviralta for the new and profitable OTC area. By 
1996, the success of both brothers, but mainly the achievements of Pablo Roviralta in his 
new post (Commercial Director), started to pay off and reshaped the role of the Board: 
"Ourfather started to be more open towards what was going on in the company and he 
started to listen to us. We were working hard and our accomplishments were helping us to 
be heard. , 173 
In 1993, Pablo Roviralta took over the project of the OTC area in Andr6maco with 
great success (in three years he increased the volume of OTC products sold fivefold). 174 By 
1996, achievements in the OTC area led Pablo Rovitalta to become Commercial Manager 
of the company, a critical role in a company that was struggling to survive. 
"Pablo [Roviralta] set about taking on more of the company's problems until he 
actually replaced Tuchi. It was a natural process and that gives added value to the 
leadership Pablo achieved within the company. He took overpower which nobody held, 
appropriating bit by bit all the realpower while Tuchi was only left with theformalpower. 
172 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (second interview, 2000). 
173 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (second interview, 2000). 
174 Archival material. Data provided by the Marketing OTC Product Departments. 
206 
The whole process was accomplished thanks to Pablo's amazing strategic vision. , 175 
In 1997, when Pablo Roviralta took over control of the company, the Board was 
composed of three members, all of them family members: Alejandro Roviralta, Alejandro 
Roviralta Jr. and Pablo Roviralta. 176 Alejandro Roviralta was the President of the 
company, Alejandro Jr. the Vice President. Alejandro Roviralta Jr. dealt mainly with 
Public Relations issues. Everything that concerned dealing with the industry was delegated 
to Alejandro Jr.: "Alejandro [Jr. ] has a subsidiary role within the company. However he 
attends the weekly meetings of the Board. "177 Pablo Roviralta, on the other hand, was both 
CEO and a Board member. 
"Alejandro Roviralta has delegated a lot to his son Pablo, who has responded by 
achieving great success. 77ds constituted the mainstay of the restructuring process. Pablo 
is quite an autonomous figure. Sandi [Alejandro Roviralta Jr's nickname] has a very good 
relationship with Pablo because their different personalities complement each other: Pablo 
is more thoughtful and Sandi more intuitive, less respectful offorms, less willing to take 
risks, with less theoretical base to his actions but a wide knowledge of the day-to-day 
reality. By contrast, Pablo has done more formal training, which helps him to be more 
sure ofhis concepts, taking risks in things which make up the business. , 178 
Strategy, delegation and control 
"The old company was very dull and bureaucratic, decisions werefar too reliant on 
the centre of power., Julio Tuchi, the Managing Director. This person presided over a 
golden period in the company's history and another period of bad luck He nearly 
compromised its survivaL P, 179 
"The Board did not agree with decisions being made at the lower levels, but 
"s Interview with Juan Pablo Rizzo-HR Manager in Andr6maco. 
76 By 1999, Alejandro Roviralta was 73, Alejandro Roviralta Jr. was 47 and Pablo Roviralta 45. 
77 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (second interview, 2000). 
178 Interview with Juan Pablo Rizzo-HR Manager in Andr6maco. 
179 Interview with Juan Pablo Rizzo-HR Manager in Andr6maco. 
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insisted that everything be studied by them, an attitude which remains today but to a lesser 
degree now. "180 
"Under Tuchi's administration, decision-making took ages because two or three 
people in the company decided everything, every single detail. , 181 
Centralisation of decision-making not only seems to have been an old problem but 
continues to be one: "I am trying to delegate decisions to the managers, but this will take 
time. The management team is new and wefirst need to make them work as a team. , 182 
The Board and the CEO are very much involved in the different operative activities 
of the company: "We are still very dependent on the owner. Although the company is 
family-run and the owners are professional in their actions, they continue to make the same 
kind of gut decisions typical of this sort of company. Decisions are made more according 
to the ownerswhim than by obeying business logic.,, 183 
Control mechanisms were always stringent in Andr6maco. However there was a 
difference in nature. "Under Tuchi's management the Board was very keen on obtaining 
information and controlling. They were always on people's backs [ ... j This type of control 
generated harmful behaviour in the managers and workers. , 184 "Today's control is 
different. I would say that control is tighter now than before but is more consistent. , 185 
"Control was based on fear [under Tuchi's administration]. At that time a good 
employee was one who arrived at work early and never took time off. The company 
directives inspired terror and were an abuse ofpower. The worker was not allowed to 
poke his nose into the company's business. "186 
However, there was a general feeling among managers that the control mechanisms 
were still excessive: "The nature of this business, and all businesses, is that decisions and 
"0 Interview with Juan Pablo Rizzo-HR Manager in Andr6maco. 
'a' Interview with Hector Alquati-OTC Marketing Manager in Andr6maco. 
182 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (first interview, 1999). 
... Interview with Hector Alquati-OTC Marketing Manager in Andr6maco. 
184 Interview with Javier Ruiz-Promotion and Sales Manager in Andr6maco. 
185 Interview with Juan Pablo Rizzo-HR Manager in Andr6maco. 
196 Interview with Hugo Garcia-Logistic Manager in Andr6maco. 
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counter-decisions must be taken throughout the progress of the different activities. These 
decisions have to be made on a daily basis. The problem we have is that the CEO and 
Board want to participate in each decision. , 187 
Table 7.11 illustrates the way Andr6maco's Board of Directors controlled the 
different areas of the company through a variety of meetings, reports and specific 
indicators. Many managers thought that the frequent meetings got in the way of the day-to- 
day running of the operation. 
187 Interview with Hector Alquati-OTC Marketing Manager in Andr6maco. 
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TABLE 7.11: FOLLOW UP ON MEETINGS/REPORTS BETWEEN THE BOARD AND THE DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS" 
Department Frequency Indicators/aspects required by the Board 
meeting/report 
Administration and -Weekly (report) -Debt 
Finance -Weekly (meeting) -Payment of suppliers 
-Monthly (report) -Brcakeven point 
-Gross operating margin in general and by product 
-Taxes 
-Net Sale by product 
-Market share 
-Different aspects relating to the systems of the 
company 
Human Resources -Weekly (report) -People: Appraisal assessment with comments, 
-Weekly (meeting) absences, overtime work, wage development. 
-Monthly (report) -Administration: Selection, dismissal of people 
-Organisation: News in the different areas and 
training. 
-Security and hygiene: Projects, accidents, news, 
hygiene and maintenance of the building, and 
production. 
-Life quality: Medical services, "smoke-frcc zone" 
programme, "bathroom hygiene"programme". 
Logistics* -Weekly (report) -Quality: processes and training to the internal 
-Weekly (meeting) customer, policy of stocks, measurement and control 
-Monthly (report) -Deposits: News and stocks 
-Quality and costs: assessment of process between the 
real capacity and the required capacity; 
standardisation, measures and control. 
-Assessment of each line and machine of production 
-Assessment of the assembly line in terms of 
maintenance of the building 
-Planning assembly line production 
Marketing Proauct OTC -Weekly (report) -Profile new people that were hired by the area 
-Weekly (meeting) -Units sold in each line of products 
-Monthly (report) -News of each line (packaging, advertisement 
campaign). 
-Units sold, discounts, estimates for the following 
week. 
-APMs activities. Details 
-Projects in analysis. 
As many managers recognised, the higher degree of centralisation and control 
impeded the company's ability to respond quickly. However, Pablo Roviralta stated that: 
"The company came from a very low level. We were at rock bottom. So the first 
commitment I had was to reach a level ofperformance that allowed us to survive. Tight 
control of operations has allowed Andr6maco to Perform well over the last two years and 
is still necessary. As soon as we achieve stability and a continuous and better performance 
... This table was prepared using the results of the interviews held with different managers and a copy of the 
latest follow up reports in the selected areas. 
*Only some indicators/aspects are mentioned here. 
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we are going to whip up supportfor delegation. "189 
The unresolved issues 
Two issues regarding the future of the company concerned the Board and, in 
particular, the CEO. These two issues are related to the possibilities of growth in the 
medium and long term, and the succession process. 
There is one big challenge for the company in the medium term. As many 
managers mentioned, the niche strategy was good for taking Andr6maco out of the crisis it 
went through. However, they also saw the strategy as a limitation for growth: "I agree that 
concentrating on one area was the bestfor the company in the mid-1990s. However, now 
that the strategy is consolidated, Andr6maco is suffering a growth crisis. Andr6maco 
wants to grow in a market that is in decline. "190 Figure 7.17 shows Andr6maco's 
increasing importance in the dermatology sub-market. However, as can be seen in the 
figure, the importance of the dermatological sub-market within the pharmaceutical market 
in Argentina is shrinking. This reduction of the share of the dermatological sub-market in 
Argentina is a product of the maturity of such a sub-market and the lack of investments in 
R&D and innovation in it. These two factors (i. e., R&D and innovation) have impacted on 
the average price of dermatological products which is below the industry average. The 
heavy dependence of Andr6maco on such products, as shown in figure 7.18, has impacted 
negatively on the average prices of the products sold by the company. 
"Growth is not going to befeasiblefor our current skincare products because they 
are nearly hitting the roof To achieve our objectives by 2003, that is to increase the 
company's share of the market in skincare products to 25? 16, there are various alternatives. 
One is to buy up new brands, but it is diffilcult to do so because the brands which stay on 
the market are the biggest and it would mean an extraordinary investmentfor, 4ndr6maco, 
'89 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (second interview, 2000). 
190 Interview with Hector Alquati-OTC Manager Andr6maco. 
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an aniount of money that we do not have. The second allemative consists oj'developing 
products in those niches where we have notyet participated. "'()' 
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Interview with Walter Monzon-Finance Manager Andr6maco. 
192 Sources of inforniation: I MS Reports 1994-1999 and archival material provided by the Marketing urc 
and Promotion and Sales Department in Andr6maco. 
"" Source of information: IMS Reports, 1989-1999. 
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Years 
The succession process and the entrance of the fourth generation of family members 
are the other issues that concern the Board. Measures have not yet been taken to ensure a 
planned and smooth succession. 
"My older brother works with me but the younger one does not. I have two 
brothers andfive sisters. Six of us have nothing to do with the company. Besides that I 
have twenty-two nephews. Myjather is 73 years old and one of the matters on the agenda 
is to see how continuity will be affected in thefuture. It is a challenge we willface in the 
future. , 194 
The managers see succession as a problem that might not only damage family 
relationships but something that could endanger the future of the company. There is also a 
widespread ignorance of family arrangements among managers in the company. 
"I do not know how the shares are spread between the family members, nor 
whether there is any agreement between Alejandro Roviralta's children about what will 
happen when he leaves the Board. The situation is very complicated seeing as in this kind 
of company it is very difficult to distinguish between company andfamily. [ ... ] We [the 
managers] do not know anything about thefamily. We only have contact with Sandi and 
Pablo. There is a lot of secrecy surroundingJamily affairs. "195 
194 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (first interview, 1999). 
195 Interview with Juan Pablo Rizzo-HR Manager in Andr6maco. 
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Chapter 8A: Case Study: AGD Aceitera General Deheza 
8.1 Brief overview of the history of AGD 1948-1999 
Founded in 1948 by Adrian Urquia, AGD (Aceitera General Deheza) transformed 
itself from a small oil-processing factory into the biggest indigenous firm in the industry. 
Nowadays AGD is a leading edible oil export company and also one of the frontrunners on 
the retail market for bottled oil with several successful brands. It ranked 40th among the 
1000 top companies in terms of turnover in Argentina in 1999 (Revista Mercado, 1999), 
and it is considered the fifth most important exporter in the country (Revista Mercado, 
1999). 
After the changes the country went through in the 1990s, the company was able to 
adapt and thrive in an industry in which most indigenous businesses did not manage to 
survive. Nevertheless, the roots of AGD's success do not date from the 1990s but long 
before, in their thinking ahead about ways of improving technology, scale and cost- 
effective measures -a trio of decisions that would prove to be the right combination for 
survival and success. 
The first generation tenure of the firm lasted 37 years: from 1948 to 1985, when the 
founder bowed out from the executive direction of the company and became its President. 
This foundational period can be split into three sub-periods: the founding period from 1948 
to 1968, the crisis in 1968, and finally, the consolidation of the company between 1968 and 
1985 (see stages of the history of the firm in figure 8.1). 
The first generation tenure is shaped by the figure of its founder, Adrian Urquia, 
who was absolutely determined to set up an oil factory in the countryside in the Province of 
C6rdoba. His enthusiasm and commitment, plus the importance Urquia attributed to 
technology and process flexibility, were key factors in the success of the firm: "He [the 
founder] worked permanently to increase production volume in order to improve 
economies of scale. Optimising logistics, achieving efficiency and lowering costs were 
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particular preoccupations of his. Another distinctive attitude was the systematic 
incorporation oftechnological developments. P, 196 
However, there were a number of obstacles in the way. 1968 was a milestone year 
for the company. AGD was forced to shut down. An unfortunate combination of events - 
such as a worldwide increase in oilseed prices and the lack of a commercial strategy - 
forced the company to rethink its strategy. 
From 1968 to 1985 the consolidation process took place until AGD had reached a 
leading position in the industry. In 1985 the company was a hundred percent export- 
oriented, selling bulk products made with state-of-the-art technology. 
Urquia's children not only inherited the company, but also some of their father's 
fundamental values that were and still are deeply rooted in AGD's culture: paternalism, and 
Directors who know the operations and who are constantly attentive to what is going on 
both within the industry and outside it. 
In 1985 the founder withdrew from the daily operation. 1985 is also an important 
date because that was when Urquia's youngest child, Adriana, started to work in the 
company. His sons Roberto and Adrian Jr. had already joined the firm several years 
earlier. 
The period from 1985 to 1999 was characterised both by times of turmoil and spells 
of stability in Argentina. Changes in macroeconomic policies prompted companies to 
rethink their businesses and strategies. AGD did just this and ahead of the other companies 
in its industry, it launched two strategic inititatives: firstly, it started to manufacture brand 
products to compete with the retail market; and secondly, it set about strengthening the 
logistics chain to achieve cost effectiveness. A second stage began in 1995 when the 
company took a good look at its internal organisation -a process which triggered changes 
affecting the structure, management and governance of the company. 
196 Interview with Roberto Urquia- Director of AGD 
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In November 1996, the founder died. By that time, the firm was a leading 
indigenous edible oil producer. In figure 8.2 we present a detailed account of the evolution 
of AGD and the industry during the company's first tenure (1948-1985). As can be seen in 
the figure, the changes at the sectoral level had a deep impact on the evolution of the 
company (i. e., international crisis speeded up the internal crisis in the company in 1968; the 
soya boom in the country boosted AGD's processing capacity). 
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FIGURE 8.1: CHRONOLOGY AND STAGES IN AGD'S HISTORY 
First generation tenure Second Generation tenure 
1948ýý ---------------- ! 385--1919. -199P 
Y 
Starting from scratch: Crisis: bankruptcy Consolidation and growth Preparing Transformational period 
The founding stage the ground 
I Focus of the analysis 
FIGURE 8.2: THE EVOLUTION OF THE FIRM AND SECTOR 1948-1982 197 
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197 Archive material from the company (provided by Adriana Urquia); Gatto and Gutman, (1993) and Gutman 
and Feldman, (1990) were used to analyse the sectoral evolution). 
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8.2 Understanding the transformation of AGD: Chronological and 
analytical tracing of key elements over the period 1989-1999 
Strategic initiatives: Branding 
By 1988, AGD saw the need to diversify its production of bulk edible oil. It was to 
be expected that a company that crushed and refined oilseeds would make a move into the 
retail market: "Thefamily wanted to keep onefoot in the internal market as a safeguard in 
case the external market did badly. The retail market offered that opportunity. It was the 
opposite of what other companies were doing. Everybody wanted to export to avoid the 
turmoil of the internal market. A98 
Adrian Urquia Jr., the Director and CEO of the company, assumed the 
responsibility of preparing the launch of the new strategy. "After one trip to the USA he 
[Adrian Urquia Jr. ] came to a Board meeting and opened a suitcasefull ofoil bottles. They 
were plastic bottles -a different concept to that used in Argentina back then, because the 
market leader used glass bottles. He also came up with the idea of non-cholesterol oil, 
which was apiece ofluck because until then this was a dormant market. "199 
Another important development took place in the retail market for edible oil: 
Molinos, the leader, bought Santa Clara, the second company in the retail market: "We 
perceived that the important customers wanted to have more than one supplier. Besides 
that, Molinos was so far ahead of the rest of the market that it did not need to keep up to 
date. Undoubtedly this led them to relax and not think about innovation, which was a big 
mistake and we took advantage ofthat mistake. Theyfell asleep. "200 
"Commercialising products with an extra value, achieving greater profitability and 
becoming more diversified were the outcomes of this strategy, " stated Roberto Urquia. 
'9' Interview with Miguel Acevedo-Finance Manager. 
199 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director. 
"0 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Dircctor. 
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"Not putting all their eggs in one basket, , 201 as one Director said, was the strategy 
followed to stabilise, the margins of the business. 
In 1989 AGD launched the first pure sunflower oil to appear on the Argentinian 
market as shown in table 8.1. Ketelhohn et al (1998) pointed out that customers not only 
saw this product as healthier but also a good combination of relatively low cost price and 
perceived high quality, proving AGD's strategy of product innovation to be a successful 
one and achieving a high share of the market for brand name oils (see market share 
evolution in figure 8.3). 
AGD also took a step towards its entry into the massive consumer market by 
launching products related to the oil industry such as mayonnaise and juices based on soya 
and fruits. The following table and figures aim to illustrate the sequence in which new 
products were launched and the market share obtained. 
TABLE 8.1: RELEASES OF DIFFERENT PRODUCTS BY AGD PER YEAR102 
]ProduS! _---- 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000* 
. I--- Year 
of Launching 
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201 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director. 
202 This table was created using documentary data provided by Marketing Department. 
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1997 1998 1999 
Years 
Strategic initiatives: Origination and the logistics chain 
The success of their entrance into the retail market made the Board and Managers 
more confident about the future of the company. AGD also started to evaluate the 
implications of macroeconomic measures that caused inflation to fall and prices to stabilise. 
It became increasingly important to achieve cost-effectiveness. The company reacted 
promptly and started to attack the weakest part of its value chain: 'the origination' process 
and its logistics chain. 
Origination is the name the company uses for buying seeds, transporting and storing 
them. It is an activity which has always existed. AGD has always bought seeds, but their 
method of buying changed in the 1990s. Until then, the company had bought seeds from 
intermediaries or on the cereal stock market and stored them in silos (grain collecting 
stores) that were often owned by the same intermediaries from whom the company had 
bought the oilseeds. This way of doing business became the company's Achilles' heel: 
AGD was dependent upon the intermediaries to obtain the raw material it needed to process 
oil. In order to counter constant supply problems, as well as dealing with the new 
economic situation, the Board implemented a strategy that was to have an impact on the 
whole organisation: they decided to move backwards in the chain of value to enable them 
to make available all the raw material needed. "We are well aware of our company's 
history. In 1968 the company went bankrupt because we did not have the raw materials to 
supply the plant. We are not going to go through the same thing again. We have learnt 
our lesson. , 205 By 1999, the company had twenty two grain collecting plants and two 
purchasing offices spread throughout the country. 
The firm's strategy gave them two advantages: firstly, it did not have to pay 
commission to the agent at the stock market because it bought the raw material directly 
from the farmer: and secondly, it provided the company with a commodity backup, thus not 
205 lntcrview with Adriin Urquia-Director and CEO. 
221 
leaving them heavily dependent on market prices. The outcome was what the company 
wanted: achieving efficiency by reducing costs. 206 
The company saw that the logistics chain would have been incomplete without an 
adequate transportation system. Transport was also seen as critical for the business: 
"Formerly the aim was to get the supplies neededfor our processing facilities, but when 
you think that grinding a tonne of soya costs twelve or thirteen dollars and transport 
between Tucumdn and Rosario comes out atfourteen dollars, you see that logistics are all- 
important in our business. And here is where you can achieve efficiency. , 207 
In 1992 the company incorporated a fundamental link into its logistics chain: the 
Nuevo Central Argentina (NCA) railway which AGD operates. With a 40 year concession, 
and in partnership with other groups, AGD controls the 4,757 of kilometres of track, 
linking storage facilities with industrial plants and the port, making connections possible 
with the rest of the country. Furthermore, this strategy was complemented by the facilities 
at the Terminal 6 port. In 1996, Terminal 6 became the biggest private port in the 
country. 208 
"The company gained a real advantage in the sector with this strategy. I think we 
are ten years ahead of the other companies. Aefew national businesses that survived are 
trying to copy our strategy. Even Molinos 209 is trying to replicate our success. , 210 
Not only did this strategy help AGD become leaders in the industry, but it also 
allowed the company to incorporate new businesses and seize the opportunity in others. In 
1993, following the strategy of making the very most of its logistics chain, the company 
206 Interviews with Roberto Urquia and Miguel Acevedo. 
207 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director. 
20' Archivc material provided by the company (NCA, T6 and Board of Directors). 209 This is a different company to the one on the retail market. The Molinos that Miguel Acevedo refers to is 
a crushing company owned by the multinational Bunge, while the Perez Companc family owns the company 
on the retail market (previously both companies were owned by Bunge). 
210 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director. 
222 
moved into the purchase and export of cereals as an independent activity. In 1997, AGD 
sold one million tons of cereals worldwide and in 1999 one and a half million tonnes. 211 
"The origination business made us broaden our perspectives at the same time. We 
started off buying only oilseeds, but to shut out possible competition from intermediaries 
we started to huy cereals too. Yhat is how our Cereal Export Department came into 
being. , 212 
The producer also required different services such as loans, agrochemicals, and 
seeds, so, in 1994, the company created the Agro-product Department, adding more 
businesses and services to the origination complex. 
Summary and concluding remarks on the strategic initiatives undertaken by AGD. 
In 1989 AGD launched Natura, the first branded product for the company. This 
decision meant that the company would be participating in a different market: AGD would 
not only be an export company selling edible oil in bulk, but would also participate in the 
internal retail market and achieve a leading position. Later, the company was to 
incorporate new products although always related to the oilseeds they processed. The aim 
and result of this policy was adding value to the raw material the firm exported in bulk. 
In 1991 changes in the macro-economy encouraged the company to react speedily 
to improve efficiency by enhancing and expanding its origination area. The outcomes were 
cost reduction, the broadening of the business scope of the company and, finally, the 
strengthening of AGD's logistics chain. 
Figure 8.5 aims to summarise the main changes the company underwent and how 
these strategic initiatives changed the nature of AGD as a business. The figure shows how 
AGD transformed itself from a company that focused on the crushing activity of the 
business and being dependent on intermediary agents (see top of the figure), to a firm that 
21 1 Archive material from the company (provided by the Cereal Export Department). 
212 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director. 
223 
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Generating the process of intemal change: Organisational and structural changes 
Thinking out a new business structure 
In 1995, once the new strategic initiatives were running successfully, the Board 
decided to implement a new structural design. The growth the company underwent over 
the period 1989-1995 plus the intense competition and changes within the industry made 
the Board reformulate the way the company should be organised. 
The Board hired a group of Consultants and started work on the most far-reaching 
and organisational changes in the firm's history. Behind such changes was a clear idea: 
"We had a clear objective once we started making changes in the structure: we wanted a 
structural change which would enable the Board to have more timeforplanning strategies 
and spend less time on the operational side. -213 
The document presented by the consultants is revealing in terms of highlighting the 
aims behind the changes in the structure: firstly, seeking ways to liberate the Board from 
operative tasks but at the same time allowing them to keep control of the operation; 
secondly, clarifying the different departments of the company and differentiating between 
operative (business units) and support areas: and lastly, the idea that the structure should 
clarify the relationships between the different departments, customers and suppliers. 214 
The new structure brought a new concept into the organisation: the idea of business 
units and support units. The concept of the business unit entailed each one taking 
responsibility for its own profits and business performance. Until 1996 the structure had 
been a functional one in which all the departments were dependent on the Board, and the 
Directors played the role of Directors and Managers at the same time. The new concept of 
213 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director AGD. 
214 Documentary material "Ideas and criteria of the work done for AGD" (provided by Consultants). 
226 
business units meant giving more responsibility to the managers of different units and also 
meant that the Board sbould start to delegate operational tasks. 215 
Support areas were either reformulated or created from scratch such as the New 
Businesses unit and the Economic Studies unit. An economist with extensive experience in 
market studies was appointed to head the Economic Studies unit. The idea of setting up 
this new department was to consider the "short, medium and long-term future of the 
company, to centralise the economic information that the Board received and to interpret 
environmental informationfor the Board. PP216 
The figure below shows the different stages of the evolution in the company's 
structure. Units that could work together and had common elements were merged until 
they formed the business units seen in figure 8.6. The new structure meant that the 
different support units had to learn to offer services to the business units rather than 
working according to what the Board required. The business units, on the other hand, had 
to be more efficient in the use of resources, coordinate their different activities to avoid 
duplication and re-structure different processes to attain more effectiveness (i. e., 
administrative processes in the different business units and production processes). 
21' Documentary material "Ideas and criteria of the work done for AGD" (provided by Consultants). 
216 Interview with Carlos Haeberle- Economic Studies Unit Manager. 
227 
FIGURE 8.6: EVOLUTION OF THE COMPANY'S STRUCTURE- 
Functional structure First stage of change Business units and 
till 1996 year 1997 support areas since 
1998 
Administration and IT Administration and IT Administration and IT 
Finance Finance Finance 
Human Resources Human Resources Human Resources 




























Communicating the changes in structure 
In November 1996, the Board met the top and middle management of the company. 
Roberto Urquia gave a speech prepared by the Board and the consultants. Some 
paragraphs of the speech are enlightening in terms of defining the Board's aims for the 
future of the company. Firstly Urquia stressed the importance of the company's stance 
once the process of change had begun: "AGD is an organisation which, fortunately, is 
growing at the moment. The company is not in the critical position ofsome organisations 
217 Documentary material "Ideas and criteria of the work done for AGD" (provided by Consultants) and 
Archival material from the company (provided by Human Resources Area). 
*Directly dependent on the Board. 
228 
in which re-organisation is undertaken not in order to be more efficient, but to avoid 
collapse. , 218 
Customer focus was the reason given to justify the immediate need for change: "In 
a phase of expansion like ours, we need to have a flexible organisation and a flexible 
structure which allows us to adapt quickly to the needs of the customer and the market. To 
achieve this we are thinking of giving more autonomy to the different areas to allow the 
businesses to develop better but within certain organisational guidelines, which will 
facilitate horizontal communication an allow the sectors to work together. This will be 
advantageous to the company and result in a better servicefor the customer. , 219 
The Board also decided that a new area of human resources was needed to 
operationalise the changes. The head of the HR area remembers the difficulties in 
implementing the organisational changes: "There was resistance to implementing the ideas 
that the Board launched in November. Atfirst, managers were keen to go ahead with the 
changes, but when we went to the departments they started to say, 'why don't we do it next 
week', - Y am very busy at the moment'and gave plenty of other excuses. There was a lot of 
anxiety. , 220 
Marcelo Vit's work also resulted in flattening the hierarchical levels of the 
company. From the six levels that existed in the structure 1996, he streamlined down to the 
current three levels, eliminating the supervision level: "One of the things that the Board 
wanted was for the managers to have more contact with the process. Having a top-heavy 
structure meant the middle managers had less of a hands-on approach towards the 
process. , 221 
218 " Speech from the Board"-Roberto Urquia-November, 1996. 
219 "Speech from the Board"-Roberto Urquia-November, 1996. 
220 Interview with Marcelo Vit-HR Manager. 
221 Interview with Marcelo Vit-HR Manager. 
229 
The tasks still underway 
Some aspects of the process, nevertheless, are not yet complete. The structure 
shown in figure 8.6 has already been implemented, but the transformation of the different 
areas is lopsided: "I believe thatfurther clarification of the structures is necessary. Maybe 
certain people in charge don't have an ideal profile. They are older people whom AGD 
trusts. , 222 
The Peanuts business unit is the most advanced of the four in that its structure has 
been totally clarified: "77ie Peanuts unit advanced a lot because of the pressure from the 
younger managers, while other areas such as the Deheza Plant were more difficult to 
restructure, the staffare older and the changes take longer to implement. #223 
Changes in the Management of the compa 
A new generation ofmanagers 
The new businesses of the company and the need for better-prepared managers for 
running the business units opened the door to new managers with different skills and 
education. The profile of these new managers was stated in the speech given by the Board 
while launching the new organisational design of AGD: "We sought and want people who 
are not afraid of a challenge, who are oriented towards both internal and external 
customers; who have the capacity to work in a team and the ability to interrelate, who 
think analytically and strategically, who are enterprising and oriented towards action; and 
above all we are lookingforpeople who would risk everythingfor the company. , 224 
This was a challenge for a company used to low levels of employee turnover and a 
homogeneous culture. The running of the company's various departments required more 
sophisticated tools and those tools were brought to AGD by professionals who joined the 
222 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director. 
223 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director. 
224 "Speech from the BoarV-Robcrto Urquia-Novcmber, 1996. 
230 
organisation over the 10-year period analysed. "With the new incorporations, we are 
looking for people with a more complete profile, not only professionally, but also with 
leadership and teamwork skills, things that we did not look for before, that were not 
prioritised. We had good managers, but we thought that we could be better than before 
and preparefor new challenges. , 225 (See the evolution over time of the profile required in 
different areas of AGD in table 8.2). 
It was seen as important to professionalise the company so that it could face the 
challenges of the new context in Argentina. Nevertheless, there was a feeling of pride 
about the way the company was managed before 1990s. This pride arose from the idea 
within the company that its managers were different from these of the MNC companies. In 
the opinion of different managers, the difference stemmed from the fact that managers at 
AGD were closer to the process, knew the area and its problems and had closer ties with 
the producers. As one manager said: "If we need to use a Poncho, we'll use it and if we 
have to dance atfarmers'parties, we will. It is a different approach to those companies 
that send managers out in suits and ties. " 226 
Whereas the company had not set high standards as regards what it expected from 
its new employees in the 1980s, the 1990s were to see conditions change as it became 
much harder to join the firm as indicated in table 8.2. At the same time the demographic 
conditions of the company were also changing in that it was reducing the average age of its 
personnel. This last aspect was the outcome of the incorporation of younger personnel 
throughout the 1990s (see table 8.3). 
225 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director. 
226 Interview with Marcelo Vit-HR Manager AGD. 
231 
TABLE 8.2: DEGREES REQUESTED AND EXPERIENCE REQUIRED FOR JOINING VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS OVER THE 
PERIOD 1989-1999227 
Business Units 1989 1999 
Brands* -University degree not required -University degree is a pre- 
requisite. 
- Previous experience only -A minimum of 3 years 
needed in marketing or experience required for middle 
*Includes Brand and the commercialisation in the edible management positions 
fractional distillation area in the oil industry -Previous experience in the food 
1980s sector rather than edible oil 
industry is welcomed. 
Cereals and Oilseeds -Country people to deal with -A degree in Agricultural 
(origination, industrial, trading) farmers engineering required to run the 
-No higher education required purchase offices and grain 
Jechnicians to work in the collecting plants. 
industrial complex -A degree in Industrial 
-Internally trained people for engineering is required to work 
trading in top positions in the plants; 
group leaders must be 
technicians. 
-Experienced traders with a 
university degree and previous 
experience in trading companies 
are required to fill these 
positions. 
Peanuts Jechnicians to work in the field -Engineers to operate the plant 
Jechnicians to operate the plant -Agricultural engineers to work 
in the fields 
Agriculture and Livestock* -Not specified -A degree in Agricultural 
engineering needed for 
*Includes agriculture, pigs and managerial positions 
agro-products areas in the 1980s 
TABLE 8.3: AVERAGE AGE OF PERSONNEL IN SELECTED AREAS (TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WHOLE PERSONNEL 
OF THE DEPARTMENT/AREA)228 
Areas of the company 1989 (Age-average) 1999 (Age-average) 
Administration and IT 48 34 
Finance 47 36 
Brands 46 35 
Origination so 32 
Peanuts 55 34 
DH Plant 55 30 
The challenge ofhaving 'two generations ofmanagers' 
Probably one of the most important challenges, as the Board recognised, was 
dealing with the issue of having two generations fighting over the same power. The 
changes in the company structure and the possibility for a new generation of managers to 
227 This table was prepared using AGD's archive material from the HR department and data provided by the 
interviews with Adriana Urquia, Marcelo Vit, Gonzalo Dominguez and, Ricardo Ssenz. 22g This table was prepared using AGD's archive material provided by the HR department 
232 
work more freely under the new conditions caused conflict: "Around here, what happened 
was that before the process of change started, we had a few old leaders who were more in 
javour of the old system, more rigid, more for the establishment, less for teamwork. Now 
we have a group ofyoung people who have come here and have been encouraged by the 
changes. They have had other ideas: to work as part of a group, to participate. Yhis fact 
has generated conflict and strain sometimes. , 229 
Nevertheless, AGD was able to handle the transitional stage firstly due to a good 
group of top managers "aware of the future challenges , 230 and secondly, because of the 
company's decision to avoid sudden or large-scale replacements of managers, unless 
absolutely necessary. "We think that our company was lucky because in most cases the old 
generation and the new get on well, the old one gave the new one experience and customer- 
oriented service and the new one gave the old one the administrative tools the senior 
managers lacked. POI 
Control andplanning processes 
The 1990s also introduced new managerial concepts into the company. Both 
planning and control emerged as two different and complementary aspects that the 
managers of AGD started to learn and apply. The different areas of AGD at different levels 
started to formalise more what had been impossible in the 1980s. 
The mechanisms of control and planning, nevertheless, were supposed to provide 
"not only short term control but also long term Vision. , 
232 The company did not want to 
become more bureaucratic once the systems of control and planning were installed, 
nevertheless, these systems were necessary: "Although we have grown as a company, we 
do not want to lose the virtue of being agile when it comes to decision making. Rps 
important to avoid bureaucracy. Otherwise you end up accumulating things but not 
229 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director. 
230 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director. 
231 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director. 
232 Interview with Ricardo Sienz-Manager ofOrigination area. 
233 
attributing any value to them. We need control andplanning, we need moreformalisation, 
hut not so much that we risk destroying the agility and promptness of our decision-making 
process that I would say we are proud of , 233 
The following table shows the main indicators of control used by selected 
departments of the company over time. The table also shows how the indicators have 
increased over time. The fact that AGD was a company with a greater size and business 
scope caused these indicators to increase. 
TAi3LE 8.4: INDICATORS OF CONTROL I TvF. T)RYqp. i. F. rTF. nARF. AqOVlPR Tt-IF PFRTOn 103ZQ-1000234 
Areas 1989 1999 
Brand Crude Oil: not considered Crude Oil: Cost effectiveness 
Branded products: Branded products: 
-Average price -Average price 
-Share in volume -Share in volume 
-Shares in US$ -Share in US$ 
-Profits with/without 
amortisation of debts 
-Evolution of markets 
-Evolution of each product 
Logistics I -No indicators, estimates -Cost of transport-evolution 
-Cost of stock (storing jzrains) 
The Board of Directors: Strategy and family alignment 
Governing the company., Structure and strategy 
Until 1996, the year when AGD's founder died, Urquia's children had been 
working as company Directors but without specific responsibilities. Nevertheless, as soon 
as the first of his children started to work for the company in 1968, the Directors started to 
mould a profile that would shape the future of the Board. Adrian Jr. was very keen on 
technology and marketing. He was the one that pushed for the launch of the new branded 
products and developed the retail market. Roberto was very committed to the industrial 
complex - that comprised more than 60% of the company's turnover. He was the force 
233 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director 
234 This table was put together using AGD's archive material and data provided by Gonzalo Dominguez and 
Ricardo Sfienz 
234 
behind the origination and plans for the logistics chain. Finally, Adriana, the youngest of 
the children was the last one to join the company. She liked the freedom that the very 
profitable Peanut area gave her and, at the same time, started to get involved in human 
resources (henceforth, HR). 235 
Adrian Urquia died in 1996. His children did not modify the way they were 
working. Adrian Jr. took over as President because the company needed a President. 
Nevertheless there was a verbal agreement that the President would be 'ýprimus inter 
,, 236 
The changes the company went through after 1996 made the Board rethink its 
function. The Directors wanted to "think strategically and act in consequence, , 237 they 
did not want to get involved in the day-to-day operation. Once the business and support 
units were set up the Board divided its responsibilities: Adrian Jr. would supervise the 
Brand business unit and the Purchasing unit; Roberto would control the Cereals and 
Oilseeds business unit, Administration and Information Technology, and Finance; and 
Adriana would be in charge of Peanuts and HR. 
"nile Roberto and Adrian are the strategists of the company, Adriana had 
masterminded the organisational changes AGD had gone through. "2'8 ItwasAdrianawho 
insisted on working in-depth on organisational, issues once the Consultants were hired. She 
saw the opportunity to speed up the organisational changes that were needed. 
The Board was also working, pushed by Adriana, on a family protocol: "If you 
don't plan, or you don't shape it [family protocol] when things are calm, afterwards it 
might cause a lot ofproblems. We have plenty of time. Pomo is still single, Roberto has 
two young daughters and my daughter isjust a baby. ', 239 The aim of the family protocol is 
to establish the pre-requisites family members had to fulfil to join the firm: "It is really to 
235 By 1999, Adrian Urquia Jr. was 58 years old, Roberto Urquia was 54 and Adriana Urquia, 38. 
236 Interview with Adriana and Adrian Urquia. 
237 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director AGD. 
238 Interview with Marcelo Vit-Director. 
239 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director. 
235 
stop loads of relatives joining in the future. , 240 Only the brightest and most committed to 
the company's work culture will be granted a place in the firm. 
The following table shows the main aspects of the family protocol signed by the 
Board. 
TABLE 8.5: PRE-CONDITIONS FOR FAMILY MEMBERS WISHING TO JOIN AGD IN THE FUTURE241 
Aspects Requisites 
General conditionsfor afamily -They must share the values of the company. 
member tojoin the company -They must have a degree from a good university. Preferably a 
degree which suits the company's needs. 
-They must speak fluent English. 
-They must pass an entrance exam set by a different company that 
sets the exams for the rest of the employees. 
Careerplan -During the university degree stage: It would be convenient if 
they worked in the company over this period (in internships for 
example). 
-Postgraduate stage: A two-year long Masters degree in Argentina 
or abroad. 
Training and Assessment -After training in the company, an assessment of the family 
mcmberjob will be undertaken. The company will decide if the 
family member will or will not continue working for the 
company. Family members will not reach high positions in the 
company simply because they are family members. Promotion 
will depend on their capabilities and performance. 
-Once the members are incorporated definitely, they will be 
evaluated by the normal assessment systems in the company. 
While these systems are still in development, the assessment of 
the family member will be made by an external consultant. 
Permanent attitude -The family members have to have a good attitude and disposition 
towards the rest of the employees. 
-Family members have to start to work in junior positions in the 
company and move between posts in different areas to get a 
deeper understanding of the company's businesses. 
-Being humble and respectful is an attitude expected from a 
family member. A lack of ostentatious behaviour is also a key 
attitude. 
-It is forbidden to have another job outside the role that the family 
member has within the company. 
Strategic thinking and strategic decision-making 
While the 1980s represented a period of economic turmoil in which strategic issues 
were set aside because of short-term problems related to the operational side of the 
business, the 1990s were seen as the opportunity to start focusing on strategy: "In the 
240 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director AGD. 
241 "Family protocol for members of the Urquia family"-Documcntary material provided by the Board of 
AGD. 
236 
1980s there was so much time invested in the short term that you were not able to look to 
the medium and long-term. , 242 
In the 1990s the Directors wanted to focus on strategic issues. To do so, the Board 
started to prioritise strategic decisions over operational ones. The delegation process that 
began in the mid-1990s helped the Board to achieve this aim: "The experience taught us to 
delegate, because in a family business this is not easy. We were starting to have a 
bottleneck situation. The bottleneck is the decision-making process that stops you moving 
forWard. ', 243 
The Board made a firm decision to distinguish between those decisions that had to 
have the Board's approval (considered by the Board to be strategic decisions) and 
operational decisions that did not need their intervention (see table 8.6). 
In 1998, with the launch of the new structure, more frequent meetings took place to 
inform the Board of aspects related to the business units and to allow them to control their 
operation (see table 8.7). 
TA13LE 8.6: STRATEGIC DECISIONS NEEDING THE BOARD'S INTERVENTION 244 
Areas Strategic decisions 
Brand -Investments 
-Product images (control of advertising) 
Origination -Investments 
-Annual amount of money available for farmers' loans 
-Development of complementary activities such as production of 
materials, distribution of seeds and production of seeds 
24' Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director. 
243 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director. 
244 Interviews with Ricardo Sienz, Gonzalo Dominguez and Roberto Urquia. 
237 
TABLE R. 7- FOLLOW-UP ON MEETINGS BETWEEN THE 130ARD AND THE BUSINESS UNITS245 
Business Units Frequency of meetings Indicators/aspects required 
by the Board 
Brands Every two months -Sales 
-Shares (Litres and US$) 
-World markets 
-Profit Margin 
Cereals and Oilseeds Every two months -Expenses 
-Sales 
-Gross profit margin 
-Follow up the grinding budget 
Peanuts Every two months -Expenses 
-Sales 
-Gross profit margin 
Agriculture and Every six months (once before sowing -Surfaces to be sown 
Livestock time and once before harvesting) -Evaluation of the harvest 
In 1995 AGD hired the STRAT consultancy to start communicating the strategy 
down through the company, improving communication between the Board and the 
managers. In 1997 the company decided to start holding "immersion days" to discuss the 
strategic directions of the company with the top managers of the different Business and 
Support Units. 
The Directors explained these changes as a positive aspect that allowed them to 
focus on strategic matters: "Focus on strategy needs the strategist to have time to think 
We need time not to lose sight of what is going on outside the company. We want to see 
our colleagues, we want to watch the international companies to see what they are doing 
better than US. , 
246 
The scale of the delegation process, however, gave some managers cause for 
complaint: "I think that the Board stillfinds it hard to delegate "; "there was a peak at that 
time of trying to delegate, and afterwards they went back to taking the reins. , 247 The same 
Directors felt that the delegation process was only half-complete: "We have still not 
completed total delegation, but I would say that we have taken a big stepforward, I spend 
much more time in meetings with different departments in the company than before. I am 
245 Interviews with Ricardo Sienz, Gonzalo Dominguez and Roberto Urquia. Reports sent to the Board by 
the Peanuts and Brands business units. 
246 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director. 
247 Interview with Marcelo Vit-HR Manager. 
238 
not concerned now about the Chicago stock market, whether it rises, sells or doesn't 
sell. , 248 
The unresolved issues 
There are two issues which the Board is very sensitive about. The first is the 
possibility of floating the company on the stock market; the second is the higher profile that 
the company needs in the internal market. 
The researcher detected a general feeling of a lack of courage and audacity to float 
the business on the capital market. The Board is split over this topic. While Roberto and 
Adriana want to move forward with this plan, Adrian Jr. is not comfortable with the idea of 
opening up the company to share holders. "From an individual's point of view, I would 
have done it already, two years ago. 7his is a big advantage we are giving other companies 
by not capturing capital in the market. This is one area where I think we are lacking in 
audacity and decisiveness. , 249 
Adriana, highlighted the limitations for growth as an outcome of not opening up the 
company to the stock market: "We have projects and we do not work on them basically 
because we do not want to spoil the solvency equation of the company. If we were to open 
up to the capitals market, I think things would turn out better. , 250 
The other topic that has preoccupied the Board is the higher profile the company 
needed in the internal market. As this is a firm that used to export oil in bulk there was no 
need to cultivate an institutional image. However, this changed once AGD launched its 
branded products on the retail market. At that time the Board felt the need to encourage a 
higher profile to push its new products. Nevertheless, the company still has a low profile in 
Argentinian society. The products are not associated with the company. Everybody knows 
Natura oil, but few people realise who the company is behind it (Benechi, 1999). 
248 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director 
" interview with Roberto Urquia-Director 
250 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director 
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"Today you can offer thirty percent of your company for sale and it makes no 
difference. I think that it would not even lose the family profile, that is the first point. 
Another point I think is important is that we are not keen on opening up the company 
because we are worried about the higher profile the company can achieve. Weshouldnot 
be scared of having a higher profile if this could considerably help our own brand 
products. When you are already in the retail market I think it is important that whatever 
product you pull out ofyour sleeve, you know that you have the company to fall back on, 
and we are weak in this respect. , 251 
251 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director. 
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Chapter 8B: Case Study: Vicentin 
8.3 Brief overview of the history of Vicentin 1929-1999 
In 1929, Pedro and Francisco Vicentin set up what would become one of the most 
important companies in the edible oil industry in Argentina: Vicentin. Nowadays Vicentin 
is considered an important crushing company in the edible oil industry and ranks 26'h 
among the 500 top exporters in Argentina in terms of the value of its exports (Revista 
Mercado, 1999). 
The first generation tenure (1929-1973) was shaped by the work done by its two 
founders, Pedro and Francisco Vicentin. They saw the company reach many milestones, 
for example, when in 1943 the company first started processing oilseeds (mainly cotton 
seeds), or when in 1966 it incorporated solvent extraction, thus updating its production 
facilities and making them among the best in the world (Ketelhohn et al, 1998). 
The third generation tenure started right after the death of its founders in 1973. 
Herman Vicentin, grandson of Francisco, became President. The third generation bypassed 
the second generation and took control of the firm. The explanation for this was very 
straightforward: "The foundational stage was very long. Yhefounders had a grip on the 
business for along time until they died. With forty years running the business along with 
their children, when the time came to change the tenure, the second generation offamily 
members were tired and preferred their children to be in charge. , 252 (See stages of 
Vicentin's history in figure 8.7). 
This tenure witnessed the soya boom in the 1970s and 1980s. The boom in 
production and exports of soya in the 1970s made many companies in the edible oil 
industry shift their crushing production towards more profitable soya. And this is what 
Vicentin did, but always maintaining the importance of the cotton activity. However, the 
252 Ra6l Gonzalez Arceluz-Corporate Lawyer. 
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problem of the cotton business was twofold: it was shrinking over time and necessitated 
heavy investments in infrastructure, thus preventing the company from investing heavily in 
fast growing markets such as soya crushing. 253 In 1979 the company also entered the 
bottled edible oil market and attained, at that time, 14% of the market share. 254 
Although the Board initially held back while it decided whether it should retain 
cotton ginning as its primary activity, the company invested in production and shipping 
facilities in the Port of San Lorenzo that were completed by April 1987. Ten years later, in 
1997, these shipping facilities would become Port Vicentin. 
1987 saw a turnaround in the company's activities. One result of the investments in 
crushing and shipping facilities, which allowed the company to start FOB exports, 255 was 
that turnover and crushing production doubled, thus becoming even more important than 
before. 
Vicentin, however, did not abandon investments in the cotton market. The 
investments in cotton ginning plants took off from 1985 onwards after the purchase of 
Buyanor S. A., a ginning plant in Formosa Province. During the 1980s and 1990s, Vicentin 
advanced in the cotton business by incorporating four more plants. 256 The deep 
involvement of the company in the cotton industry caused them to suffer when it faced the 
crisis which began in 1997. 
The 1990s found a company that depended more and more on crushing activities 
but had heavy investments in a declining cotton industry. As shown in figure 8.8, by the 
253 Archival material Vicentin: "Vicentin's ginning and crushing operations: a review. " 
254 Data provided by the Commercial department. 
255 FOB exports are goods sold to a local or multinational company - generally large trading companies - 
which is then responsible for their distribution and re-location. CIF export, on the other hand, is when the 
company that exports ships and distributes the merchandise on its own, thus dealing directly with end 
customers. 
256 Archival material in Vicentin "Financial Presentation years 1996-1999" prepared by the company in May 
2000. 
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end of the decade it had increased its commitment to the cotton industry by integrating its 
activities from processing to spinning and weaving. 257 
FiGuRE 8.7: CHRONOLOGY AND STAGES IN VICENTN'S HISTORY 
First generation tenure and second generation tenure Third generation tenure 
1929 1943 1966 1973 1987 1989 1997 1999 
Foundýing stage 
Consolidatio i and growth 
1FF 
Company's new Crisis and strategic 
facilities in San turnaround 
Lorenzo Port 
Focus of the analysis Starting point Incorporation of Last living 
for crushing state-of-the-art founder dies. 
activities technology of solvent Crushing capacity 
extraction doubled 
257 In February, 2000 Vicentin integrated the cotton business vertically by acquiring one of the largest cotton 
spinning and weaving mills in the country. 
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FIGURE 8.8: VICENTN'S EVOLUTION 1929-2000 
0 
Investments in crushing 
activities other than cotton 
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Investment in activities 
related to cotton 
8.4 Chronological and analytical tracing of key elements over the period 
1989-1999 
Markets and products: The pendulum strategy 1989-1997 
The 1990s brought major challenges for the industry as a whole: the opening up of 
the economy brought into the market the last competitors that were not already in the 
Argentine edible oil industry. Furthermore, a wave of mergers and acquisitions of local 
businesses was initiated because local companies found they were not large enough to 
compete. Vicentin realised the importance of scaling up its plants to enable them to 
compete. However, decisions were taken regarding the scale of cotton plants rather than 
crushing plants: "We had made a great effort in cotton processing in terms of attaining the 
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right scale. However, the crushing activity, our main business, was demoted. Therefore, 
from 1997 to 1999 we invested a lot in increasing daily production. Nowadays both 
activities -cotton and crushing -produce 10,000 tons a day. , 
258 
From 1989 to 1997 Vicentin invested a lot in cotton and port facilities. The 
crushing capacity was lagging behind its competitors who had already started to invest in 
updating technology and increase scale: "By 1995-1996 there was a strong consensus in 
the company that we did not have to invest in scaling up crushing capacity but use the idle 
capacity that existed in the market. We tried to use slack capacity and increase sales 
volume. We were also aggressive with our price policy, lowering our prices in the internal 
marketfor edible oils. "259, 
Many interviewees stated the incoherence of this strategy, bearing in mind the 
importance of the crushing activity for the company and the declining cotton market: "The 
Board was split into those that wanted tofollow industrialisation andprocessing cotton 
and those that preferred crushing of other oilseeds. I could never understand this division 
in the Board. Yhe numbers speakfor themselves: crushing represents more than 80% of 
the company's activity while cotton accountsfor only 10percent! P, 260 
As another interviewee pointed out: "The problem arose because Vicentin started 
as a cotton processi . ng company, so the senior members of the Board were reluctant to shift 
from that strategy although it was a loss-making strategy. , 261 
1979-1997., Thefailureofthe brand strategy 
In 1979 Vicentin launched its edible oil "Vicentin" onto the internal market. The 
edible oil launched was mixed oil. In a few years the company reached 14% of the market 
share, an important slice of the market taking into consideration the predominance of 
259 Interview Daniel Buyatti-Head of Technology Department, Director of the Board and third generation 
family member. 
259 Interview with Osvaldo Arciniegas-Commercial Department. 
260 Interview with Miximo Paduin-Commercial area and fourth generation family member. 
261 Interview with Osvaldo Bochini-Director. 
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companies such as Molmos. However, the company's market share, which reached its 
peak in 1981, had been failing over the period Lip until 1997 (see figure 8.9). One manager 
explained this reduction in the market share: "The problein was that Vicentin could not 
consolidate its brand strategv. It was a pity because the conipam, had taken up this 
strategy before inany oj'todays success/id conipanies in the edible oil inarket. Mid the 
cotnpaiýy consolidated its brand strategi, in the 1980s, todcq we would he leading this 
prqfitable inarket. , 
262 
HoURI: 8.9: MARKI"I'SHARL Ol-'V[('[-. N IIN'S BRANDFI) EDIBLE OILS 1979-1997-"" 
Over the period 1979-1997 the company did not change the packaging or the type 
of oil sold, and therefore lagged behind more innovative brands that were introducing new 
packaging (such as PEI' bottles), or new types of edible oils (such as pure Sunflower 
instead of mixed oil). "The conipanY did not understand the citstoiner. WeJust sold oil 
and we did not care about what our custoniers did. The consequence was evident - ive lost 
market share. This loss was considerable and dy -ult to recover because the market now 
is much more competitive than in the 198()ý,;. -264 
", I nterview ), % ith Rian Rodriguc/-Coninicrcial Department. 
'63 Data provided by the Commercial department. 
264 Interview with Mdxinio Padmin-Coniniercial area and fOLITIll generation family member. 
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1997: The company's strategic turnaround 
In 1997 changes regarding the company's strategy were paramount. That year, due 
to weather problems, the production of cotton fell. Over this period many companies in the 
industry closed down and Vicentin suffered as well because of its investments in the cotton, 
industry. However, the company reacted swiftly and in 1997 realised that its tripartite 
strategy (cotton, crushing and branding) was over. It was the crushing activity that 
supported Vicentin's heavy loses in the cotton industry. 
Moreover, the branding strategy failed to secure substantial market share for 
Vicentin's edible oils products, thus the whole commercial policy was at stake as well. 
In 1997 the Board agreed a new strategic focus that was described as follows: 
"1997 is a turningpointfor the company. A new image of the company has emerged. The 
Management of Vicentin sees the company as an industrial group dedicated to crushing 
oilseeds and cotton ginning. By doing so it is seeking to achieve the highest standards of 
efficiencies, being a leading company in terms of both crushing capacity and technology. It 
does what it believes it is able to do best, performing an efficient role between the 
production of bulk commodities and international consumer markets. We are also of the 
opinion that the marketing function, in our particular case, is at present performed more 
efficiently and at a lower cost by the multinational trading companies with whom the 
company has developed very strong relationships over time. We have a strongfocus within 
our company on our two core activities. Many services, not directly related to our core 
businesses, have therefore been outsourced. P, 265 
The strategic objectives of the company can be seen in the following table: 
265 Interview with Roberto Gazze-Finance Director, Director of the Board and third generation family 
member. 
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TABLE 8.8: STRATEGIC oBjEcrivEs oF ViCENTIN SINCE 199766 
Strategic Objectives Obtained through... 
Focus on crushing and cotton ginning -Investment in technology 
-Stable supply of raw material at competitive 
prices 
-Efficient logistics 
-Outsourcing (IT, transport, storage) 
-Competitive crushing costs through economies of 
scale, location of plants and technology 
-Multiseed production facilities 
-Solid financial 
-structure Invest to become a low cost and efficient provider -Investments in production facilities such as 
in each market itparticipates in crushing plants and cotton ginning plants 
-Investments in port facilities 
Maintain profitability through high production -Crushing three different oilseeds (soybean, 
flexibility sunflower and cotton) at the Ricardone Plant (in 
I the port) 
The first decision, which was a product of the new strategic objectives the company 
defined, was that the factories in the north of the country that were used for crushing should 
be closed down and the crushing facilities located in the San Lorenzo Port area, thus saving 
money on logistics. Crushing scale was boosted by investments in technology. In 1999 the 
company crushed up to 10,000 tons of seed per day, the fourth largest company in terms of 
crushing capacity that year. 
Crushing, became the most important business for Vicentin throughout the ten year- 
period analysed. From 1997 onwards, Vicentin would focus on crushing, and other 
activities besides crushing, such as production and direct exports, would no longer be a 
priority. Vicentin would be an intermediary company buying oilseeds from farmers and 
selling bulk oil to traders. 267 
The company also decided to make some investments in cotton ginning plants. 
Because of the crisis in the cotton industry caused by three years of floods, in February 
2000 Vicentin bought a spinning and weaving mill, thus vertically integrating its activities 
in the cotton industry. 
266 Archival material of the company "Strategic outlines and objectives of Vicentin. " 267 Interview with Sergio Nardelli-Commercial Director, Director of the Board and third generation of family 
member. 
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After 1997, the brand strategy was considered a marginal business: "The policy our 
company decided to adopt was to carry on with the crushing business. There are great 
risks in the area of the diversification ofproducts because it means you begin to compete 
with companies which are already present in the market. It would require huge 
investments in marketing and research into how we could best penetrate the market, and 
we simply could not afford that. We did not want to produce finished products such as 
soya milk and launch it onto the internal market. Our market is to export bulk products. 
The internal market is a marginal one. , 268 
Vicentin wanted to position itself as a low price, good quality brand. However this 
strategy was not the success the company was expecting. By the year 2000 the market 
share of brand products was 7%, that means less than in 1997 when the company decided 
to change its branding strategy. Furthermore, market studies suggested that consumers' 
perception of Vicentin's brands was that they were cheap and low quality products 
(Ketelholn, et al, 1998). 
The following figure shows the business segments in Vicentin taking into 
consideration exports and the domestic market. The former is more important than the 
latter, accounting for 85.2% of the turnover, while the domestic market accounts for 14.8%. 
268 Interview with Ra6l Gonzalez Arceluz-Corporate Lawer in Vicentin. 
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Organisational and managerial changes in Vicentin 1989-1999 
Neither the structure of the company nor the managerial team have changed 
significantly over the ten year period analysed. The high level of centrallsation of decision 
making at the Board level and the reliance on family-members to cover managerial 
positions might explain the lack of changes. 
"We did not see the need to change the sinicture. I think this is a trend in the 
indlistfy. We do not think that changes in the structure would change much in the 
26') Source: Archival material Viccntin provided by Finance Department. 
270 SOUrce: Archival material Vicentin provided by Finance Department. 
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company. We have a centralised structure. Eventhing is decided (it the cotporate level. 
Remember that this is afialniýv biisineývs with many shareholders, so we need to keep our 
cycs peeled. -271 
"There are on1v three managers that report back to the President. Our structure 
then is ven, flut at the corporate level, with all the characteristics q1'afinnily run business, 
having to deal with minor delails. -272 
The structure of Vicentin is still a functional one, with corporate areas that control 
its different plants or companies. 271 The corporate struCtUrc consists of' the Board of' 
Directors and three Departments: Cornmerciallsation, Technology and Finance (see figurc 
8.12 and 8.13). 




Finance Manages and controls all the 
Direction finance or administrative 
Ir Roberto departments in other . plants or companies. 
Gazze Manages corporate finances 
Dmmercial 
Direction Manages the reiation with 
Ir. Sergio broker-, and cotton 
Nardelli cornmercialisation 
Technology 
Direction Manages and controls all the 
Mr. Daniel technical aspects in the 
Buyatti different plants and companies 
27 [ Inicrview with Hernian V icenti n- President. 
272 Interview with Roberto Gazze- Finance Director, Director of the Board and third generation family 
mcniber. 
273 For legal and fiscal reasons, sonic of the plants or ginning facilities are considered companies in their own 
right. flov,, ever, they arc centrally managed. 
274 Data provided by the Board of Directors of Viccntin. 
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Fi(iumm 8.13: STRUCFURF IN VICEN-FiN: I 989_ 1999275 
Structure 1989 Structure 1999 
Department Direction Depailmcni Direction 
,, # -Administration -Administration 
-i Inance 10 -1-inance -Fxports -Fxpolis 
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During the decade analysed the company has experienced no changes in its 
management team. The Directors of finance, technology and cominercialisation have not 
changed in recent years and few incorporations at the departmental level of the hierarchy 
have occurred. 
"We have scell lllalýv companies in the industn, that have gone through big changes 
and the incorporation oj'new managers. Those companies that did not go hankrupt had 
such a nightmare in terms of cultural clashes that they would have preferred not to change 
anYthing at all. I think this answers your question about the companys management. "270 
The main criteria for appointing managers did not change significantly over the 
period 1989-1999 (see table 8.9): "To be able to. fill one oj'the managerial positions, you 
had to be afiimil. v member or. forget it! There had been no change in this respect over the 
275 , Fhis figure was constructed using data provided by the different areas of the company and archival 
material of Vicentin (Docurnent "Organisational Structure"). 
216 Interview with Hernian Vi cent in- President. 
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last ten years. On the contrary, new generations were pushing to enter the company and 
they didn't want to be part ofthe shopfloor ofcourse! j, 277 
All the managerial positions in the company are given to family members, thus 
leaving little leeway for non-family members to gain access to important positions: "Ifyou 
work in Vicentin you have to be aware that there is a limit to your professional career. 
That limit is thefamily. You cannot get access to the best posts. This company is goodfor 
trainees and administrative or shop floor employees. I would say that is also goodfor 
middle managers. But, bright people with ambition who are willing to succeed don't last 
long. , 278 
Age and experience in the sector was a condition sine qua non for important posts 
as seen in table 8.9. These selection criteria caused Vicentin to become an elderly 
organisation. as indicated in table 8.10, with low levels of staff turnover and with family 
members occupying managerial positions. 
TABLE 8.9: REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTERING THE DIFFERENT AREAS OF THE COMPANY OVER THE PERIOD 1989- 
1999279 
Areas of the company 1989 1999 
Finance -Family member for managerial -As in 1989 
positions 
-Accounting, Finance or -As in 1989 
Business studies degrees for 
intermediary positions 
-No specific requirement for -As in 1989 
administrative positions 
-Experience in edible oil -Experience in edible oil and 
industry food processing industries 
Commercialisation -Family member for managerial -As in 1989 
positions 
-Experience in branding in the -As in 1989 
industry 
-Experience in brokering 
Technology -Family member for managerial -As 1999 
positions 
Jechnical or engineering -Engineering studies 
studies 
277 Interview with Juan Carlos Romero-Personnel Department San Lorenzo. 
279 Interview with Juan Carlos Romero-Personnel Department San Lorenzo. 
279 This table was prepared using archivc material from Vicentin's Personnel Department and data provided 
by the interviews with Roberto Gazze, Sergio Nardelli and Daniel Buyatti. 
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TABLE 8.10: AVERAGE AGE OF PERSONNEL IN THE AREAS OF THE COMPANY (TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE 
VMOLE PERSONNEL OF THE AREA)280 
Areas of the company 1989 (Age average) 1999 (Age average) 
Finance 
48 57 
Commercialisation 45 56 
Technology 56 59 
The fact that after 1997 Vicentin decided that crushing and cotton ginning would be 
its most important activities also had an impact on the professionalisation of the company. 
Neither activity needs a wide variety of skills. Technical skills are the most important 
requirement for understanding the problems of crushing and ginning. Cotton ginning, on 
the other hand, is a manpower intensive industry that requires staff with technical skills 
rather than professionals from different backgrounds. 
The company, also lacked an HR area. It had, however, two Personnel 
departments: one in the Port of San Lorenzo and the other in the north of the country in the 
cotton ginning facilities: "Why do we not have an HR department? Because we do not need 
it of course! Because all the most important managers are family members, all the 
problems are sorted out at the Board level. All otherproblems are sorted out by the heads 
of the different areas. The main aim of our personnel department is to hire shop floor 
employees and they also carry out administrativefunctions. , 281 
While there were not many changes regarding structural or managerial issues, the 
governance of the company and family related issues have changed a lot, thus raising 
concerns over the future of the firm. The next section will discuss this aspect further. 
2'0 This table was prepared using Vicentin's archive material provided by the Personnel Department San 
Lorenzo. 
281 Interview with Herman Vicentin-President. 
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Board of Directors: Govemance, strategyand family 
Corporate governance in Viccntin 
As time passes and more generations of family members have been incorporated 
into the company, the evolution of the govemance in Vicentin highlights two main issues: 
the interest of the shareholders and the best way of running the business effectively and 
efficiently. 
A family tree will help to explain the different relationships within the family and 
the composition of the Board of Directors. 
H(WRE S. 14: VICENTN'S FAMILYTREF IN 1999282 
282 Data provided by the Board of Vicentin. 
The + sign indicates those family members have already died. 
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Figure 8.14 shows the heirs of both founders and also the third generation that 
cuffently participates in the company. Light shading shows the cuffent directors in the 
company and their ages are also highlighted. In most cases, the third generation is 
represented by the grandchildren of Pedro and Francisco. However, in the case of Alberto 
Paduin and Osvaldo Bochi, they are the granddaughters' husbands. 
When Pedro and Francisco were in charge of the firm - from 1929 to 1973 - the 
governance of the company was simple. Francisco was the President and Pedro the Vice- 
President and both ran the company together. There was no Board of Directors in the 
company until one of the founders died. 
In the 1960s Francisco's children (the second generation) started work in the 
company. Roberto controlled the commercial area, Miximo the administration and Serafin 
was involved in the technical aspects. The youngest of the male cousins, Ruben Dario - 
Pedro's son -joined the company in the 1970s. 
After the death of Francisco Vicentin, his grandson Herman took over the Vice- 
presidency. 283 Later when Pedro died, he was elected President by a general consensus of 
the shareholders. Ruben Dario, on the other hand, was sworn in as Vice-President. All the 
Board members had executive roles as well. The President was therefore responsible for 
the commercial side of the business, the Vice President and Miximo for administration and 
finance, and Serafin was in charge of the technical area. 
By 1976, and as a result of the selling of shares between family members, Pedro's 
heirs held 40% of the shares and Francisco's heirs held the remaining 60%. Until 1980 the 
Board consisted of four members of the family. 
By 1985 the third generation of family members was already working in the 
company and the first quarrels regarding the Board's arrangements flared up. The 1970s 
saw Francisco Vicentin's children pass away. Plans to make the Board represent the whole 
283 Herman's father was already death. 
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family were left in tatters. For more than ten years the Board had been "somethingfor the 
books and auditing. The company was run by Herman and Ruben Dario and the rest of the 
family did not participate at all. , 284 Furthermore, Ruben Dario's sisters wanted their 
children to participate in the firm as well as Francisco's grandchildren. 285 
A new Board arrangement was created when in 1990 the Board was restructured 
and the seventy-five shareholders were represented by ten directors: four directors were 
Pedro's heirs and six Francisco's heirs. Only one Director -the Vice President - was a 
second-generation member, the rest were third generation family members. 
"The Board's arrangements are not perfect. But they are still better than nothing. 
Today more or less everybody feels represented in the company and we listen to 
everybody's suggestions regarding its future. However, this is far from perfect. I could 
mention that over timejealousy builds up, that is a problem between members of the same 
family. P, 286 
New problems, however, are emerging among the fourth generation of family 
members who feel underestimated and dismissed: "The Board does not represent us [fourth 
generation], they do even not think about taking one of us onto the Board. I think that it is 
time our voice was heard on that Board of bone idle leeches. We are more dynamic and 
entrepreneurial, open to what is happening in the sector and we are more determined to 
change things in the company. , 287 
Strategy, delegation and control 
The Board participates in everyday operations. Three of the Directors have an 
operational area under their responsibility. The heads of the commercial, finance and 
technology areas are Directors of the company; the President is deeply involved in the 
2'4 RaW Gonzalez Arceluz-Corporation Lawyer. 
725 Interview with Ruben Dario Vicentin-Vice President. 
286 Interview Daniel Buyatti-Head of Technology Department, Director of the Board and third generation 
family member. 
287 MIXiMo PaduAn-Commercial area and fourth generation family member. 
257 
commercial area, and the Vice President in the administration. The rest of the Directors 
also have an operational responsibility in the different areas of the company. 
"Without the Board's agreement, nothing related to investments or spending can be 
processed. The Board started to centralise these decisions even more after 1997 when they 
saw that being cost-efficient was a crucial aspect for the company's survival. , 288 The 
Board therefore made all the decisions regarding investments in the company, such as 
buying cotton ginning plants, scaling up the crushing capacity, and hiring people. It also 
authorised all expenditure over US$ 500. 
This concentration of power sometimes makes it hard to move forward: "On the 
one hand, I can understand that keeping costs down is a key issue, but on the other hand, 
you waste your time and decisions are delayed until the Board makes up their mind if they 
are going to let you go ahead with the spending. Ny is the Director of the area not in 
charge of authorising you to spend? Why should everything be concentrated at the Board 
level? Sometimes they [Directors] are involved in minor things and I do not think this 
should be the role ofa Director, do you? , 289 
"Our Board meetings are exhausting. We sit around the table andfirst of all we 
discuss the different topics that range from important strategic decisions to buying paper 
for the photocopier. I think that this should change in thefuture so that we can have more 
time to think analyse and work on important strategic matters. "290 
The control mechanisms of the company are based on personal control exercised by 
the members of the Board: "Sometimes I have to give three members of the Board the 
answer to the same question on the same day. It is quite a tiresome experience to deal with 
them. They think you want to rip them off or take their money. Their control is inquisitive 
rather than professional. "291 
288 Interview with Miguel Valazza-Finance Finance department and Administration office Buenos Aires. 289 Interview with Domingo de ]a Rosa-Technology department. 
'90 Interview with Rodrigo Ahumada-Port San Lorenzo Operation and Director. 291 Miguel Valazza- Finance department and Administration office Buenos Aires. 
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The Board receives three monthly reports, one from each area. The reports are 
discussed at the monthly Board meeting and decisions are taken accordingly. The 
following table shows the information/indicators required by the Board in the different 
reports. 
TA13LE 8.11: REPORTS TO THE BOARD IN VICENTiN-YEAR. 1999292 
Area Main Indicators 
Commercial -Market share (branding products) 
-Investment requirements 
-FOB Exports by product 




-Cost of goods sold 
-Gross Income 
-Administrative, commercial and financial expenses 
-Operating income 
-Net income 
Technology -Needs for investment 
-Technological updates 
-Productivity cotton ginning/crushing 
-Quality of products 
Incomplete tasks 
Two main issues concerned the Board regarding its governance. Both issues are 
considered to be "hindering the company's potentialfor success and its ability to survive 
as afamily business. , 293 The issues are the succession process and the role and entrance of 
family members. 
Regarding the first issue - the succession process - the President is thinking of 
retiring but he is afraid that this will give rise to problems regarding the succession process. 
"There are three candidates, natural candidates to replace me. They are the heads of the 
three departments of the company. Since I said that in five years I would bow out, 
wrangles have broken out and alliances have started to build up in the Board. This 
292 This table was prepared with the result of the interviews with different managers and a copy of the latest 
follow-up reports in the selected areas. 
293 Interview with Herman Vicentin-President. 
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situation might destroy the harmony I have tried to establish since the enlargement of the 
Board was decided. P, 294 
Another important problem the company has to solve concerns the entrance of 
family members. The fourth generation has shown an interest in having a more active and 
dynamic role. However, the Board is still thinking about how to do this: "We are thinking 
about writing down afamily protocol that would help us to have the bestfamily members in 
the company. This is crucial becausefamily members are the managers of the company. 
There are seventy-five shareholders. In afew years there will be more than a hundred of 
us. A hundred shareholders would mean that the company was no longer viable. "295 
Challenges for the future and unresolved issues 
There are two issues that the company's managers have highlighted as important to 
the company's future: the first is the possibility of finding a partner as a way of injecting 
capital into the company. The second issue, which is related to the first, is finding ways for 
the company to grow. 
The first issue was emphasised by many family members. There was a great 
concern among many managers that the market concentration in the industry would affect 
the viability of the company if Vicentin does not acquire the right size to allow it to 
compete: "77zefuture shows that we are going to need to lookfor a partner, a buffer, with 
whom we can guide the companyforward and weather the storm. , 296 
Having a partner was also seen as a way of sorting out financing problems. 
Furthermore, a partnership would accelerate decisions concerning the future of the family 
shareholders: "With seventy-five shareholders, any partnership or alliance looks 
impossible. Yhere would be resistance but I think in the end and after a longfight among 
294 Interview with Herman Vicentin-Presidcnt. 
295 Interview with Roberto Gazze- Finance Director, Director of the Board and third generation family 
member. 
296 Interview with Robcrto Gazze- Finance Director, Director of the Board and third generation family 
member. 
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family members some of them will get rid of their shares. Thefirst step is to concentrate 
the shares in three orfourfamily branches. To reduce the number of shareholders by a 
third or even more than that. , 297 
The second issue is the current concern among several managers regarding future 
growth of the company. Many interviewees pointed out that this is the first issue to sort out 
because it is a process that can be managed by the company unlike finding a partner which 
is a long-term project that will depend on the company's market position. 
The managers seemed to lack any clear vision as to where to start work to enable 
the company to grow faster. The concentration on the crushing industry and the low- 
margin profits that characterise it, affected Vicentin's opportunities for investments in other 
areas. Furthermore, managers did not attempt to take risks, but waited for changes in the 
industry first, saw how leaders responded and after that made a decision: "The processes of 
expansion have not been produced by strategic questions within the company, but by a 
movement that the whole industry has taken. So wait and see is our strategy. , 298 
"Someone who thinks about how much his company is going to grow in two or three years 
will not get there. This is why you have to wait till the market shows you the ways to 
groW.,, 299 
Following the leaders and avoiding risks were stressed by other managers: "I think 
that we arefirst of all going to see what Cargill, Dreyfuss and AGD have done. If we can 
compete we are going to copy the strategy, otherwise we will try tofind a niche market that 
the big companies are not interested in and take advantage ofthat. , 300 
297 Interview with Daniel Buyatti-Technology Department, Director of the Board and third generation family 
member. 
298 Interview with Roberto Gazze- Finance Director, Director of the Board and third generation family 
member. 
299 Interview with Sergio Nardelli-Commercial Department, Director of the Board and third generation family 
member. 
300 Interview with Miguel Valazza-Finance Finance department and Administration office Buenos Aires. 
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Chapter 9: Concluding remarks on the transformation process of the 
firms analysed 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the different ways organisations can 
undertake organisational change. However, the fact that the four firms analysed underwent 
a process of transformation throughout the 1990s means that we need at least to understand 
the depth and scope of such a process. Moreover, writers in the field of organisational 
flexibility such as Volberda (1999) point out that adaptability can be achieved because 
flexible firms can transform when needed. For this reason, understanding how the firms in 
this study transformed also helps to shed light on their flexible capabilities (Volberda, 
1996,1999; Djelic and Ainarno, 1999). 
It is therefore important to establish the basic differences between the concepts 
writers have used to explain change in organisations. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) 
differentiate between two aspects of organisational change. Firstly, they distinguish 
between radical (or what we call transfonnational) and convergent change. It is radical not 
convergent change in which we are interested. Secondly, they draw a distinction between 
revolutionary and evolutionary change. 
For Greenwood and Hinings (1996: 1024) radical change involves the 
transformation of the organisation while convergent change "is fine tuning the existing 
orientation". Under great pressure from the competitive enviroriment that characterised 
Argentina in the 1990s, indigenous firms needed to respond rapidly and transform the 
company's activities to be able to compete efficiently with MNC companies (Toulan and 
Guill6n, 1997; Guill6n and Toulin, 1997; CEP, 1998; Volberda, 1999). 
The pace of adjustment, on the other hand, defines revolutionary and evolutionary 
change. While revolutionary change occurs swiftly, evolutionary change happens 
gradually. Many writers have argued that mounting competitive pressures prompt 
revolutionary changes in organisations (as in the case of the hospitals analysed by Meyer et 
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al, 1990 or in the airline industry analysed by Kelly and Amburgey, 1991). In 
understanding the transformational process of organisations it is important to know whether 
change has evolved (Miller and Friesen, 1982) or has exploded on to the scene as a 
revolutionary transformation (Thomson and Millar, 200 1, Tushman and Smith, 200 1). 
Questions also arise regarding the process of transformation undertaken in the four 
firms in our sample, for example, how did the firms under analysis tackle the challenge of 
transformation in their organisations? What w6re the main differences between flexible and 
less flexible firms? Did firms differ in terms of the speed of their transformation process, 
and if so, why? In the following pages we briefly examine the trajectories of transformation 
in both the flexible companies and the less flexible companies. 
The flexible firms: The transformational renewal iourne 
The flexible firms in this research have transformed themselves through a process 
of organisational and strategic renewal. Thus far, the literature has analysed the 
implications of organisational and strategic renewal in organisations. Floyd and Lane 
(2000) depict renewal as an iterative process of beliefs, action and learning, with the 
purpose of aligning the organisation and its strategy with changing environmental 
circumstances (see also Huff et al, 1992). 
Volberda et al (2001) have used the concept of transformational renewal to refer to 
those organisational transformations that are associated with significant unleaming, new 
ways of thinking and new mindsets, and different paths of technology. According to 
Volberda and his collegues (2001) a transformational renewal journey is characterised by 
periods of systemic exploration as the organisation renews and changes its skills and 
competencies. For them, transformational renewal demands that the whole organisation 
should be involved in radical changes at both the strategic and organisational level. 
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So, how did the flexible firms undertake their transformational journey? Both AGD 
and Sidus were able to undertake radical changes by renewing both their strategies and 
their organisations. The strategic renewal of the companies (i. e., through their strategic 
initiatives) was accompanied by organisational renewal (i. e., in terms of structural, 
managerial and governance changes) in order to align the whole organisation and its 
strategy to the demands of the environment. Let us consider some examples of how both 
AGD and Sidus undertook their transformation process through organisational and strategic 
renewal. 
Since 1986 AGD has introduced different strategic initiatives that have transformed 
not only the company but also the industry (Ketelhohn et al, 1998). From being dependent 
on the crushing side of the business in 1989, AGD diversified and integrated its activities. 
Among the most important strategic initiatives in which AGD invested are the logistic 
investments in 1986, the launch of branded products in 1989, and farming investment in 
1990. 
But while exploring new strategies AGD was also able to go through broad 
organisational and managerial changes. By 1999, AGD had modified its functional 
structure to one based on business units. This structure provided a higher level of 
delegation and responsibility for the managerial team in running the company. The 
overriding intention behind the structural changes was to grant the Board more time to 
concentrate on strategic issues. 
The new business AGD added during the 1980s was complemented in the early 
1990s by the opening up of the firm to new managers with different educational 
backgrounds and experience. The governance structure of the company was also 
consolidated. The transition after the founder's death towards the second-generation tenure 
occurred smoothly and without problems. The Board had complementary roles in the 
process of transformation: Roberto and Adrian (Jr) Urquia masterminded the company's 
strategic change; Adriana Urquia was the one pushing for internal changes. 
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In the 1980s, Sidus began a series of strategic initiatives that transformed the 
company from a small nationally-owned laboratory to "a health company. "301 From the 
creation of the Biotechnology company in 1989 to the setting up of the Retail Business unit 
in 1999, Sidus diversified and integrated its activities both backwards and forwards 
throughout the value chain. This strategy had three outcomes: firstly, the company no 
longer depended on selling traditional pharmo-chemical products; secondly, it was a more 
efficient company that enjoyed economies of scale; and, finally, it became a company that 
was ahead of its competitors in terms of reaching different stages of the chain of value. 
The strategic renewal of Sidus went hand in hand with a renewal of its organisation. 
By the time Sidus launched its second strategic initiative in 1990 (i. e., the distribution 
company) the firm had changed its functional structure to a divisional one. Each new 
venture of Sidus became an independent company. This new structure was designed to 
give the Board more time for strategic issues. 
At the same time the company also experienced changes at the managerial level. 
The homogeneous culture of Sidus in the 1980s was transformed when the company started 
to diversify its activities. Professionals with different experience and from different 
backgrounds entered the company to run the different businesses Sidus had launched. 
The case studies also illustrate the pace of change in AGD and Sidus. Although the 
changes in both companies were profound and transformational, the changes were neither 
dramatic nor revolutionary but continuous (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). Therefore, 
punctuated equilibrium explanations of the transformation of AGD and Sidus are not 
adequate to capture and explain such a process (see Tushman and Romanelli, 1985 and 
Tushman and Smith, 2001). Our two flexible firms were quick to adapt to new changes by 
means of continuous explorative and simultaneous changes at different levels of the 
organisation (i. e., strategic and organisational changes). 
301 Interview with Marcelo Argflellcs, CEO Sidus 
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The less flexible firms in this research, however, display a different change journey. 
For reasons that we will explain, the companies were reluctant to change their strategies 
and the way they were organised although the context had already changed. In the next 
section, therefore, we analyse the way the transformation process was undertaken by both 
Vicentin and Andr6maco. 
The less flexible firms: Transformation through re olution 
While the punctuated equilibrium model did not offer an adequate explanation of 
the change process in AGD and Sidus, the theory helps to answer an important question 
concerning the process 4 transformation in the less flexible firms: why was the 
transfonnation process at Vicentin and Andr6maco revolutionary? 
Tushman and Romanelli's (1985: 190) seminal paper on the punctuated equilibrium 
model of organisational change sheds light on the reasons for revolutionary changes in 
organisations. They state that resistance to change and inertia cause delay in aligning the 
organisation to environmental requirements. Therefore, fundamental change "occurs only 
via simultaneous and discontinuous interruption of on-going activities and 
interrelationships. " 
Tushman and Romanelli (1985) also discuss conceptually the internal and external 
forces that resulted in the revolutionary transformation of firms. They mention as external 
forces the evolution of products in markets. As internal forces for fundamental change they 
point out that sustained low performance and/or a change in the balance of power may 
disrupt the organisation. In another piece of research, Romanelli and Tushman (1994) 
report the results of their study of the causes of revolutionary transformation in 25 
minicomputer producers in the USA. They suggest that revolutionary transformations were 
influenced by major changes in envirom-nental conditions and successions of chief 
executive officers (CEOs). 
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The circumstances surounding the revolutionary transformation of Vicentin and 
Andr6maco are similar to those described by Tushman and his associates. Both Vicentin 
and Andr6maco were laggards in their own industries. For a long time both firms resisted 
any far-reaching changes. In Vicentin, the Boards' attachment to the tradition of cotton 
ginning delayed the decision to switch investments to the profitable activity of crushing. 
As one manager stated, the company "was born and raised on it [cotton ginning]. s#302 
Thus Vicentin's interest in that business was the result of conservatism regarding the 
activity that lay at the origin of the company and was not due to any consideration of the 
profitability of the cotton industry. Only after the performance crisis in 1997 did Vicentin 
decide to shift its strategy and focus its activities on the crushing business. That sudden 
transformation was necessary to allow the firm's survival. 
Andr6maco, on the other hand, had been influenced by its past success and the fact 
that the company had participated with its products in all the market niches. After years of 
bad commercial and financial decisions, the company modified its strategy to focus on the 
shrinking dermatology niche in which Andr6maco had a certain competitive advantage. 
The decision to transform, again, came late and in a revolutionary way. This happened 
after a new CEO took over in response to the critical situation that was threatening the 
survival of the company. In a few months the new CEO of Andr6maco replaced the top 
management team (i. e., immediately dismissing 22 managers), shifted the strategy of the 
company (i. e., towards a focus on dermatology) and started to change some key processes 
in the company (i. e., new HR policies, IT investments). The newcomers, as Gersick (1991) 
states, facilitated the task of breaking up the old deep structure and reorienting the 
organisation by removing sources of inertia and resistance to change. 
Sull's study of adaptation and inertia in Firestone and Laura Ashley suggests that 
inertia and resistance to change are reinforced when firms resist transformation of their 
main activity and prefer to rely on old formulas that brought about their initial success 
302 Interview with Roberto Gazze-Finance Director Vicentin 
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(Firestone continued to produce bias tyres instead of shifting to the new radial technology. 
Laura Ashley did not move from its outdated designs and expensive manufacturing. ) This, 
in turn, inhibits experimentation and organisational responsiveness to environmental shifts 
(Sull, 1999 a&b). 
In delaying their transformations, Andr6maco and Vicentin could not explore the 
most convenient alternatives (i. e., in Andr6maco, to diversify into other niches such as 
paediatric medicine; in Vicentin, to boost the brand strategy). Rather, the firms were 
pressed by the critical situation, and the selection of new strategies and organisational 
arrangements was made in a revolutionary way and according to one criterion: 
organisational survival. 
We have explored the differences between the flexible and less flexible firms in 
terms of their transformational process. We have analysed how the flexible firms 
transformed by means of a process that included organisational and strategic renewal. We 
have also defined the process of transformation as continuous throughout time and 
occurring simultaneously at the strategic and organisational level. The less flexible firms, 
on the other hand, attempted a process of revolutionary transformation. These firms were 
slow to undertake the process of transformation that was eventually attained only in the late 
1990s by means of a sudden change. 
The continuous transformation experienced by the flexible firms involved a good 
deal of trial and error. These companies continuously explored new strategies and 
organisational arrangements. As the flexible firms changed what they were and what they 
offered through continuous transformation, they migrated into new strategic and 
competitive domains. As a result of this migration, they needed to regenerate competitive 
advantages relative to the new competitors they encountered in these domains. Rindova 
and Kotha's (2001) analysis of what they call "continuous morphing" in two internet firms 
shows that firms in a continuous state of transformation ("morphing') were able to 
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regenerate competitive advantages when competitive conditions changed. Rindova and 
Kotha (2001) also highlight that dynamic capabilities (i. e., determinants of organisational 
flexibility) facilitated continuous transformation in the companies they analysed. 
Conversely, the less flexible firms stressed exploitative activities and delayed any 
changes until a preponderance of evidence suggested that a major shake-up was necessary. 
Not only does the latter approach stifle experimentation, but action may also be delayed 
until time is too limited and resources are constrained. 
The analysis of the transformation of the four firms is revealing in terms of the 
depth and scope of the changes undertaken. So far, however, we have not analysed what 
enabled the companies to transform and adapt -so -quickly in conditions of environmental 
turmoil that characterised Argentina in the 1990s. Iberefore, questions arise as to what 
capabilities allowed flexible firms to engage effectively in the process of continuous 
transformation. What capabilities did the flexible firms have that helped them to be early 
adopters or first movers of strategies? Why were the less flexible firms laggards in their 
industry? Chapter 10 will introduce and analYse the determinants of organisational 
flexibility. 
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Chapter 10: Determinants of Organisational Flexibility 
10.1 Introduction 
In the last two chapters, we described the findings of our case studies of the 
transformation process in four firms: two of which were considered to be flexible and two 
less flexible companies. A number of themes were apparent in our data which highlighted 
a range of managerial, organisational and contextual factors related to the ability of the 
firms to adapt quickly under environmental pressure. These themes included the effect of 
new managers coming in from outside the industry, the firms' relationship with its industry 
peers, the nature of the decision-making process and the early adoption of strategies and 
organisational changes in the flexible firms. 
Our review of the literature (see chapter 2) indicated that research on the 
determinants of organisational flexibility and innovativeness and institutional 
embeddedness offer an insight into the explanation of patterns or mechanisms of 
adaptation. 
At the sectoral or industry level, the institutional perspective provides an 
explanation of the possibilities firms have to adapt and avoid isomorphic and inertial 
forces. Haveman (1993) argues that members of an industry group tend to imitate the 
actions of industry leaders. The speed at which firms will adopt new initiatives, and 
therefore whether they will be early or late adopters, will be influenced by the degree to 
which they are embedded within the industry macroculture (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 
1994; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Oliver, 1991). The degree of embeddedness varies 
between organisations according to different factors. These include the connectedness of 
the organisation to other members of the industry group, the extent to which the firm 
perceives itself to be similar to other firms in the industry and the homogeneity of 
management within the firm (DiMaggic, and Powell, 1983; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; 
Greenwood et al, 2002). 
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At the organisational level, the literature on organisational flexibility and 
innovativeness offers two predictions: firstly, that the decision-making process will be 
decentralised in flexible firms; and, secondly, that fast adaptation requires low levels of 
formalisation. The literature on organisational innovativeness, however, stresses the 
importance of the conflicting demands on the organisation in terms of the appropriate 
degree of centralisation and formality in the different phases of the innovation process (i. e., 
initiation or implementation). Flexible firms are those that are able to accommodate these 
conflicting requirements (Adler, 1996,1999; Volberda, 1999; Damanpour, 199 1). 
As far as the top managerial level is concerned, the three bodies of literature 
reviewed (i. e., determinants of organisational flexibility, innovativeness and institutional 
embeddedness) make one prediction: that only those firms with a heterogeneous dominant 
coalition are likely to adapt successfully in conditions of environmental turmoil (Volberda, 
1996; Damanpour, 1991,1996; Fox-Wolfgramm et al, 1998). The heterogeneity of the 
dominant coalition reflects the composition and internal interaction of the top team. The 
heterogeneity of the top team would therefore influence their cognitive models for 
interpreting the reality and their capacity to act (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991; Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996; Webb and Pettigrew, 1999). 
From our inductive analysis of the case studies two other determinants of 
organisational flexibility emerged: environmental scanning and a strong organisational 
identity. These two determinants and the literature that underpins them are operationalised 
and analysed later in this chapter. 
While the literature on determinants of organisational flexibility, innovativeness and 
that on institutional embeddedness describe different organisational capabilities as enablers 
of transformation and adaptation, there is no mention of how the nature of the firm can 
affect the creation of those capabilities. In this research, we are dealing specifically with 
family-owned businesses. . Before analysing the determinants of organisational flexibility, 
questions arise as to what the main features of family firms are and how these 
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characteristics can impact on the formation of the flexible capabilities necessary for them to 
adapt and transform under constantly changing environments. 
Issues affecting organisafional flexibility of family firms 
Family businesses face very particular challenges in their attempt to achieve 
organisational flexibility. These challenges arise at different stages in the life of a family 
firm. Ward (1987) point outs that over these stages (e. g. the founding stage, and second 
generation tenure, among others) family firms need to learn to delegate authority (i. e., 
decentralising operational and strategic decisions), cope with transitional stages, and 
professionalise the company by bringing in new managerial skills from outside the 
company (i. e., non-family members). Family companies that are not able to meet these 
challenges stagnate, and thus their ability to adapt to new, market conditions is impaired 
(Ward, 1987: 33). 
'Broadly speaking, the factors mentioned by Ward (1987) as affecting the 
development of organisational flexibility within family-owned firms fall into three 
categories. These categories are: the life cycle of the family firm and the role of the 
founder; the control systems and professionalisation of the management team; and finally, 
ownership issues. 
Life cycle of thefamilyfirm: the role of thefounder 
Many organisational writers have emphasised the relationship between a firin's 
history and its current capabilities (Selznick, 1957). Teece et al (1997) and Rosenbloom 
(2000) recognise that the development of organisational capabilities is strongly related to 
the history of the firm (the 'ýpath dependencies" for Teece et al, 1997). Thus, a firm's 
previous choices shed some light on its current organisational capabilities. Similarly, Raff 
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(2000), studying the transformation of two book retailers in the USA, states that the 
founders' vision and values influence what the companies become and the capabilities they 
can develop (see also Helfat, 2000). These writers consider history to be one of the factors 
contributing to the development of organisational capability. 
Based on his longitudinal study of the birth and early development of a medical 
school, Kimberly (1979) underlines the problems that the organisation had to confront 
during the different stages of its development. Being influenced by its founder's ideals of 
innovativeness, Kimberly shows how this imprint constituted a significant constraint for the 
organisation's subsequent choices. He also points out the tensions between the 
innovativeness of the early phases and the institutionalisation and formalisation that occur 
at later stages in the organisation's development. 
In his empirical study in a British boarding school, Pettigrew (1979) also explores 
the critical role of the founder of an organisation (in this case the founder of the boarding 
school) in creating organisational culture and set of beliefs. The founders, "entrepreneurs " 
in Pettigrew's words, give energy, purpose and commitment to the organisation they are 
creating (Pettigrew, 1979: 580). 
Kimberly's (1979) and Pettigrew's (1979) findings are particularly revealing of the 
role of the founder and the imprint he leaves on the organisation. In family firms it is 
particularly important to understand the role of the founder in determining the company's 
set of beliefs and how this value system can help the firm to confront the demands of new 
organisational stages. The fact that our sample contains family firms at different life stages 
(the second and third generations of family leadership) also illustrates the process of how 
the family firms in this study move from one stage to the next (i. e., through the succession 
process) and how they cope with the requirements for institutionalisation (i. e., more formal 
mechanisms and professionalisation). These issues are addressed in the following section. 
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Control systems andprofessionalisation ofthe management team injamilyfirms 
Control systems also evolve throughout the life cycle of a family firm. In the first 
tenure of the company - the founder or entrepreneurial experience - control tends to be 
informal, with little planning and coordination. Decision making, on the other hand, is 
highly centralised in the founders (Moores and Mula, 2000; McCollom Hampton, 1996). 
Moores and Mula (2000) show empirical evidence in Australian family firms to suggest 
that at successive stages of life, family firms tend to formalise mechanisms of control and 
decentralise decision making. This happens because after the founder's tenure, the 
different family branches need to keep abreast of company issues, and accordingly control 
and formalisation must increase. On the other hand, the size and scope of some businesses 
and the increasing professionalisation of the firm make decentralisation a necessary process 
(Moores and Mula, 2000). 
How professionalisation is handled in family firms can often determine whether or 
not the firm will continue to grow and thrive (Dyer Jr., 1996). There are a number of 
reasons why a family firm might want to professionalise its current management team. 
Dyer Jr (1996) states that one reason for bringing non-family managers into the company is 
because there is sometimes a lack of management talent within the family. A second 
reason Dyer stresses is that professionalising the management is a way to change the norms 
and values of the firm. 
Ward (1987) highlights the fact that family firm's health might suffer if, in the 
middle or late stages of its organisational. development, it does not learn to professionalise, 
delegate authority and establish formal management systems. Success in business, states 
Ward (1987), hinges on the development of new management processes according to the 
different stages of the company's life. 
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Ownership issues 
The structure and distribution of ownership - who owns how much of what kind of 
stock - can have profound effects on the governance and growth of the firm (Gersick et al, 
1997). Ward (1987) proposes a progression of ownership from founder to sibling 
partnership, and finally to the family dynasty. Gersick et al (1997) introduce an ownership 
developmental dimension with three stages: controlling owner, sibling partnership and 
cousin consortium. What the different classifications show, however, is simply how 
ownership becomes increasingly diluted from a single majority owner (i. e., the founder 
stage for Ward or the controlling owner for Gersick et al) to a few or several owners. 
The possibilities for growth are linked with the ownership structure of the family 
business. In successive generations of family members, as Haynes et al (1999) underline, 
family firms intermingle business and family resources. However, relying on a firm's 
profits and family savings may restrict a company's growth. Family firms, as Mah6rault's 
(2000) empirical study on family firms' finance shows, prefer not to open the company up 
to the public because they are afraid that the dilution of equity structure will diminish 
family power. The result of this process for family firms is a crisis of identity (Mah6rault, 
2000). 
The previous analysis leads us to raise the following questions: How did the family 
firms in this study build up the flexible capabilities needed to adapt under environmental 
pressure? How did the character and particular features of the family firms under study 
shape the determinants of organisational flexibility? Why were some firms able to achieve 
flexibility while others could not? The analysis of the determinants of organisational 
flexibility will seek to answer these questions. 
The structure of the analysis is similar for the five determinants analysed: firstly we 
explain how the determinants are operationalised; secondly, we analyse and compare the 
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highly flexible and less flexible finns in each industry (i. e. AGD and Vicentin on the one 
hand, and Sidus and Andr6maco on the other). Finally, we present some patterns common 
to the flexible firms (i. e., Sidus and AGD) and the less flexible firms (i. e., Vicentin and 
Andr6maco). 
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10.2 Heterogeneity of the dominant coalition 
What it is understood by dominant coalition and what does heterogeneity of the 
dominant coalition mean? Hambrick (1989) states that the area of strategic leadership 
studies incorporates individual executives (i. e., CEOs), the top management team, or other 
governing bodies (Le, a Board of Directors) as the subject of the analysis. This study uses a 
broad definition of the dominant coalition as the individuals responsible for determining a 
firm's direction (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992. See also Cyert and March (1963) for 
organisational coalition). This means that Directors of the companies and the top 
management team are included in the definition of dominant coalition used in this 
research. 303 This broad definition of the dominant coalition derives from the fact that in 
family businesses the Directors of the company have a crucial role in executive decisions 
(Neubauer and Lank, 1998). Tbus, to leave them out of the analysis would be to ignore the 
particularities of a family business as a special type of organisation (Neubauer and Lank, 
1998; Gersick et al, 1997). 
To understand what heterogeneity is, let us start by understanding what 
homogeneity means in terms of group dynamics. A homogeneous group is one whose 
members have a similar age, tenure and background and who may have been together for a 
long time. A homogeneous group is said to exert more influence on its members and 
produce greater conformity (Murray, 1989), contribute towards a firm's efficiency, and be 
more inclined to maintain the status quo (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). There would also 
be more solidarity among similar individuals, and more congruence in beliefs, giving rise 
to consensus in decision making (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
Heterogeneity in the top management team has the potential to enhance the 
adaptability and creativity of the group. The diversity of skills and backgrounds mean that 
heterogeneous groups are more adaptable (Murray, 1989). Demographic heterogeneity 
may also lead to diversity in information sources and perspectives and more creativity and 
'0' In the family firms analysed in this research some of the executive team members are also Directors 
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innovation in decision making (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Furthermore, the different, 
competing views in such heterogeneous teams may facilitate radical change (Webb and 
Pettigrew, 1999). 
The study of the heterogeneity of the dominant coalition as a determinant of 
organisational. flexibility is operationalised through the demographic studies tradition that 
analyses demographic variables to understand the characteristics of the management team 
in ternis of their homogeneity and heterogeneity (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Murray, 
1989; Hambrick, 1989). In particular two empirical studies inform this analysis and the 
variables used here: firstly the research done by Bantel and Jackson (1989) in which the 
demographic features of the top management team in the banking industry are analysed 
(i. e., average age, organisational tenure, educational level and background); and secondly, 
Wiersema's and Bantel's (1992) study of a hundred firms listed in Fortune 500, which uses 
similar variables to Bantel and Jackson (1989) and which sheds light on the relationship 
between a firm's diversity and strategic change. 
To gain a holistic view of the features of the members of the dominant coalition, in 
this research we have analysed the following variables over three periods of time 304 : age, 
tenure in the company, tenure in the role, experience in the industry, experience in the 
industry and related industries, and finally, experience in other industries. We calculated 
the mean (average), standard deviation and ranges (maximum and minimum), for all the 
variables. Table 10.1 summarises the variables used and their use in the literature. Tables 
10.2 and 10.5 and figures 10.1 and 10.2 show the statistical analysis undertaken. 
We also used a significance test that, when applied to a set of observations, results 
in a P-value relative to some hypothesis. A P-value is the probability of having observed 
our data when the null hypothesis is true and highlights the statistical differences between 
the different variables (Everitt, 1998). The significance test used in this case is known as 
'04 The three periods of time arc: 1989, the starting point of the analysis; 1996, the year before the radical 
changes happened in the less flexible companies and; 1999, the end of our period of analysis. 
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"hypothesis test for comparing two population means" (Everitt, 1998). This test was 
chosen because we need to determine whether there are differences between a variable in 
one company and the same variable in another company where the variable is considered to 
be a continuous one (i. e., we would like to determine whether the average age of the top 
team in AGD in 1989 is the same average age for the top management team in Vicentin for 
the same period of time). 
The significance test will tell us whether the null hypothesis has been rejected or 
not. If the null hypothesis has been rejected, this means that there is statistical difference 
between the variables analysed in the companies. 'Ibis is indicated in tables 10.3 and 10.6 
with a Yes (i. e., when the average age between AGD and Vicentin are statistically different 
for the period of time analysed). However, if there is no statistical difference (i. e., when 
there is statistical evidence to say that the average age between AGD and Vicentin is 
similar for the period of time analysed) the null hypothesis is not rejected and it is indicated 
in table 10.3 and 10.6 with a No. 
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TABLE 10.1: VARIABLES USED IN THE DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS AND THEIR USE IN THE LITERATURE 
Variables Use of the variable in the literature (theoretically and 
empirically) 
Age of members of the dominant Hambrick and Mason, 1984 
coalition Wicrsema and Bantel, 1992 
Bantel and Jackson, 1989 
Murray, 1989 
Webb, 1999 
Pitcher and Smith, 2001 
Tenure company of members of the Wiersema and Bantel, 1992 
dominant coalition Hambrick, 1989 
Bantel and Jackson, 1989 
Murray, 1989 
Webb, 1999 
Pitcher and Smith, 2001 
Tenure role of members of the dominant Hambrick, 1989 
coalition Bantel and Jackson, 1989 
Murray, 1989 
Webb, 1999 
Experience in the industry of members ffambrick and Mason, 1984 
of the dominant coalition: Webb, 1999 
AGD and Viccntin: Edible Oils Eisenhardt and Schoonhovcn, 1990 
Sidus and Andr6maco: Phan-naceuticals Pitcher and Smith, 2001 
Experience in the industry and related Hambrick and Mason, 1984 
industries of members of the dominant Webb, 1999 
coalition Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990 
AGD and Vicentin: Food 
Sidus and Andr6maco: Health 
Experience in other industries of Hambrick and Mason, 1984 
members of the dominant coalition Murray, 1989 
Webb, 1999 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990 
Indicator Use of the indicators in the literature (theoretically and 
empirically) 
Educational background of the Hambrick and Mason, 1984 
dominant coalition Wierscma and Bantel, 1992 
Bantel and Jackson, 1989 
M rray, 1989 
The data on the dominant coalition was obtained from three sources: interviews; 
archival material provided by the HR departments; and, in those cases in which the 
information was missing or incomplete, a questionnaire with details of the information 
required was sent to the manager to be completed and sent back to the researcher. On a 
few occasions the information was collected by means of a telephone interview. 
Pettigrew (1992b) criticises the narrow demographic approach favoured in some 
studies of top management team. His main criticism stems from the "enormous 
interpretative leaps" that are made from "distant" demographic data about the managerial 
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team characteristics to various kinds of organisational outcomes with no direct analysis of 
intervening processes (Pettigrew, 1992b: 176). In his view, this approach leads to a loss of 
perspective regarding important issues such as organisational processes, structure and the 
performance of top teams. Consequently, in this study the quantitative results of the 
demographic analysis are combined with qualitative data drawn from the interviews, and 
this helped the researcher to interpret the data. 
AGD and Vicentin 
Our analysis of the demographics of the dominant coalition shows the differences 
between the two companies (see table 10.2 and figure 10.1). In AGD, the average age, 
tenure (company and role) and experience (in industry and also related industries) dropped 
over time while experience in other industries increased. Vicentin, on the other hand, 
followed a more irregular pattern: average age fell until it reached a plateau in 1996. After 
a trough in 1996, tenure (role and company) and experience (in industry and related 
industries) rose again in 1999. The only indicator with a decreasing tendency is experience 
in other industries (see figure 10.1). 
As table 10.3 shows, the demographic differences between AGD and Vicentin are 
supported by the significance test undertaken. The test underlines statistical differences 
between AGD and Vicentin in most of the variables. In the case of the two variables 
'tenure in the present role' and 'years of experience in the industry an related industries, ' 
the significance test shows there is no statistical difference in 1989 and 1996 but there is in 
1999. 
How can these changes in the variables be explained? In AGD the fall in the 
different variables is an indicator of the renewal of the number of professionals in the 
company. A closer look at the demographic analysis shows that the renewal of 
professionals in the early 1990s brought an increase in the variable 'years experience in 
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other industries' (see figure 10.1), thus producing a reduction in the average length of 
company tenure and industry experience between 1996 and 1990. 
The case of Vicentin, on the other hand, should be understood by reference to the 
changes the top management underwent during the 1990s. 'Me sharp changes in the 
variables between 1989 and 1996 are the outcome of a reorganisation of the Board of 
Directors when the third generation set up a new Board. Having a new generation of 
managers made all the indicators fall although to a lesser extent than in the case of AGD. 
The rise of the variables in 1999 is due to the fact that the top management team did not 
vary much and new managers did not have much experience in other industries. On the 
contrary, all of their work experience was in the edible oil industry (see figure 10.1). 
The rise of the variables analysed in Vicentin in 1999 and the fall of those variables 
in AGD is reflected in the fact that the significance test highlights statistical differences in 
all the variables between the companies. With the passing of the time, the differences 
between the companies become deeper and more noticeable (see table 10.3). 
What stands out in the analysis of the standard deviation in both AGD and Vicentin 
is the high dispersion AGI? had in 1989 in variables such as tenure in the company and role 
and experience in industry and related industry, while in Vicentin the standard deviation 
was lower. This difference stemmed from the homogeneous management team in Vicentin 
at that time (in terms of the variables analysed) and the diversity of managers' 
backgrounds in AGD (see table 10.2). 
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TABLE 10.2: DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE DOMINANT COALITION TEAM AT AGD AND VICENTtN (MEAN AND 
., TAMnARn 
nPNnATTON) 0 
Mean (Average) Companies Average 1989 1996 1999 
Age AGD 42.1 43 42.6 40.8 
Vicentin 53.9 60.5 51 50.2 
Tenurein AGD 11.6 12.3 11.8 10.6 
company Vicentin 21.1 27 17.1 19.1 
Tenure in present AGD _ 7.8 10.8 7.1 5.4 
role Vicentin 12.7 15.5 9.9 12.7 
Years experience AGD 13.6 15.9 13.9 10.9 
in industry Vicentin 22.6 30 18.1 19.8 
(pharmaceuticals) 
Years experience ýMD 14.6 18.7 14.2 10.9 
in industry and Vicentin 23.3 31 18.7 20.2 
related 
industries305 
Years experience AGD 4.7 1.3 5,9 6.8 
in other Vicentin 1 1.25 0.9 0.8 
industries 306 
Standard Deviation Company 1989 1996 1999 
Age AGD 10.5 6 6.4 
Vicentin 10.8 5.4 7.6 
Tenure in company AGD 11.7 8.4 8.8 
Vicentin 6.1 6.4 6.9 
Tenure in present role AGD 11 7.9 7.3 
Vicentin 1.3 7.6 7.8 
Experience in industry AGD 10.3 7.2 8.7 
Vicentin 9 5.9 7.1 
Experience in industry AGD 13.5 7 8.9 
and related industry Vicentin 9.8 6.5 7.6 
Experience other AGD 1.7 3.4 3.7 
industries Vicentin 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.2 
305 Years experience in the industry and related industry refers to the number of years working in a traditional 
Fharmaccutical industry and related industries such as health and biochemistry. 
06 Years experience in other industries refers to the number of years working in industries other than 
pharmaceuticals. 
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TABLE 10.3: SIGNIFICANCE TEST IN AGD AND VICENTiN: HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR COMPARING TWO 






Difference p value Reject Ho 
Age 43 60.5 17.5 0.012 YES 
Tenure in the company 12.3 7 14.7 0.033 YES 
Tenure in the role 10.8 15.5 4.7 0.419 NO 
Years experience in the industry 15.9 30 14.1 0.029 YES 
Years experience in the industry 
and related industries 
18.7 31 12.3 0.118 NO 
Years experience in other 
industries 






Difference p value Reject Ho 
Age 42.6 51 8.4 0.010 YES 
Tenure in the company 11.8 17.1 5.3 0.182 NO 
Tenure in the role 7.1 9.9 2.8 0.477 NO 
Years experience in the industry 13.9 18.1 4.2 0.225 NO 
Years experience in the industry 
and related industries 
14.2 18.7 4.5 0.201 NO 
Years experience in other 
industries 










p value Reject llo 
Age 40.8 50.2 9.4 0.007 YES 
Tenure in the company 10.6 19.1 8.5 0.026 YES 
Tenure in the role 5.4 12.7 7.3 0.040 YES 
Years experience in the industry 10.9 19.8 8.9 0.021 YES 
Years experience in the industry 
and related industries 
10.9 20.2 9.3 0.021 YES 
Years experience in other 
industries 
6.8 0.8 6 0.000 YES 
307 The first column of each table contains the variables that are being analysed. The second and third 
columns show the mean of each variable for AGD (A) and Viccntin (V). The fourth column (i. e., difference 
AN) indicates the difference between the averages presented in columns two and three. With that difference 
and a test statistic we obtained a p-value (see the fifth column). Conventionally a cut-off of 0.05 is chosen. If 
P is smaller than the cut-off value (i. e., 0.05) the null hypothesis is rejected and the result of the p value is 
called statistically significant. When the result of the p value is above 0.05 it is called not significant. 
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People with different educational qualifications and work experience in non- 
traditional disciplines were hired in AGD whereas in Vicentin this was not the case (see 
table 10.4). In the case of AGD, new expertise was brought into the management team of 
the company mainly by outsiders and, to a lesser extent, from internal promotions of the 
younger generation of managers. Professionals from industries other than edible oil and 
food were hired, and others with a wide variety of experience in consultancy, textile and 
commercial activities were incorporated. However, these changes were not achieved 
randomly. It was a conscious decision on the part of the Board to confront the new wave of 
competition and economic openness. At AGD they stated: "The Board is always open to 
what is happening elsewhere. A change in the contextual conditions triggered the hiring of 
new types of professionals. From nothing you will nowfind a group of professionals from 
different disciplines. , 308 
In Vicentin, on the other hand, experience in the sector in which the company 
participates stands out as an important common factor among the top management team. 
Some of them show little or no experience outside the edible oil industry or food sector: 
"Wefound that experts in the industry can make better decisions than other managers 
hired with different background experience. We are in the edible oil industry, so we do not 
needpeople with experience in the petrol or retail industry. , 309 
'0' Interview with Marcelo Vit-HR Manager AGD 
309 Interview with Herman Vicentin-President of Vicentin 
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TABLE 10.4: BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE OF THE DOMINANT COALITION IN AGD AND VICENTiN OVER THE 
PERIOD 1989-1 999310 
1989 1999 
Background experience/ Areas AGD: Edible oil, Food, Cereals AGD: Edible Oil, Food, Public 
of work experience and Agriculture, Marketing, Sector, Commerce, Agriculture, 
Accounting. Steel, Accountancy, Textiles, 
Auditing, Trading. 
Vicentin: Edible oil, Food Vicentin: Edible oils, Food 
processing, Marketing, processing, Agriculture and 
Agriculture, Engineers. Cereals, Trading, Logistics, 
Engineers. 
Formal education AGD: ACID: 
0 8% Postgraduate * 40% Postgraduate 
degrees degrees 
0 50% University 0 80% University 
degrees degrees 
0 50% Technical degrees 0 20% Technical degrees 
Vicentin: Vicentin: 
* 25% University * 10% Postgraduate 
degrees degrees 
* 75 % Technical 0 50% University 
degrees degrees 
40% Technical degrees 
10% No degrees 
Sidus and Andr6maco 
While AGD and Vicentin presented dissimilarities in the variables analysed that 
were evident right from the beginning of the period of analysis, this was not the case with 
Sidus and Andr6maco. Prior to the 1990s, Andr6maco had low average levels in all of the 
variables except the average age if compared to Sidus. This is mainly why the significance 
test shows no statistical difference in most of the variables in 1989 (see table 10.6). 
A closer look at table 10.5, however, shows that at Sidus all the variables analysed 
fell over time while in Andr6maco variables reached a peak in 1996 only to fall again in 
1999 but always remaining higher than in Sidus. The significance test also illustrates these 
changes in the demographic variables by demonstrating statistical differences between the 
companies in 1996. However, by 1999 the significance test shows no statistical difference 
between the companies (see table 10.6). The reasons for such a difference in the statistical 
310 This table was developed using archival material from AGD and Viccntin over the period 1989-1999. We 
also used data collected from the interviews and in a few cases we collected information by means of 
telephone calls. 
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analysis can be explained by looking at the internal changes the firins went through over 
the ten-year period analysed. 
By 1990, Sidus was a consolidated pharmaceutical company and running a 
biotechnology project successfully. By 1996, the company had incorporated new managers 
to run the new distribution business. In 1999 Sidus was a group of companies ranging from 
traditional pharmaceuticals and biotechnology to retail. These new strategic initiatives 
needed managerial skills to manage diverse businesses. New appointments are illustrated 
in the variable "experience in other industries" in figure 10.2. As can be seen, this variable 
began to rise in 1989. 
The high dispersion indicated by the standard deviation found in Sidus in 1999 is 
the result of the business diversification undertaken by the company (see table 10.5). This 
diversification meant the incorporation of new managers from backgrounds other than 
traditional pharmaceuticals (giving rise to the high dispersion in the variable 'experience in 
other industries), and with little experience in the pharmaceutical industry (hence, the high 
dispersion in the variable 'experience in the industry' and 'tenure in company'). 
At Andr6maco, on the other hand, things were not so promising. The long tenure of 
Tuchi, the CEO (1981-1997), had a detrimental effect on the renewal of the top 
management team. Until 1997 there were few changes in Andr6maco's top management 
team. The sudden drop in all the variables in 1999 is a direct consequence of the reshuffle 
of the top team (see figure 10.2). Twenty-two managers were dismissed when Pablo 
Roviralta became the new CEO in 1997. These managerial changes had a direct impact on 
the significance test undertaken in that we could not find any statistical difference in the 
variables analysed between Sidus and Andr6maco (see table 10.6). Most of the variables, 
however, showed a higher average compared to those found in Sidus in the same period of 
time (see figure 10.2). 
288 
TABLE 10.5: DEMOGRAPHICS OF TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM AT SIDUS AND ANDR6MACO (MEAN AND STANDARD 
DEVIATION) 
Mean (Average) Companies Average 1989 1996 1999 
Age Sidus 46.3 48.4 45.6 45 
Andr6maco 54.2 54 58.9 49.8 
Tenurein Sidus 15 19 13.4 12.6 
company Andr6maco 14.3 16.1 17.8 8.9 
Tenure In present Sidus 7.9 13 5.4 5.2 
role Andr6maco 10.7 11.2 14.3 6.7 
Years experience Sidus 18.4 21.6 17.3 16.2 
in industry Andr6maco 19.7 19.1 23.1 16.8 
(pharmaceuticals) 
Years experience Sidus 19.7 23.8 18.1 17.3 
in Industry and Andr6maco 23.4 23.8 28.1 18.7 
related 
Ind stries3" 
Years experience Sidus 5.2 0.8 7 7.8 
in other Andr6maco 2.9 2.4 3.2 3 
industries 312 
Standard Company 1989 1996 1999 
Deviation 
Age Sidus 3.3 9.1 10.3 
Andr6maco 10 11 9 
Tenurein Sidus 5 10.4 11 
company Andromaco 9 8.5 5. 
Tenurein Sidus 3.6 4.2 3.7 
present role Andr6maco 5 6.4 6.8 
Experience Sidus 4.5 10.3 11.1 
in industry Andr maco 9.1 10.7 10.7 
Experience Sidus 3.9 9.9 10.3 
in industry Andr6maco 11.1 12.6 12.6 
and related 
industry 
xperience, Sidus 1.3 11.1 11.2 
other 
n 
h Andr6maco 1.7 2.1 2.1 
us indu stries 
311 Years experience in the industry and related industry refers to the number of years working in a traditional 
harmaccutical industry and related industries such as health and biochemistry. .2 Years experience in other industries refers to the number of years working in industries other than 
pharmaceuticals. 
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p value Reject Ho 
Age 48.4 54 5.6 0.078 NO 
Tenure in the company 19 16.1 2.9 0.335 NO 
Tenure in the role 13 11.2 1.8 0316 NO 
Years experience in the industiy 21.6 19.1 2.5 0.399 NO 
Years experience in the industry 
and related industries 
23.8 23.8 0 1.000 NO 

















p value Reject Ho 
Age 45.6 58.9 13.3 0.003 YES 
Tenure in the company 13.4 17.8 4.4 0.255 NO 
Tenure in the role 5.4 14.3 8.9 0.000 YES 
Years experience in the industry 17.3 23.1 5. 0.173 NO 
Years experience in the industry 
and related industries 
18.1 28.1 10 0.033 YES 


















p value Reject Ho 
Age 45 49.8 4.8 0.260 NO 
Tenure in the company 12.6 8.9 3.7 0.360 NO 
Tenure in the role 5.2 6.7 1.5 0.488 1 NO 
Years experience in the industry 16.2 18.8 2.6 0.579 NO 
Years experience in the industry 
and related industries 
17.3 18.7 1.4 0.769 NO 









313 The first column of each table contains the variables that are being analysed. The second and third 
columns show the mean of each variable for Sidus (S) and Andr6maco (A). The fourth column (i. e., 
difference S-A) indicates the difference between the averages presented in columns two and three. With that 
difference and a test statistic we obtained a p-value (see the fifth column). Conventionally a cut-off of 0.05 is 
chosen. If Pis smaller than the cut-off value (i. e., 0.05) the null hypothesis is rejected and the result of the p 
value is called statistically significant. When the result of the p value is above 0.05 it is called not significant. 
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The new strategic initiatives Sidus undertook in the early 1980s and then again in 
the 1990s meant that the company needed new managerial skills. As a manager in Sidus 
stated: "We knew that we needed more abilities and skills when setting up the new 
companies. 7hat's why the new managers ofthe new companies ofthe group were not only 
very professional but younger than the average age in Sidus. P, 314 Managers from different 
educational backgrounds and experience in fields such as marketing, consultancy, auditing 
and logistics were recruited (see table 10.7). This renewal of the management team started 
earlier in Sidus than in Andr6maco, as shown in figure 10.2 in the variable 'experience in 
other industries. 
Until 1997, "age and experience in the industry, A315 was the most important factor 
in deciding who was appointed to Andr6maco's top team. This criterion made it difficult 
for new managers with diverse professional backgrounds to get into the company. By 
1999, as shown in figure 10.2, the new CEO could not reverse this tendency. The variable 
dexperience in other industries' has not changed from its level in 1996. However, it is too 
early to draw any conclusions about this while the new CEO is still trying to renew his 
managerial team. 
314 Interview with Santiago Garcia Belmonte-Executive Director of Retail Businesseses 315 Interview with Hugo Garcia-Logistic Manager in Andr6maco, 
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TABLE 10.7: BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE OF THE DOMINANT COALITION IN SIDUS AND ANDR6MACO OVER THE 
PERIOD 1989-1 999316 
1989 1999 
Background experience/ Areas Sidus: Pharmaceuticals, Sidus: Pharmaceuticals, 
of work experience Biochemistry, Consultancy, Academia (research), 
Public Service (Health), Health Marketing, Logistics, Transport, 
Cereals and Agriculture, 
Finance, Consultancy, Auditing 
Andr6maco: Pharmaceutical, Andr6maco: Pharmaceutical, 
Chemistry, Biology, Marketing, Chemistry, Finance, Marketing 
Accounting 
Formal education Sidus: Sidus: 
0 6% Postgraduate 40% Postgraduate 
degrees degrees 
a 67% University 80% University 
degrees degrees 
0 33 % Technical 20% Technical degrees 
degrees 
Andr6maco: Andr6maco: 
0 54% University 0 11% Postgraduate 
degrees degrees 
031% Technical degrees 0 55% University 
0 15% No degrees degrees 
0 45% Technical degrees 
The dynamics of the dominant coalition and organisational flexibility: The cognitive 
diversity of the dominant coalition 
The literature on the top management teams and cognitive processes have signalled 
the importance of the cognitive diversity of the top managerial team (Wiersema and Bantel, 
1992; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). According to Hambrick and Mason's (1984) seminal 
paper on the role and influence of the top management team in organisations, a team of 
more heterogeneous managers interpret reality from a different cognitive base, with 
different visions and managerial perceptions. The result, for Hambrick and Mason, would 
be a decision-making process that would contain an array of innovative alternatives. 
We found strong evidence to suggest that the most flexible companies in our study 
had broadened their cognitive bases, bringing new mental models into the firms over time. 
Two indicators illustrate the existing cognitive diversity in the most flexible firms: firstly, 
316 This table was developed using archival material from Sidus and Andr6maco over the period 1989-1999. 
We also used data collected from the interviews and in a few cases we collected information by means of 
telephone calls. 
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the capacity of the top managerial team to act; and secondly, the constructive conflict 
among the members of the management team. How these indicators influence the ability of 
an organisation to be flexible and to adapt to market changes is described in the literature 
on cognitive processes and managerial elites. 
Various theorists have suggested that different mental models in an organisation 
might enhance the organisations' ability to adapt, to change and to succeed (Thomas and 
McDaniel, 1990; Barr et al, 1992; Webb and Pettigrew, 1999), enhancing the capacity for 
action (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) or action orientation of an organisation (Grinyer et 
al, 1988). Greenwood and Hinings (1996: 1039) defined the capacity for action as "the 
ability to manage the transition process from one template to another. " Capacity for 
action, according to Greenwood and Hinings, is the key to accomplishing radical change. 
This capacity for action will boost risk-taking behaviour. Three components are proposed 
as influencing a firm's capacity of action: first, the willingness of management to explore 
new strategic alternatives; secondly, the eagerness of the firms to take risks; and, finally, 
the keenness of the top team to confront difficult issues (Webb and Pettigrew, 1999; 
Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). In the light of these observations questions were asked 
about the capacity for action in the four firms under analysis. 
There is also a rich array of research stating that a diverse cognitive base among the 
members of the management team might bring potential for conflict. However, the 
literature states that this conflict is valuable and essential 'for effective strategic choice" 
(Eisenhardt et al, 1998: 142). To be constructive, this conflict should be issue-oriented 
rather than interpersonal (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Eisenhardt et al, 1998) to sharpen the debate, 
create more options and energise the entire organisation (Biggadike, 1998). A lack of 
cognitive diversity, on the other hand, will cause a group to have low conflict levels, 
thereby diminishing effectiveness and reducing its ability to offer alternatives (Eisenhardt 
et al, 1998). The interviewees were therefore asked: were there different views as to what 
the organisation was? (Webb and Pettigrew, 1999) Were there new ideas as to how to 
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change the status quo? (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Webb and Pettigrew, 1999); Did the CEO help 
to differentiate personal disagreement from disagreement on issues? (Eisenhardt et al, 
1998). 
The use of visual mapping as applied by Webb (1999) and Webb and Pettigrew 
(1999) provides insight into the comparison between highly flexible and less flexible firms 
in terms of cognitive diversity over three periods of time: 1989,1990-1995; and 1996- 
1999.317 
Figures 10.3 to 10.6 were created by coding the transcripts of each interview in the 
four companies under analysis according to the response the top management team 
provided to a range of questions that were indicative of the two components of the 
cognitive diversity of the dominant coalition: capacity to act and constructive conflict. In 
some cases, questions were sent by e-mail or post. In a few cases, questions were asked by 
means of telephone call. Four responses were allowed - 'yes', 'no, 'it was increasingly 
changing or varied across the company' or 'no data' (n/d), when the manager was not able 
to give any answer because he/she lacked data or because he/she was not at the company in 
the period of time analysed. Responses were shaded according to whether the interviewes 
answered 'yes' (black shading), 'increasingly changing or varied across the company' (grey 
shading), or 'no' answer (no shading). The shadings are shown against the related question 
and under the interviewee's initials. An inter-coder reliability check gave a score of 
between 76% and 8 1%. 318 
3 17 The three periods of time in the analysis were decided according to the following criteria: 1989 represents 
the starting point of the analysis and shows the companies before the opening up of the markets for 
competition. 1990-1995 indicates the period of far-reaching changes up to the Mexican crisis. This is also a 
period during which the companies under analysis underwent important changes in terms of the renewal of 
their top managerial team. Finally, the period 1996-1999 represents a turnaround for the less flexible 
companies due to strategic changes these companies underwent, thus impacting on the formation of the top 
team. For the most flexible firms this period represents a consolidation of their strategies. 3'8 The reliability score was calculated by the researcher re-coding three interview transcripts for the sets of 
questions asked as influencing the cognitive diversity of the dominant coalition of the firms under analysis. 
The rc-coding was then compared to the original coding and the percentage score calculated according to 
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The capacity of the top management team to act 
Sondergaard (2001) and Webb (1999) underline the importance of managerial 
intentionality as a way of explaining why some firms were able to respond more swiffly to 
market changes than others. With competitive pressures increasing in the different sectors 
after the opening up of the Argentinian economy early in the 1990s, a rapid adaptation to 
the new market was critical for the survival and success of the companies. However, as our 
analysis of the top management team's capacity to act shows, some firms were able to 
respond more rapidly than others. 
Our interviewees in AGD stated the importance of the capacity for action by 
highlighting the significance of exploring different strategic alternatives over time (see 
figure 10.3). AGD started to explore new fields before the 1990s. From 1990 onwards the 
company started to incorporate new businesses into its repertoire. Although originally a 
crushing company, AGD invested in transport, brands, fanning, storage and soya sub- 
products - all this in a twelve-year period (1986-1999). 
Managers at ADG explained how this risk-taking attitude evolved over time: "As a 
family business, AGD was not keen on taking risks, commercial risks. However, after the 
investments in our own brands, AGD started to pluck up courage and look at different 
possibilities in the market. Besides that, the incorporation of a new generation of 
managers helped AGD in this respect. They brought more ideas into the company and they 
were less worried about trying to innovate and less wary as well. "319 
Vicentin presents a different case. Figure 10.4 shows how the interviewees 
perceived that their capacity to act was fading over time. The period 1990-1995 is 
indicative of a drop in the company's capacity to act and take risks. This is illustrated in 
figure 10.4 by more negative answers to our questions regarding the capacity to act (no 
shading). This represents the interviewees perception of a low capacity for action 
compared to 1989. This period coincides with a lack of investment and exploration of new 
319 Interview with Miguel Acevedo-Finance Manager AGD 
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businesses. The period 1997-1999 is marked by the strategic reorientation of the company 
after many years of downturn. 
After the strategic changes in 1997 there was a widespread feeling in the company 
that the capacity for action was damaged: "1997 was a watershedfor the company in many 
respects. But one of the aspects that strikes me the most is our passivity. We preferred to 
avoid confrontingproblems. P320 
The fact that Vicentin relies on family members for its top managerial positions 
might be an explanation for the downturn in its capacity to act. As a manager and family 
member said: "I believe that organisations needfresh blood and ideas. But we had been 
invitingJamily members into the companyfor as long as I could remember. This situation 
makes me remember something I studied about the Egyptian kings. They married their 
sisters. The result was that their heirs were so weak or so stupid that they could not 
govern. I am afraid that this situation' will happen here. We need to open the company up 
to professional managers that will bring fresh ideas and action. Otherwise the Egyptian 
syndrome will affect US. , 321 
The capacity for action in Sidus and Andr6maco also illustrates the influence of the 
cognitive diversity brought by new managers. As a product of the increasing managerial 
diversity in the company over time, Sidus presents a growing explorative attitude as well as 
major exposure of its managers to difficult situations. Figure 10.5 illustrates the 
incremental evolution of the firm's capacity for action (see in figure 10.5 where the black 
shading -indicating the presence of factors positively related to the development of the 
firm's capacity to act - has increased over time). 
From the 1980s onwards the company pioneered the pharmaceutical sector, 
investing in diverse businesses such as biotechnology, distribution, OTC, retail and 
320 Interview with Roberto Gazze-Finance Manager-Vicentin 
321 Interview with Miximo Paduin-Commercial department and fourth generation family member-Vicentin 
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intermediary companies. It also started up the first strategic alliance in the industry and it 
acquired a company. 
"Yhe new professionals were thought-provoking. Yhe professionals that entered the 
company in this decade were different in that they were not afraid of changing the status 
quo, injact they were very happy to change it. , 322 
In Andr6maco, on the other hand, the capacity for action has been influenced by the 
absence of cognitive diversity in the company over time: "For many years the company 
lacked the managerial skills needed to confront the market changes. Managers were 
executors of orders. However, you needed a different type of manager, someone that could 
or would change things. We did not have this. s323 
However, the reshuffle of the managerial team in 1997 brought the winds of change 
to the company. The exploration of new alternatives was boosted by seeking new strategic 
alternatives for growth. Figure 10.6 shows that the exploration of new alternatives began to 
appear in the period 1996-1999 (coinciding with the reshuffle of the top team). However, 
the support for risk-taking actions was reduced over time as the company became 
financially more cautious and the focus on dermatology meant that fewer spare resources 
were available to try new alternatives (see in figure 10.6 that none of our interviewees 
considered that Andr6maco had a risk-taking attitude in the period 1996-1999. This is 
indicated in the figure by a lack of shading). 
The cognitive diversity of the most flexible firms enhanced their capacity for action 
as can be seen by the support for the exploration of new strategic alternatives, risk-taking 
attitudes, and the ability of the management team to face difficult situations. In the less 
flexible companies, however, the capacity for action was diminished (mainly in Vicentin) 
by the lack of the new managerial capabilities needed to confront market changes. 
322 Interview with Marcelo Burstein-HR manager in Sidus 323 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco 
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The cognitive diversity found in the most flexible firms, however, made the 
management team more prone to disagreement. How this conflict evolved in both highly 
flexible and less flexible firms is the focus of the next section of this analysis. 
Stimulating constructive conflict 
Our interviewccs in the flexible firms highlighted the importance of an increase in 
disagreements among the top management team. The increasing conflict was seen by the 
interviewees as providing flexible firms with more alternative views. The differences in 
this respect between AGD and Vicentin are revealing. 
Figures 10.3 and 10.4 show the differences between AGD and Vicentin in the way 
the conflict (i. e., constructive conflict) differed and varied over time. Figure 10.3 illustrates 
how different views of what the organisation was and new ideas about how to change the 
company had followed the entrance of new managers in AGD (see how the black shading 
follows an incremental pattern). Figure 10.4, on the other hand, illustrates the lack of such 
a conflict in Vicentin from 1989 to 1995 (i. e., little or no black shading). Only during the 
period 1996-1999 did new ideas as to how to change the status quo begun to appear. 
AGD encouraged its managers - both new and old - to interact more. However, the 
effect of this was more conflict: "We thought that more interaction would help managers 
to iron out differences. On the contrary these meetings sharpened the differences among 
them. , 
324 
The diversity in the managerial team was, however, considered very positive in the 
longrun: "Dissension flared up in the early 1990s and we thought it would delay decision- 
making. On the contrary, it made us think twice before launching ourselves into a new 
324 Intcrvicw with Adriana Urquia-Dircctor AGD 
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business, and he prudent hut certain when we took a decision. It was like a brainstorming 
exercise. "323 
Vicentin, on the other hand, had seen a low level of conflict until 1997 when the 
strategy of the company changed. The low level of conflict had its consequence in terms of 
seeking new scenarios for the company: "For a long time, the management ofthe company 
was too complacent andfailed to offer alternatives. , 326 
On the other hand, interaction among the management team was too low: 
"Everybody is too busy to meet. Ifyou do not meet, you do not interact. And ifyou do not 
interact you do not exchange ideas, so you are not constructive. -327 
The pharmaceutical firms present a similar perspective to that of the edible oil 
companies. As before, the amount of black shading shows when firms have had more or 
less constructive conflict. Figures 10.5 and 10.6 illustrate the contrasting patterns found 
between Sidus and Andr6maco: Sidus has emphasised constructive conflict in order to 
achieve a greater openness to alternative views; Andr6maco avoided conflict among its top 
team for most of the period analysed (see in figure 10.6 the evolution of black and grey 
shading for 1989 and 1990-1995). A diversity of views only began to appear in the late 
1990s after the new CEO took over and after the top management reshuffle took place. 
Sidus managed the potential for conflict among the various managers by creating 
new companies. As the CEO of the company said: "We interact a lot in meetings, but on a 
day-to-day basis we are in different companies, therefore allowing interpersonal animosity 
to subside. , 328 
The CEO is also conscious of the advantages and disadvantages of conflict among 
members of the management team: "So, I reckon that you may lose time arguing but in the 
325 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director AGD 
326 Interview with Roberto Gazze-Finance Manager in Vicentin 
327 Interview with Roberto Gazze-Finance Manager in Vicentin 
328 Interview with Miguel ArgOelles-CEO Sidus 
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end we not only have different alternatives, but we also envision thefuture, as is the case 
with many ofour initiatives. , 329 
The case of Andr6maco is one in which a powerful CEO impeded dissension: 
"Tuchi [the CEO unfil 1997] found conflict unpleasant. So he crushed it. None of the top 
team members at that time wanted to appear to be offending him, so they avoided 
conflict. , 330 
The changes in the top management team in Andr6maco from 1997 brought about 
new ideas as to what the company should be doing in order to grow. The role of the CEO 
also changed: "The new managerial team was open to dissent. I therefore acquired a 
different role. I not only had to think about the strategy but also make sure that dissension 
did not open up a chasm between managers. , 331 
Brief remarks on the differences between flexible and less flexible firms 
Our analysis of the demographics of the top management team and our interviews 
in the different companies revealed significant differences between highly flexible and less 
flexible firms. While in the highly flexible firms more heterogeneity prevailed among the 
top team, the less flexible firms presented a more compact and homogeneous managerial 
elite. We also revealed a second main difference between flexible and less flexible firms: 
the former are cognitively diverse compared to the latter. In addition to highlighting the 
contrasts suggested by our interviewees' comments, the coding of the interview transcripts 
also demonstrated the consistency of the findings (as shown in figures 10.1 to 10.6). 
Our discussion of the demographics of the dominant coalition in the firms shows 
that AGD and Sidus are more heterogeneous than Andr6maco and Vicentin. AGD and 
Sidus appointed managers from outside the firm before the changes in the Argentinian 
329 Interview with Miguel Argilelles-CEO Sidus 
330 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco 
331 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco 
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economy had begun. AGD started to appoint executives from outside the firm earlier in the 
1980s when the company made its first logistic investments. Sidus, on the other hand, did 
the same when the strategic alliance with Merck was forged. In addition, the inflow of 
managers with non-traditional backgrounds in edible oils (i. e., in AGD) and 
pharmaceuticals (i. e., in Sidus) reduced the degree to which the company was influenced 
by institutional pressures (this also links to another determinant of organisational flexibility 
- macroculture embeddedness). As a manager at AGD stated "The variety of experience 
and backgrounds of our top team allowed us to leapfrog the competition because we were 
betterprepared with more skills than them. , 332 
These appointments, together with internal promotion of young executives with 
different backgrounds and great potential, increased the diversity of views and cognitive 
mindsets among the top management team. That diversity of mental models generated a 
variety of interpretations of the firm and its environment. As Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
(1990) argue, the presence of divergent cognitive frameworks is essential in a turbulent 
environment. It granted AGD and Sidus a deeper understanding of the patterns of change 
that were occurring and allowed them to decide on the most appropriate actions to take or 
develop (i. e., in both companies the different strategic initiatives). So, in the 
hypercompetitive environment in which the pharmaceutical and edible oil industries 
operated in the 1990s, Sidus and AGD were better able to understand the new environment 
and act more quickly than the less flexible firms. 
In contrast, in the less flexible firms the flow of outsiders into senior positions 
started either late in the 1990s (i. e., in the case of Andr6maco, after 1997) or it did not start 
at all (i. e., the case of Vicentfn in which the managerial positions are all occupied by family 
members). As a result, in both companies the top team in the 1990s was highly 
homogeneous both as regards its background and the way they saw the company and its 
environment. 'Ibis homogeneity increased the degree to which the company was embedded 
332 Interview with Marcelo Vit, HR Manager in AGD 
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in the industry macroculture. The lack of cognitive diversity that stemmed from the 
prevailing homogeneity in Andr6maco and Vicentin's top team also made it difficult for 
the firms to interpret the signals from the environment and be proactive. 
The finding of this determinant of organisational flexibility is also important in 
understanding strategic decision-making in organisations. Hickson et al (1986) in 
analysing how decisions are made at the top of organisations question whether the 
management of the organisation is more influential in decision making than those on the 
outside, such as trade unions and government departments. The cases of the flexible firms 
reveal the importance of those inside the firm in shaping decisions internally and even 
influencing decisions at the industry level. A great majority of decisions of this order arose 
from deliberate managerial strategies. On the other hand, the less flexible firms 
demonstrated how they were influenced by decisions taken by other actors such as industry 
leaders and government departments. 
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10.3 Centralisation and formalisation of the decision-making process 
From our review of the literature on organisational flexibility and innovation 
(Volberda, 1999; Damanpour, 1991, among others), we would expect that the more 
formalised and centralised decision-making is, the less flexible an organisation will be. 
However, high degrees of autonomy and laxity in control might constrain the 
implementation of innovation (Nicholson et al, 1990; Damanpour, 1992) and strategies 
(Fredrickson, 1986). 
Formalisation reflects the emphasis on rules, procedures and control when carrying 
out organisational activities. Fon-nalisation is frequently measured by the presence of 
manuals, job description, procedures and mechanisms of control (Webb, 1999; Caruana et 
al, 1998; Damanpour, 1991; Corwin, 1975). 
Centralisation, on the other hand, reflects the extent to which decision-making 
autonomy is dispersed or concentrated. It is generally measured by the degree of 
participation of organisational members in decision-making (Webb, 1999; Damanpour, 
199 1; Aiken and Hage, 197 1). 
To avoid misinterpretation, the interviewees were consistently informed how the 
concepts of centralisation and formalisation of decision-making were to be applied in this 
research. We also gave some examples of those concepts. In the light of these definitions, 
the interviewees were questioned about their perception of the levels of strategic and 
operational centralisation and formalisation in their companies throughout the period 1989- 
1999. For example, was strategic decision-making (i. e., strategic planning, strategic 
meetings) formalised? Were strategic decisions (strategic decision such as investments, 
new strategic initiatives) taken mainly by the CEO or the Board? 
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The interviewees were also asked to assess the question according to degree: low, 
medium-low, medium, medium-high and high. 333 The answers were coded on an ordinal 
scale starting from I (low) to 5 (high). An inter-coder reliability check gave a score of 
87.5%. 334 Figures 10.7 and 10.8 demonstrate both the difference between the companies 
(AGD and Vicentin; Sidus and Andr6maco) and the differences within each company 
between two periods of time, 1989-1999. 
To illustrate the similarities and differences between the firms analysed, a 
hypothesis test - using the Mann-Vv%itney-Wilconxon test - was calculated for each 
company and the results were then compared (the comparison was made between AGD and 
Vicentin, and between Sidus and Andr6maco) (Gopal, 1995). This test is used when there 
is an ordinal scale to answer the questions the interviewees are asked (as in this research in 
which questions were answered according to a scale from 1 to 5). With this test it is 
possible to determine statistically whether there are differences between the responses 
between companies (Gopal, 1995). Tables 10.8 and 10.9 show the comparison between 
AGD and Vicentin, on the one hand, and Sidus and Andr6maco, on the other. These results 
are analysed in the following pages. 
Organisational flexibility and the degree of centralisation and fonnalisation 
A GD and Vicentin 
AGD showed lower levels of centralisation (both strategic and operational) in 1999 
than in 1989. However, strategic and operational formalisation rose over the time analysed 
(see fIgUTe 10.7). 
333 We have asked all our interviewees questions related to the centralisation and formalisation of decision 
making in the firms. Hence, 15 interviews in AGD, Andr6maco and Sidus and 14 interviews in Vicentin (see 
chapter 3 to more details on the interviewing process). 
334 The reliability score was calculated by the independent re-coding of four interviews in each company of a 
set of questions related to the centralisation and fon-nalisation process in the companies under study. The 
recoding was then compared with the original coding and the percentage score calculated using Huberman 
and Miles (1994) formulae: reliability=number of agreements/total number of agreements + disagreements. 
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In AGD, our interviewees stressed that the Board was more detached from 
operative decisions in 1999 than in 1989. "In the 1980s the Board was involved directly in 
day-to-day operations. They were Executive Directors and Managers at the same time. 
Every decision taken at the operational level had to be agreed by one of them. , 335 
The organisational changes the company undertook in the 1990s - such as the 
changes in the structure from a functional to a business unit one - were deliberately made in 
an attempt to change the role of the Board: "The changes in the structure are a strong 
indicator of the Board's attitude regarding the operational side of the business. The 
change from a functional structure to a structure based on the business unit conveyed a 
messagefrom the Board. - 'look the operation is your business, we are going to concentrate 
on the important matters. ' , 336 
However, strategic decisions were still highly centralised in the Board: "The 
Directors were very clever., while they stood apartfrom the operation, they concentrated 
on strategic issues. 71ey still have a strong grip on these issues. , 337 
The control mechanism grew over the 10 years analysed. This is probably why 
managers' perceptions of the degree of formality over the period 1989-1999 also increased 
(see in figure 10.7 the interviewees' mounting perception of AGD's level of formalisation 
in 1999). In the 1980s there was an absence of control systems such as budget and 
planning. This low degree of formalisation was the result of turbulence in the Argentinian 
economy, which prevented the company from working with control systems and planning. 
The 1990s drew attention to the necessity of updating and incorporating more formal 
mechanisms that did not entail, in the opinion of different managers, more bureaucracy. 338 
335 Interview Miguel Acevedo-Finance Manager AGD 
336 Interview Miguel Acevedo-Finance Manager AGD 
337 Interview Marcelo Vit-HR Manager AGD 
338 Interview with Roberto Urquia, Adriana Urquia and Marcelo Vit of AGD 
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"A GD is at a hat6vay point now: we do not have a heftyformalisation process but 
someformalisation is required to succeed. We try to beflaxible and to avoid bureaucracy. 
This is the most important thing to US. , 339 
Vicentin, on the other hand, presents a different picture (as seen in figure 10.7). By 
1999, centralisation levels were still very high. Whereas formalisation at the strategic level 
remained at low levels, the formalisation of operative decisions increased substantially. 
Regarding the high levels of centralisation in the company, the interviewees pointed 
out that: "Decisions in this company are centralised by the Board. They decide everything. 
You will notfind an issue or decision in the company that has not been discussed by the 
Board. P, 340 
Having Directors that also participate in the operation of the company caused 
decisions concerning the operation of Vicentin to become highly centralised: "Remember 
that they [Directors) are working on the operation of the company, so they know about day- 
to-day operations. They like to wander around and ask questions and decide about these 
issues. . 341 
Some managers and employees also complained about the high levels of 
formalisation on a day-to day basis (see in figure 10.7 how this variable rose over time). 
There is also a perception that after the enlargement of the Board early in the 1990s, the 
formal procedures increased: "Decisions concerning investments areformalised. There 
are procedures you have to follow. However, in this company there is always a way of 
bypassing rules otherwise you would get stuck in bureaucratic paperwork. Yhings were 
better when the Board consisted ofonlyfour members ofthefamily. P, 342 
Formalisation at the strategic level showed a slight variation and remained at a low 
level compared to that of AGD. This low level of formalisation at the strategic level may 
339 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director AGD. 
340 Osvaldo Arciniega-Commercial department-Vicentin. 
341 Interview with Sergio Nardelli-Commercial Department, Director of the Board and third generation family 
member. 
342 Interview with Juan Carlos Romero-Personnel Department San Lorenzo. 
311 
be explained by the lack of "strategic Pj(,,,,, j1, g,, 
343, "lack qfstrategic t, 'iý( tltj a 
, 34-1 or 
because of the size of the Board that "[ ... I prevents usfi-om movingfin-ward in strategic 
issites. Thercfibre our meetings (ire shallow and disorganise(I. -345 








































Centrahsation Centralisation Formalisation Formahsation 
Strategic Operative Strategic Operative 
Decision Decision Decision-Making Decision-Making 
Making Making Process Process 
- Interview with Roberto Gazle, Finance Director-Viccritin 
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What stands out between AGD and Vicentin is the differences between the levels of 
operational centralisation and formalisation (both strategic and operational). Our 
significance test found that operational centralisation was statistically different in both 
firms in 1989 and 1999. Formalisation processes (i. e., strategic and operational), however, 
were statistically different between AGD and Vicentin in 1999 (see table 10.8). The 
significance test, nonetheless, did not find significant differences between AGD and 
Vicentin in the variable "strategic centralisation" which, in this case, indicates that strategic 
decision making was highly centralised at the Board level in both companies (se table 10.8 
and figure 10.7). 
Operational formalisation increased in both companies, but in Vicentin the growth 
was much more marked than in AGD (see figure 10.7). AGD's higher levels of 
formalisation were balanced out by structural reforms and a delegation process that allowed 
them to achieve low levels of operational centralisation. Vicentin, on the other hand, did 
not change its structure and, by 1999, decision-making appeared to be even more 
concentrated at the Board level than in 1989. We have also shown the differences between 
the levels of formalisation of the strategic decision-making process. Vicentin's level was 
lower than AGD's over time (see figure 10.7). The rise of this variable in AGD is due to 
the implementation of formal mechanisms at the Board level, such as strategic planning and 
strategic meetings. In Vicentin, however, none of these mechanisms were applied, thus 
resulting in low levels of strategic formalisation over time. 
Finally, both companies present high levels of centralisation at the strategic level. 
However, AGD shows a decreasing tendency while Vicentin an increasing one (see figure 
10.7). These high levels should be understood in the context of these firms: both are family 
firms and the family maintains a strong grip on strategic issues (Poza, 1995). 
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TABLE 10.8: MANN-WHITNEY-WILCONXON TEST FOR THE LEVELS OF CENTRALISATION AND FORMALISATION 
IN AGD AND VICENTiN 3,46 
1989 Question AGD Vicentin Difference P value Reject 
average average (A-V) Ho 
(A) (V) 
Strategic To what degree were strategic 4.83 4.88 0.04 0.80 NO 
Centralisation decisions taken by the CEO or 
the Board? 
Operational To hat degree were operative 3.92 4.63 0.71 0.05 YES 
Centralisation decisions taken by the CEO or 
the Board? 
Strategic Was strategic decision making 2.25 2.38 0.13 0.74 NO 
Formalisation formalised? What was the 
degree of such formalisation? I 
Operational What was the degree of 2.25 2.63 0.38 0.14 
Formalisation fon-nalisation of decision 
making in your area? 
1999 Question ACD Vicentin Difference P value Reject 
average average (A-V) Ho 
(A) (V) 
Strategic To what degree were strategic 4.58 4.90 0.32 0.19 NO 
Centralisation decisions taken by the CEO or 
the Board? 
Operational To what degree were operative 2.67 4.80 2.13 0.00 YES 
Centralisation decisions taken by the CEO or 
the Board? 
Strategic Was strategic decision making 3.67 2.60 1.07 0.01 YES 
Formalisation formalised? What was the 
degree of such formalisation? 
Operational What was the degree of 3.50 4.60 1.10 0.00 YES 
Formalisation formalisation of decision 
making in your area? I 
Sidus and Andr6maco 
Sidus' levels of centralisation (strategic and operational) diminished over the period 
1989-1999. Meanwhile, during the same period, levels of formalisation (both strategic and 
operational) tended to increase (see figure 10.8). 
346 The first and second columns of the tables contain the variables that are being analysed (i. e., strategic 
centralisation) and the question the interviewees were asked in each company respectively. The third and 
fourth columns show the mean of each variable for AGD (A) and Vicentin (V). The fifth column (i. e., 
difference AN) indicates the difference between the averages presented in columns three and four. With that 
difference we obtained a p-value (see the sixth column). Conventionally a cut-off of 0.05 is chosen. If P is 
smaller than the cut-off value (i. e., 0.05) the null hypothesis is rejected and the result of the p value is said to 
be statistically significant. When the result of the p value is above 0.05 it is called not significant. 
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At Sidus, operational centralisation decreased over time due to a re-shaping of the 
Board's activities. While in the 1980s the Board was "everywhere", it now concentrates 
on strategic issues. Operational decentralisation was boosted after the changes in the 
structure that split Sidus up into a group of companies. Since then, the different companies 
have gained autonomy of decision-making. Each company has taken its own decisions and 
the Board has accepted this so long as these decisions have not been strategic ones. 347 
Centralisation of strategic decision-making was still considered to be very high in 
1999: "The Board is reluctant to delegate those aspects that they consider strategic. They 
think about this, they make their own decisions and we acknowledge this after the decisions 
have been taken. [ ... ] Of course they share their decisions with us, but these are their 
decisions, we are not participating in orformulating them. , 348 
Formalisation was very low in the 1980s. At the end of the 1980s and beginning of 
the 1990s the Board foresaw the importance of some sort of formal control mechanism to 
suit the new times. IT systems, budget control, productivity and indicators of performance 
appeared in different areas as a way of "integrating and being more efficient and not with 
the idea ofadding bureaucracy. , 349 
Changes in the outer context made the company standardise some procedures and 
add more formal mechanisms: "With the regulations due to be implemented in 1995, the 
company had to be ready to face fierce competition. Informality and a relaxed attitude 
could have harmed the company. We have seen in the sector that companies with a lax 
attitude lost ground. We had to tighten controls, not because we wanted to do that, but 
because of the looming competition. Otherwise, we would be running a loss-making 
company. , 350 
347 Interview with Marcelo Argilelics-CEO Sidus 
34' Interview with Claudio Battilana-Finance Manager Sidus 
349 Interview Marcelo Burstein- HR Manager Sidus 
350 Interview Claudio Battilana- Finance Manager Sidus 
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One manager outlined his ideas about the process of formalisation in the company: 
"I think everything that happened was a logical process in a family business. We [the 
managers] have more autonomy to decide; they [the Board] had a grip on strategy. 
Because the Board delegated the operation to their managers they also increased the 
control systems, otherwise how could they control whether what we were doing was right 
or wrong? How could they track several decisions that they were no longer taking? In their 
position, I would have strengthened the mechanism ofcontrol too. , 351 
Andr6maco's levels of formalisation and centralisation of decision making, on the 
other hand, are marked by the change of the company's CEO. When Pablo Roviralta took 
over the post in 1997, operative centralisation, which had been very high in 1989, was 
reduced slightly 1999. The levels of both operative and strategic formalisation, however, 
increased notably from 1989-1999 (see figure 10.8). 
Centralisation - both operative and strategic - were considered too high by far, as 
was the interference of the Board in running the operation: "Everything concerning the 
company, from hiring a shopfloor employee to the retirement of another one requires the 
Board's approval, as do any investments made in the department. , 352 
It was not only the number of control mechanisms that had increased the perception 
of high levels of formalisation in Andr6maco as shown in figure 10.8, but also the 
administrative procedures that were set up by the new CEO after years of disorder and 
corruption. These procedures were seen as both a burden and as producing "decision- 
stiffness. P, 353 "For a project to be approved it has to havefourteen signatures! P, 354 
351 Interview Marcelo Criscuolo-Executive Director of BioSidus 352 Interview with Hugo Garcia-Logistic Manager in Andr6maco 
353 Interview with Juan Sackman-Ethical Marketing Products Manager in Andr6maco 
354 Interview with Juan Sackman-Ethical Marketing Products Manager in Andr6maco 
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The most conspicuous differences between Sidus and Andr6niaco, however, are the 
ditTerences at the level of operative centralisation and operative I'Miallsation. In our 
significance test in table 10.9 the questions related to operative ccntralisation and 
fornialisation were found to be statistically difTerent in both Sidus and Andr6nlaco Ior tile 
two periods analysed (i. e., 1989 and 1999). 
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The delegation process Sidus started in the 1990s allowed the company to achieve 
higher levels of operative decentralisation. This process was accompanied by changes in 
the structure from a functional to a divisional one. These changes helped to compensate for 
the rise in the levels of formalisation in the company. 
At Andr6maco, on the other hand, the high levels of operative centralisation in the 
late 1980s had lessened in 1999 but were still very high compared to those in Sidus. 
Formalisation was still very high in 1999, both strategically and operationally. These 
levels of formalisation are the outcome of stringent controls and administrative processes. 
Our significance test, on the other hand, points out that the questions related to 
strategic centralisation and formalisation were nol statistically different in 1989 or 1999 
which demonstrates that the Boards of both Sidus and Andr6maco were centralising 
strategic decisions as well as formalising them (see table 10.9 and figure 10.8). The family, 
again, holds all the power to formulate and decide the strategic orientation of the company. 
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TABLE 10.9: N4ANN-WHITNEY-WILCONXON TEST FOR THE LEVELS OF CENTRALISATION AND FORMALISATION 
IN SIDUS AND ANDR6MACO"s 
1989 Question Sidus Andr6maco Difference P Reject 
average average (S-A) value Ho 
(S) (A) 
Strategic To what degree were 5.00 5.00 0.00 1.00 NO 
Centralisation strategic decisions taken 
by the CEO or the Board? 
Operational To what degree were 3.92 4.63 0.71 0.03 YES 
Centralisation operative decisions taken 
by the CEO or the Board? 
Strategic Was strategic decision 2.67 2.38 0.29 0.51 NO 
Formalisation making formalised? What 
was the degree of such 
formalisation? I II II 
Operational What was the degree of 2.33 3.25 0.92 0.05 YES 
Formalisation formalisation of decision 
making in your area? 
1999 Question Sidus Andr6maco Difference P Reject 
average average (S-A) value 110 
(S) (A) 
Strategic To what degree were 4.83 4.90 0.07 0.66 NO 
Centralisation strategic decisions taken 
by the CEO or the Board? 
Operational To what degree were 2.75 4.10 1.35 0.01 YES 
Centralisation operative decisions taken 
by the CEO or the Board? 
Strategic Was strategic decision 3.42 3.90 0.48 0.27 NO 
Formalisation making formalised? What 
was the degree of such 
formalisation? 
Operational What was the degree of 3.58 4.5 0.92 0.04 YES 
Formalisation fon-nalisation of decision 
making in your area? 
355 The first and second columns of the tables contain the variables that arc being analysed (i. e., strategic 
centralisation) and the question the intervicwccs were asked in each company respectively. The third and 
fourth columns show the mean of each variable for Sidus (S) and Andr6maco (A). The fifth column (i. e., 
difference S-V) indicates the difference between the averages presented in columns three and four. With that 
difference we obtained a p-value (see the sixth column). Conventionally a cut-off of 0.05 is chosen. If P is 
smaller than the cut-off value (i. e., 0.05) the null hypothesis is rejected and the result of the p value is said to 
be statistically significant. When the result of the p value is above 0.05 it is called not significant. 
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Comments on the pattem found in the highly flexible and less flexible firms 
Our discussion of the variation over time of the degrees of formalisation and 
centralisation clearly indicates that they influenced the flexibility each organisation had to 
adapt under circumstances of turbulence and uncertainty. The individual effect of either 
centralisation or formalisation was difficult to establish because in our case studies a 
change in one resulted in a change in the other. So, how have the flexible firms balanced 
out the effects of different levels of centralisation and formalisation? What form did the 
process take in the less flexible firms? 
In the flexible firms we found three common patterns in the way they have 
managed centralisation and formalisation processes: firstly, both AGD and Sidus had 
centralised strategic decision making while the operation of the business was delegated to 
the managers; secondly, both firms underwent deep structural reforms; and finally, the 
formalisation levels had increased over time in both firms. 
Our analysis of the centralisation process at AGD's and Sidus' highlighted the high 
level of strategic centralisation and low level of operative centralisation of decision- 
making. In both firms, the Board delegated the operation of the business to the manag I ers 
while the Board itself concentrated on strategic issues. The reduction of operational 
centralisation increased the autonomy of business managers and with it their fteedom to act 
and be flexible. In so doing, the firms believed that new strategic initiatives would be 
encouraged and implemented quickly. 356 
The interviewees also stressed the importance of the structural changes throughout 
the 1990s (see evidence provided while comparing flexible and less flexible firms in this 
section. See also case studies in chapter 7 and 8). For the Boards of both AGD and Sidus, 
356 Interviews with Adriana Urquia (AGD); Santiago G. Belmonte (Sidus); Marcelo Argaelles (Sidus) 
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changes in the structure of the firms were essential in helping them to delegate and dedicate 
their premium time to strategic issues. 357 
The changes in the structure helped AGD and Sidus mitigate the possible harmful 
consequences of the upsurge of formalisation. The business units at AGD and the new 
companies or divisions at Sidus had fewer layers thus facilitating communication and fast 
responsiveness. AGD's and Sidus' new way of organising is more horizontal and 
organised across functional core processes. Tbus, hierarchy is vanishing and teamwork is 
becoming the cornerstone of these organisations. In AGD they claimed that "We built a 
flatter structure which was an advantage we had over our competitors. Ourflat structure 
gave the managers more autonomy, and we were veryfle-xible and adapted quickly. , 358 As 
Pettigrew (1999) and Pettigrew and Fenton (2000) state, new ways of organising are 
required to improve flexibility, creativity and the companies' capacity to react. 
The levels of formalisation - strategic and operational - found at AGD and Sidus 
went surprisingly against the results found in the literature on organisational innovativeness 
and flexibility that state that low levels of centralisation and formalisation of decision 
making are required to boost innovativeness and creativity in an organisation (Nicholson et 
al, 1990; Damanpour, 1991; Overholt, 1997). 
There are two reasons why we found higher levels of formalisation in AGD and 
Sidus. The first reason is related to the changes in the economy over the period 1989-1999, 
and the second reason is associated with the control mechanisms the Board needed. 
Firstly, the 1980s were very hectic in terms of economic and political turmoil, and 
therefore the companies could not plan or strategise in advance. In 1989 alone, inflation 
reached approximately 5000%. Speculation was more important than production and 
budget control. Hence, informal procedures were needed to enable companies to respond 
quickly to the changes in the environment. 
357 Interview with Adriana Urquia and Roberto Urquia of AGD and Marcelo Argilelles and Santiago 
G. Belmonte of Sidus 358 Interview with Marcelo Vit-HR Manager in AGD 
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The 1990s, on the other hand, brought economic stability but difficult times for the 
companies in terms of competitiveness. More formal procedures and a less relaxed attitude 
were needed. Long-term thinking replaced the attitude of rushing into short-term matters. 
Deregulation opened the country up to foreign investors and helped create competitive and 
efficient companies. More control and planning appeared as a way of being cost-efficient. 
If decision making had become too decentralised and informal, organisational flexibility 
might also have suffered (Volberda, 1999). As an interviewee in Sidus pointed out "the 
1990s meant the search for efficiency, and attaining ifficiency meant having more 
formality. , 359 
Adler's theoretical studies on different types of formalisation (1996 and 1999) 
highlight that whether the impact of formalisation is positive or negative (enabling or 
coercive formalisation) on employees' attitudes is a function of whether that formalisation 
enables them to master their tasks or impedes them from doing so. The evidence provided 
by both AGD and Sidus illustrates that the incorporation of formal mechanisms in the 
1990s was enabling rather than coercive. 
The second explanation is related to the control mechanism the Board needed. 
While delegation of the operational matters started in 1990, the Board also increased 
control mechanisms so as to be able to monitor their managers. In family businesses 
characterised by strong leadership, this might be considered a normal process (Ward, 1987; 
Aronoff and Ward, 1997). 
Regarding the less flexible firms - Vicentin and Andr6maco - the main similarities 
lay in the high levels of centralisation and formalisation of decision making over time. 
Levels of strategic and operative centralisation were higher in Andr6maco and 
Vicentin than in their fellow flexible firms. However, it is important to notice that in 
Andr6maco operative centralisation has tended to decrease while in Vicentin it has 
increased. Ibis different tendency over time may be explained by the internal changes the 
359 Interview with Marcelo Burstein-HR Manager in Sidus 
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new CEO in Andr6maco was trying to implement (in terms of more delegation of the 
operation to the new top team) after the reshuffle of the top management team in 1997. 
The high level of centralisation in both Vicentin and Andr6maco, as Fredrickson 
(1986: 284) highlights, increases the probability that cognitive limitations of the top 
management will constrain the "comprehensiveness of the strategic process". Our 
interviewees have been clear about the lack of fresh ideas 360 or lack of strategic 
orientation 361 in both Vicentin and Andr6maco. 
Formalisation, on the other hand, also presents its differences. Formalisation at the 
operation level was higher in both Andr6maco and Vicentin than in the highly flexible 
companies and was increasing over time. In Vicentin, one interviewee indicated: "71e 
level of bureaucracy in this company stij7es our decision-making process. We suppressed 
any incentive our managers might have had to innovate. , 
362 
Conversely, the formalisation of the strategic decision-making process varied in 
both companies: Vicentin showed low levels of formalisation (even lower than AGD) and 
Andr6maco saw this level soar over the period 1989-1999. The differences between the 
companies stem from the ways strategy is formulated and implemented. Andr6maco's high 
level of strategic formalisation was the outcome of the implementation of strategic planning 
and control. Vicentin's low level, on the other hand, was the result of informality and lack 
of strategic planning. 
The results of the findings about the determinant centralisation and formalisation in 
decision-making are important for those that have emphasised the relationship between 
structure and size of the organisation (Child, 1984). Child (1984) highlights the concern of 
the impact of large organisation on organisational structure. The larger an organisation is, 
states Child, the more likely it is that a centralised approach to control will generate top 
management overload. One of the most difficult transition for a young firm is, according to 
360 Interview with Miximo Paduin-Commercial department and fourth generation family mcmbcr-Viccntin 
361 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco 
362 Interview with Maximo Paduin-Commercial department and fourth generation family membcr-Vicentin 
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Child, is when the CEO, who may be the founder, has to hand over some of the reins to 
subordinates. Pugh and his associates (1975) also consider large size to influence 
structural complexity that sets up pressures for delegation. 
The findings in the flexible and less flexible firms, however, showed a different 
pattern where the large flexible firms were able to mitigate the harmful consequences of an 
upsurge of formalisation and the less flexible firms (that were smaller in size) could not. 
We have seen then how the flexible finns balanced out the effects of different levels 
of centralisation and formalisation. The less flexible firms were not able to balance the 
levels of centralisation and formalisation needed over different periods of time. The 
overlaying of more centralisation and formalisation in Andr6maco and Vicentin in the 
1990S 363 increased the negative influence on organisational flexibility. We will return to 
the conflicting advantages of high and low levels of formality and centralisation later in 
chapter 11. 
363 With the exception of strategic formalisation in Vicentin (see figure 10-7) 
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10.4 Low macroculture embeddedness 
Another factor identified by this study as a determinant of organisational flexibility 
is the extent to which the companies analysed are embedded in their sectoral macroculture. 
This factor reflects the institutional pressures exerted upon the organisation and may affect 
the speed with which it can adopt new strategies (Abrahamson and Fornbrun, 1994; Webb 
and Pettigrew, 1999; Dacin et al, 1999,2002). 
From our inductive analysis, two factors emerged as indicating the degree to which 
the companies under analysis were embedded in their macroculture: the perceived 
similarity and dissimilarity to other firms in the industry and the degree of connectedness to 
other firms in the industry. 
Institutional theory describes how these factors influence the degree of 
embeddedness within the industry macroculture. The higher the perceived similarity to 
others in the industry, the more likely it is that firms will accept the prevailing norms and 
become more institutionalised in that industry (Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996). On the 
other hand, the degree of connectedness refers to interpersonal contacts between executives 
in the same industry (Gnyawali and Ravindranath, 2001; Dacin el al, 1999; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Frequent contacts promote the awareness of the practices and values of an 
industry (Webb and Pettigrew, 1999). 
To understand the perceived similarity/dissimilarity to their macroculture, 
interviewees were asked about which company or companies were used by them for 
benchmarking. Similarly, to understand the levels of connectedness, the interviewees were 
asked whether their company supported any professional association in the industry and, if 
so, which professional association they supported. Questions were asked regarding two 
specific years: 1989 and 1999. 
325 
Answers for each question were displayed in a table and different percentage scores 
calculated as shown in tables 10.10 to 10.17. An inter-coder reliability check gave a 
reliability score between 85 and 90%. 
364 
AGD and Vicentin 
The interviewees at AGD and Vicentin were consistent in their description of the 
extent to which these two factors were present in their companies. Tables 10.10 to 10.13 
demonstrate the different perceptions in both firms regarding the level of 
similarity/dissimilarity and connectedness with the industry macroculture. While the level 
of embeddcdness of AGD in the macroculture of the edible oil industry declined over the 
period 1989-1999 (i. e., demonstrated through benchmarking outside the industry as 
illustrated in table 10.10, and low level of contact in professional associations as shown in 
table 10.12), Vicentin's embeddedness was more manifest as illustrated by the evolution of 
its benchmark within the edible oil industry (table 10.11) and its high level contact with the 
professional associations (table 10.13). 
At the end of the 1980s, AGD's benchmark was mainly against indigenous 
businesses that participated in the edible oil industry and also against some MNCs (see 
table 10.10). However, this benchmark started to change by the time the company 
364 The question regarding the perceived similarity/dissimilarity was an open question, that means that the 
interviewees were free to answer with examples of companies that they believed they were using for 
benchmarking. The answers were coded into three categories of benchmarking for each company as shown in 
tables 10.10,10.11,10.14 and 10.15. and percentages calculated accordingly. In the question regarding the 
level of connectedness, only two responses were allowed: yes or no (tables 10.12,10.13,10.16 and 10.17). 
The reliability score was calculated by the independent re-coding of six interview transcripts in each company 
for the two questions the interviewecs were asked. The re-coding was then compared to the original coding 
and a percentage score calculated according to Huberman and Miles (1994) formulae: rcliability--numbcr of 
agreements/total number of agreements + disagreements. 
In the analysis of the macroculture embeddedness of the firms we did not use any significance test. The 
statistical test used in the foregoing analysis (i. e., heterogeneity of the dominant coalition, degree of 
centralisation and formalisation of decision making) is based on the assumption that the response was 
measured at least using an ordinal scale (i. e., from I to 5), whereas in the questions concerning the degree of 
macroculture embeddedness of the firms the scale used was categorical (i. e., interviewees were given a set of 
possible answers or categorics). Thus it is not possible to use a significance test in this analysis (Everitt, 
1998). 
326 
launched its first strategic initiative (1989-1990). Molinos, a food and edible oil company, 
was then used as benchmark. 
The process of benchmarking before launching the first strategic initiative illustrates 
the way the company's benchmark has changed over time: "We have our own strategies. 
We look inside and outside the country to see what we can to do to differentiate ourselves 
from the rest, not to see how we can copy them. " 365 This was the thinking behind the way 
the brands were introduced by AGD. First of all Adriin Urquia Jr. went abroad to see what 
other companies were doing. The Board also analysed the competitors within the internal 
market, although none of the companies in direct competition with AGD were the focus of 
the benchmarking: "The first comparison we made was with big companies such as 
Molinos. 366 It would have been nonsense to compare ourselves with other direct 
competitors. We would have remained a medium sized company. , 367 
The diversification process AGD underwent over the period 1989-1999 caused the 
company's benchmark to change over time. Today's benchmarks are with Bestfood, an 
American food company, and Arcor, a regional food company (based in Argentina) 368 (see 
table 10.10). "Now, as a company, we do not have only edible oil products but other 
products such as mayonnaise and soya milk So we no longer consider edible oil 
companies to be our idealparallel, butfood companies. , 369 
Vicentin, on the other hand, has seen a different pattern regarding its benchmark. In 
the 1970s and 1980s managers claim that the company liked to benchmark against 
companies such as Cargill and Dreyfus - both of them MNC companies. The company 
was a growing one that had "aspirations of becoming a leader. , 370 However, the critical 
1990s caused the company's choice of benchmark to shift dramatically. The strategy of the 
company evidently favoured concentration on crushing and cotton ginning as a niche 
365 Interview with Marcelo Vit-HR Manager 
366 Molinos is an Argentinian edible oil and food company. 
367 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director 
368 Interview with Gonzalo Dominguez-Marketing Manager 
369 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director 
370 Interview with Ra6l Gonzalez Arceluz-Corporate lawyer in Vicentin 
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market, thus the benchmark leaned towards crusher companies. The clarification of the 
strategy in 1997 fixed the benchmark on nationally-owned crushing companies. Since 
then, the company's perceived similarity within the edible oil industry has grown even 
more (see table 10.11). 
"We'd like to compare ourselves with other nationally-owned businesses. It is 
impossible to benchmark with multinational companies. They have resources that we do 
not have, they have worldwide experience that we do not have. Multinationals have 
different objectives in mind. Copying them would have been disastrousfor us. , 371 
TA13LE 10.10: LEVEL OF SIMILARITY/DISSIMMARITY WITHIN THE INDUSTRY: BENCIIMARKING AT AGD 
Percentage 1989 1999 
With whom is the company 
benchmarking? 
Benchmarking with indigenous 61% 7% 
edible oil companies 
Benchmarking with 44% 27% 
multinational edible oil 
Benchm arking with food- 0% I 67% 
processing companies 
TA13LE 10.11: LEVEL OF SIMILARITY/DISSIMILARITY WITHIN THE INDUSTRY: BENCHMARKING AT VICENTtN 
Percentage 1989 1999 
With whom is the company 
benchmarking? 
Benchmarking with indigenous 73% 87% 
edible oil companies 
Benchmarking with 33% 33% 
multinational edible oil 
companies 
Benchmarking with food- 7% 0% 
processing companies 
Compared with Vicentin, AGD also demonstrates a lower level of connectedness in 
the industry over time. This can be seen in AGD's declining participation in the 
professional association as seen in table 10.12. The company maintains passive 
371 Ruben Dario Vicentin-Vice President 
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participation in CIARA. Table 10.12 shows how the support of professional associations 
was trimmed down from 80% in 1989 to 47% in 1999. 
Vicentin, on the other hand, has seen its level of connectedness increase over the 
period 1989-1999 (see table 10.13). The perceived similarity of the company with its 
industry counterparts greW after its strategic orientation changed. 
The high level of connectedness in Vicentin made industry associations the most 
important source of information for the managers of the company. Ibis frequent 
interaction with the professional bodies of the industry, as Webb and Pettigrew (1999) 
point out, reinforces the values and norms of the sector in the firm. The interviews with 
some managers of the company are revealing in this sense: "I personally participate in 
CIARA [professional association]. Meeting other colleagues in the industry helped me to 
acquire infonnation about what the trends are and what they are doing and whether what 
we are doingfollows thatpath or not. , 372 
TABLE 10.12: DEGREE OF CONNECTEDNESS IN THE INDUSTRY: AGD'S SUPPORT FOR PARTICIPATION IN 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
Percentage 1989 1999 
Support for Participation In 
Professional Associations 
YES. Participation in professional 80% 47% 
associations is actively supported 
by the company 
NO. Participation in professional 20% 53% 
associations is not actively 
supported by the company 
TABLE 10.13: DEGREE OF CONNECTEDNESS IN THE INDUSTRY: VICENTN'S SUPPORT FOR PARTICIPATION IN 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
Percentage 1989 1999 
Support for Participation In 
Professional Associations 
YES. Participation in professional 64% 79% 
associations is actively supported 
by the company 
NO. Participation in professional 36% 21% 
associations is not actively 
supported by the company 
372 Interview with Sergio Nardelli-Commercial Department, Director of the Board and third generation family 
member 
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Sidus and Andr6maco 
Tables 10.14 to 10.17 and our interview data demonstrate that the level of 
embeddedness of Sidus in the macroculture of the pharmaceutical industry declined over 
the period 1989-1999 (see table 10.14 and 10.16). In contrast to Sidus, Andr6maco was 
deeply embedded in the macroculture of the industry (see tables 10.15 and 10.17). 
In contrast to the benchmarks that Sidus used in the 1980s, which were with 
indigenous companies such as Roemmers and Bago, its current benchmark lies outside the 
Argentinian market (see table 10.14). In 1999 Sidus targeted health companies in the 
biotechnological market - such as Genetech and Amgen (both American companies) - as 
the focus of its benchmarking activities. 
The evolution of the benchmark is related to the image of the company its members 
had. Early in the 1980s the company saw itself as a small national company and 
benchmarked accordingly. 373 However, by the time the biotechnology initiative and the 
strategic alliance with Merck (1988) took off, the paradigm had changed: 
"In the early 1980s we saw ourselves as part of the national market, we were a tiny 
company in the industry. We compared ourselves to other competitors in the market. 
Today, our models are outside the Argentinian market. We have the most important 
biotechnological company in the region, so why should we be compared with a national 
laboratory? We look at companies such as Genetech or, 4mgen. , 374 
Andr6maco, on the other hand, saw important changes in its benchmark over time. 
Most respondents stated that from the 1980s to 1996 the benchmarking was against 
nationally owned companies (see table 10.15). The appointment of a new CEO in 1997 
caused the benchmark to start to change. Today's benchmarking is mainly against national 
companies. However, multinational laboratories running their business in Argentina have 
also been incorporated into the company's benchmark (see table 10.15). 
373 Interview with Marcelo ArgQellcs-CEO Sidus 
374 Interview with Marcelo ArgOelles-CE0 Sidus 
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"In the 1980s and 1990s as well, we tried to copy the behaviour of other 
laboratories, with the risk of incurring the loss of the company's vision and the potential it 
could have. In the economic conditions of the 1980s, I can understand this. Copying what 
other players in the sector were doing reduced the risk. That was our benchmark 
before. , 375 
From 1997 onwards the company broadened its benchmark. National and MNC 
companies were then the subjects of comparison: "We wanted our managers to have a 
broad picture of the sector. We camefrom a company in which the benchmark was simple: 
we had to follow the leader. Now, if you ask the different managers, they have more 
companies they want to imitate orfollow. However, we still have to work on that. We are 
still imbued with the old culture ofbenchmarking. , 376 
TABLE 10.14: LEVEL OF SIMILARITY/DISSMIILARITY WITHIN THE INDUSTRY: BENCHMARKING AT SIDUS ' 
1989 1999 
Percentage 
With whom is the company 
benchmarking? 
Benchmarking with indigenous 87% 9% 
pharmaceutical companies 
Benchmarking with 20% 39% 
multinational pharmaceutical 
Benchmarking with 7% 52% 
biotechnology or health 
companies 
TABLE 10.15: LEVEL OF simiLARrry/DissimiLARiTY WITHIN THE INDUSTRY: BENCHMARKING AT ANDR6MACO 
Percentage 1989 1999 
With whom is the company 
benchmarking? 
Benchmarking with indigenous 91% 63% 
pharmaceutical companies 
Benchmarking with 18% 37% 
multinational pharmaceutical 
companies 
Benchmarking with 0% 9% 
biotechnology or health 
companies 
375 Interview with Hector Alquati-OTC Manager Andr6maco 
376 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (second interview, 2000) 
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Regarding the level of connectedness, Sidus saw changes in its level early in the 
1980s. Since breaking away from the professional association of the industry (CILFA) in 
1988, the level of connectedness has diminished substantially, as seen in table 10.16. Since 
then, its support for professional bodies has continued to fall until it reached the low levels 
of 1999. 
After breaking from CILFA, Sidus joined a low profile professional body that 
operated among small and medium size laboratories - COOPERALA. At Sidus they 
stated: "We just do not care about what they are doing [competitors] in professional 
associations. We are part of Cooperala because we have to be, but it is only a 
fonnality. jJ77 
Andr6maco, on the other hand, saw an increasing level of connectedness between 
1989 and 1999 (see table 10.17). After re-defining the strategy in 1997, the new CEO 
encouraged participation in the different activities prepared by the professional association 
(COOPERALA) or other chambers in the different areas. 
"Each manager participates in meetings in different chambers. Igo to CAPEMUEI 
-Chamber ofFree Sale Producers. I try to go on a monthly basis to the meetings. 77ds is a 
way ofteeping in touch with sectoral trends and changes , 378 
TABLE 10.16: DEGREE OF CONNECTEDNESS IN THE INDUSTRY: SIDUS'UPPORT FOR PARTICIPATION IN 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
Percentage 1989 1999 
Support for Participation In 
Professional Associations 
YES. Participation in professional 40% 27% 
associations is actively supported 
by the company 
NO. Participation in professional 60% 73% 
associations is not actively 
supported by the company 
377 Interview with Marcelo Burstein-HR Manager of Sidus 378 Interview with Hector Alquati-OTC Marketing Product Manager in Andr6maco 
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TABLE 10.17: DEGREE OF CONNECTEDNESS IN THE INDUSTRY: ANDR6MACO'S SUPPORT FOR PARTICIPATION IN 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
Percentage 1989 1999 
Support for Participation in 
Professional Associations 
YES. Participation in professional 53% 73% 
associations is actively supported 
by the company 
NO. Participation in professional 47% 27% 
associations is not actively 
supported by the company 
The impact of the company's embeddedness on the speed with which it can adopt strategies 
One of the consequences of the level of macroculture embeddedness of the firms 
analysed in this study is their freedom to make strategic moves and become either early 
adopters of strategies or laggards. Institutional theory states that over time firms tend to 
adopt a particular strategy that will become increasingly institutionalised within the 
framework of the industry (Abrahamson and Fornbrun, 1994). To be early movers or first . 
adopters of strategies, firms must try to avoid the pressures exerted by the environment 
(Dacin et al, 1999,2002; Oliver 1991,1992). Therefore, those firms which are less 
embedded in their macroculture may succeed in their attempt to adopt new strategies more 
rapidly (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Shanna, 2000). 
Perceived turmoil encourages companies to try explorative activities such as 
diversifying, broadening the boundaries of the sector, making alliances, and investing more 
in R&D, among others. Lewin et al's coevolutionary approach (1999) states that in periods 
of disorder, companies are keener to intensify exploratory activities. 
What were the strategic responses of the companies under study? How did 
macroculture embeddedness influence this response? By tracking the strategic initiatives 
of the four companies - as shown in figures 10.9 and 10.10 we were able to visualise the 
early adoption of strategies and follower behaviour. 379 
379 The most important strategic initiatives between 1989 and 1999 were tracked. The strategic initiatives of 
the most flexible firms are shown in black shading and the ones corresponding to the less flexible firm are 
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HoURE 10.9: EARLYADOPFION OF STRATWIFS INA GD AN D VICENIN 380 
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The existent gap - if there was any - between the launch in one company and the other is highlighted with at) 
arrow. 
; S, () This figure was created using information from the interviews carried Out at AGI) and Viccntin, and 
brochures and archival material from the companies. 
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Figures 10.9 and 10.10 shows the inain dillerence between Inglily flexible and less 
flexible fimis in ternis of their adoption of strategies. AGD, flor example was ail early 
adopter of strategies compared to Vicentin. AGD disrupted the edible oil industry by 
integrating all its activities, from farming to selling products in supermarkets. None of' its 
competitors followed this strategy, a fact which demonstrates that AGI) operates outside 
institutional nornis. In many cases - such as investments in transport, fanning and storing 
capacity - AGD was a first mover in the edible oil industry and its competitors were 
followers. 392 
By contrast, Vicentin was only an early adopter in ternis of branding strategy. 
I lo)A, e%, cr, this strategy failed and needed to be re-launchcd In 1997, nine years after AG 1) 
181 This figure was created Using information from the interviews carried out at Sidus and Andr6nlaco, and 
brochures and archival material from the company. 
182 CIARA, 19ft Gano and Gutman, 1993 and company data. 
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had released its own successful brands. The figure also shows that AGD was keener to 
explore different strategies that Vicentin did not eventually want to adopt. 
The differences between Sidus and Andr6maco are also noticeable (see figure 
10.10). Of eight strategic initiatives undertaken by Sidus, only two were adopted by 
Andr6maco. Sidus' weak ties with its macroculture can be seen in the company's 
investments in biotechnology and the integration of its businesses far beyond the 
wholesaler channel by acquiring a pharmaceutical retail chain. None of the company's 
competitors used similar strategies. Sidus was also a first mover in strategies that were 
later followed by its competitors, such as the acquisition of pharmaceutical companies 
(Manzone, 2000). 
Remarks on the differences between highly flexible finns and less flexible finns 
From the previous analysis the differences between highly flexible and less flexible 
firms are self-evident: AGD and Sidus - both highly flexible companies - demonstrate a 
degree of "disembeddedness", that is, a low degree of embeddedness (Dacin et al, 
1999: 341). On the contrary, the less flexible firms illustrate a higher level of 
embeddedness in the industry macroculture. 
This notion of low embeddedness, or 'disembeddedness, ' relies on intentional 
action by AGD and Sidus to step back from institutional frameworks of cognition, culture 
and the social structure of inter-actor relations. This was indicated by the perceived high 
levels of dissimilarity and low levels of connectedness in both companies. Vicentin and 
Andr6maco, on the other hand, demonstrated high levels of perceived similarity and 
connectedness over time (see tables 10.10 to 10.17). The strategic content and speed, and 
cognitive activities of the firms are revealing of the differences between flexible and less 
flexible firms in terms of their level of embeddedness. 
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These comments and our previous discussion indicate that because of their high 
level of embeddedness in the industry macroculture, Andr6maco and Vicentin faced 
considerable institutional pressure to conform. This in turn had a negative effect upon the 
strategic content and speed of the companies. In the case of AGD and Sidus, the fact that 
they increasingly distanced themselves from other Argentinian competitors meant that 
institutional pressures to conform to the norms of the edible oil and pharmaceutical 
industries were much weaker. As a result, the industry macroculture had little effect upon 
the firms' selection of their strategies. 
The flexible companies in this study adapted by exploring new competitive 
advantages but moving rapidly from one advantage to another, from one series of short- 
lived actions to another, thereby disrupting the market place (Lewin et al, 1999; Lewin and 
Volberda, 1999; March, 1995). The most flexible companies in this study showed what 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) and Anderson and Tushman (1990) called competence- 
destroying discontinuities instead of competenc e-enhancing discontinuities. Evidence was 
offered to confirm that the most flexible firms disrupted their industry with new 
competence-disrupting discontinuities (i. e., AGD through strengthening its logistic chain 
and through launching its branding strategy; Sidus through its biotechnological initiative 
and through its retail strategy). 
In figures 10.9 and 10.10 it is possible to observe that there is a short lag between 
the different strategic initiatives launched by the firms. The short lag between initiatives 
was a way of achieving competitive advantage over other companies in the industry. In 
periods of environmental turmoil in which advantages are eroded rapidly this might be 
considered an offensive rather than a defensive strategy (D'Aveni, 1994). 
Andr6maco and Vicentin, on the other hand, did not show any of the patterns 
evidenced by AGD and Sidus. On the contrary, their strategic initiatives were isomorphic 
with the predominant strategies in the sector (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The 
institutional pressures these firms had to conform to and the high level of similarity to other 
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companies in their sector meant that it was very difficult for them to achieve non- 
isomorphic behaviour such as that found in AGD and Sidus. 
As in the findings in the literature on organisational embeddedness, we have also 
identified other major source of pressure on institutionalised norms from cognitive 
practices that may have influenced the strategic and organisational responses of the flexible 
and less flexible firms (Oliver, 1992; Dacin et al, 2002). 
The study of the cognitive mechanisms of the organisation is concerned with the 
way the frameworks of meaning affect individual and corporate actors as they interpret and 
make sense of their world (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). With a more heterogeneous 
management team, the flexible firms had the possibility of a broader cognitive range that 
helped them to act fast and take risks (i. e., such as the strategic initiatives undertaken by the 
flexible firms). The less flexible firms, however, with a more compacted and homogeneous 
top team with background experiences mainly in the edible oil and pharmaceutical 
industries, were constrained by institutional pressures and thus their strategies were 
isomorphic with the rest of the industry. 
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10.5 Anticipating changes in the industry: Environmental scanning 
In introducing their model of organisations as interpretative systems, Daft and 
Weick (1984) assert that the capacity to interpret is a key element that distinguishes human 
organisation from others. To achieve a deep interpretative capability, scanning the 
environment is a fundamental activity for the organisation. Scanning, then, can be 
considered both the starting point of the interpretation process in an organisation (Daft and 
Weick, 1984: 286) and the starting point of the decision-making process (Mintzberg el al, 
1976). 
So why is it important for a flexible company to be aware of the mechanism of 
scanning the environment? In an attempt to provide an insight into the relationship between 
the strategic sensemaking process (i. e., scanning, interpretation and action) and 
organisational performance in 156 hospitals, Thomas et al (1993) argue that when 
managers implement a mechanism to increase information use by scanning the 
environment, they increase the likelihood of interpreting issues quickly and will sense the 
controllability of the process. Companies are thus able to respond more swiftly to any 
environmental threat or opportunity (Smith et al, 1991). The idea of fast response capacity 
is reinforced by Pettigrew and Whipp's (1991) detailed study on the ability of UK firms to 
manage strategic change. They emphasise that companies that can absorb signals and, 
mobilise resources from the environment will be more proactive and able to deliver 
successful changes. 
From the inductive analysis, two indicators emerged as factors illustrating the 
importance of environmental scanning in the companies analysed. Under conditions of 
intense competition in the period 1989-1999, firms sought new sources of information and 
set up both formal and informal mechanisms for scanning the environment. 
The literature on environmental scanning describes the extent to which the two 
indicators found may help companies to interpret and anticipate market changes. Daft et 
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al's (1988) empirical research on the scanning behaviour of fifty CEOs emphasises the 
importance of using different sources of information to prevent managers from forming 
their impressions on the basis of narrow environment data. They state the importance of 
scanning both the task or operational environment (i. e., customers, suppliers, competitors 
and technology) and the general environment (i. e., economy, politics, social and cultural 
matters and regulations) (see also Hambrick, 1981; Choo, 1999; Ebrahimi, 2000; Sawyeff 
et al, 2000; Beal, 2000). 
Pettigrew and Whipp (1991), on the other hand, recognise that environmental 
scanning happens across the organisation. They also argue that it is highly dangerous to 
assume that a single specialist can by himself achieve an adequate interpretation of the 
outer context. Therefore, formal structures for scanning the environment are not only not 
enough, but they are also dangerous as they can lead the organisation to inadequate 
interpretations. Informal ways of scanning are also necessary. 
I The following table summarises how the different indicators were operationalised 
through questions and categories of analysis. The use of visual mappings as applied by 
Webb (1999) and Webb and Pettigrew (1999) helped to simplify and visualise the results of 
the analysis (see figures 10.11 to 10.14). 
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Questions asked Categories/Coding built 
New sources of -To what extent did you use -Answers were classified according whether 
information sources of information to they referred to the scanning of the task or 
understand issues related to general environment. Four answers were 
customers, competitors, allowed: 'extensively', 'not at all', 'to a 
suppliers and technology? certain extent' and 'no data'. Responses 
were shaded in figures 10.11 and 10.13 
-To what extent did you use according to whether they related to a 
sources of infori-nation to 'Extensively' answer (black shading), 'to a 
understand issues related to the certain extent' answer (grey shading), 'Not 
national economy, politics, at all' (no shading) 'No data' (n/d). 
socio-cultural matters and -The appropriate shading is shown in the 
regulations? figure against the appropriate category of 
task environmental scanning (i. e., 
customers, competitors, suppliers and 
technological) or general environment (i. e., 
national economy, politics, socio-cultural 
matters and regulations). Questions were 
asked for both 1989 and 1999. 
Setting up offormal -Is there in the company any - Two answers were allowed: yes or no. If 
and informal area whose main responsibility yes, the interviewee was told to point out 
structuresfor scanning is gathering and analysing which area of the company he/she was 
economic and sectoral data? referring to. 
-Did you have formal and/or -Answers were classified according to 
informal talks, meetings or whether the interviewee considered the 
activities to discuss issues activity to be a formal or an informal one. 
related to the customer, The interviewee was asked to list the 
competitors, suppliers and meetings, activities and topics discussed. 
technological matters? Responses were coded in figures 10.12 and 
10.14 according to whether they were 
informal activities (T and grey shading), 
-Did you have formal or/and formal activities (7) or neither of these 
informal talks, meetings or (this was indicated with a blank space). 
activities to discuss issues The appropriate letter is shown in the figure 
related to the national economy, against the appropriate category of task 
politics, regulations and socio- environmental scanning (i. e., customers, 
cultural matters? competitors, suppliers and technological) or 
general environment (national economy, 
politics, socio-cultural matters and 
regulations). Questions were asked for both 
1989 and 1999. 
_ --I 
383 An inter-coder reliability check gave a reliability score of between 79.7% and 84% for the questions related 
to the environmental scanning behaviour of the companies under analysis. The reliability score was 
calculated using eight interview transcripts. The re-coding was then compared to the original coding and 
percentage score calculated using Huberman and Miles (1994) formulae: reliability=number of 
agreements/total number of agreements + disagreements. 
341 
Environmental scanning and organisational flexibility 
AGD and Vicentin 
AGD and Vicentin sought new sources of infonnation throughout the 1990s. AGD, 
however, procured information from different sources, unlike Vicentin in which the 
scanning behaviour was more erratic as evidenced by the opinion of the interviewees and 
illustrated in figure 10.11. 
As figure 10.11 illustrates, our interviewees in AGD laid considerable importance 
on scanning the environment. However, figure 10.11 shows a variation over time: while in 
the 1980s the company stressed the scanning of the general environment, in the 1990s the 
greatest effort was made in scanning the task envirom-nent (see in figure 10.11 the black 
shading representing the extensive scanning activity in the task environment in the 1990s). 
In the 1980s AGD stressed the scanning of the general environment - mainly 
macroeconomic issues - and in the task environment only gathered data from the crushing 
industry and "somehow" found information about the edible oil industry. During the 
course of the 1990s this situation changed: "We are not only aware of what is happening in 
the edible oil industry, but also in thefood industry, and we have stronger relationships 
with customers and suppliers. They are also key elements in sensing the environment. " 384 
The idea of "being open to what is happening outside the organisation 385 is an 
integral part of the Board's day-to-day work: "thinking strategically means that you have 
to be aware of what is going on not only in your company, but also in the rest of the 
industry and the country. , 386 AdriAn Urquia Jr. stated that the idea of scrutinising the 
outer-context was not new, but had always been in the spirit of the Board: "We learntfrom 
the founder always to be ready to listen, to be aware of what others were doing. Ae 
difference now is that with the new contextual reality, this is more organised and our 
384 Interview with Adriana Urquia-a Director of AGD 
385 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director 
396 Interview Adrian Urquia-Director-CEO 
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agenda isfull of activities to enable us to look into this reality. this openness allowed 
us to take advantage ofmarket opportunities as in the case ofour branding strategy. , 387 
Vicentin presented a different scanning behaviour compared to that of AGD. Our 
interviewees described the extent to which their scanning behaviour had changed over time. 
Figure 10.11 demonstrates that in the 1980s the company was mainly scanning the general 
environment. The task environment was not tackled as a priority. Only in the 1990s, as 
figure 10.11 illustrates, was there more stress on scanning the task environment albeit to in 
a lesser extent than AGD (see in figure 10.11 variation in shadings from different periods). 
Some managers blamed the problems they experienced during the 1990s on the company's 
failure to pay attention to the outer context: 
"In the 1980s and 1990s we could not anticipate the changes in the market for 
edible oils, the importance ofscaling up our crushing capacity and the consequences of the 
economy opening up inArgentina. I would not say weJailed, but we did not perform as 
well as other companies did. , 388 
397 Interview Adrian Urquia-Director-CEO 





























Differences between both AGD and Vicentin also arose in terms of the formal and 
informal mechanisms the companies had for scanning the environment. Our interview data 
and figure 10.12 highlight the differences between the firms. Firstly, AGD used both more 
formal and informal mechanisms than Vicentin. Secondly, from 1989 to 1999 AGD had 
increased its informal mechanisms compared with Vicentin, as can be seen in figure 10.12 
(see differences in shading between AGD and Vicentin). 
The emergence of formal and informal mechanisms of scanning in AGD reveal the 
ways in which the company supported the scanning behaviour it wanted from its managers 
and employees. AGD set up an Economic Studies Unit as a means of channelling 
macroeconomic and sectoral information to the Board and managers. 
"Setting up this unit gave us a means of channelling the information from the 
environment, and secondly, it formed part of an organisational effort to emphasise the 
importance of being open to the outside world. Ofcourse this is a process that takes years. 
Setting up this unit was the outcome ofa whole philosophy. , 389 
The importance of scanning the environment in AGD was reinforced by informal 
mechanisms at different levels of the organisation (see figure 10.12). The Board supported 
different levels of contacts with colleagues from other companies in different industries, 
trips abroad to visit other companies and institutions, and internal meetings between 
different levels of employees and experts in different fields. 
Vicentin did not have a formal structure for scanning and while informal 
mechanisms were developed over the period 1989-1999 they were still not enough for 
some managers: "They've got everything [Directors], we have nothing. Ifyou do not have 
information, you make the wrong decisions. This is an issue here. The management do not 
bother to share the information they have to help us in our work I do not think they do this 
on purpose, I think it is more to do with the culture of the organisation: 'we family 
Interview with Carlos Haeberle-Economic Studies Manager in AGD 
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members make decisions, so you do not need to bother about it. ,, 390 Middle managers and 
employees therefore keep themselves informed through publications issued by the 
professional associations and industry reports the company buys for specific reasons, such 
as those related to the branding market. Visits to suppliers in the country and abroad are 
some of the informal mechanisms used in Vicentin. 
390 Intcrview with Osvaldo Arciniega-Commercial dcpartment 
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Sidus and Andr6maco 
Our interviewees in Sidus and Andromaco, as shown in figure 10.13, were 
consistent in their descriptions of the extent to which the scanning behaviour of the firms 
has changed over time. The opening up of the industry to competition in the early 1990s 
boosted scanning activities in Sidus and, to a lesser extent, in Andr6maco. While both 
companies saw changes in their scanning behaviour and structures, the main differences 
need to be stated. 
In the 1980s the most important scanning activity in Sidus sought to understand the 
national economy and competitors' moves in the pharmaceutical industry. However, by the 
1990s new scanning interests in customers, suppliers and competitors emerged, as the 
increase of the black shading in figure 10.13 shows. 
The transformation of the company from a simple national laboratory in the 1980s 
to a major health company in the 1990s was considered as having an impact on the 
assessment of the environment: "Over this period [from the 1980s to the 1990s] you could 
imagine that we went through stages in which more information was neededfrom different 
sectors like biotechnology and new relationships were built. Gathering this information 
was vitalfor seizing opportunities in the market. , 391 
Andr6maco, on the other hand, showed a different pattern of scanning behaviour. 
Based on our interviews in the company, figure 10.13 displays the low level of scanning 
activity in the 1980s and the rise in this activity in the 1990s albeit to a lesser extent than in 
Sidus (see evolution of black shading in figure 10.13). 
The low level of scanning activity in the 1980s was the result of the concentration 
392 
of decision-making power in the hands of the CEO, as many interviewees suggested . 
The 1990s required a different approach and this was brought into the company by the new 
CEO, Pablo Roviralta. The company's focus on its customers rather than the wholesaler 
391 Interview with Marcelo Argilelles-President and CEO of Sidus 
392 Interviews with Pablo Roviralta, Pedro Carvallo and Alejandro Roviralta 
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chain (one of the main changes after 1997) made Andr6maco start to scan more and look at 
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Both Sidus and Andr6maco also diverge regarding the way formal and informal 
mechanisms of scanning were used. Figure 10.14 demonstrates clearly the differences 
between the firms in that Sidus not only used more mechanism of scanning (i. e., formal and 
informal) but also increased the number of informal mechanisms over time (see in figure 
10.14 where the grey shading represents the areas where informal mechanisms are being 
used). 
Informal and formal structures of scanning became much more widely used in Sidus 
over the period analysed, as shown in figure 10.14. Three areas were created: legal and 
regulatory analysis; sectoral; and macroeconomic analysis to keep the Board and managers 
abreast of the latest changes in the sector and in national economy. The information 
produced by the legal and regulatory area was widely disseminated throughout the 
company to keep employees informed of recent changes in legal and regulatory systems. 
Informal mechanisms supported the scanning structure of the company. Internal 
workshops were a widespread practice at different levels of the company and formed an 
arena in which relevant aspects of the national economy or sectoral trends were discussed. 
Also employees from different levels of the structure had access to a wide variety of 
publications including retail reports, and sectoral and macroeconomic reports, among 
others. 
The scanning mechanisms in Andr6maco, on the other hand, evolved over time. 
From the 1980s up to 1996 managers in Andr6maco only had access to sectoral reports. 
Contact with Tuchi, the CEO, was sporadic, thus preventing managers from discussing 
sectoral and company strategies with him. 
Pablo Roviralta - the new CEO - started to have meetings with the different 
managers and sought to convey those factors in the environment that would affect the 
company in general and each manager's particular area: "I try to analyse with the different 
areas the impact of the macro-policies on the company and on their department. This is 




What stands out in Sidus and Andr6maco as a similarity in their scanning behaviour 
is the fact that the scanning of the general environment was considered critical in both 
companies. Figure 10.13 shows the relevance of the scanning of the general environment 
over time. Being a regulated industry in the 1980s and in a process of deregulation in the 
1990s might explain this behaviour (Grabowsky et al, 1978). The increased scanning of 
the 'regulatory' source of information in the 1990s is also noticeable. This occurred after 
the regulations of the industry were loosened, opening up new opportunities in the industry. 
393 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco (second interview, 2000) 
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Environmental scanning in the most flexible firms and in the less flexible finns 
What are the similarities and differences between the scanning behaviour of the flexible 
and less flexible firms? And what has influenced that behaviour? 
In the flexible companies we found three common patterns in the way they scanned the 
environment: firstly, both AGD and Sidus created formal and informal structures of scanning; 
secondly, both companies attempted to create an external openness and orientation; and, finally, 
the scanning behaviour of both companies was boosted by the new mental models that prevailed 
during the 1990s. 
Regarding the first aspect, AGD and Sidus tried to limit the ambiguity of the environment 
by setting up information-processing structures (Thomas et al, 1993) and informal mechanisms 
of scanning (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991). AGD set up the Economic Analysis Unit and Sidus 
convened three units to keep the company abreast of the macroeconomic situation, the sector, and 
legal and regulatory changes. 
The second aspect - external openness and orientation - was also seen as a common 
factor in both AGD and Sidus. Externally oriented companies are more able to sense 
competitors' moves (Ibomas et al, 1993) and perceive themselves as more capable of 
implementing competitive responses than internally focused firms. Managers in these firms are 
also more confident at creating a fit between the organisation and the environment by using 
environmental scanning (Smith et al, 1991; Barr and Huff, 1997). 
It was essential for AGD and Sidus to scan the environment to become externally 
oriented: "From thefoundation of the company, thefounders were aware of the importance of 
understanding what was going on outside the company. We were never a selr-absorbed 
company. We were always aware of the importance of being externally oriented [ .. ] Every 
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employee is aware of the importance of having an open mind and catching all they can from the 
sector, competitors and customers. This is our constant message to them. , 394 
"Watching what was going on outside the company, and observing the trends and 
changes in the competition was the only way ofsucceeding wefound. Ihis [external orientation] 
helped us to seize the opportunity while others [competitors] were more concerned with domestic 
problems. , 395 
The third common aspect we found in AGD and Sidus was the influence of the new 
mental models on their scanning behaviour. While analysing the heterogeneity of the dominant 
coalition as a determinant of organisational flexibility, we flagged the importance of the 
cognitive diversity or diversity of mental models in the dominant coalition. These new mental 
models helped managers to sense signals from the outer context and it also helped them to make 
sense of those signals (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991: 117). 
"Aefact that we have changed the profile of our management over the last 10 years to 
suit the requirements of the Argentinian environment, also swayed our decision-making process. 
Managers arefully aware ofwhat is happening in the external context through our department of 
economic studies and their own information, reports and contacts. We have internal meetings or 
workshops -a word that is trendy now - to clarify and share information and make decisions 
accordingly. s)396 
"Before, we [the Board] made decisions by relying on common sense. Today things are 
different. The new professionals come better prepared and are very quick off the draw. Thatis 
better because it accelerates our response. , 397 
394 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director in AGD 
395 Interview with Santiago Garcia Belmonte-family member and Executive Director of Retail Businesses in Sidus 396 Interview with Adriana Urquia-Director of AGD 
397 Interview with Marcelo ArgUelles-President and CEO of Sidus 
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Regarding the less flexible firms - Vicentin and Andromaco - the main similarities lay in 
the lack of a formal structure for scanning and the importance of scanning the general 
environment instead of the task environment during the 1980s. 
Neither Vicentin nor Andr6maco have formal structures for scanning. There are different 
reasons for this lack of formal structure. In Vicentin they claimed that there was no formal 
structure because there was no need 398 or because the main scanning activity fell to the Board of 
Directors. 399 In Andr6maco, on the other hand, they are more hesitant regarding the usefulness 
of such a structure: "We are not a big enough company to afford an area fully dedicated to 
assessing the context. We found, however, that companies in the sector are setting up these 
structures. We have still not made up our mind about the best route tofollow. PAOO 
In the 1980s both companies also highlighted the importance of scanning the general 
environment. This attitude has changed since 1990 and the focus of the scanning behaviour has 
been placed firmly on the task environment (see figures 10.11 and 10.13). The lack of support in 
the 1980s, for task scanning in the companies bad harmful consequences for business, as can be 
seen in the opinion of the interviewees: "Theproblems we have are the result ofnot caring much 
about our customers' taste and our competitors' moves. Now there is an awareness that the 
customer is the king and our competitors are there to watch them and care about what they are 
doing. , 401 
"We were a closed company. The result in Vicentin was clear: the crisis in 1997, low 
profitability and a low level ofprofessionalism in the company. , 402 
The highly flexible firms in this research sought new sources of information much more 
actively and applied a rich array of formal and informal mechanisms for scanning the 
environment. The less flexible firms had a less well organised approach to environmental 
398 Interview with Herman Vicentin 
399 Interview with Osvaldo Arciniega-Commercial department 
400 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco 
401 Interview with Javier Ruiz-Promotion and Sales Manager Andr6maco, 
402 Interview with Juan Rodriguez-Commcrcial department 
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scanning. The outcome of the scanning behaviour was self-evident: flexible firms anticipated 
changes in the sector and seized opportunities while the less flexible firms simply could not. 
357 
10.6 A strong organisational identity 
Why does the concept of organisational identity emerge as an important one in 
understanding how flexible firms adapt? And what are the main features of the concept of 
organisational identity? 
Albert and Whetten (1985) characterise organisational identity as a concept with three 
dimensions: firstly, what is considered central to the organisation; secondly, what makes the 
organisation distinctive; and finally, what is perceived by members to be an enduring or 
continuing feature linking the present of the organisation with its past. At the heart of this 
definition are core values that make organisations act or react in a particular way and the lenses 
through which managers interpret organisation level issues (Dutton and Penner, 1993; Collins 
and Porras, 2000; Gioia and Thomas, 1996). 
We preferred to use the concept of values rather than culture or organisational culture 
because the former is more sharply demarcated than the latter facilitating organisational analysis 
(Alvesson, 1987). While culture is more preoccupied with limited organisational meanings, 
symbols and beliefs (Pettigrew, 1979), values are central aspects of the organisation and more 
enduring as well (Albert and Whetten, 1985). 
Therefore, how can a firm's identity enhance or harm organisational flexibility? Some 
writers on organisational identity emphasise that because organisational identity is composed of 
values that are enduring and deeply ingrained, it is likely to provide a natural inertial force 
(Stimpert et al, 1998; Reger et al, 1994) and cause resistance to change (Dutton and Dukerich, 
1991). 
On the other hand, among those favouring the idea of organisational identity as a source 
of both organisational continuity and change are Collins and Porras (2000). In their examination 
of eighteen long-lasting firms, which they term 'visionary firms', they concluded that visionary 
companies are those that can articulate a core ideology. Through these core values, companies 
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have a clear identity, lending the organisation strategic continuity and precision. For Collins and 
Porras, strategies change as market conditions change, but core values remain intact in a 
visionary company. 
The questions that emerge from this are: what type of organisational identity do the 
companies under analysis have? And how did their organisational identities - through their set 
of core values - promote or constrain their organisational flexibility? 
Due to the central role of core values within the concept of organisational identity, we 
tried to operationalise this determinant through one activity: ideological coaching over successive 
generations. Ideological coaching, a term previously used by Collins and Porras (1991 and 
2000), is the anchor that makes it possible for the values of previous generations to be passed on, 
accepted and used by successive generations. 
How this factor influences the identity of an organisation and its ability to change is 
described by the literature on organisational identity. The analysis of the evolution of company 
values over successive generations seems more appropriate when seeking to determine whether 
or not the firms are conservative about their values and how this influences their organisational 
identity (Collins and Porras, 2000), and whether those values acted as enablers of organisational 
flexibility or as constraining factors (Volberda, 1999). 
To undertake the analysis of ideological coaching over successive generations, we used 
different types of written material (i. e., speeches, letters) ftom which we attempted to obtain 
organisational. values. The sources of data in the four companies are specified in table 10.19. In 
their review of unobtrusive methods, Webb et al (1966) and Lee (2000) argue for the use of 
speeches and letters as ways of understanding the evolution of ideas and values. Similarly, 
Collins and Porras (199 1) also compared speeches and discourses to analyse how values from the 
first generation influenced the second one. 
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TA13LE 10.19: SOURCES OF DATA IN THE FOUR COMPANIES UNDER ANALYSIS 
Company Material analysed 
AGD Note sent from Adrian Urquia to the Manager of the GD Plant. Dated January, 1963. 
Speech given by Mr Adrian Urquia to managers and employees in December, 1968. 
Speech given by Mr Roberto Urquia to managers and employees in March, 1989 at the 
launch of "Natura" bottled edible oil. 
Speech given by Mr Adrian Urquia Jr to managers in June, 1990. 
Speech from the Board-Roberto Urquia-November, 1996. 
1 Speech from the Board to newcomers during the induction week. 
Vicentin Based on the 14 interviews held in the company 
Sidus Speech given by Mr. Miguel Argilelles in CILFA - the Professional Association- in 
October, 1972. 
Speech given by Antonio Arg0elles to Sidus' managers explaining the investments in 
the biotechnological department in the company. Dated August, 1980. 
Letter from Antonio Argilelles to his children - it was a letter that was given to 
Antonio's children after his death- dated July, 1984. 
Article in "Argentime" Magazine. Number 5, year 1998, page 123. 
Presentation given by HR area to managers of Sidus in December, 1999. 
Speech given by Mr. Marcelo Argoelles in the "Executive Programme for Sidus 
Managers" in module 6 "Motivation and empowerment in the management practice" 
617 December, 2000. 
Speech given by Marcelo Arg0elles at the launch of a genetic therapy in a joint venture 
with Fundacion Rene Favaloro. May, 2000. 
Andr6maco Speech given by Alejandro Roviralta in commemoration of the 65' anniversary of the 
company in Argentina- 4/10/1991. 
Speech given by Alejandro Roviralta on the occasion of the launch of Vita Dermaglos 
(dermatological product) in the Caesar Palace Hotel- 4/11/1992. 
Note from Pablo Roviralta to Alejandro Roviralta Jr. Dated 1998. 
Speech given by Pablo Roviralta on the occasion of the 'Pharmaceutical day' in the 
Coliseum theatre- 30/11/1999. 
Speech given by Pablo Roviralta on the occasion of the national convention of sales in 
SaIguero Plaza auditorium V and 2nd of March 1999. 
Speech given by Pablo Roviralta to the 'brand team' in September 2000 (first speech). 
Speech given by Pablo Roviralta to the 'brand team' in September 2000 (second 
speech). 
We need, however, to acknowledge the limitations of our analysis. As mentioned before, 
we tried to collect data regarding the values of the different firms over successive generations. 
Nonetheless, the absence of data points in terms of quantity and quality meant that the data 
presented in this section is only indicative of the importance of certain values and that the study 
of this determinant needs to be undertaken in a more comprehensive and systematic way as we 
highlight later in the conclusions. 
Hardy (2001) indicates that one of the main difficulties associated with data collection in 
discourse analysis is the sampling of the documents used for analysis. She argues that the 
sampling should contain enough documents - in terms of quantity and quality - to enable the 
researcher to draw conclusions from them. In analysing the social identities and relations in the 
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Canadian refugee system, Hardy and Phillips (1999) analyse 127 different documents as a way of 
achieving depth and scope of the social reality among refugees. Between the four companies 
analysed in our research, we were able to gather only 22 documents. Furthermore, in one of the 
firms - Vicentin - such material was unavailable. Due to the quantity and quality of the 
documents available in the companies it was inappropriate to draw any firm conclusions. 
In the light of what has been said, we decided to include 'strong organisational identity' 
as a category of analysis in this thesis because it has the potential to help us understand 
organisational flexibility. While we found this determinant important and appropriate in terms of 
the literature, we also acknowledge the limitations of our analysis. This is the main reason why 
we do not want to expose fully the data obtained from the analysis as we have thus far done with 
previous determinants. Therefore, all the statements made in this section should be taken as 
indicative of the importance of some organisational values in the companies over time rather than 
as clear or overwhelming evidence. 
For each company, a set of values was indicated. At AGD, values such as constant 
learning, an agile decision-making-process, and innovation, were identified as values that had 
been rooted in the company since the first generation tenure of family members. Some 
quotations from the documents analysed are indicative of the values the companies uphold over 
time: 
"It is like emergingfrom the ashes. It is dificult, I know, but we must standfirm, we must 
remainstrong. We have to bear the brunt of these problems. If we stick together and we sort all 
these problems out, what is happening in the company [ 1968 crisis] would be for our future 
managers and us a great learning experience, and for us a way ofjumping hurdles without 
breaking our bones! We are going to be tougher and stronger; we are going to learn from this 
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tough experience. We must learn, otherwise we are not going to survive. , 403 [quotation 
indicative of constant learning as a value in the previous generation]. 
"Ourfather always preached that you should learn from your experience. Weareunder 
pressure to make a decision [about investing in origination]. We have to learn from the lessons 
of the past. In 1968 we nearly went bankrupt because we had not realised the importance of 
having adequate stocks of raw material. This is an opportunity to moveforwards and still learn 
as the founder said. PA04 [quotation indicative of constant learning as a value in the current 
generation]. 
"We do not want to lose something that we have been cultivating since myfather created 
this company. This is to make decisions fast, without bureaucratic structures that hinder the 
decision process. With these changes we want to ensure fast resposiveness. "05 [quotation 
indicative of agile decision making process as a share value over time]. 
"Ourfather always says that we have to be quick as a rabbit to take on competitors. This 
can be only achieved throught creating and innovating. Natura is the example of this. This is 
ourfirst step towards leading the market. P, 406 [quotation indicative of innovativeness as a share 
value over time]. 
At Sidus, values such as risk taking and innovation were found to be ingrained in the two 
generations of family members. Again, some quotations from documents currently used by the 
firm are indicative of the existence of such values: 
"Thefounders took a great risk while trying to set up the basis of this company. Yhey 
always stated that this is the only way to achieve things. But risks, as you knowfrom the history 
403 Speech given by Mr Adrian Urquia to managers and employees in December 1968 
" Speech given by Mr Addin Urquia Jr. to managers in June, 1990 
405 Speech from the Board-Roberto Urquia-November, 1996 
406 Speech given by Mr Roberto Urquia to managers and employees in March, 1989 at the launch of "Natura" bottled 
edible oil. 
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of the company, also imply sacrifices. 407 [quotation indicating risk taking as a share value over 
time]. 
"Do not copy be creative or innovative, otherwise we are going to be followers rather 
than leaders. "408 [quotation indicative of innovation as a value in the previous generation]. 
"Innovation was the key to the foundation of our company. It seems that innovation 
continues to be the pillar of our growth. Biotechnology is thefuture and this is thefoundation 
stone. "409[quotation indicative of innovation as a share value over time]. 
"We arepioneers: we were innovative in our research, we diversified, always trusting the 
country and its human potential. Over 60 years we privileged and invested in the development of 
science [ ... j Our grouth is 
based on a solid base of infrastructure, technology and 
innovation. "410 [quotation indicative of innovation as a share value over time]. 
"Infrastructure, technology and innovation, are what made this possible. 77ds new 
methodology is the latest in the process ofgenetic engeneering. We achieved this because of our 
commitment to innovation and creating solutions like this one. 411 [quotation indicative of 
innovation as a value in the current generation]. 
Vicentin and Andr6maco, on the other hand, differ from AGD and Sidus in this respect. 
We could not find strong evidence to support the existence of many shared values over time. 
What we found, however, is an indication of rejection of values sustained in previous 
generations. In Vicentin we found some evidence indicating that values such as innovation and 
being ahead of competitors that were considered important in previous generations of family 
owners were abandoned by the current generation as the following quotations indicate: 
40' Speech given by Mr. Marcelo Argilelles in the "Executive Programme fro Sidus Managers" in module 6 
"Motivation and empowerment in the management practice" 67 December, 2000 
408 Letter from Antonio Argaelles to his children - it was a letter that was given to Antonio's children after his death 
-dated July, 1984. *'9 Speech given by Antonio ArgUelles to Sidus' managers explaining the investments in the biotechnological 
department in the company. Dated August, 1980 
410 Article in "Argentime" Magazine. Number 5, year 1998, page 123. 411 Speech given by Marcelo ArgUelles at the launch of a genetic therapy in a joint venture with Fundacion Favaloro. 
May, 2000 
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"When I was a child my grandfather told me about a company of dreams. We had 
products on the shelves of the supermarkets, our brand name sounded in customers' heads and 
we took care of details. We were an innovative company in the market. '-412 [quotation indicative 
of innovation as a value in the previous generations]. 
"The worst thingfor me is that innovation is not at the heart ofthe company's values. On 
the contrary, innovation implies risks and we hate that. Innovation implies investment in 
research and development ofproducts, and we cannot afford that. Finally, innovation implies 
managerial capabilities that we do not have. 413 [quotation indicative of innovation as a value 
not shared by the current generation]. 
" Mat strikes me, and you can consider this a change in values or ideas, is that we were 
winners, or we felt as if we were winners. Now we feel like survivors. This is a big change 
because ifyou think you are a winner, you will try to succeed and lead, but ifyou believe you are 
struggling to survive, you will never lead, you are a follower, whichever way you look at it. 414 
[quotation indicating that 'being ahead of competitors' is not a value shared between the previous 
and current generation]. 
The case of Andromaco is similar to that of Vicentin where risk taking is now rejected 
while it seems that in previous generations risk taking was considered critical to succeed. The 
following quotations show this apparent difference: 
"As pioneer, RaO Roviralta Astoul had the capacity to merge a good idea and the 
courage to take the risk of starting with this company. Without this entrepreneurial and risk- 
taking spirit, this company would not have been possible. "415 [quotation indicating risk-taking as 
a value in previous generations] 
412 Interview with Miximo Paduin-Commercial area and fourth generation memeber-Viccntin. 413 Interview with Miximo Padudn-Commercial area and fourth generation mcmeber-Viccntin. 414 Interview with Ra6I Gonzalez Arccluz-Corporatc lawyer 
415 Speech given by Alejandro Roviralta in commemoration of the 65"'anniversary of the company in Argentina- 
4/10/1991. 
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"We cannot afford to take risks. We would like people with stamina to try new things but 
under a controlled process. Therefore, we can attempt new things but only after we have thought 
a lot about it . , 
416 [quotation indicating that risk taking is not a value shared between the previous 
and current generations]. 
How did the firms under study build up their identity over time? And, most importantly, 
how did the identity of the organisation affect the possibilities the organisation had for changing 
and thereby its flexibility? We start by explaining how the core values we previously indicated 
helped the flexible finns to build up a strong identity, unlike the less flexible finns. 
Ideological coaching from previous generations to the current one 
The core values that shape organisational identity did not emerge out of the blue, but it 
took time to form a consistent set of beliefs that moulded the identity of the organisations. The 
role of leadership in tackling this task proved to be important in the most flexible firms, and lack 
of leadership or problems of leadership proved to be critical in this respect in the less flexible 
firms. 
In introducing his conceptual framework to understand the creation and change of 
organisational culture, Gagliardi (1986) states that in the early phases of an organisation, it is the 
leader who sets up the core values and beliefs of an organisation. Over the life span of an 
organisation, a series of formal structures will be created, and rules and procedures will replace 
the active role of the leader. The leader's role would then be important but not as critical as in 
the first stages of the organisation (Collins and Porras, 2000; Albert and Whetten, 1985; 
Kimberly, 1979; Pettigrew, 1979, Selznick, 1957). 
In AGD and Sidus many interviewees conveyed the critical role played by their founders 
in setting up the organisation's values and aims: "Through our identity we convey what we are 
416 Speech given by Pablo Roviralta to the 'brand team' in September, 2000 (first speech). 
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and what we want to be. We follow the way marked out by the founders, and we have a 
commitment to those values and that way ofdoing things theyfirst established. , 417 
"What myfather did is immeasurable. From nothing he set up what today is a leading 
company in its sector. His commitment and ideals remain today. His ideals are vivid andjog 
our memory about the right things to do. , 418 
But leader's beliefs are not enough. Argyris (1992) asserts that success tends to 
consolidate the commitment and the set of beliefs an organisation has. What happened with 
AGD and Sidus was that the success of the business shifted the rational agreement members of 
the companies had with the leader's beliefs towards a concentration on identifying with those 
beliefs. This is why, in our opinion, the process ofidentification started in both companies. Both 
companies developed consistent actions over time to build up their organisational identity. AGD 
and Sidus asserted the validity of their faith in innovation even when they faced threats and 
criticism from the external environment (Sidus with its deal with Merck, and AGD with its 
investments in the origination area); both companies made long-term investments even if the 
economic situation was bad (Sidus in biotechnology and AGD in brands). 
The lack of success in both Vicentin and Andr6maco, on the other hand, harmed the 
commitment to the companies' set of beliefs. Andr6maco disinvested and, for a long time, many 
of the market launches were not successful. After the new CEO took over, releases of products 
were called off for two years. "We were a shrinking company. In a shrinking company nobody 
cares about the ship, but about their lives. You need to find a lifeboat rather than commit 
yourseIrto a sinking company. , 419 
Vicentin was careless regarding the innovativeness that characterised the company in the 
1970s and put aside the branding strategy. The company no longer aspired to be a leader of the 
market - as previous generations had pleaded - and instead became a laggard. 
417 Interview with Marcelo ArgUelles-CE0 Sidus 
418 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Director AGD 
419 Interview with Pablo Roviralta-CEO Andr6maco 
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Our findings in the flexible and less flexible firms are important in understanding the 
relationship between strategy and leadership. The leaders in the flexible firms were an important 
element in strategy formation. Viewing leaders as historical figures and "tenants of time and 
context" (Leavy and Wilson, 1994) made us emphasise on the challenges the leaders faced 
during their tenures at the top rather than on personal attributes. Strategy in the four firms was 
informed by the organisational history (the "path dependencies" for Teece et al, 1997) and the 
organisation leaders. Raff (2000) shows how the founders' vision and values in two book 
retailers in the USA have influenced what the company became and the strategies they followed. 
Kimberly (1979) and Pettigrew (1979) empirically demonstrated the critical role of the leaders of 
the organisations analysed (i. e., the founders of the organisations) in shaping the organisations' 
strategies and set of beliefs. Similarly, this thesis demonstrates how the founders' values and 
beliefs helped the organisations to cope with the demands of the new environment through 
implementing new strategic initiatives (i. e., biotechnological project in Sidus, branding in AGD) 
(Kimberly, 1979). 
Briefly, by ensuring that their values remained largely unchanged throughout different 
generations, the flexible firms forged a very strong identity, unlike the less flexible firms in 
which the organisation's core values changed over time. The role of the founders in creating a 
set of beliefs (i. e., values) and in consolidating the people's commitment to those values allowed 
the companies to achieve a strong organisational identity. 
The indoctrination of one generation by the previous one may, however, prove to be a 
critical element in forging organisational identity and most importantly, we need to understand 
how the firms (i. e., flexible and less flexible) coped with the transformation needed to be able to 
survive. Also how did the strong identity found in the flexible firms encourage change raher than 
impede it? 
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Change and identity in the flexible and less flexible firms 
The main difference between highly flexible and less flexible firms is in the way their 
identity - through their organisational values - helped them to change or trapped them in inertial 
forces. 
However deeply-rooted, the strong identities of both AGD and Sidus did not trap them in 
the rigidity of inertial forces. On the contrary, both companies were able to change quickly and 
smoothly without affecting their organisational core values. So how were AGD and Sidus able to 
cope with the relationship between strong identity and change? And why did Vicentin and 
Andr6maco, fail over time to undertake substantial transformations? 
Barney et al (1998) suggest that organisational identity is likely to be a source of 
competitive advantage when the environment is stable and homogeneity is high. Otherwise, 
identity is likely to be a source of competitive disadvantage. However, when the identity 
includes ideals favouring change, innovation and risk taking, identity may not be a factor causing 
resistance to change. 
Both AGD and Sidus incorporated values related to innovation and change (in AGD 
values such as agile decision making, and innovation; in Sidus values such as innovation and risk 
taking). The incorporation of these values enabled them to undertake major transformations 
without damaging their core identifies and yet avoiding resistance to change (Barney et al, 1998). 
Vicenfin and Andr6maco, on the other hand, rejected those values from a previous 
generation that emphasised change or transformation. Vicentin, for example, rejected the value 
of innovativeness. Andr6maco, conversely, dismissed the value of risk taking that had been 
emphasised by previous generations. 
Based on their theoretical analysis of organisational identity and change in turbulent 
environments, Gustafson and Reger (1995) distinguish two parts of an identity: the intangible 
attributes that are central and enduring - the core values - and the substantive attributes of 
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organisational identity. Examples of those substantive attributes are products, strategies, and 
geographic scope, among others. In times of turmoil, when organisations need to adapt to new 
environmental circumstances, the substantive parts change while the intangible parts remain 
unchanged. For Guftafson and Reger the outcome of this process is organisations that embrace 
change while simultaneously maintaining a sense of stability by using their sense of identity as a 
psychological anchor. 
The strong sense of identity gave the most flexible companies the organisational anchor 
they needed to be able to move forwards and change (Gustafson and Reger, 1995; Calori et al, 
2000). By maintaining core values but changing their strategies, products and processes, AGD 
and Sidus managed to transform themselves without creating internal turmoil. The interviews are 
revealing in this respect: 
"Over the 1990s the company has changed a lot. However, if you ask an employee 
whether they have felt the changes, they would say that they had not noticed internal turmoil. 
They did not feel threatened by the changes. I do not know how or why this has happened. 
However, if you compared our business now and ten years ago, you would think we were a 
different company. [ ... 
] Regarding the process of transformation we went through, I would say 
that we did well in terms of avoiding internal chaos, but we were probably lucky enough to avoid 
these problems or we built some capabilities over time without noticing their effects in the long 
term. A20 
At Sidus, they stated: "One amazing aspect of this company is that over the last decade 
or over the last thirteen years, Sidus has shilled its strategy completely hut we still have the spirit 
of the old times, even similar traditions and stories. We did not lose the thread that links us with 
our past, although we look to the future -a wise combination that was fostered by the founders 
and their children. , 421 
420 Interview with Roberto Urquia-AGD Director 
421 Interview with Marcelo Burstein-HR Manager Sidus 
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We have therefore underlined the critical role of identity in the process of change. Both 
AGD and Sidus were conservative about their core values but dynamic at the same time. This 
dynamism is represented by organisational values that were enablers of change and 
transformation. The strong identity found at Sidus and AGD did not imply, as some writers in 
the field of organisational identity state, an inertial force impeding change and transformation. 
On the contrary, their strong organisational identity enhanced their organisational flexibility by 
providing the anchor they needed to change, try new things and take risks. 
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10.7 The interconnection between the determinants of organisational 
flexibility 
So far, we have considered the different determinants of flexibility individually, and have 
not addressed the linkages between them. The evidence provided suggests that there is an 
interconnection between the five determinants of organisational flexibility, which facilitated the 
rapid adaptation in the flexible firms analysed. 
We argue that the five determinants we have analysed individually in previous pages 
form an interconnected model that enhances our understanding of the way flexible firms have 
successfully adapted in conditions of environmental turmoil. This model (see figure 10.15) is not 
a prescriptive one. On the contrary, it has emerged ftorn the interplay of the initial theoretical 
framework and the empirical research undertaken in the four companies as shown in chapters 7 
and 8. We are not claiming that this model could be used as an instruction manual to enable a 
firm to achieve flexibility. Instead, we would like to offer "a representation ofthe inechanism by 
which thephenomenon understudy operates" (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991: 270). 
The issue of interconnection between different organisational elements is not new. 
Pettigrew and Whipp's (1991) study of organisational change and performance in eight 
companies in four different industries sheds light on the holistic appreciation of organisational 
dimensions and their interrelation. They highlighted the importance of five interconnected 
factors in the way high and low performing organisations managed change over time. The firms 
in their study differed in the way they scanned the environment, managed their HR, led change, 
linked strategy and operationalised change, and achieved coherence. No single factor could 
provide an answer as to how a firm managed change to achieve competitive success. Rather, the 
explanation of change and competitive success was to be found in the interconnection of the five 
factors. 
Figure 10.15 illustrates the existent interrelation between different determinants of 
organisational flexibility as revealed by the evidence provided in this chapter. This relationship 
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is shown through dotted lines. The lines represent a qualitative interpretation and do not imply a 
quantitative relationship. An explanation of those interrelations follows. 
FiGuRE 10.15: INTERCONNECTION OF DETERMINANTS OF ORGANISATIONAL FLEXIBILITY 
4 
Characteristics of f th Ch: act- 
Dominant Coalition 1 
Organisational Macroculture 
Identity Embeddedness 
Environmental entralisation and 
Scanning Formalisation of 
Decision Making 
The inflow of new managers with diverse experience background in the 1980s and early 
1990s helped both AGD and Sidus to reduce the influence of institutional pressures. The 
heterogeneous top team had different cognitive frameworks that also helped the firms both to 
sense the signals from the environment and broadened their capacity for interpretation. As a 
result, both AGD and Sidus explored new strategic initiatives and became either early adopters or 
first movers of strategies (i. e., Sidus in biotechnology and retail in the pharmaceutical industry; 
AGD in branding and logistics in the edible oil industry). 
The importance of the low level of macroculture embeddedness of AGD and Sidus (i. e., 
through the low level of connectedness and similarity in their industries) has been demonstrated 
by the fact that both firms were able to move rapidly and anticipate other competitors' moves. 
The 'disembeddedness' of AGD and Sidus from their macroculture was facilitated firstly by, 
mechanism of scanning (i. e., formal and informal mechanisms as previously analysed) and, 
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secondly, by managers who came from industries other than those in which the firms 
participated. 
The low levels of centralisation and formalisation demonstrated by the flexible firms, on 
the other hand, increased the possibilities the top team had for interacting more (i. e., the 
constructive conflict we have analysed in this chapter), participating in decision making (i. e., 
through the process of delegation started by the Boards of both Sidus and AGD in the 1990s), 
and speeding up the responses of both firms when needed (i. e., the strategic initiatives of the 
flexible firms). 
Scanning the environment in the flexible firms not only became a critical factor for 
anticipating competitors' actions (i. e., through the firms' formal and informal mechanism) but 
also influenced other determinants of organisational flexibility. Being open to the signals of the 
environment influenced the firms' ability to notice the importance of new managerial skills early 
in the 1990s as a competitive advantage (i. e., both firms had incorporated new managers 
throughout the late 1980s early 1990s). Similarly, scanning has also been important in the firms' 
decisions to re-arrange their structure and initiate a delegation process to allow greater 
participation of the business managers in operative decisions and allow the Boards of AGD and 
Sidus to perform a strategic role in the firms. 
Finally, the strong organisational identity of AGD and Sidus represented by their set of 
core values impacted on the rest of the determinants. By supporting values related to change and 
innovation (such as a risk-taking attitude and innovation in Sidus, and agile decision making and 
innovation in AGD), the firms were able to avoid isomorphic behaviour in their industries. The 
same set of values enabled the firms to achieve external openness in an attempt to find new 
opportunities and maintain the competitive advantages that made them successful at adapting 
quickly. AGD and Sidus' set of beliefs also made it necessary for managers to realise those 
values. Finally, the values also necessitated organisational arrangements to enact those values. 
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The changes in structure and delegation process implemented in AGD and Sidus were the fruit of 
the companies' values of innovation and change. 
The five determinants of organisational flexibility interconnected and complemented each 
other in a way that allowed the flexible firms to adapt rapidly under environmental turmoil, to 
move fast and first in their industries (Le, through their strategic initiatives) and to cope with 
political and economical changes (i. e., changes in regulations and government policies) (see 
figure 10.16). 
FIGURE 10.16: THE UPWARD SPIRAL OF FLEXIBILITY: INTERCONNECTION OF DETERMINANTS OF ORGANISATIONAL 
FLEXIBILITY IN THE FLEXIBLE FIRMS 
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The less flexible firms, on the other hand, were laggards in their industries, they were not 
able to adapt rapidly under environmental uncertainty and, they were lagging behind the flexible 
firms (i. e., losing market share, lack of strategic initiatives). The less flexible firms were affected 
by what Whittington and Pettigrew (2003) called "a complementarities trap. " This 
complementarities trap happens, according to Whittington and Pettigrew, when firms persist with 
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what once fitted the organisation best, making it difficult for the organisation to change and adapt 
to new contextual challenges. 
Andr6maco was trapped in an old formula of success: the idea that they should participate 
successfully in the different market niches of the pharmaceutical industry. Andr6maco toyed 
with different niches for a long time and overlooked the den-natological niche in which the firm 
had a competitive advantage. Vicentin, on the other hand, became trapped in the low-profit 
business of cotton ginning because it was part of the business the company started with. Vicentin 
did not invest in its brand strategy that was proving to be more profitable than cotton ginning and 
crushing. Both firms became stuck in the modes of thinking and working that brought them their 
initial success. When business conditions change, their once winning formulas instead bring 
failure (Sull, 1999 a, b). 
The absence of determinants of organisational flexibility (most notably in Vicentin) may 
have encouraged Vicentin and Andr6maco to stick to the old complementary system that no 
longer worked in the 1990s. Neither Andr6maco nor Vicentin could envision a new system to 
replace the old one. Instead, they kept the same strategic frames that blinkered their vision, 
preventing managers from noticing new options and opportunities. This process lead both 
Andr6maco and Vicentin to achieve high levels of inertia, making adaptation a difficult process. 
What saved the companies from succumbing was mainly the fact that they either markets willing 
to buy the firms' products (i. e., the case of Vicentin) or the internal changes in the company 
saved it from a downward spiral of more inflexibility (i. e., the case of Andromaco after the 
replacement of the CEO) (see figure 10.17). 
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FIGURE 10.17: THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF FLEXIBILITY: INTERCONNECTION OF DETERMINANTS OF ORGANISATIONAL 
FLEXIBILITY IN THE LESS FLEXIBLE FIRMS 
Homogeneity of the 
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Chapter 11: Conclusions 
This thesis examines the process of organisational adaptation and the competitiveness of 
firms in an emerging economy. The study is set in the Argentinian context of the 1990s when a 
combination of economic and political change triggered a transformation in the competitive 
context of indigenous firms. Two highly flexible firms and two less flexible firms were studied 
from the pharmaceutical and edible oil industries and longitudinal data were used to explore the 
determinants of organisational flexibility in those organisations. 
This perspective raised a number of important issues regarding the content and process of 
being flexible and the determinants of organisational flexibility. Recognition of this gap in the 
literature prompted the development of three researchable questions: 
-Do some firms display more flexibility than others in competitive circumstances? 
-Why are some firms able to display more flexibility? 
-And how do they do it? 
In this final chapter we return to our research questions and draw together the results of 
our case study findings and analysis. We will also discuss the contributions this research has 
made to the study of flexibility, adaptation and change theory. We also identify the contributions 
to both the literature on family firms and the literature on the influence of national differences as 
shapers of the organisational action of firms. Finally, we describe the limitations of our work and 
suggest recommendations for further research, both to address these limitations and to exploit the 
utility of the research method developed during this study. 
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11.1 Findings and contributions of this study 
In chapters 1 and 2 we stressed the importance of organisational flexibility as a way firms 
have of adapting under high levels of competitive pressure. We have also described our two 
main criticisms of research into adaptation - the extreme views in adaptation theory (i. e., 
contingency theory, population ecology) and the single level of analysis in some research on 
organisational adaptiveness. We argued that organisational adaptation and therefore flexibility 
is the interplay between inner and outer context, a dynamic process in which elements of both 
managerial choice and environmental influence coexist. 'Mus, deterministic and voluntaristic 
positions are rejected. Regarding the single level of analysis predominant in some research into 
adaptation, we propose a multilevel approach to understanding organisational flexibility. As yet, 
there are few multilevel analysis of organisational flexibility. If we recognise the dynamic and 
multilevel character of organisational flexibility then it is possible to raise a number of important 
questions concerning the process and character of a firm's flexibility over time and the factors 
that influence such a process. This study took up the challenge of exploring these dynamic issues 
regarding organisational flexibility. 
Our research questions also encouraged us to address two critical aspects of the 
methodology (chapter 3). Firstly that data collection had to be longitudinal. Secondly, although 
the firm level of analysis was the focus of our interest, we also needed to investigate the 
phenomena at the industry level. Our choice of multiple levels of analysis therefore required the 
use of multiple research methods. 
In chapter 4, we examined the national business environment (NBE) and the elements that 
may have influenced a firm's development in an economy characterised by turmoil. These 
factors were the role of the state, the role of financial institutions and the role of national culture. 
We demonstrated how the different elements of the NBE impacted on the constitution of 
indigenous firms. We firstly underlined the role of the state as critical in deciding the different 
types of firms that predominate over time (i. e., indigenous firms, multinationals, national 
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holdings) (Whitley, 2000; Kosacoff, 2000). We secondly stressed the role of financial 
institutions as determining the way firms funded their growth (i. e., through bank loans or own 
savings) (Zysman, 1983). Finally, the role of national culture was considered crucial in 
influencing a firm's governance structure, the ways in which people deal with each other and 
with other organisations, and the patterns of work organisation and control (Hofstede, 1991; 
Whitley, 2000). 
In chapter 5 we explored the competitive environments within which the Argentinian 
pharmaceutical and edible oil firms operated during the 1980s and 1990s. We demonstrated how 
the environment had changed for regulated (i. e., pharmaceutical) and non-regulated (i. e., edible 
oil) industries from being a highly protective environment to one characterised by 
hypercompetition (D'Aveni, 1994). 
Chapter 5 prompted us to concentrate on our first researchable question: do some firms 
display more flexibility than others? In other words, we wanted to know what indicates whether 
a firm is more or less flexible. We raised a set of indicators of flexibility, customised them for 
the different industries under study, and operationalised them to discover the flexible and less 
flexible firms in the two industries under analysis (i. e., pharmaceuticals and edible oils). The 
most flexible firms coped better than the less flexible firms in this new environment in terms of 
the four indicators analysed, namely: product innovation, collaboration and partnerships, and 
internationalisation and diversification. Sidus and AGD succeeded in adapting to the new 
circumstances while Andr6maco and Vicentin were laggards in their industries. 422 
In chapters 6 to 10 we turned our attention to our second and third researchable questions: 
why are some firms able to display more flexibility? And how do they do it? In essence, what 
factors will determine whether a firm is flexible? The four comparative case studies presented in 
chapters 7 and 8 revealed the transformation trajectories of the flexible and less flexible firms. In 
422 The way the indicators were chosen and operationalised to select flexible and less flexible firms are explained in 
the methodology chapter (i. e., chapter 3). 
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the course of the case studies we were able to see how the flexible firms renewed their strategies 
and organisational arrangements in a process of continuous change. The less flexible firms, on 
the other hand, followed a different transformational trajectory characterised by attempts of 
revolutionary change (see chapter 9). 
Our comparative case studies of the four firms identified five interrelated factors as 
determining a firm's flexibility: characteristics of the dominant coalition; the degree of 
formalisation and centralisation of decision making; embeddedness within the industry 
macroculture; environmental scanning; and organisational identity (see chapter 10). 
The internal dynamics and characteristics of the dominant coalition refer to the 
heterogeneity of the top management team and the interaction within the group. A diversity of 
career background and tenure within the industry promotes a range of cognitive mindsets and 
values among the top management team. The greater the heterogeneity and the greater the 
number of mental models there are among the top team, the wider the range of alternative 
interpretations of the state of the firms and their environment there will be. 'Me cognitive 
diversity of the management team is represented in our research by the capacity for action and 
the constructive conflict among the top team. The former will allow managers to take risks and 
explore new opportunities (i. e., new strategies and new organisational arrangements). The latter 
will stimulate debate and offer new alternatives. 
The degree of formalisation and centralisation of decision making refers to the extent to 
which the actions of the firms are governed by fori-nal rules and procedures and the extent to 
which they are determined centrally at the top of the organisation. The more centrally and 
formally the organisation is controlled the more its actions are determined by a small number of 
senior managers. Consequently, the extent to which alternative ideas and interpretations of the 
organisation and its environment can emerge and influence decision making is reduced 
(Damanpour, 1991; Bahraini and Evans, 1995). The flexible firms in this thesis combined high 
levels of strategic centralisation and low levels of operational centralisation. Formalisation levels 
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in the four firms, however, increased over time because the changes in the outer context (i. e., 
opening up of the Argentinian economy) needed more formal mechanisms and control to achieve 
efficiency. This differs from the findings published in the literature on organisational 
innovativeness and flexibility that expects low levels of centralisation and formalisation of 
decision making in organisations (Volberda, 1999; Damanpour, 1991). However, the literature 
on organisational innovativeness and that on organisational flexibility concentrates on developed 
economies and firms rather than emerging markets. 
Embeddedess in the industry macroculture refers to the extent to which the firm adheres 
to the institutionalised norms and values of the industry group in which it operates. Firms which 
are highly embedded within the industry macroculture are less inclined to reject institutionalised 
types of activity and pursue new strategies ahead of their competitors. 
Environmental scanning highlights the importance of anticipating competitors' moves. 
Managers must be willing and able to interpret the firm's environment as they absorb signals and 
to question not only how the firm does things but also what it does. Using different sources of 
information as well as formal and informal sources helps managers to discern and interpret 
reality and anticipate challenges posed by the environment. 
Finally, our last determinant is related to organisational identity. Organisational identity 
underlines the important role of the core values of the organisation as its central, distinctive and 
most enduring part (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Collins and Porras, 2000). Organisations with a 
strong set of core values related to innovation and change help firms to transform and adapt 
under changeable contexts. 
Our findings demonstrate that none of the determinants identified on its own promotes 
organisational flexibility. It is, however, the interrelation of the five determinants that causes 
firms to be more flexible. 
381 
Implications of our framework and findings for the inteMretation of the current Argentinian 
context 
We have already discussed the empirical evidence this study provides for the 
understanding of the determinants of organisational flexibility and their importance in the 
adaptation of a firm in highly changeable contexts. We have not only revealed what determines 
whether an organisation is flexible (chapter 10) but have also identified a set of indicators to 
identify flexible firms (chapter 3). 
The critical socio-economic situation that began in Argentina at the end of 2001 gave the 
researcher an opportunity to witness directly the way flexible and less flexible firms adapted in a 
rapidly changing environment. The way in which the crisis has begun to affect the firms in this 
study also confirms the appropriateness of the sample we have chosen to use: all four firms have 
begun to show patterns of behaviour previously identified in this study. AGD and Sidus have 
adapted quickly, whereas Vicentin and Andr6maco were sluggish in their response. Let us 
comment briefly on the way flexible and less flexible firms were adapting to the economic 
situation that was emerging by the end of 2001. 
From 1998 Argentina began to enter and suffer a long recession that by the end of this 
PhD showed no signs of improving. As a consequence of that recession, and the resultant fiscal 
and debt burden the economy had almost ground to a halt by the end of 2001. The chain of 
payments between consumers, businesses and suppliers had broken down, and people were 
prevented from using their bank savings. Moreover, after a decade in which the peso was fixed 
by law at parity with the dollar the government allowed the peso to float on the open market (The 
Economist, March 2 nd 2002). 
How did the flexible and less flexible firms in this research confront such an 
unpredictable and changeable situation? The case of the edible oil industry is illustrative of the 
way the strategies elaborated by the firms in the 1990s helped them to make decisions according 
to the market needs a decade later. AGD's diversification strategies helped them to avoid 
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making huge losses. Since 2000, AGD has focused its efforts on exporting branded or elaborated 
products (i. e., soya milk, soya sub-products, and mayonnaise, among others) to avoid tax 
retentions from the government for products sold in bulk. 423 The brands for the internal market 
continued but with a higher price (due to the devaluation of the peso). Market share was stable 
and showed no signs of losing ground in the edible oil market. In addition, AGD's efficient 
logistics chain helped the company to be cost efficient. 424 
Vicentin's focus on exporting bulk products was not rewarded by the new economic plan. 
A 10% retention tax was levied on exports of bulk products. Cotton ginning exports had to 
compete with lower prices from other developing countries and the internal sales of those 
products stagnated. In a deep economic crisis, Vicentin's inexpensive edible oil brand however 
was doing well and increasing its market share. It is important to remember, however, that the 
company had cast off such a strategy in the past and the brand strategy was a marginal one (see 
case study in chapter 8). Therefore, the company could not counteract the effect of the losses the 
firm suffered in the main businesses. 425 
When, as a result of the economic crisis, the pharmaceutical industry was running short of 
basic products, Sidus' biotechnological project was the good sign on the horizon. Through 
reinforcing exports of biotechnological products, Sidus invested the result of the exports into 
supplying their own pharmacies with pharmaceutical products. It was an exception among the 
shortages that affected the whole industry 426 : "This is a bad timefor the country and the industry, 
but we have also seen an opportunity in trying not to betray our customers. They can find 
products in our pharmacies. Yhe economic situation will see some pharmaceutical firms 
strugglingfor survival, and we are going to gain terrain in the market, '. 427 In spite of the crisis, 
Sidus also decided to make 20% of BioSidus public during 2002. The sell-off will provide Sidus 
423 The retention tax was 10% for agriculture exports and 5% to industrialised products. 424 Informal talk with Adriana Urquia, Director AGD in December 2001; e-mail sent on 14/3/2002 425 information obtained by e-mail sent by Roberto Gazze, Financial Director in Vicentin in March, 2002 426 La Nacion Newspaper. 27/06/2002, secci6n Economia. 427 Informal talk with Santiago G. Belmonte from Sidus. Talk held in January 2002 and telephone call in March, 
2002. 
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with the money to continue to invest in a market that "will become even more concentrated after 
the collapse ofsome ofthe remaining nationalfirms " 428 
Finally, the case of Andr6maco is not so promising. The decision to focus on skin care is 
backfiring on the company. In the current economic situation, skin care is not seen to be an 
essential product, so sales have dropped. The company is running short of imported products. 
All these factors are worsening the financial situation of Andr6maco. In March 2002 there was a 
drop of 16% in sales compared to the same period the year before. Andr6maco's response to the 
crisis was to postpone investments and to cut costs including salaries. 429 
The flexible firms have adapted quickly to the new economic situation. Furthermore, the 
diversification strategy initiated in the 1990s gave Sidus and AGD flexibility to adapt a decade 
later. On the contrary, the focused strategy of the less flexible firms only provided them with 
short-term solutions, but in the longer term, these have turned out to be traps because such a 
focused strategy has impeded the firms' ability to adapt The 2001/2002 crisis in the Argentinian 
economy confirmed Khanna and Palepu's (1997) assertion that focused strategies may be 
inadequate for emerging markets. 
11.2 Organisational Flexibility 
Throughout this thesis we have further developed the term 'organisational flexibility' to 
refer to the repertoire of organisational and managerial capabilities that allow organisations to 
adapt quickly under conditions of environmental change. The term organisational flexibility has 
previously been used to refer to the means firms have for limiting the impact of environmental 
change on the organisation (Ansoff, 1988). In Ansoff s words, the aim of organisational 
flexibility is to provide the firm with a buffer to protect the organisation from distubances so that 
Informal talk with Santiago G. Belmonte from Sidus. Talk held in January 2002 and telephone call in March, 
2002. 
4 .9 Information provided by email by Pablo Roviralta, CEO of Andr6maco 15/3/2002 
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uncertainty will be reduced. However, the passive connotation of the idea of organisational 
flexibility as used by Ansoff does not result in fundamental changes to the organisation. 
NVe have demonstrated the significance of a much more active interpretation of 
organisational flexibility than that offered by Ansoff (1988). The active interpretation includes 
factors that made the flexible firms analysed highly responsive to environmental change, 
allowing them to adjust their strategy and organisation quickly to exploit changes in their 
environments. Flexible firms were able to respond successfully to sudden environmental 
changes and able to build up new organisational capabilities (i. e., flexible capabilities) if 
required. 
Flexible organisations do not just respond quickly to change in the environmentý they also 
proactively influence that environment and force others to match their moves. AGD's and Sidus' 
strategic initiatives have changed the map of competition in their industries as they became first 
movers or early adopters of strategies, while other companies attempted to imitate the strategies 
adopted by Sidus and AGD in their respective industries. 
In the case of the flexible firms analysed in this thesis, organisational flexibility also 
involved adaptation to environmental turmoil across the organisation and at different levels 
within the organisation, namely the strategic, organisational and managerial levels. Both AGD 
and Sidus have simultaneously changed their strategic orientation (i. e., both firms invested 
backwards and forwards in the chain of value of their respective industries), while transforming 
their organisations (i. e., introducing new managerial skills, and working on new organisational 
practices such as enhancing the delegation process, developing more professional management 
and a structure that stresses operational autonomy). 
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11.3 Further contributions of this research 
Tlis study makes a number of contributions to the study of organisational adaptation and 
organisational flexibility. These are mainly methodological and empirical, but this research also 
contributes to the theoretical debate about a number of related analytical issues. These include an 
understanding of bow the character and specific nature of family firms shaped the determinants 
of organisational flexibility; and also understanding of the role of national differences in the ways 
firms organise and act. 
Contnbutions at the methodological level 
Lewin and Volberda (1999) suggest that in the field of organisational adaptation 
longitudinal research is required, but that such research is far from becoming the norm. In the 
organisational flexibility field most of the writting has been theoretical and although there are 
some exceptions (Bahraini, 1992; Bahraini and Evans, 1995; Volberda, 1999), as yet there has 
been little empirical research. 
A particular strength of this study is the use of the comparative case study method that 
allowed us to explore and investigate the phenomenon of organisational flexibility in depth over 
a relatively long period of time (1989-1999). A complementary strength of our methodology is 
the analysis technique we have used to explore the different determinants of organisational 
flexibility. The analysis of the determinants is an original contribution to the field of 
organisational flexibility - in particular the coding analysis and the display techniques used 
throughout the analysis. 
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OrganisatiOnal flexibility process 
Is flexibility an intended or emergent process? This is another question that this thesis 
helps to answer. McKinley and Scherer (2000) distinguish between intended and emergent 
actions. The former is the goal towards which the action is destined; the latter is the outcome of 
an action that the actor is not expecting. This is an important differentiation that can shed light 
on the process of being flexible. 
In contrast to what some writers in the field of organisational flexibility have argued (see 
Volberda, 1999), there is clear evidence in the case studies to show that the flexible firms were 
building organisational flexibility as an intended process instead of just an emergent one. The 
intentionality of the process triggers questions about what the antecedents and origins of the 
process of being flexible are, and whether the building of organisational flexibility is a long-term 
process. To understand the trajectory of building organisational flexibility in these companies, 
we need to draw upon the five determinants of organisational flexibility we analysed in chapter 
10, and in particular we need to understand not only how many determinants the firms had (as we 
analysed in chapter 10), but also when they had them. 
Sidus' process of building flexibility is revealing as far as the intentionality of such a 
process is concerned. The firm showed low macroculture embeddedness early in the 1980s when 
it decided to follow a different strategic orientation, that is, investment in biotechnology. T'he 
company decision to withdraw from CILFA - the professional association of the industry - in 
1988 was an intentional action that confirmed Sidus' objective of differentiating itself from the 
rest of the firms of the industry: " We always try hard to be different from the rest of our 
competitors. That difference give us an advantage over the rest of the companies in the 
industry. A30 
Similarly it was a deliberate action on Sidus' part to become more decentralised and to 
enhance the scanning activities of the organisation. As early as 1989 Sidus recognised the 
430 Interview with Marcelo Argaelles-CEO Sidus 
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importance of splitting the Group into different companies thereby emphasising a 
decentralisation process to avoid bureaucracy in a company that was growing very fast. We also 
provided evidence of how Sidus, in a calculated move, enhanced its scanning behaviour by 
creating three areas which aimed to look at the context surrounding the company: regulation and 
legal analysis, sectoral analysis (both areas created in 1990), and macroeconomic analysis (set up 
in 1997). 
'Me heterogeneity of the dominant coalition at Sidus can be considered both an emergent 
and intentional process. When the company set up its biotechnological venture, it opened up the 
doors of the Group to new professionals with a different educational profile, experience and 
background. The cultural gap between Instituto Sidus and the new professionals was an 
unexpected result of the changes. However, after this first experience with a new profile of 
managers and employees, the company deliberately attempted to achieve high levels of 
professionalism in all its new ventures by hiring professionals with diverse backgrounds. This 
was also used as a way of putting pressure on the more resistant management of Instituto Sidus to 
make them change. 
Similarly, AGD reveals a trajectory of building organisational flexibility that underlines 
its intentionality. AGD's low macroculture embeddedness goes back to the 1980s when the 
company launched its first strategic initiative - branding. The intentionality of the process was 
asserted by some members of the Board when saying, "copying what others in the sector are 
doing is a loser's strategy. Ifyou want to be in theforefront, you have to leapforwards, outside 
sectoralboundariesý and this is what we did. You need to have your body in the sector but your 
head outside it. 431 Some investments that allowed AGD to become a strong, vertically 
integrated company, however, were the consequence of opportunities such as the grain export 
business that became an important business in its own right 
431 Interview with Roberto Urquia-Dircctor AGD 
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It was also a purposeful action on AGD's part to boost the levels of autonomy and 
scanning in the organisation. To avoid problems with the upsurge of formalisation needed after 
the opening up of the economy early in the 1990s, AGD favoured and reinforced operational 
autonomy through the creation of business units with more freedom to act. Regarding the 
scanning of the organisation, the Directors of the firm pointed out the fact that being open to 
what the context had to say was a constant fact in the Board's day-to-day work. AGD's scanning 
behaviour was intentionally boosted when the firm, in 1996, set up the economic studies unit 
with the main purpose of scanning the environment. 
Like Sidus, in AGD the heterogeneity of the dominant coalition can be considered both 
an emergent and intentional process. When AGD began its logistic investments in 1986 and its 
branding strategy in 1989, the company received a flow of new managers and professionals who 
ran the new businesses. However, as many in the company believe, AGD did not expect this 
process to be a challenge for the company. The company confronted some startling problems 
stemming from the wave of new professionals combined with the old generation of managers. 
The intentionality of the process can be seen when in 1996 the Board deliberately implemented a 
strategy of professionalising and diversifying its management team. 
Regarding the determinant related to the strong organisational identity in both AGD and 
Sidus, the analysis of the case studies indicated that the current generation of family members in 
both companies have intentionally forged their identity around the values of previous 
generations. We suggested in chapter 10 that Sidus and AGD deliberately wanted to preserve the 
values of previous generations as a way of giving the company an anchor to try new things and 
change yet, at the same time, avoid organisational chaos. 
The experiences of both Sidus and AGD demonstrate that intentionality in building 
organisational flexibility matters. As such, creating organisational flexibility is not a short term 
process but a long one in which firms build up the capabilities that will form the determinants of 
organisational flexibility. The trajectory process, however, may differ in each company. On the 
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one hand, Sidus built up its flexible capabilities between the early 1980s and early 1990s, while 
in AGD that process lasted longer. The main reason for this difference lies with the different 
sectoral realities in which the firms were embedded. Sidus, unlike AGD, was in an industry 
unaccustomed to competitive pressures of the deregulated market. Therefore, Sidus needed to 
build up its flexible capabilities more quickly than AGD. 
Contributions to adaptation and change theories 
Our research has also provided empirical evidence which can contribute to the long- 
standing debate within the organisational and management literature -that of continuous versus 
revolutionary transformation, and that of environmental determinism versus strategic choice. 
We have already shown in chapter 9 how the flexible firms undertook transformations 
that involved continuous change, while the less flexible firms displayed a more revolutionary 
attempt at transformation. The outcome of the transformation process in the flexible firms does 
not conform to the pattern portrayed in the literature on adaptation and change which explains 
transformations as processes that include long periods of stability or convergence and short 
periods of revolutionary change (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Tushman and Smith, 2001; 
Benner and Tushman, 2001). The most flexible firms have shown continuous change rather than 
stable equilibrium positions punctuated by sudden change. 
Our study also contributes empirical evidence to the debate between environmental 
determinism and strategic choice. We have seen how deterministic and voluntaristic approaches 
have influenced the field of organisational adaptation (chapter 2). However, we reject purely 
deterministic theories in which adaptation and thus flexibility are reactive capacities of the 
organisation (i. e., contingency theory), or even more radical approaches in which the power of 
the environment is such that organisational adaptation is impossible (i. e., population ecologists). 
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Additionally, we claim that voluntaristic approaches that rely entirely on the power of managerial 
enactment and choice are also false (i. e., strategic choice). 
Our findings suggest that these polar positions are empirically untenable. In line with the 
contcxtualist approach proposed by Pettigrew (1985) and Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) we view 
adaptation as a dynamic concept and the result of a fusion of managerial choice and the pressures 
imposed by the internal and external contexts in which firms operate. In this context, flexibility 
is a set of organisational capabilities (i. e., managerial and organisational) allowing the firms to 
adapt fast in conditions of environmental turmoil. 
Contribufions in the field of family businesses 
Our study has also contributed to the understanding of the transfonnation, adaptation and 
flexibility of family firms. Ward (1987) and Gersick et al (1997) have highlighted the lack of 
research into transformation and change in family firms. In the most important journal in the 
field of family firms (Family Business Review) less than 4% of the articles published between 
1988 and 1997 addressed the issue of change and development (Dyer and Sanchez, 1998). 
But most importantly, this thesis highlights the way the character of family firms has 
influenced and shaped the determinants of organisational flexibility. At the beginning of chapter 
10 we introduced three main issues affecting the organisational flexibility of family firms, 
namely: the life cycle of the family firms and the role of the founder; control systems and 
professionalisation of the management team; and, ownership issues. The first two issues have 
shaped different aspects of the determinants of organisational flexibility analysed in this thesis. 
Ile role of the founder had a great impact on the way the identity of the flexible firms 
developed. We pointed out that the flexible firms in this research, unlike the less flexible firms, 
had a strong identity based on a set of core values shared with previous generations. The strong 
identity found in the flexible firms is contrary to some organisational studies that assert that a 
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strong identity can hamper the ability to see important changes in the market (Ouchi, 1981). 
Burgelman (1983), for example, underlines the importance of a strong organisational identity in 
helping the organisation to preserve order. However, Burgelman also warns that a strong identity 
may impede organisational change. The flexible family firms analysed in this thesis, however, 
managed to maintain an identity containing values that facilitated and motivated change. 
The life cycle of the firm and the mechanisms of control applied in our family firms 
impacted on the determinant 'centralisation and formalisation of the decision-making process. ' 
The evidence provided by AGD and Sidus confirms the conclusions of the literature on family 
firms: both firms became more autonomous in their operation and also more formalised in later 
stages of life (see evidence in chapter 10, and also Moores and Mula, 2000). The decisions of the 
companies to give more autonomy to the managers meant that more formalisation and control 
was necessary to keep the family abreast of operations. The less flexible firms followed a 
different pattern: both Vicentin and Andromaco had increased formalisation and centralisation of 
decision making over time, therefore taking a more hands-on approach towards the running of 
the company. The evidence by flexible and less flexible firms revealed a pattern different from 
that found in studies of non-family firms that have widely accepted that low levels of 
centralisation and formalisation foster innovativeness and flexibility in organisations (Volberda, 
1996,1999; Bahraini, 1992; Damanpour, 1991,1992). The evidence provided by our case 
studies indicates a different process inside family firms. 
Finally, the degree of professionalisation of the top team in the family firms had an 
important influence on the demographic characteristics of the firms analysed. The literature on 
family firms has suggested that professionalisation of the management team is a critical issue in 
the middle or late stages of their organisational development. Failure to professionalise might 
have devastating consequences for the survival and success of the firms (Ward, 1987). The 
earlier professionalisation of Sidus and AGD helped them to build a more heterogeneous top 
team. By contrast, the lack of incorporation of a professional management with different 
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background experience, and the fact that the less flexible firms relied upon family members to fill 
top jobs shaped the existent homogeneity found in Andr6maco and Vicentin. The long-term 
consequences were evident in the firms: the heterogeneous firms had more cognitive diversity 
that helped them to take risks and boosted their capacity to act. Meanwhile, the homogeneous 
firms revealed some of the cognitive limitations that restricted the top team capacity for action. 
The influence of the National Business Environment (NBE) as a shaper of organisational action 
in the firms 
This thesis also contributes to our understanding of the different ways the NBE impinges 
on a firm's ability to adapt and change. While there have been some attempts to address this 
issue (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Hoskisson et al, 2000; Lewin et al, 2002) there is still a large 
gap in our understanding of how institutional factors affect management practices, innovation 
processes, creativity and flexibility in organisations. 
In presenting a combined approach to which institutional and cultural elements were 
gathered together, we were able to examine the context in which the firms have to operate from a 
multidimensional viewpoint. Such an analysis makes it possible to begin answer the following 
questions: what are the institutions that can help us to understand the evolution of indigenous 
firms? How have these institutions shaped the development of the national enterprise? And 
finally, what elements of the national culture influence the managerial behaviour of the firms and 
their ability to change and adapt? 
The two institutions analysed - the role of the state and the role of financial institutions - 
clarifies the institutional influence of the emergence, development and demise of indigenous 
businesses. The role of the state in the economy was significant in shaping the levels of 
centralisation and formalisation of decision making found in the firms. With the sudden opening 
up of the economy early in the 1990s flexible firms became more formalised and less centralised 
as far as the operations were concerned to confront the efficiency required in a market that 
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stabilised (in terms of macroeconomic indicators) and became more competitive (after the 
opening up of the economy to international competition). This implied an approach that differed 
ftorn that used in the 1980s in which flexible firms were less formalised and more centralised to 
be able to confront a closed but highly unstable market. 
The scanning behaviour of the firms was also influenced by the changes in the economy. 
After the opening up of the economy, flexible firms, and to a lesser extent the less flexible firms, 
started to scan more the environment to understand competitors" moves and customers' needs. 
The sudden opening up of the economy fostered by the Argentinian state also impacted 
on the strategies of the flexible firms. To be able to compete in an open economy, the flexible 
firms needed to integrate their businesses because of the lack of reliable suppliers. New business 
strategies and long-term planning were necessary to confront the new competitive landscape. 
Elements of the national culture also shed light on the implications for organisational 
action. Linking the results of our analytical chapter (chapter 10), and the cultural elements 
analysed in chapter 4, produces some revealing results regarding the way flexible and less 
flexible finns behave. 
In chapter 4 we described how four elements of national culture as stated by Hofstede 
(1980,1991) may have impacted on the way firms organised themselves and changed. Hofstede 
stated that Argentina would be a country with high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, 
collectivism and masculinity. The less flexible firms confirmed the patterns we found when 
trying to link the four elements of analysis of the national culture as suggested by Hofstede and 
the ways firms organised themselves in the Argentinian case (i. e., high levels of centralisation 
and formalisation, resistance to change among others. See table 4.4 in chapter 4). 
Most interesting is the case of the flexible firms that did not comply with some of the 
factors of our analysis of national culture. Sidus and AGD behaved counter culturally vis-a-vis 
the predictions of national culture. It seems that in these companies a local organisational effect 
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overrode the effects of the national culture. This was demonstrated by the fact that the flexible 
firms decentralised decision making, took risks and undertook organisational change. 
There is still a question to tackle, that is, whether organisational action in flexible firms is 
shaped only by elements of the national culture or, as Whittington and Mayer (2000) argued, by 
convergence based on efficiency. The results of our research make it difficult to answer such a 
question. More research comparing flexible firms in different countries will facilitate the 
understanding of whether flexible firms converge towards adapting structural and process 
routines associated with greater flexibility, or whether prevalent management practices reflect 
specific national state configurations as determined by cultural factors. 
11.4 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
In chapter 3 we indicated some of the main limitations of this thesis. These limitations, 
however, open up challenges for further research. Our findings are based on a comparative case 
study of polar types: two flexible and two less flexible firms in two industries - pharmaceuticals 
and edible oils. Consequently there must be questions as to the extent to which these findings are 
applicable to other contexts. Because the extent to which our findings are supported by elements 
of the literature on organisational flexibility, organisational innovativeness and institutional 
embeddedness, some level of generalisability can be claimed. However, the originality of this 
work within the adaptation literature cannot be claimed until further research into other industrie's 
is carried out. This is a critical issue which 'needs to be resolved before we can claim 
generalisability of the findings. 
The use of a particular set of indicators to select flexible firms and the selection of the 
determinants of organisational flexibility as categories of analysis may also have limited the 
findings of this research. Further research needs to show whether a selection of other indicators 
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would produce similar results and also whether other determinants can shed light on the way 
firms can achieve flexibility. 
As said before, the selection of the determinants of organisational flexibility as categories 
of analysis may also have limited the findings of this research. In our research, we have not 
analysed three important issues that may have had an influence on the organisational flexibility 
of the firms researched: leadership, technology and the role of HRM. 
Although we have addressed the issue of leadership while analysing the strong 
organisational identity determinant, we have not tackled such an important topic directly. 
Leadership style can clarify issues such as the potential for a participative or delegative culture, 
the planning approach of the organisation and the management attitude (Volberda, 1999). 
However, our analysis of the dominant coalition, organisational identity and transformation of 
the firms is a proxi analysis of leadership effects. Instead of isolatig it out, we picked up its 
effects in different ways. 
Another possible determinant of organisational flexibility that was not considered in our 
analysis is the flexibility potential of technology (i. e., mode of production, physical layout and 
means of transformation). Volberda (1999) has included technology as an indicator to explain 
organisational flexibility. However, we believe that technology was not an issue related to 
organisational flexibility but with manufacturing flexibility (Adler, 1988). The findings of this 
thesis confirmed our choice of leaving behind technology as a determinant of organisational 
flexibility. Although flexible and less flexible firms had similar levels of technological 
innovation, this did not imply any change in the organisational flexibility of the firms. However, 
fiirther research is needed to explore whether technology can be a factor in achieving 
organisational flexibility (i. e., through exploring how technological change can influence 
changes in organisational processes). 
HRM was also not considered in this analysis as a determinant of organisational 
flexibility. While some writers have considered HRM as a factor in understanding adaptation 
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and change (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991), in this study, HRM has not been considered as a 
determinant of organisational flexibility but seen important in supporting the knowledge, skills 
an attitudes that firms need to compete. The main limitation for us to leave this determinant 
behind was the fact that the firms analysed in this thesis lacked in HR area (i. e., the case of 
Vicentin or the case of the rest of the firms until late 1990s). However, further studies may 
consider the feasibility of HRM as a factor in understanding the differential ability of the firms 
and how this impacts firm's flexibility. 
One clear limitation of our analysis of the determinants of organisational flexibility was 
the approach chosen to analyse the determinant 'organisational identity. ' As we stated before, 
organisational identity as a category of analysis is sensible in terms of the literature. This 
determinant has the potential to help us understand how the organisational values of an 
organisation can foster or harm organisational adaptation, change and flexibility. The limitations 
of our analysis, nevertheless, stem from the lack of data points. Not only was the quantity of the 
data insufficient, but the quality was also inadequate. 
Therefore, in addressing the issue of identity as a determinant of organisational 
flexibility future research should consider how to improve the methodology of analysis so as to 
study organisational identity in the firms comprehensively and systematically. Improving the 
quality of analysis means that the researcher needs to connect texts with their historical and 
social contexts and to be able to refer to particular actors, relationships, and practices that 
characterise the situation under study (Phillips and Hardy, forthcoming 2002). In our analysis of 
organisational identity we made some attempts to do this. However, the lack of data made our 
analysis incomplete and the statements presented in this thesis should be considered only as 
indicative of the identity of the firms. 
In this thesis two issues emerged as central to our understanding of governance and 
leadership in family firms and their influence on organisational flexibility. These aspects, 
however, were not tackled directly. The first aspect is related to the corporate governance of 
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family firms. The second issue relates to the internal dynamics of the Board of flexible and less 
flexible firms. 
The family is the most important component of the governance structure in most family 
firms. Hence, power is normally concentrated at Board level. None of the companies 
investigated have intermediary structures such as an executive committee. But how can a 
different corporate structure enhance organisational flexibility? Can, for example, executive 
committees help to boost the flexibility of a firm? Neubauer and Lank (1998) emphasise that less 
concentration of power in the Board and the presence of intermediary structures in family firms 
might facilitate the participation of managers and younger family members in strategic decisions. 
On the other hand a corporate structure that incorporates intermediary structures may offer the 
Board alternative views and therefore enhance its capacity to act. Consequently, a less 
centralised corporate structure may offer some insight into other ways flexibility can be achieved 
at the top level of the firm. 
FIGURE 11.1: POWER CONCENTRATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE IN TI IE FIRMS ANALYSED 
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The four companies analysed in this thesis do not offer insight into the benefits of 
intermediary arrangements in corporate structure. As figure 11.1 shows, the concentration of 
power at the Board level in the firms analysed meant a lack of intermediary structures between 
the Board and managers. Moreover, the Boards in the four firms are exclusively made up of 
family members. In the Boards there were no part-time members, non-executive members or 
outside Directors. This is another element of the Board composition that Neubauer and Lank 
(1998) consider a key issues in family firms. They suggest that in family firms part-time or 
executive directors can act as knowledgeable outsiders that can potentially offset the 
management's shortcomings and can also give and test new ideas. Outsiders offering alternative 
views to the Board, then, may influence family firms' flexibility. More research analysing 
flexible firms with different corporate structures may shed light on the way the firms' capacity 
for action may be boosted and organisational flexibility enhanced. 
The second factor we mention as potentially important to our understanding of 
organisational flexibility is the internal dynamic of the Board itself. Throughout the analysis of 
the case studies we perceived the importance of complementarities between members of the 
Board in the flexible firms. However, we did not explore this topic further. 
Both AGD and Sidus had three directors. These triads, using Simmel's (1950) words, 
shaped the dynamic work between directors. At AGD, Adrian and Roberto Urquia were the 
strategists of the company while Adriana was the mastermind behind the organisational change 
the firm went through. At Sidus, the CEO was responsible for all the strategic initiatives while 
the other two directors dealt with the administrative adjustments needed after each new venture 
was incorporated. Communication between directors as well as daily interaction was dynamic in 
the flexible firms unlike in the less flexible firms. Further research needs to address the 
complementarities of the Board's members and interpret them vis-6-vis the organisational 
flexibility of the firms. Different questions will probe the way a Board's complementarity might 
enhance a firm's flexibility: what is the Board's composition and hierarchy in a flexible firm? 
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What personal traits are necessary or sufficient in a flexible firm? What kind of interaction 
between Board members is required? And what is the knowledge base that would enhance a 
firm's flexibility? 
In family firms where the family controls and decides the fate of the business, it is 
important to grasp the way corporate governance develops as well as understand the internal 
dynamic of the Board. In this way, we may be able to appreciate the genesis of the process of 
becoming flexible, the context from which flexible capabilities can be generated and the 
constraints on developing flexible capabilities. 
We introduced chapter I with a quote by D'Aveni (1994) in which he warned researchers 
and practitioners about the complexity of the business world. In the same essay D'Aveni predicts 
that hypercompetitive environments will favour organisations that are able to be flexible and to 
adapt quickly to change. Throughout this thesis we have developed theoretically and empirically 
what determines whether an organisation is flexible. However, our study is still a limited 
contribution to the understanding of organisational flexibility. More research needs to be done in 
a field the importance of which has been recognised for the survival and future success of 
organisations, but which, to date, has been characterised by scarce research. 
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ANNEXES 
ANNEX 1: Letter sent to Sidus' Board of Directors 
ANNEX 2: Interview Pro-Forma 
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4th July 2000 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Sr. Santiago Garcia Belmonte 
Suped 2514 1 er Piso 
(C1430) Capital Federal 
Buenos Aires 
Argentina 
Dear Mr Garda Belmonte, 
RE: Research project on transformation and change In Argentinian Companies 
Further to our telephone conversation concerning my doctoral research project, I would like to 
clarify the main aims of my research and the data I would like to collect from your company. 
The main aim of my research is to understand the transformation of family-owned firms in 
Argentina over the period 1989-1999. The fact that family firms went through dramatic 
processes of transformation after the opening up of the economy in the early 1990s highlights the 
importance of understanding those processes that enabled firms such as Sidus to transform and 
adapt to envirommental changes. 
Moreover, the pharmaceutical industry benefited from substantial amounts of foreign direct 
investment during this period, and accordingly, competition within the industry rose 
considerably. The main questions my project seeks to answer are therefore as follows: How did 
432 This is an English translation of the original letter in Spanish sent to the company 
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Sidus cope with the changes in the Argentinian economy? How did your firm deal with the 
intense competition in the industry? What processes have changed over time to allow the 
company to adapt to sudden environmental changes? 
To be able to answer these questions, I would ideally need to interview both managers and 
employees, and both family and non-family members of the firm. I am happy to discuss with 
you which employees might be the most suitable candidates for the interviews. In my research, 
interviews will be one of the main sources of information. All information obtained during the 
interviews will be treated as strictly confidential and will be used exclusively for academic 
purposes. 
In addition to interviews, it would be very helpful if I could gain access to any of the company's 
documents that may reflect changes in its strategic focus over time and any archive material that 
might otherwise contribute to the accuracy of my research. I understand that this will depend on 
the availability of such a material in the company and the extent to which it is possible to disclose 
the information it contains. 
On completion of my project, I am sure you would like to share the results of my study. One 
way in which I might present my research might be in a workshop made up of those members of 
staff you consider appropriate. I should also like to take this opportunity to thank you for your 
time and effort. I am very much indebted to you and your company. 
Yours sincerely, 
Andr6s Hatum 
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